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Abstract 
This thesis explores the ethics of conditional and directed deceased organ donation. It 
uses an empirical bioethics approach that uses empirical data to inform and enhance 
philosophical analysis. 
An initial philosophical analysis of the key ethical considerations was undertaken, and it 
is argued that the policy prohibiting most conditional and directed donations is wrong. 
The concept of altruism, in particular, is poorly conceived and applied in transplantation 
policy.  
Qualitative data obtained by interviewing relevant stakeholders are presented. The data 
suggest that although there are concerns about the consequences of accepting 
conditional and directed donations, many participants thought these donations should 
be accepted in some circumstances. The data also provide lines of argument against 
conditional and directed donations, and these are considered. 
Using this data, and making some reasonable assumptions, it is argued that it is better 
to accept conditional and directed donations than it is to reject them.  
The thesis culminates with 8 recommendations for policy regarding conditional and 
directed donations, and argues that a trial period of accepting these donations should 
be implemented so that the effects can be accurately observed. 
  
 
 
 
Dedication: 
 
 
To my parents, Madge and Brian.   
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Completing this thesis would not have been possible without the support and assistance 
of many people. I will inevitably fail to mention everybody by name, so I apologise to 
anyone who feels forgotten. 
First, I must acknowledge the endless support of my supervisors, Heather Draper, 
Jonathan Ives and Simon Bramhall. Their scant regard for working hours legislation has 
meant that feedback on drafts has always been prompt, detailed, and above all else, 
useful. They have ensured that the project has always had direction, and each of them 
has always been willing to do anything to help me, with only minimal complaining. They 
have each had their own approach to supervision, but as a ‗PhD family‘ I could not have 
wished for a better combination. I must also acknowledge the support of my funders, 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council and Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham 
Charities. This Collaborative Doctoral Award has provided me with insight and 
experiences that purely theoretical work never would have, and I think the project has 
been better for that.   
I should also acknowledge the support of my family. Their support has never waned, 
despite me not always taking the most sensible path in life. They have always 
encouraged me to pursue education, and the dream of achieving better qualifications 
than my sister has been a constant motivator.  
Sarah Coleman has been an amazing source of encouragement, support and cups of 
coffee during difficult periods. She has tolerated me being stressed, poor and self-
absorbed, but has always remained positive about what I have been doing.  My 
gratitude extends to the entire Coleman family, who have consistently shown interest in 
my work, and provided me with many welcome breaks to Centre Parcs. 
I should acknowledge Eric Robinson who has provided satisfactorily entertaining 
conversations over lunch. I will never forget the countless times I beat him at Scrabble, 
Cluedo and Guess Who.   
Simon Jenkins has been maximally effective as a ‗PhD little brother‘, insofar as his 
tendency towards wrongness has frequently elucidated the path of righteousness. I 
value his continued existence at approximately 14 utils. 
Thank you to each and every participant who took part in my study. Without them the 
project would have been very different. Thanks are also due to everybody who helped 
with recruitment: this includes the Host Nurses, the GP practices who agreed to help, 
all of the staff at the transplant centre, and the people who helped to ‗snowball‘ 
invitations. 
Also needing acknowledgement are the following: Brad Hooker, Jon Heyes, Rhiannon 
Mee, the entire Primary Care bunch, Vicky McTear, Emma Collins, Nick Harrison, and 
my Med School PhD buddies.  
  
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Complex nature of the problem ..................................................................... 1 
1.2 The empirical turn ....................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Choosing a method for this project ................................................................ 7 
1.3.1 The limits of empirical data – A consistent philosophical approach ............... 8 
1.3.2 The starting point ................................................................................ 10 
1.3.3 Intuitions and ‗Encounters with Experience‘ ............................................ 11 
1.3.4 Consequences and making acceptable recommendations ......................... 13 
1.4 Thesis Structure ....................................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2 - Background .................................................................................. 17 
2.1 How organ donation in the UK works ........................................................... 17 
2.1.1 Transplant authorities and organisations in the United Kingdom ................ 17 
2.1.2 Parallel donation systems ..................................................................... 18 
2.1.3 Deceased donation .............................................................................. 18 
2.1.4 Conditional and Directed Deceased Donation .......................................... 20 
2.1.5 Living Donation – normally directed ....................................................... 21 
2.1.6 Altruistic living donation ....................................................................... 22 
2.2 Law, policy and guidance – history and development ..................................... 22 
2.2.1 1998 – racist conditions ....................................................................... 22 
2.2.2 Backlash, DH report and outcomes ........................................................ 23 
2.2.3 Legal aspects of the report ................................................................... 25 
2.2.4 Challenges to the Report – Specific Cases .............................................. 26 
2.2.5 March 2010 – policy revisions ............................................................... 29 
2.2.6 Inconsistencies ................................................................................... 31 
2.2.7 Shortage and need .............................................................................. 32 
2.2.8 Organ Donation and South Asians in the UK ........................................... 33 
2.3 What the literature says ............................................................................. 35 
2.3.1 Consequentialism ................................................................................ 35 
2.3.2 Special obligations and partiality ........................................................... 38 
2.3.3 Justice/fairness/equality vs autonomy.................................................... 44 
2.3.4 Gifting/altruism ................................................................................... 48 
2.3.5 Why is this important? ......................................................................... 52 
Chapter 3 - Philosophical Introduction and Groundwork ................................ 57 
 
 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 58 
3.2 The nature of organ transplantation ............................................................ 58 
3.3 Who is the donor? ..................................................................................... 60 
Chapter 4 - Altruism and regarding others ..................................................... 63 
4.1 Altruism in the philosophical literature ......................................................... 63 
4.2 Nagel‘s pure altruism ................................................................................. 64 
4.4 Altruism, partiality and self-interest ............................................................ 69 
4.4.1 Applying Nagel .................................................................................... 69 
4.4.2 Applying Blum .................................................................................... 73 
4.5 Cottingham‘s defence of partiality ............................................................... 78 
4.5.1 Agent related partiality ........................................................................ 82 
4.5.2 Philophilic partiality ............................................................................. 82 
4.6 Other accounts of altruism/beneficent behaviour ........................................... 85 
4.7 Sliding scale of altruism ............................................................................. 87 
4.8 Altruism tracking morality .......................................................................... 89 
4.9 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 89 
Chapter 5 - The DH’s Position on Conditional and Directed Donations ............ 91 
5.1 Why the DH does not permit conditional donations ........................................ 91 
5.2 Organs should be donated unconditionally.................................................... 92 
5.3 Organs should be donated altruistically ........................................................ 93 
5.3.1 2000 report points towards Nagel .......................................................... 93 
5.3.2 The DH cannot consistently require pure altruism .................................... 94 
5.3.3 March 2010 recommendation points towards Blum .................................. 97 
5.3.4 Pick and mix altruism and its implications .............................................. 98 
5.4 Organs should go to patients in the greatest need/according to agreed criteria 100 
5.4.1 The impact of conditions and directions ................................................ 102 
5.4.2 Need and other principles ................................................................... 103 
5.4.3 The shift to ‗agreed criteria‘ ................................................................ 104 
5.4.4 Why should donors care? ................................................................... 104 
5.5 Equitable treatment ................................................................................ 105 
5.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................ 107 
Chapter 6 - Recipient Obligations and Waiting One’s Turn ............................ 109 
6.1 What recipients owe to one another .......................................................... 109 
6.2 Scarcity ................................................................................................. 111 
 
 
6.3 Queuing ................................................................................................. 112 
6.4 Waiting one‘s turn ................................................................................... 115 
6.5 Avoiding negative loss ............................................................................. 117 
6.6 Getting off the list and staying off the list ................................................... 119 
6.7 Information for recipients – do they need to know about conditions? ............. 120 
6.8 Conclusions ............................................................................................ 121 
Chapter 7 - The NHS, its options and furthering wrongful ends .................... 123 
7.1 A preliminary note on efficiency ................................................................ 123 
7.2 A defence of unconditional donation .......................................................... 124 
7.3 Conditional donation and the supply of organs ............................................ 125 
7.4 The NHS‘s role ........................................................................................ 126 
7.5 The NHS‘s options ................................................................................... 127 
7.5.1 Lie to the next-of-kin and ignore the conditions completely .................... 128 
7.5.2 Turn the organs away and provide no benefit to transplant recipients ...... 129 
7.5.3 Accept the conditions and allocate accordingly ...................................... 132 
7.6 Accepting the unobjectionable .................................................................. 133 
7.7 Accepting the objectionable ...................................................................... 134 
7.8 Involvement in the wrong ........................................................................ 135 
7.9 Negotiating with terrorists ........................................................................ 137 
7.10 Minimising harm and possibilities for offsetting ......................................... 137 
Chapter 8 - The Embedded Study .................................................................. 142 
8.1 Study Aims ............................................................................................ 142 
8.2 Setting .................................................................................................. 144 
8.3 Sampling, participants and recruitment ...................................................... 145 
8.4 Participants ............................................................................................ 148 
8.4.1 Transplant staff ................................................................................. 148 
8.4.2 Potential donors ................................................................................ 148 
8.4.3 Potential Recipients ........................................................................... 151 
8.5 Interviews .............................................................................................. 153 
8.6 Topic guide and scenarios - development ................................................... 156 
8.7 Recruitment ........................................................................................... 158 
8.7.1 Staff ................................................................................................ 158 
8.7.2 Potential donors ................................................................................ 158 
8.7.3 Recipients ........................................................................................ 161 
8.8 Location of interviews .............................................................................. 162 
 
 
8.9 Recording .............................................................................................. 162 
8.10 Consent ............................................................................................... 162 
8.11 Method of analysis ................................................................................ 163 
8.12 Ethical approval and NHS permissions ..................................................... 164 
Chapter 9 - Results ....................................................................................... 169 
9.1 Participants ............................................................................................ 169 
9.2 Overview ............................................................................................... 170 
9.3 Medical decisions and allocation – keeping the medical ‗medical‘ ................... 173 
9.3.1 What are ‗Medical Criteria‘? ................................................................ 177 
9.3.1.1 Transplant Outcomes ................................................................... 177 
9.3.1.2 Greatest Need ............................................................................. 178 
9.3.2 Fairness ........................................................................................... 180 
9.3.3 Who am I to judge? ........................................................................... 181 
9.3.4 Such serious decisions should not be left to individuals .......................... 182 
9.4 Factors beyond the medical ...................................................................... 183 
9.4.1 Family partiality is acceptable ............................................................. 183 
9.4.2 Responsibility for condition ................................................................. 184 
9.4.3 Priority for Children ........................................................................... 185 
9.4.4 Future Behaviour/Willingness to Change .............................................. 187 
9.5 Inaccurate Conditions .............................................................................. 188 
9.6 Life-Saving and Waste ............................................................................. 189 
9.6.1 Life-Saving is paramount ................................................................... 189 
9.6.2 Wastage .......................................................................................... 191 
9.6.3 Donor Wishes and Flexibility ............................................................... 192 
9.7 Other Considerations ............................................................................... 196 
9.7.1 Reasons behind donation ................................................................... 196 
9.7.2 More Information .............................................................................. 197 
9.7.3 The Slippery Slope/Setting a Precedent ................................................ 198 
9.7.4 Reduced access to organs .................................................................. 200 
9.7.5 Recipients‘ views on receiving conditional donations .............................. 200 
9.7.6 Role-based differences ....................................................................... 202 
9.7.7 Professional obligations ...................................................................... 203 
9.8 Conclusions ............................................................................................ 204 
Chapter 10 - Discussion ................................................................................ 205 
10.1 Ideas Arising from the Data .................................................................... 206 
 
 
10.1.1Priority for Children .......................................................................... 207 
10.1.1.1 Fair Innings .............................................................................. 208 
10.1.1.2 Vulnerability and Sympathy ........................................................ 211 
10.1.1.3 Helping bereaved families ........................................................... 213 
10.1.2 Responsibility for condition ............................................................... 213 
10.1.3 Family Partiality .............................................................................. 223 
10.1.3.1 Blood is thicker than water ......................................................... 224 
10.1.3.2 Looking after your own first ........................................................ 224 
10.1.3.3 Doing for family what one would not do for others ......................... 226 
10.1.4 Section conclusions .......................................................................... 227 
10.2 Life-Saving and Avoiding Waste .............................................................. 229 
10.2.1 Avoiding Waste ............................................................................... 229 
10.2.2 Turning away organs is a form of absolute waste ................................ 231 
10.2.3 Flexibility avoids absolute waste ........................................................ 232 
10.2.4 Accept any donation – regardless of condition ..................................... 233 
10.2.5 Avoiding waste may cause waste ....................................................... 234 
10.2.6 Section Conclusions ......................................................................... 234 
10.3 Concerns and Barriers ............................................................................ 236 
10.3.1 Recipient views: avoiding negative loss and queue jumping .................. 236 
10.3.2 Slippery Slope ................................................................................. 237 
10.3.3 Conditions arise from lack of understanding ........................................ 240 
10.3.4 Furthering Wrongful Ends ................................................................. 242 
10.3.5 Staff views on waste ........................................................................ 244 
10.3.6 Transparency and perceived fairness ................................................. 245 
10.3.7 Introducing non-medical factors ........................................................ 248 
10.3.8 No room for emotion ........................................................................ 250 
10.3.9 Who am I to Judge? ......................................................................... 251 
10.3.10 Impartiality ................................................................................... 255 
10.3.11 Fairness and Justice ....................................................................... 257 
10.3.12 Urgency and loss of life .................................................................. 260 
10.3.13 Donor Motivation -  Altruism ........................................................... 262 
10.3.14 Preferences ................................................................................... 264 
10.3.15 A note about South Asian potential donors ........................................ 266 
10.3.16 Section Conclusions ....................................................................... 266 
Chapter 11 - Limitations, transferability and positives ................................. 268 
 
 
11.1 Limitations ........................................................................................... 268 
11.1.1 South Asian Potential Donors ............................................................ 268 
11.1.2 Potential Recipients ......................................................................... 270 
11.1.3 General .......................................................................................... 272 
11.2 Transferability of conclusions .................................................................. 273 
11.3 Positives .............................................................................................. 274 
Chapter 12 - Framework and Conclusions .................................................... 276 
Recommendation 1 ....................................................................................... 276 
Recommendation 2 ....................................................................................... 277 
Recommendation 3 ....................................................................................... 279 
Recommendation 4 ....................................................................................... 281 
Recommendation 5 ....................................................................................... 282 
Recommendation 6 ....................................................................................... 283 
Recommendation 7 ....................................................................................... 284 
Recommendation 8 ....................................................................................... 285 
12.1 Thesis Conclusions ................................................................................ 290 
12.2 Reflexivity ............................................................................................ 292 
Appendix 1 – NRES, R&D, and University of Birmingham approval notices ... 295 
Appendix 2 – Letter from NHSBT re: removal from ODR ............................... 309 
Appendix 3 – Interview Topic Guide ............................................................. 310 
Appendix 4 – Consent Form .......................................................................... 313 
Appendix 5 – Participant Information Sheet – Potential Donor .................... 315 
Appendix 6 – Participant Information Sheet – Potential Recipient ............... 319 
Appendix 7 – Participant Information Sheet – Transplant Staff .................... 323 
Appendix 8 – Sample of coded transcript ..................................................... 326 
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 327 
  
 
 
Table 1- Policy and accounts of altruism ............................................................... 98 
Table 2 - Interview scenarios ............................................................................ 166 
Table 3 - Unwillingness for non-medical criteria to feature in allocation decision ...... 173 
Table 4 - Faith in medical staff .......................................................................... 174 
Table 5 - Staff's faith in medical criteria ............................................................. 174 
Table 6 - Emotional factors ............................................................................... 175 
Table 7 - No emotion in allocation decisions ........................................................ 176 
Table 8 - Ignore irrelevant factors ..................................................................... 176 
Table 9 - Support for transplant outcomes .......................................................... 178 
Table 10 - Greatest need as urgency .................................................................. 178 
Table 11 – Donors are not in a position to judge .................................................. 181 
Table 12 - Donors should not choose who lives or dies ......................................... 182 
Table 13 - Support for family partiality ............................................................... 183 
Table 14 - Support for lower priority for those responsible for illness...................... 185 
Table 15 - Support for priority for children .......................................................... 185 
Table 16 - Support for future behaviour being important consideration ................... 187 
Table 17 - Concerns about factual accuracy of conditions...................................... 188 
Table 18 - Support for life-saving being important ............................................... 189 
Table 19 - Support for accepting conditional donations as a last resort ................... 190 
Table 20 - Views on waste ................................................................................ 191 
Table 21- Waste and future behaviour ................................................................ 192 
Table 22 - Respecting donor wishes ................................................................... 193 
Table 23 - Support for considering the implications of specific donations ................ 193 
Table 24 - Conditional donations more acceptable if they increase donation rates .... 194 
Table 25 - Accept conditional donations if the alternative is turning donations away . 195 
Table 26 - Staff views on altruism ..................................................................... 196 
Table 27 - Views on 1998 case .......................................................................... 197 
Table 28 - More information might prevent conditions .......................................... 198 
Table 29 - Concerns about slippery slopes .......................................................... 199 
Table 30 - Concerns about access to organs ........................................................ 200 
Table 31 - Staff's professional obligations ........................................................... 204 
Table 32 - Summary Recommendations ............................................................. 289 
 
Figure 1 - Mind Map ......................................................................................... 172 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to produce an empirically informed ethical analysis of 
conditional and directed deceased donation. A request for conditional donation occurs 
when a donor, or donor family, is willing to donate only if the organs are not given to a 
certain type of person. A directed donation occurs when a donor, or donor family, 
requests that organs are only given to a certain person or certain type of person. 
Current policy banning conditional deceased donation has been criticised in the 
academic literature and faced challenges from situations that have occurred in recent 
years. The empirically informed ethical analysis was therefore intended to assess 
existing policy and make recommendations for future policy where appropriate.  
The empirical bioethics approach combines a philosophical analysis with data 
gathered from a qualitative study looking at the views of key transplantation 
stakeholders. Although in theoretical terms these aspects of the thesis could be 
considered separately, in reality the boundaries between the two are blurred; initial 
philosophical reflections informed the design of the empirical study, and aspects of the 
empirical project undoubtedly informed the on-going philosophical analysis. This thesis 
starts with an explanation and justification of the overarching empirical bioethics 
approach used, from which the overall structure of the thesis is then outlined and 
explained.  
1.1 Complex nature of the problem 
Conditional organ donation is a complex ethical issue which has been discussed in some 
detail in the philosophical literature. Some people have argued in favour of conditional 
donations1,2, whereas others have argued against3,4. The fact that there is 
                                                          
1 Wilkinson TM, 'Ethics and the Acquisition of Organs', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)  
2 Radcliffe-Richards J, 'The Ethics of Transplants: Why Careless Thought Costs Lives', (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012)  
3 Pennings G, 'Directed Organ Donation: Discrimination or Autonomy?', Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 
(2007) pp41-49 
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disagreement is not surprising – these sorts of disagreements are common in 
philosophy – but one reason for this sort of disagreement is that different people 
consider different things to be important and worthy of extra consideration in moral 
arguments. Wilkinson, for instance, takes a broadly consequentialist approach and uses 
this to justify accepting conditional donations in some situations. Pennings, in contrast, 
takes equality and justice to be of more importance than maximising the number of 
donated organs and promoting positive consequences. In terms of guiding policy, the 
purely philosophical arguments appear to have reached an impasse.  It is not clear that 
one approach is better than another, although there could undoubtedly be more 
philosophical debate about this (which would probably again end in a deadlock, albeit at 
a more fundamental level of moral theory).  
In order to get beyond this stalemate, one might want to look beyond 
theoretical philosophy and consider the views of those likely to be affected by the 
issues. A policy based upon purely consequentialist reasoning is unlikely to receive 
much support if everybody affected by it considers other things to be more important 
and therefore disagreed with the policy. In the words of Ives and Draper ―an effective 
policy … cannot afford to disregard or alienate a significant proportion of the community 
at which it is aimed‖5. Producing recommendations so unpopular they are rendered 
ineffective does not seem worthwhile. Similarly, a recommendation is unlikely to be 
taken seriously if it is based upon intuitions that are not shared by others, or incorrect 
assumptions about particular important things. 
There are facts about the nature of organ donation and allocation systems in the 
UK that distinguish them from systems in, for example, the USA. These facts may, in 
some cases, reveal morally relevant differences. Some of these differences are defined 
in policy (The United States has different policies from the United Kingdom, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4 Veatch RM, 'Transplantation Ethics', (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000)  
5 Ives J and Draper H, 'Appropriate Methodologies for Empirical Bioethics: It's All Relative', Bioethics 23 
(2009) p251 
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instance6), whereas others can only be discovered by speaking to people who have 
experience of the intricacies of the transplantation system. A full understanding of how 
transplantation works in practice could be quite different from a full understanding of 
how transplantation works according to policy, and this practical account is more useful 
to philosophy that intends to guide future policy and practice. 
As well as potentially ignoring context, abstract theoretical philosophy may also 
lack an awareness of differing perspectives. This may be problematic for something like 
conditional donation, the perceived acceptability of which may vary according to the 
perspective from which it is viewed. A potential recipient who urgently needs a 
transplant in order to live may consider a conditional donation more acceptable than 
someone who does not need a transplant so urgently. Difference in perspective may 
mean that different moral considerations need to be taken into account, and a ‗one-
size-fits-all‘ take on the ethical issues may ignore these considerations. A philosopher 
may try to imagine what is important to people from each perspective, but actually 
having ―encounters with experience‖7 is likely to provide more credible representations 
of different perspectives. Empirical data can highlight the considerations taken to be 
important from various perspectives, and put these forward for philosophical scrutiny. 
Although in the past there may have been a tendency to undertake philosophy from a 
detached, impartial, and supposedly objective perspective, there is now recognition 
that other perspectives have to be taken seriously in order for an ethical problem to be 
understood. For Leget et al, one of the requirements for a good description of an ethical 
problem is to know how ―relevant actors experience a practice‖8. It may be tempting to 
give these different perspectives some epistemic authority, but there ultimately needs 
to be a final arbiter to determine which considerations are valid and need to be taken 
                                                          
6 For instance in the USA it is relatively commonplace for recipients to advertise for living donors through 
websites such as MatchingDonors.com. Traditionally UK living donation has either been living-related or 
altruistic non-directed. 
7 Ives J, ''Encounters with Experience': Empirical Bioethics and the Future', Health Care Analysis 16 (2008) p2 
8 Leget C, Borry P, and De Vries R, ''Nobody Tosses a Dwarf!' The Relation between the Empirical and the 
Normative Reexamined', Bioethics 23 (2009) p232 
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most seriously. For instance, different perspectives may consider directly conflicting 
things to be important, or a certain perspective many consider something to be 
important that is actually completely unjustifiable. Taking these perspectives at face 
value could result in defending the indefensible, or cause difficulties in resolving 
conflicts if each perspective is given epistemic authority. An awareness of perspectives 
is vital, but philosophy is still needed to distinguish between those which are justifiable 
and those which are not. 
These theoretical issues are not unique to this project, and there is increasing 
recognition within bioethics that a purely philosophical approach is often insufficient at 
answering complex applied questions. 
1.2 The empirical turn 
The problems of taking a purely philosophical approach have been articulated in detail 
by Hedgecoe9, but others have raised similar concerns. Lopez, for instance, claims that 
bioethics‘ origins within philosophy have led to a ―selectivity towards a formalistic, 
procedural, disembodied and universalistic way of identifying and resolving bioethical 
dilemmas‖10. This criticism may be valid of some philosophical bioethics, but can clearly 
be side-stepped by those who avoid a universalistic approach. Herrera correctly points 
out that different bioethicists ―align themselves with radically different perspectives‖11, 
and this will be true even of bioethicists who practice under the broad and varied 
banner of applied ethics. Hedgecoe asserts that ―[b]ioethics is constructed in such a 
way as to ignore the role of social and cultural factors‖12. Again, this seems true of 
some bioethics, but need not be true for all. Most philosophers do not exist in a social 
vacuum, and many of their intuitions and arguments will already be influenced by social 
and cultural factors. One need only look at different philosophical traditions within 
                                                          
9 Hedgecoe AM, 'Critical Bioethics: Beyond the Social Science Critique of Applied Ethics', Bioethics 18 (2004) 
pp120-43 
10 López J, 'How Sociology Can Save Bioethics . . . maybe', Sociology of Health & Illness 26 (2004) p878 
11 Herrera C, 'Is It Time for Bioethics to Go Empirical?', Bioethics 22 (2008) pp137-46 
12 Hedgecoe AM, (2004) op. cit. p125 
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different societies to see that this is the case13. Hedgecoe‘s criticism is probably 
intended to cut deeper than this, however, and suggest that bioethics does not give 
sufficient weight to cultural and social factors affecting people other than the 
philosopher. This criticism is more convincing, since a purely theoretical piece of 
bioethics may attempt to reflect social and cultural factors affecting various people, but 
these would ordinarily be based upon the philosopher‘s assumptions and these 
assumptions may be quite different from the empirical reality. As with the earlier 
criticism, however, philosophy can still provide a way forward, so long as it is in 
possession of certain empirical data that helps the philosopher overcome her own 
assumptions, prejudices and limited perspectives. 
Hoffmaster states that the applied ethics approach has no way of resolving the 
conflict that occurs when two or more principles work against each other14, and this 
does seem like a limitation of applied ethics. There is scope to appeal to different moral 
theories to justify a certain weighing of various principles, but then it is not clear why 
one moral theory should be given weight over another. Moreover, it is difficult to argue 
conclusively that one course of action is the right approach when someone endorsing a 
different moral theory might contend the same about a completely different course of 
action. This sort of conflict, although perfectly acceptable moral disagreement, could 
stand in the way of applied philosophical approaches acting as a useful and practical 
guide to specific problems, particularly when clear and consistent policy guidance is 
required.     
Theoretical ethics (particularly with a consequentialist leaning) tends to predict 
the likely consequences of certain courses of action, and this can form part of the 
justification for normative conclusions – even if one does not adopt a fully 
consequentialist standpoint. Where theoretical ethics can be criticised is that often the 
                                                          
13 For instance, the morality underpinning Chinese bioethics is quite different from that underpinning western 
bioethics: Nie J-B, 'The Plurality of Chinese and American Medical Moralities: Toward an Interpretive Cross-
Cultural Bioethics', Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10 (2000) pp239-60 
14 Hoffmaster B, 'Can Ethnography Save the Life of Medical Ethics?', Social Science and Medicine 35 (1992) 
pp1421-31 
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person predicting the likely consequences does so from a distant non-involved position, 
and may not actually have an accurate picture of the depth and range of the likely 
consequences. Although it would require an ambitious empirical study (probably taking 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches) to confidently predict all likely 
consequences, speaking to relevant stakeholders will give a better understanding of 
possible consequences than not doing so. The results gained from a qualitative study 
cannot be used to predict the statistical likelihood of a certain consequence, but they 
can give an indication of the range of possible consequences that ought to be 
considered. A creatively-minded philosopher may, in theory, be able to envisage these 
consequences without an empirical study, but by engaging stakeholders in the process 
there is less likelihood of things being overlooked.   
Given the sometimes valid criticisms of traditional applied ethics, one may think 
it obvious that using empirical data is a requirement for good bioethics, and that using 
empirical data can provide all the answers to these criticisms. This is only true, 
however, if the right sort of empirical data is obtained, and if the data is used in the 
right way. The role given to empirical data must be given careful consideration, as 
there are limits to its capacity to inform ethical reasoning. As Callahan points out, when 
confronted with an individual‘s belief about a particular problem, one can, from an 
ethical perspective, say ―so what?‖15. The same is true if the view is held by many 
people. Just because one person or many people think that something is right or 
wrong, this does not mean that the something is right or wrong. The beliefs may be 
based upon invalid reasoning, or factually incorrect premises. This is a simplistic 
example of the is/ought problem16, but nevertheless it is a problem that may impose 
genuine restrictions on the role that empirical data can play in ethical debate.   
                                                          
15 Callahan D, 'The Social Sciences and the Task of Bioethics', Daedalus 128 (1999) p286 
16This claims that ―no descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement without the addition of at 
least one evaluative premise‖ Searle JR, 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"', The Philosophical Review 73 
(1964) pp43-58 
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In a paper that is largely critical of applied ethics approaches, Hoffmaster 
concedes that some philosophers have contributed to the ―moral improvement of front-
line activities‖ by producing ―highly nuanced, particularized analyses of cases and 
problems [with] an appreciation of the settings in which these cases and problems 
arise‖17. If philosophy can do this, then one has to consider exactly what additional 
data is required for this to be achieved, as opposed to simply doing philosophy well. 
1.3 Choosing a method for this project 
The difficulties in combining empirical data with philosophy have been widely discussed, 
and several approaches have been suggested. Some of the first people to take the 
approach of combining empirical data with bioethical theorising were Alderson, 
Farsides, and Williams18 and Rogers19, and the approach to data collection for this 
project has strong similarities with Alderson et al (the merits of this approach are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). There have been many attempts to explain how 
empirical data can be combined with theoretical philosophy20,21,22, and various methods 
and techniques have been suggested for overcoming potential problems that are 
encountered.  
The aim of this project was not to provide a sociological description of how study 
participants regard and think about conditional organ donation. The aim was instead to 
produce normative conclusions to guide acceptable practice involving conditional organ 
donation. The role of the qualitative data was as a resource to inform and improve the 
philosophy. The influence of the qualitative data was restricted to this role, and this 
may provide ammunition for claims that this project uses social science as a junior 
                                                          
17 Hoffmaster B, (1992) op. cit. p1422 
18 Alderson P, Farsides B, and Williams C, 'Examining Ethics in Practice: Health Service Professionals‘ 
Evaluations of in-Hospital Ethics Seminars', Nursing Ethics 9 (2002) pp508-21 
19 Rogers WA, 'Beneficence in General Practice: An Empirical Investigation', Journal of Medical Ethics 25 
(1999) pp388-93 
20 Frith L, 'Symbiotic Empirical Ethics: A Practical Methodology', Bioethics 26 (2012) pp198-206 
21 Leget C, Borry P, and de Vries R, (2009) op. cit. pp226-35 
22 Molewijk B et al., 'Empirical Data and Moral Theory. A Plea for Integrated Empirical Ethics', Medicine, 
Health Care and Philosophy 7 (2004) pp55-69 
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partner23, or places it in a handmaiden role24. The production of good philosophy aimed 
for by this project, however, does not require cross-disciplinary equality.  
Where matters of policy are involved, it is important that discussion focuses on 
rationality, consistency and robustness25. Stakeholder views should be considered, but 
ought to be subjected to the same robust scrutiny that a philosophical argument should 
be. If the views are shown to be grounded in mistaken beliefs, or cannot be justified, 
then they can have no role in determining what ought to happen.  
 There is undoubtedly some merit in performing the integrated bioethics 
approaches described in much of the literature26,27 but it seems that many of the 
criticisms of more theoretical bioethics can be relatively simply overcome by conducting 
qualitative research to augment and inform a traditional applied ethics approach. The 
aim of this project is not to formally ‗integrate‘ philosophy and qualitative data in the 
manner described in the literature (see Molewijk et al for example28). Rather, the aim is 
to do philosophy, but to do it in a way that is well positioned to provide practical, 
achievable and realistic guidance to a real-world problem. The qualitative data informs 
the philosophy, and enhances its fitness for purpose, but ultimately it is philosophy that 
provides the normative conclusions. 
1.3.1 The limits of empirical data – A consistent philosophical approach 
The approach taken for this project is quite distinct from those that attempt to 
seamlessly merge empirical data with theoretical philosophy into an integrated blend of 
                                                          
23 Hedgecoe AM, (2004) op. cit. p133 
24 Haimes E, 'What Can the Social Sciences Contribute to the Study of Ethics? Theoretical, Empirical and 
Substantive Considerations', Bioethics 16 (2002) pp89-113 
25 Fischer F, Miller GJ, and Sidney MS, 'Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods', 
(Boca Raton, FL.: Taylor & Francis, 2006) p161 
26 Frith L, (2012) op. cit. pp198-206 
27 Molewijk B et al., (2004) op. cit. pp55-69 
28 Ibid.  
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the prescriptive and descriptive. Philosophy is the final arbiter for this project. In the 
rhetorical words of Callahan, ―ethics must, in the end, be ethics, not social science‖29.  
The approach used for this project uses empirical data for two primary reasons: 
to provide the facts, and to provide new lines of potential enquiry. This approach has 
been criticised30,31. Nelson is concerned that, regardless of approach, empirical enquiry 
is shaped by the ―schedules of value endorsed by those directing such enquiry‖32. This 
would raise questions about the objectivity of the facts provided by any empirical study, 
particularly a study such as the one in this project where the philosophy and empirical 
study are conducted by the same person. The data has been collected, analysed and 
viewed with a philosophical mindset, and this will limit its applicability and usefulness in 
other settings. For the purposes of a largely philosophical project such as this, a 
philosophical approach to data collection is not inappropriate. It is, however, important 
to constantly bear in mind the impact on the data that this will have had, and the 
implications for this in terms of the overall conclusions of the project. This falls under 
the remit of reflexivity, which requires ―a critical interrogation of the relationship 
between the researcher, the world she is studying, and her experience and awareness 
of that world‖33. Although this thesis will not make use of the ‗confessional tale‘ 
espoused by Ives and Dunn (primarily because this would distract from the main body 
of the thesis), there is a need for open reflection and transparency when it comes to 
starting points of the philosophical arguments, how participants‘ data has been coded 
and interpreted and why certain lines of argument have been chosen. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 12, as will the impact that this has on the nature of 
the conclusions.  
 
                                                          
29 Callahan D, (1999) op. cit. p285 
30 Hedgecoe AM, (2004) op. cit. pp120-43 
31 Nelson JL, 'Moral Teachings from Unexpected Quarters: Lessons for Bioethics from the Social Sciences and 
Managed Care', The Hastings Center Report 30 (2000) p13 
32 Ibid. p13 
33 Ives J and Dunn M, 'Who's Arguing? A Call for Reflexivity in Bioethics', Bioethics 24 (2010) pp256-65 
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1.3.2 The starting point 
Conditional donation has been discussed in Government reports34, in academic 
literature35 and in the media36. These sources have highlighted interesting areas of 
debate that demand further philosophical scrutiny. The DH report, for instance, 
suggested that altruism was a significant factor in assessing the acceptability of 
conditional donation, and this acted as a springboard for a more detailed philosophical 
analysis of altruism in Chapter 4. Similarly, existing philosophical literature provided 
subject matter for further examination, as did various media reports. This has formed 
the primary content of the philosophy chapters (3-7).   
This process of undertaking this project began with a review of philosophical and 
sociological literature, policy documents/reports, and media stories. Immersion in these 
various types of literature provides a more varied understanding of the problem than 
merely focussing on one type of literature. This step is no different from what a good 
applied philosopher would (or should) do. Describing a problem requires researching it, 
and taking this approach provides a description based upon the perspectives that are 
already available37. An applied philosopher ought to be aware that a full description of a 
problem may require viewing the problem from many additional perspectives, and 
although the ethical issues raised by conditional donation has been covered by 
ethicists, there is a lack of similar literature from the perspective of those most likely to 
be affected by it.   
 
 
 
                                                          
34 For example, Department of Health (2000) 'An Investigation into Conditional Organ Donation', Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4035
465.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
35 For example, Wilkinson TM, 'What‘s Not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?', Journal of Medical Ethics 
29 (2003) pp163-64 
36 For example, BBC News (1999) 'No Health Apartheid', Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/387817.stm, Last Accessed: 22/10/2012  
37 This description stage is present in most approaches to empirical bioethics. See, for example, Leget C, 
Borry P, and de Vries R, (2009) op. cit. pp226-35, and Frith L, (2012) op. cit. pp198-206 
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1.3.3 Intuitions and ‗Encounters with Experience‘ 
Qualitative data can reveal the way that participants reason and debate ethical issues. 
This may include their background assumptions, as well as the structure and form of 
their arguments. Taking these arguments and using them uncritically to construct more 
general ethical arguments relating to conditional donation would fall foul of the is/ought 
problem. Participants thinking that a certain argument can justify certain conclusions 
should not be accepted at face value. Instead, the arguments used by participants 
should be examined and subjected to rigorous philosophical scrutiny. As Callahan says, 
it is important to ―oppose forthrightly cultural values and moral convictions that do not 
withstand the scrutiny of fair and careful judgment‖38. By knowing the sorts of 
arguments that participants are using, one can know what sorts of recommendations 
are likely to receive support in practice, and also know what types of argument are 
likely to be met with resistance. Potential resistance to a valid and sound argument 
does not necessarily speak strongly against that argument, because sometimes 
necessary reforms are not popular. It does, however, provide guidance about where 
one‘s argumentative energies might need to be directed.  
One criticism of conventional applied ethics is that decisions about what is right 
or wrong are made on the basis of one individual‘s reasoning39, and this reasoning may 
be based upon intuitions that nobody else shares. The role that these moral intuitions 
can play in the moral reasoning process has been described by van Delden and van 
Thiel40 in their reflective equilibrium account of normative empirical ethics. Under 
traditional reflective equilibrium41, moral intuitions (or more strictly speaking, 
considered moral judgements) are given the same weight as moral principles, and the 
‗to-ing and fro-ing‘ between the two can result in modifications to them both. The 
method described by van Delden and van Thiel incorporates the moral intuitions of 
                                                          
38 Callahan D, (1999) op. cit. p277 
39 Hedgecoe AM, (2004) op. cit. p125 
40 Van Thiel G and Van Delden J, 'Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Empirical Model', Ethical Perspectives 
17 (2010) pp183-202 
41 Rawls J, 'A Theory of Justice', (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971)  
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participants into the equilibrium, alongside the intuitions of ‗the thinker‘ and moral 
principles. None of these is afforded a pre-determined privileged position, and each is 
open to revision. One problem with this account is that it asks a lot of ‗the thinker‘ by 
requiring them to consider their intuitions on a similar footing to the intuitions of 
others. It would take a particularly humble (and honest) philosopher to undertake a 
truly transparent and impartial equilibrium of this kind42. This is not a knock-down 
argument against a true reflective equilibrium approach, but it presents a practical 
barrier to achieving its goal43. 
The moral intuitions and reasoning from participants in this study have been 
used to identify lines of argument that may otherwise have been overlooked, and to 
provide a springboard for philosophical discussion. They have not been included in a 
clearly-structured reflective equilibrium, as such, because the distinction between the 
thinker‘s intuitions and participants‘ intuitions is not as clear-cut as van Delden and van 
Thiel suggest. Philosophy does not take place in a social vacuum, and is rarely written 
in an instant. Discussions with colleagues, encounters in everyday life, and media 
stories may also influence one‘s views and beliefs, so the idea that applied ethics is 
conducted according to one person‘s isolated ‗ivory tower‘ intuitions is mistaken. A 
result of this is that the ‗thinker‘ is already subject to the various pushes and pulls of 
their environment and the context of the research. As Elliott has noted, exposure to 
different perspectives can change one‘s moral intuitions44. By conducting interviews, 
one‘s intuitions come into critical contact with the moral intuitions of participants, and 
this process would be almost impossible to avoid with single-researcher projects. It 
could, in theory be documented over the course of a project, but knowing exactly when 
and why one‘s intuitions or considered moral judgements have changed would be 
                                                          
42 This may give a justification for projects like this being undertaken by interdisciplinary teams, but as a PhD 
this was a single-researcher project. 
43 A similar point about the demandingness of Reflective Equilibrium approaches is made by Arras in: 
Steinbock B, 'The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2007)  
44 Elliott C, 'Where Ethics Comes from and What to Do About It', The Hastings Center Report 22 (1992) pp28-
35 
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impossible in practice. A formal reflective equilibrium approach of combining the 
philosophical and the empirical was not undertaken within the discussion chapter, but it 
is probable that some form of reflective equilibrium has already taken place over the 
course of the project. 
 In this project the boundary between researcher intuitions and participant 
intuitions was blurred further by the nature of the interviews. The interview process 
was deliberately critical, so the moral intuitions and judgments of participants were 
challenged throughout the data collection process. A previous study had success using 
this critical approach and ensuring ―that principles and values were at the centre of the 
discussions [in order to] examine the logic and structures underlying common 
arguments‖45, and this was also used as the model for Ives‘ doctorate on Paternal 
Responsibilities46. Although the embedded study in this project involved interviews 
rather than focus groups, the approach was largely similar. A philosophically-minded 
researcher conducted the interviews, and the topic guide for the interview was 
designed to focus on certain ethical aspects of conditional donations (although the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed other areas to be discussed if 
participants wished). Participants were presented with modified counterfactual 
scenarios in order to encourage them to consider the justifications for their views, and 
were asked probing questions to try to get to the root of their reasoning.   
1.3.4 Consequences and making acceptable recommendations 
As discussed, philosophy can encounter problems when principles come into conflict, 
and the weight afforded to principles in these situations is open to debate. Different 
philosophers will afford different weight to different principles, as will members of the 
public. It seems obvious to state that a policy will be most acceptable to the public if it 
aligns best with what the public thinks the policy should be. If one wants to make 
                                                          
45 Alderson P, Farsides B, and Williams C, (2002) op. cit. p509 
46 Ives J 'Becoming a Father/Refusing Fatherhood:  How Paternal Responsibilities and Rights Are Generated', 
(PhD, University of Birmingham), (2007)  
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acceptable recommendations for policy, then one needs to know what the public thinks 
and how the public thinks47. 
In this project, in matters where there was more than one valid solution (where 
validity has been determined by a philosophical analysis of an argument), the option 
that aligned best with the views of participants has been endorsed. This was not to 
deem one philosophical approach ‗better‘ than another, but was instead merely a 
practical concession to ensure that the recommendations, where possible, are based 
upon the sorts of reasoning and arguments that stakeholders would find acceptable. 
This did not give participants‘ views an overwhelming power – philosophy was the tool 
used to determine whether a particular line of argument is a suitable candidate for a 
policy recommendation – but participants‘ views helped to select a recommendation 
that was likely to be acceptable to stakeholders. Sometimes consistency and 
acceptability clash: the most acceptable policy for one thing may have a justification 
that is not consistent with the most acceptable policy for another thing. If this situation 
occurred, a recommendation that was thought to be as acceptable as possible whilst 
maintaining consistency was sought. Although acceptability of each recommendation is 
important, it is possible that people may find inconsistency unacceptable. 
In many instances this process has, at first, worked backwards by taking the 
views of stakeholders and attempting to formulate consistent and coherent 
philosophical arguments out of them by seeing how they link to arguments discussed in 
the philosophy chapters and the wider literature. The vast majority of this takes place 
in Chapter 10. In this way, stakeholder views have provided a springboard for 
philosophical discussion. In some specific instances, the stakeholder views failed to 
provide suitably consistent and robust lines of argument, and here philosophical lines of 
argument have been used that best fit with the general lines of argument used 
                                                          
47 This is an oversimplification, of course. One could consider many different publics, and even within each of 
these it seems unlikely that views would be homogeneous.  
15 
 
throughout. It should be noted that this method is markedly different to that discussed 
by Hoffmaster48, as this is not the ‗ground up‘ approach that he espouses. There was no 
attempt to understand morality contextually49, as this runs the risk of relativism. 
Instead this was an attempt to apply moral reasoning to a specific context in a way that 
is acceptable to people within that context.     
One might argue that by trying to make recommendations based upon what is 
acceptable to participants, there may be a tendency to maintain the status quo. This, 
however, would be much more likely in cases where participants generally believed that 
the status quo represented the right approach, which many of the participants in the 
embedded study did not. Moreover, one might argue that recommendations ought not 
be concerned with acceptability to stakeholders. Stakeholders may potentially have 
views that are completely at odds with ethical theory, and it would seem wrong to give 
decisive weight to the recommendation likely to prove most popular. For the approach 
detailed here however, this is of limited concern. A recommendation was not judged on 
its acceptability to stakeholders unless it was first shown to be independently ethically 
justifiable.  
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The next few chapters (3-7) take an in-depth look at the philosophy behind organ 
donation in general, and more specifically conditional and directed donations. They 
assess the acceptability of these donations within the context of an altruistic organ 
donation system and suggest that the understanding of altruism apparently used by 
transplantation policy-makers is inconsistent and unrealistic. Several philosophical 
arguments in favour of conditional and directed donations are then outlined. In order to 
abide by convention, the empirical study has separate methods and results chapters 
(Chapters 8 and 9 respectively). A detailed summary of participants‘ views is presented 
                                                          
48 Hoffmaster B, (1992) op. cit. pp1421-31 
49 Ibid. p1425 
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in the results chapter. These results are then compared with those of other empirical 
studies and discussed alongside, and in conjunction with, philosophical arguments in 
the discussion chapter (Chapter 10). Finally, based on several (realistic) assumptions 
about the outcomes of permitting conditional and directed donations, in Chapter 12 
proposals are made for a framework for handling requests to make conditional and 
directed donations.  
The philosophy chapters, empirical study and subsequent discussions each have 
their own sub-aims that form part of the larger empirical bioethics methodology. These 
are outlined at the start of each of chapters.  
The next chapter explains the background to conditional and directed donation 
within the United Kingdom (UK). This will set the scene for further and more detailed 
philosophical discussion in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2 - Background  
This chapter introduces the background to conditional and directed organ donation. It 
starts by describing the transplantation system in the UK, and then details a brief 
history of conditional donation and policy development. Finally, background literature is 
introduced and discussed to bring the ethical issues to attention. 
2.1 How organ donation in the UK works 
2.1.1 Transplant authorities and organisations in the United Kingdom 
Transplantation in the UK takes place under the governance, control and advice of the 
following three key organisations: 
 The HTA was established in 2005 under the HTAct, and is the statutory authority 
charged with the giving of ―guidance on the Act‘s consent requirements for deceased 
donation of organs‖50. It provides Codes of Practice, and is responsible for ensuring that 
human tissue is used ethically and with proper consent, in accordance with the law. It 
is also responsible for approving living solid organ donations. 
 NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) is a Special Health Authority in the UK 
charged with optimising the supply of organs, blood and tissue. Part of its remit 
involves encouraging people to donate organs and helping to improve the quality, 
effectiveness and clinical outcomes of transplantation within the UK.  
 The Department of Health (DH) is responsible for legislation and overall direction 
of policy, and acts as a link between the HTA, NHSBT, and Ministers. The DH, HTA and 
NHSBT are agreed that they all ―have a locus in determining the rules for directed 
deceased donation‖51. 
 
                                                          
50 Human Tissue Authority (2008) 'Minutes of Thirtieth Meeting of the Human Tissue Authority', Available at: 
http://hta.gov.uk/_db/_documents/July_08_Authority_papers_for_the_website.doc, Last Accessed: 
31/10/2012  
51 Ibid.  
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2.1.2 Parallel donation systems 
There are two general sources of donated organs within the UK; living donors and 
deceased donors. Both systems share the goal of obtaining organs for transplantation 
in order to save or improve the lives of people who require transplants, but the 
principles that underpin each system, and thereby define acceptable donation, are very 
different.  
2.1.3 Deceased donation  
Deceased donation refers to donation after death has been declared (using either brain 
stem52 or circulatory criteria53). The UK operates an opt-in deceased organ donation 
system; those who wish to become organ donors when they die register on the national 
Organ Donor Register (ODR). Due to the nature of the injuries that commonly result in 
someone being a potential organ donor54, it is not normally possible to speak to the 
potential donor to establish her wishes around the time of death. Where a person‘s 
wishes regarding organ donation have not been recorded, the next-of-kin55 are 
consulted. In cases where a person is on the ODR but their next-of-kin do not want to 
proceed with a donation, the next-of-kin‘s wishes will be respected, even though the 
HTAct is explicit in requiring only the dying/dead person‘s consent56. Although there are 
                                                          
52 Brain stem death occurs when the brain stem has been damaged to the extent that its functions are 
irreversibly destroyed. Circulation and respiration can be artificially maintained, but the patient is considered 
dead nonetheless. Organ donation following brain stem death is sometimes referred to as ‗heart beating 
donation‘ but more commonly as donation after brainstem death (DBD). The DH‘s Code of Practice provides 
more detail: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4035
462.pdf (last accessed 29/06/2012) 
53 Circulatory death occurs when there is an irreversible cessation of neurological, cardiac and respiratory 
activity. Organ donation are circulatory death is sometimes referred to as ‗non-heart beating donation‘, but 
more commonly as donation after circulatory death (DCD). Further information is provided in the Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges‘ Code of Practice, available at: http://www.aomrc.org.uk/item/a-code-of-practice-for-
the-diagnosis-and-confirmation-of-death.html (last accessed 29/06/2012) 
54 Often traumatic head injuries, which render the patient unable to consent for him/herself 
55 The HTA operates a hierarchy of qualifying relationships for next-of-kin, which is as follows: spouse or 
partner, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, niece or nephew, stepmother or 
stepfather, half brother or half sister, friend of long-standing. Human Tissue Authority (2006) 'Code of 
Practice - Consent', Available at: http://www.hta.gov.uk/_db/_documents/2006-07-
04_Approved_by_Parliament_-_Code_of_Practice_1_-_Consent.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
56 Human Tissue Authority 'Code of Practice 2 – Deceased Organ Donation', Available at: 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/legislationpoliciesandcodesofpractice/codesofpractice/code2donationoforgans.cfm?FaA
rea1=customwidgets.content_view_1&cit_id=674&cit_parent_cit_id=669, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
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arguments that the organs of dead people should be donated (i.e. without consent)57, 
organ donation is not compulsory and the wishes of individuals and next-of-kin are 
respected.  
 Donors or donor families can choose which organs they would like to donate and 
whether they want these organs to be donated for transplantation or research or both. 
There is no obligation to donate all potentially transplantable organs; it is possible, for 
example, for someone to donate their liver and kidneys, but not their heart and lungs.  
Deceased organ donation within the UK has traditionally been described as 
‗altruistic‘. As will be discussed in Chapter 5 there is a lack of clarity about what this 
actually means, specifically within transplant policy, but it is often cited as a reason to 
prohibit payment for organs58. Indeed, for many years organ donation has been 
regarded as ‗The Gift of Life‘59, with ‗gift‘ suggesting that deceased donors should 
receive no tangible reward in return for their donation. 
 Control over what happens to deceased organs is a controversial issue, since 
some people regard them as the property of individuals or families60, whilst other 
people view them as a public resource61. If donated organs truly are a ‗gift of life‘, this 
is at odds with them being a public resource, since they would not need to be given in 
order to be used62. Cronin and Price state that the law is ―uncertain and unclear‖63: 
there is provision for individuals to control the way their bodies are used after death, 
but equally it is accepted that there is no property in a corpse64. In order for organ 
donation to be ‗a gift‘, the person doing the giving must have some disposal rights over 
                                                          
57 Howard RJ, 'We Have an Obligation to Provide Organs for Transplantation after We Die', American Journal 
of Transplantation 6 (2006) pp1786-89 
58 Jasper JD et al., 'Altruism, Incentives, and Organ Donation: Attitudes of the Transplant Community', 
Medical Care 42 (2004) pp378-86 
59 NHSBT (2007) 'My Life, My Gift', Available at: 
https://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/campaigns/other_campaigns/detail.asp?id=6, Last Accessed: 
22/10/2012  
60 Giordano S, 'Is the Body a Republic?', Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2005) pp470-75 
61 Truog RD, 'Are Organs Personal Property or a Societal Resource?', The American Journal of Bioethics 5 
(2005) pp14-16 
62 Cronin AJ and Price D, 'Directed Organ Donation: Is the Donor the Owner?', Clinical Ethics 3 (2008) p129 
63 Ibid. p129 
64 Ibid. p129 
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whatever is being disposed of, which would appear to point towards individual 
ownership. As Cronin and Price state, ―[o]ne cannot give what one does not have‖65. 
Although the situation regarding ownership is unclear, the policy regarding what 
happens after organs are donated is clear: specific organs can be offered for 
transplantation and whilst individuals can determine which organs are donated they 
have no control over who they are allocated to. Organs obtained from deceased donors 
are allocated according to a number of variables, including greatest medical need66, 
best match, age, and (for some organs) waiting time67. This is designed to result in a 
system that is fair and equitable68, and free from personal prejudice. 
2.1.4 Conditional and Directed Deceased Donation 
Although most deceased organ donations are given freely and organs are allocated by 
medical professionals, some donors or donor families wish to have some say over who 
receives or does not receive the organs. ‗Conditional‘ donation is also sometimes used 
to refer to any donation with conditions or directions attached, where the donation 
proceeding is contingent upon the conditions or directions being granted. Throughout 
this chapter, this sort of conditionality will be referred to as ‗if and only if (iff) 
conditionality‘.  
 Discussion of conditional and directed donation tends to focus on a narrow range 
of conditions, despite there being a potentially infinite number of possibilities. The most 
objectionable sorts of conditions tend to receive most attention, but commonly 
discussed examples include donations directed towards family members, individuals 
with certain health conditions, or people who have lived certain kinds of lives. 
                                                          
65 Ibid. p129 
66 NHSBT 'Liver Organ Sharing Principles', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/liver/liver_organ_sharing_principle
s/liver_organ_sharing_principles.jsp, Last Accessed: 23/10/2012  
67 NHSBT 'Deceased Donor Kidney Allocation Scheme', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/kidney_(renal)/renal_organ_shari
ng_principles/kidney_organ_allocation_scheme_2006.jsp, Last Accessed: 23/10/2012  
68NHSBT 'Organ Allocation', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/organ_allocation.asp, Last 
Accessed: 23/10/2012  
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2.1.5 Living Donation – normally directed 
Kidneys comprise the majority of living donations, and the number of living donors is 
approximately equal to the number of deceased donors. (1047 living donors in the 
financial year 2011/2012, compared with 1088 deceased donors69).  Although lung 
lobes can now be donated by live donors, none of these donations took place last 
year70. Recent advances in transplantation have allowed livers to be split, which has 
allowed partial livers to be donated by living donors (although this is the subject of 
some ethical debate due to the risk that it currently involves71). Some organs, such as 
the heart and complete lungs, cannot be removed without causing the donor to die and 
can therefore only be obtained from dead donors.  
Living donation has traditionally taken the form of ‗living-related‘ donation, 
where the donor is either genetically or emotionally related to the recipient72,73. In the 
UK, the living donation system is based upon donor autonomy, consent and individuals‘ 
wishes74.  
 
 
 
                                                          
69 NHSBT (2012) 'Latest Statistics', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/latest_statistics/latest_statistics.jsp, Last Accessed: 
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2.1.6 Altruistic living donation 
Although the vast majority of living organ donation takes the form of living-related (and  
is therefore directed), since September 200675 the Human Tissue Authority has 
permitted ‗altruistic living donations‘ in which a living donor agrees to donate an organ 
to be allocated according to the same principles governing deceased donation. Although 
directing donations towards family members and friends is commonplace in living 
donation, altruistic donations are required to be completely non-directed – so, for 
example, it would not be possible to watch an appeal from a specific individual on 
television and then request that one‘s kidney was given to her. The guidelines are very 
clear; directed donations are only permissible if there is an appropriate genetic or 
emotional relationship, otherwise a living donation must be altruistic and non-directed. 
2.2 Law, policy and guidance – history and development 
2.2.1 1998 – racist conditions 
There is little mention in the literature of conditional or directed donation before 1998, 
although this is not to say that requests for donations of this nature were not received, 
or indeed that they did not proceed.  In 1998 a case of directed donation in the north of 
England caused controversy and a substantial media attention. In this case, the 
relatives of a deceased man specified that the deceased‘s organs should only be made 
available for transplantation if they would be transplanted to white recipients. This 
decision was made because the family felt it was what the deceased man would have 
wanted76. Unsuccessful attempts were made to persuade the relatives to agree to a 
donation without any restrictions. Despite the nature of the directions attached to the 
donation, the organs were accepted, and two kidneys and a liver were transplanted into 
three white recipients. The remaining organs were unsuitable for transplantation, 
although the pancreas and lung tissue were retrieved and used for research (with no 
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suggestion that this donation for research had any conditions or directions placed upon 
it)77.  
Although the directions in this case were racist, the donation would not have 
proceeded unless the directions were respected. As a result of accepting the donation, 
three people were given a chance to have their lives saved or improved. The white 
recipients, however, were at the top of their respective waiting lists anyway so no non-
white person was deprived of an organ because of their ethnicity. The person at the top 
of the liver waiting list would probably have died within 24 hours if they had not 
received a transplant, so there was an urgent need to obtain a liver. This ‗benefit 
without harm‘ position might give a prima facie reason to think that even racist 
donations are acceptable, but the subsequent Department of Health (DH) report and 
reaction from the UK‘s media illustrate the contentious nature of  directed donation, 
particularly where the conditions attached are racist. 
2.2.2 Backlash, DH report and outcomes 
A DH investigation was ordered by the then Health Secretary Frank Dobson, who 
likened the racist conditions to Apartheid regimes: ―I have not been an opponent of the 
Apartheid movement for the whole of my adult life to see it introduced into the NHS‖78. 
The then Shadow Health Secretary Liam Fox issued a statement saying that "this is an 
extremely disturbing case. There must be no question of ethnicity clouding clinical 
judgement in such matters."79 Although these sorts of responses to the case are likely 
to be a reflex reaction from anybody opposed to racism, they perhaps fail to recognise 
the complexities of the situation. In this instance, the dilemma was not a case of 
‗accept the conditions and give the organs to white people, or reject the conditions and 
give the organs to people in greatest need regardless of ethnicity‘, but was instead 
‗accept the conditions and give the organs to white people, or reject the conditions and 
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lose the organs‘. A spokesperson for the British Medical Association (BMA) captured the 
situation with more subtlety:  
This situation will place doctors in an almost unethical dilemma. They would be 
instinctively repulsed by the idea of discriminating between black and white 
patients. But faced with a dying patient and a matching organ they might well 
feel that their overriding duty was to save the patient's life.80 
On 8th July 1999, shortly after this case was picked up by the media, Frank 
Dobson issued a press statement declaring that ―organs must not be accepted if 
conditions about the recipient are attached‖81. 
It is apparent that at the time of this case, policy on the acceptance of organs 
with conditions placed upon them was less clear than it is today, with the DH report 
stating that ―there was no guidance explicitly addressing the point in 1998‖82. Indeed, 
as a result of this case, and following requests for guidance on policy, the duty office 
manager of the UK Transplant Support Services Authority issued a memo on behalf of 
the organisation‘s Chief Executive stating that: 
[The Chief Executive] has stated that the Duty Office must offer all organs that 
they are asked to by the transplant community. If that also entails conditions 
being set then this information must be passed on when offering.83  
This memo was later criticised in the DH‘s report, resulting in the Chief Executive 
resigning her position.  
The report that resulted from the DH investigation concluded that ―to attach any 
condition to a donation is unacceptable, because it offends against the fundamental 
principle that organs are donated altruistically and should go to patients in the greatest 
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need.‖84 The report recommended that earlier statement issued by Frank Dobson 
should be formalised by the DH, and that this guidance should forbid conditions of any 
kind being attached to donated organs. Despite looking only at racist conditions in 
detail, the report endorsed the view that all conditions should be prohibited. The report 
also declared that although changes in guidance were required, legal advice is already 
clear that ―organs should not be allocated on the basis of race‖85 (according to the Race 
Relations Act 1976).    
Although the recommendations of the DH report were adopted as policy after 
their publication, they have not met with universal approval within the academic 
community. Wilkinson, for instance, argues that the DH panel‘s findings are flawed 
because they fail to distinguish between making an offer and accepting an offer86. It 
might well be utterly wrong for someone to place abhorrent racist conditions such as 
these on their organs, but whether this conditional offer of organs should be accepted is 
an entirely different question. The DH report purports to answer the question of 
whether or not conditional offers of donations should be accepted, but it actually 
focuses on the question of whether it is acceptable to place conditions on organs.  
2.2.3 Legal aspects of the report 
Prior to 2000, there was no specific legislation or guidance covering conditional and 
directed donation. The HTAct 1961 did not anticipate conditional donation, although the 
Race Relations Act 1976 would have made it illegal for racist conditions to be acted 
upon87. The same Act also made it unlawful for somebody to induce or attempt to 
induce somebody to do anything contrary to the Act, so somebody placing racist 
conditions on a donation could be regarded as being in breach of the Act88. The Panel 
concluded that no change to legislation was required, but that guidance should clearly 
                                                          
84 Ibid. p1 
85 Ibid. p25 
86 Wilkinson TM, (2003) 'What‘s Not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?' op. cit. pp163-64 
87 Department of Health (2000) op. cit. p23 
88 Ibid. p23 
26 
 
prohibit any conditions being placed on donations. As Cronin and Douglas suggest, 
however, the DH Panel made a number of assumptions that were incorrect and lacked 
support from common law or statute89. The over-riding assumption was that the 
transplant authority‘s acceptance policy represented the law, and that if conditional and 
directed donations were contrary to this policy then they were unlawful90. However, 
since the 1961 Act did not directly prohibit conditional and directed donations, and not 
all conditions or directions would be contrary to the Race Relations Act 1976, the 
transplant authority‘s (at the time this was the United Kingdom Transplant Services 
Support Authority) acceptance policy did not accurately represent the law. Therefore, 
whilst it became a matter of policy for conditional and directed donations to be 
rejected, there was little legal backing for this. 
The HTAct 2004, met the call for new legislation to govern the removal, storage 
and use of human tissue and organs as a result of the retained organs controversy91. 
The introduction of the HTAct actually had little impact upon conditional and directed 
donations, as it mostly focussed upon issues of consent, and NHSBT remains free to 
reject conditional and directed offers of organs according to its policy92. 
2.2.4 Challenges to the Report – Specific Cases 
The DH report prohibited all types of conditions and directions being placed on organs, 
despite only looking at racist conditions. Although adopted as policy, the coherence of 
the report‘s recommendations has been challenged by subsequent requests for 
conditional or directed donation that have received public support.  
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 In one case93 a 3 year old girl required a liver transplant, and her parents 
appealed on television for potential donors. Shortly after the appeal a 14 year old boy 
suffered a fatal head injury and his parents agreed for his organs to be donated to the 
general pool, except for his liver which they specifically requested should be given to 
this 3 year old girl. The parents of the deceased boy were informed that there was no 
guarantee that the liver would be transplanted to the young girl, but that suitable 
children are generally given priority over adults to paediatric organs. The parents 
agreed to the donation on this basis, and were persuaded to remove the condition from 
the donation. 
 Using media appeals to solicit directed donations is criticised by Price on the 
basis that media appeals are not available to everybody and that this favours ―those 
with access to such avenues of persuasion.‖94 It would seem fair to say that media 
appeals themselves can be a good thing insofar as they may lead to an increase in the 
number of donated organs or an increase in awareness about donation-related issues, 
but using media appeals to obtain organs for specific individuals would almost certainly 
give these individuals an unfair advantage. This sort of unfairness is admittedly rife 
within wider society, but amongst other principles, the NHS has a duty to promote 
equality . One might argue that a system of equal access to media appeals could be 
established, where everyone wishing to launch an appeal was able to do so, but this 
could still result in unfairness, since some types of people benefit more from media 
appeals than others95. 
 Another case in 2008 received sympathetic reactions from the academic 
community and the UK press. In March 2008, Laura Ashworth suffered complications 
following a severe asthma attack which resulted in her brain being starved of oxygen. 
She died after two days in the intensive care unit of a local hospital. Laura‘s mother 
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had been suffering from kidney failure for several years, and Laura had intended to 
start the process living kidney donation to her mother. However, following Laura‘s 
death the HTA decided that existing policy dictated that her organs should be donated 
to the general pool, and that a directed cadaveric kidney donation to her mother was 
impermissible.  
The emotions provoked by this decision are made clear on a memorial webpage 
for Laura. The friend who constructed the page states: ―To rub salt in the wound, organ 
transplant authorities refused to allow Laura's Kidneys and Pancreas go to her sick 
mother‖96. Rachel Leake, Laura‘s mother, said: ―It's an absolutely ridiculous law. 
Laura's helped three people through this, but Laura would have wanted to help me. To 
help her mum.‖97 This quotation is particularly interesting, because it reveals something 
about the duties and responsibilities that family members often feel that they have to 
one another, and how these could over-ride impartial principles such as helping the 
greatest number of people, or those most in need of help. Rachel Leake is also quoted 
as saying ―All I wanted to do was carry out her [Laura‘s] wishes. She would have been 
so upset that she was able to help other people and not her own mum.‖98 
The HTA issued a statement following this case which outlined what it regarded 
as the current position in transplantation policy: 
The central principle of matching and allocating organs from the deceased is 
that they are allocated to the person on the UKT[ransplant] waiting list who is 
most in need and who is the best match with the donor. This is regardless of 
gender, race, religion or any other factor. The ethics of this position have long 
been supported by the government and professionals working in the field. In 
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line with this central principle, a person cannot choose to whom their organ can 
be given when they die; nor can their family.99  
This is in line with the report from the DH on the 1998 case. Importantly 
though, while standing by existing guidance in this instance, the HTA recognised that 
there could be ―exceptional situations when this rule might be reconsidered‖100 and 
proposed to consult professionals and organisations representing families in order to 
consider whether the policy should be changed. UK Transplant (now part of NHSBT) 
issued a statement similar to that of the HTA, stating that it keenly awaited the results 
of the HTA‘s own review into directed donation after death. This represents a turning 
point, and highlights the demand for further consideration of the outright ban of 
conditions being placed upon donated organs.  
2.2.5 March 2010 – policy revisions 
In March 2010, and as a result of NHSBT and HTA being asked on several occasions 
about the acceptability of directed donations101, the DH issued guidance regarding 
requested allocation of deceased donor organs. This document provided specific 
guidance for instances where a request is made for an organ obtained via deceased 
donation to be directed to a close relative or friend, in a manner akin to living donation. 
The document states that, in some exceptional circumstances, a request for directed 
donation can be accepted where the potential recipient is on a transplant waiting list 
and has an appropriately close relationship with the donor. This changes the previous 
policy of not accepting any conditions or directions on organs from deceased donors. It 
is worth noting that the document anticipates that directed deceased donations to 
family members or friends will occur only very infrequently, and ―should not, therefore, 
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have any significant impact on the UK-wide organ allocation scheme now on the 
individuals on the transplant list waiting for a transplant‖102.  
 Although the guidance resolves some of the inconsistency between living and 
deceased donation, it does not attempt to align the two donation systems entirely. 
Importantly, the document emphasises that any deceased donation (even one featuring 
directions) must be unconditional, and that absence of conditionality is an underlying 
principle of the UK deceased organ donation system. This does not mean ‗conditional‘ in 
the sense of excluding people from receiving the donated organs, but instead refers to 
donations that will go ahead iff certain requests are complied with. So in order for a 
request for a directed deceased donation to even be considered, it must first be 
established that consent for donation is not contingent upon the direction being 
granted. Since, however, consent for donation can be withdrawn at a later stage it 
could be withdrawn after it was known that the direction was likely to not be granted, 
thereby allowing determined relatives to bypass this stipulation. The policy is also 
inconsistent with cases of directed living donation, where consent for the donation is 
ordinarily wholly contingent upon the direction being followed. 
 The second underlying principle mentioned by the document is equitable 
treatment. It states that organs must be allocated in a ―fair and unbiased way‖ and 
according to agreed criteria. One of the factors used when allocating organs is the 
likelihood of achieving the best possible match between donor and recipient, and the 
likelihood of a good match is increased when the donor and recipient are closely 
related. The principles of equitable treatment and absence of conditionality are, 
according to the policy document, key to ensuring that ―the integrity of the UK and 
donation allocation programme is not compromised‖103, and must be respected when 
requests for directed allocation are considered. 
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 Requests for directed allocation of deceased donors can be considered in two 
general circumstances. First, when a potential live donor dies before the live donation 
can go ahead, the request can be considered. Second, it may be the case that the 
‗working up‘ process for live donation has not commenced or progressed sufficiently for 
the deceased‘s intentions to be clear, in which case the next-of-kin will be consulted to 
provide information relating to the deceased‘s intentions.  Even in cases where consent 
is given unconditionally and a direction is requested, the policy does not guarantee that 
the direction will be granted. In circumstances where there is somebody with a 
―desperately urgent clinical need‖104, that person will be given priority.  
 It is clear that this updated guidance has been implemented in an attempt to 
recognise the complexities of cases such as Laura Ashworth, whilst still attempting to 
maintain the existing principles governing deceased donation in the UK. There is, 
however, inevitably some tension here. Allowing directed donation in some 
circumstances must compromise the equitable treatment principle, unless it is argued 
that the relative would have received the organ regardless of the request for direction 
(due to the strong match between related donor and recipient). But as established by 
the 1998 case, the fact that organs would have gone to that person regardless of the 
directions does not appear to lend any particular weight to the donation‘s acceptability. 
Presumably the 1998 case would still have been deemed unacceptable if the request 
had been for an unconditional (in the ‗if and only if‘ sense) directed donation towards 
white people. This suggests that some directions/conditions are simply considered more 
acceptable than others; that racist conditions are unacceptable whilst family/friend 
directions are acceptable. 
2.2.6 Inconsistencies 
Cronin and Price draw attention to the inconsistencies that are present within the 
parallel donation systems: 
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Although we are allowed to decide for ourselves whether or not we want to be 
organ donors upon our death, in the event that we do, we cannot attach a 
condition to our ‗gift‘ to society. Instead, somehow or another, our donation 
slips straight into the net of public resource and impartial allocation. If, however, 
we are alive when we donate, we may legitimately direct our donation (our gift) 
to someone with whom we hold a relationship of some kind or another.105  
 
This was written prior to the policy revision issued in March 2010. Hilhorst, also before 
the 2010 policy revision, states: 
―In short, although impartiality will probably be the main feature of a cadaveric 
allocation scheme, we can and should grant directed donation, when applicable, 
also in this context. Coherent policy-making requires this, and it would be 
unwise, inadequate and ineffective – if this option was not taken into 
account.‖106  
 
 He cites, as an example of something that might be acceptable, a mentally 
competent adult who is dying but expresses a wish for one of his kidneys to be 
transplanted to a good friend, whilst the other is donated to the general pool.  
 
2.2.7 Shortage and need 
The number of useable organs donated (living and deceased) each year in the UK is 
insufficient to meet demand. During the financial year 2011-2012, there was a total of 
2135 organ donors (excluding cornea only donors), 1088 deceased donors and 1047 
living donors107. These donations resulted in 3960 organ transplants, of which the vast 
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majority (2608) were kidney transplants. Even if somebody is willing to donate their 
organs after death, this is not always possible as other factors can dictate the likelihood 
of successful donation and transplantation. In order for organs to be successfully 
donated, the manner of death must result in an acceptable warm ischemic time (the 
time between cross-clamping - or asystole for brain-stem dead donors - and cold 
perfusion of the organ108, and this ordinarily means that the patient must have died in 
hospital.  
Although these figures represent a significant number of lives saved or 
improved, at the end of the financial year 2011-2012 there remained a total of 7636 
people on transplant waiting lists109. The simple fact that supply does not meet demand 
has negative consequences for those waiting for organs: ―1000 [people] each year – 
that‘s three a day – will die waiting as there are not enough organs available‖110.  
2.2.8 Organ Donation and South Asians in the UK 
Organ donation and transplantation is a particularly important issue for people of South 
Asian ethnic origin living in the UK. Despite several campaigns and initiatives designed 
to increase donation rates from this demographic111, donation rates are still relatively 
low. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that people of South Asian ethnic origin 
are over-represented on transplant waiting lists (particularly renal transplant waiting 
lists). South Asian people are 3 times as likely as the general population in the UK to 
require an organ transplant, yet only 1% of people registered on the ODR are of South 
Asian ethnicity112 although South Asians account for approximately 4% of the UK‘s 
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population113. This combination of high demand and low supply, particularly for organs 
such as kidneys where there is an increased likelihood of a tissue-match if donor and 
recipient are of the same ethnicity, means that South Asian people tend to wait longer, 
and are more likely to die waiting, for organs to become available. 
 Many attempts have been made to explain the low donation rates from these 
communities, with some people suggesting that there may be religious barriers114, lack 
of awareness/understanding115 or a general mistrust of organisations like the NHS116.  
 It is possible that some barriers to donation from these communities may 
involve how organs are allocated. A small study conducted in the north of England 
looking at Muslims of Pakistani origin found that ―donation was considered less 
acceptable beyond the family, even when the deceased had expressed the desire‖117. 
One of the study participants also suggested that ―if you‘re giving it to your own family 
that will encourage others as well to give their organs to somebody in their own 
family"118, and although it is not clear whether they were referring to living or deceased 
donation, it does suggest that if people could see the immediate benefits of organ 
donation in terms of impact upon family members, they might be more likely to donate. 
 Randhawa conducted a study looking at the influence of religion on organ 
donation amongst the Asian population in Luton, and although the study did not 
address conditional and directed donation specifically, one of the questions participants 
were asked was who they would feel comfortable receiving an organ from. A quarter of 
respondents indicated that they had ―a preference for organs from those with whom 
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they have a biological or sociocultural bond‖119, with some participants suggesting they 
would want organs from people of the same religion or same community. Even though 
this question focussed on receiving an organ, it suggests that biological and 
sociocultural bonds have some importance amongst these ethnic groups, and this might 
also transfer to donation.  
 Allowing conditional and directed donations may remove some barriers to 
donation for South Asian people, and therefore increase donation rates. This thesis has 
therefore given some focus to the South Asian population (for instance, South Asian 
potential donors were specifically recruited for the embedded study – see Chapter 8). 
2.3 What the literature says 
Much has been said about conditional and directed donation in the media, although this 
has, as would perhaps be expected, focussed on specific cases and people‘s emotional 
responses to these. These sorts of donations have also received attention from the 
academic community.  The arguments for and against conditional and directed 
donations can be categorised into key groups.  
 
2.3.1 Consequentialism  
One way of looking at conditional and directed donation is by focussing primarily on the 
consequences. Wilkinson, in particular, has presented a defence of the 1998 donation 
and other conditional and directed donations so long as certain conditions are met. He 
defends the claim that ―conditional allocation120 is justified when it would save the life 
of at least one person without reducing anyone‘s access to organs‖121. The 1998 case 
satisfies the criteria of not reducing anyone‘s access to organs because the organs 
would not have been donated had the directions not been granted. If the organs were 
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not going to be donated without the racist directions, access to organs for those who 
fail to meet the racist criteria is not reduced. Additionally, in the 1998 case the 
directions placed on the organs did not affect who the organs went to, since people at 
the top of the waiting list and best match were white anyway. Although it may have 
been wrong for the donor/donor family to place the racist directions on the donation, 
from a purely consequentialist point of view it would appear, at first glance, reasonable 
to accept the donation complete with directions. 
Volk and Ubel argue, contra Wilkinson, that consequentialism cannot justify 
routinely accepting racist donations122. They cite evidence123 to suggest that allowing 
these types of donations would actually reduce public support for organ donation, and 
therefore reduce future access to organs. Examination of the evidence cited reveals 
that they rely on questionable assumptions. The study they cite observed the effect of 
perceived transparency and fairness on willingness to donate within a sample of the 
United States population. Setting aside the different healthcare system in the United 
States, the results do show that willingness to donate is linked to perceived 
transparency and fairness; the lower perceived transparency and fairness, the less 
willingness to donate.  
Volk and Ubel, in order to substantiate their claim, however, need to show that 
conditional and directed donations reduce perceived transparency and fairness, and 
they fail to do this. Indeed, it is not obvious that conditional and directed donations 
would have this effect. It is possible that operating a system of ‗donor choice‘ where 
donors can select recipients could be considered more transparent than the current 
system where complicated allocation algorithms are used which the lay public may find 
bewildering. Similarly, the issue of perceived fairness is a complex issue (some of the 
perceived unfairness present in the study that Volk and Ubel cite is based upon income-
                                                          
122 Volk ML and Ubel PA, 'A Gift of Life: Ethical and Practical Problems with Conditional and Directed 
Donation', Transplantation 85 (2008) pp1542-4 
123 Boulware LE et al., 'Perceived Transparency and Fairness of the Organ Allocation System and Willingness 
to Donate Organs: A National Study', American Journal of Transplantation 7 (2007) pp1778-87 
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based discrimination in healthcare allocation, which may not apply within the NHS), and 
it does not seem necessarily true that conditional and directed donations reduce 
fairness.  To the extent that every donor would have the option to conditionally donate, 
the system could be perceived as fair.  Although there is evidence that perceived 
transparency and fairness has an impact upon willingness to donate, it would be 
difficult to confidently predict the effect that conditional and directed donations would 
have on perceptions of transparency and fairness. Volk and Ubel have merely deferred 
the problem by assuming a causal pathway for which there is no evidence. 
Consequentialist arguments about conditional donation must take into account 
possible impact upon overall donation rates. Wilkinson does not neglect this longer 
term consideration, and indeed the claim he seeks to defend takes it into account. He 
states ―(a) natural worry about a policy of conditional allocation is that it could have 
bad effects on the patterns or levels of donation, making it harder for some groups to 
get access to organs or even reducing the overall number of donations.‖124, but he 
argues that this need not be the case. He suggests that these sorts of concerns are 
mere speculation, and that without clear empirical evidence, they provide no argument 
for or against conditional and directed donations. Wilkinson suggests that empirical 
findings are likely to differ from place to place, and this highlights the difficulty in 
attempting to justify conditional and directed donations on consequentialist grounds; 
the consequences are difficult to predict accurately, measure and compare125. This 
highlights the problem with ascertaining the soundness of Volk and Ubel‘s broader 
argument that conditional and directed donations may not be justifiable on 
consequentialist grounds – the consequences are simply unknown. 
 
 
                                                          
124 Wilkinson TM, (2007) 'Racist Organ Donors and Saving Lives' op. cit. p72 
125 Hypothetically, allowing conditional donations might supply enough organs for every person who needs 
one to receive one immediately, and this could be regarded as consequentially positive. Yet allowing these 
sorts of donations might encourage discrimination in wider society, which might be consequentially bad. It is 
not clear how these consequences should be weighed against one another. 
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2.3.2 Special obligations and partiality 
Quigley suggests that we already allow directed donations in living donation126, which 
shows that the HTA accepts that direction per se is not unethical. She suggests that 
this may be because the relationship ―between living donor and recipient is… morally 
significant‖127 and the decision to direct a donation is therefore not borne out of 
prejudicial judgments towards another person or class of person. This is unclear 
though, since to favour a family member over a stranger is to make a prejudicial 
judgment about that stranger; specifically that their importance to oneself is less than 
that of a family member. It might not be a viciously motivated judgment, but it is a 
judgment nonetheless and Quigley does not attempt to explain what makes some 
judgments more acceptable than others. 
Quigley criticises the handling of the Laura Ashworth case, suggesting that 
―when regulatory bodies make what are essentially moral decisions they should take 
care to ensure that common sense thinking triumphs over the algorithmic application of 
inadequately considered and unjustified policy that parades as ethical principles‖128. An 
appeal to common sense thinking is itself an appeal to common sense thinking, but it is 
not obvious that common sense thinking can provide all the answers. The medical 
professionals who accepted the racist organ donation in 1998 may have thought that 
they were using common sense (saving the very lives that would have been saved if no 
conditions had been placed on the organs), yet the subsequent report strongly criticised 
their actions. While this criticism does not mean that the staff who accepted the racist 
donation used incorrect common sense reasoning, it does suggest that people regard 
different things as being common sense. If common sense thinking can provide 
different answers to the same problem, then some means of determining which is the 
best answer is required. It is not clear that the most commonly held view is necessarily 
                                                          
126 Quigley M (2008) 'Directed Deceased Organ Donation: The Problem with Algorithmic Ethics', Available at: 
http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/archives/issues/2008/quigley.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
127 Ibid. p4 
128 Ibid. p7 
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the right one129. More importantly though, an appeal to common sense thinking may 
merely be an appeal to intuition; and intuitions can frequently be wrong. 
 One way of attempting to defend conditional and directed donation to family and 
friends is to speak of the special obligations that may exist between certain people. 
Many philosophers suggest that one owes things to one‘s family and friends that one 
does not owe to strangers, and that this permits or even demands special treatment of 
one‘s family and friends130,131.  Although the details of different accounts of special 
obligations vary, the general claim is that one has obligations to certain people by 
virtue of one‘s relationship to them, and these are obligations that one does not 
ordinarily have with people with whom one does not have a relationship. 
 If it can be shown that special obligations exist, then using them as the basis of 
a defence for conditional and directed donation is straightforward. If one has a special 
obligation to help a certain person (but not others), then one ought, morally, to help 
this person. By not permitting conditional and directed donations, the transplant 
authorities prevent people from fulfilling their special obligations. While it may not be 
the case that this results in people acting immorally (since arguably one does not act 
immorally if one fails to fulfil a duty that one is unable to fulfil), it may be the case that 
fulfilling special obligations promotes valuable goods and that by preventing the 
fulfilment of these obligations the transplant authorities reduce the possible promotion 
of these goods. First, however, it would have to be shown that special obligations do 
exist. 
Glannon and Ross132 suggest that when one stands in a certain relationship with 
another person, there may be expectations and obligations that arise from this. They 
consider two ways of grounding these obligations; voluntariness and intimacy. Starting 
                                                          
129 Callahan D, (1999) op. cit. pp275-94 
130 Cottingham J, 'Partiality, Favouritism and Morality', The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986) pp357-73 
131 Friedman M, 'The Practice of Partiality', Ethics 101 (1991) pp818-35 
132 Glannon W and Ross LF, 'Do Genetic Relationships Create Moral Obligations in Organ Transplantation?', 
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 11 (2002) pp153-59 
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with the former, they suggest that if a parent voluntarily conceives a child then the 
parent voluntarily establishes a relationship (both biological and social) that involves 
duties to the welfare of the child. This may seem a reasonable basis for this type of 
obligation133, but it offers an incomplete picture when considering the obligations that 
one may consider oneself to have. Just as many parents feel an obligation to their 
children, many children (particularly adult children) feel obligations to their parents (the 
Laura Ashworth case would be a good example of this), and siblings also feel 
obligations to one another. Glannon and Ross state that special obligations require a 
grounding that considers something beyond the origins of a relationship, and suggest 
that this grounding is intimacy. 
According to Glannon and Ross, intimacy is a pre-requisite for special obligations 
between family members and develops over time through shared needs and 
interests134. Moreover, intimacy implies shared needs and interests135. The extent of the 
special obligations increases according to the degree of intimacy. They incorporate 
Sharpe‘s idea that the phenomenology of intimacy requires both benevolence and 
beneficence and suggest that a morality between intimates requires a ―positive 
conception of promoting the other‘s well-being‖136. If donating an organ meets the 
needs of someone with whom one is intimate, then the intimacy results in a special 
obligation to donate that organ for that person. 
Glannon and Ross talk about these obligations broadly in the context of living 
donation (indeed, as does most of the literature), and it is not obvious how significant 
intimacy is once one of the intimates has died as it may seem misguided to assert that, 
after death, there is still an intimate relationship in which to ground a special 
obligation. A distinction between types of death may help here, however. It has been 
                                                          
133 There is a wealth of literature agreeing or disagreeing with this issue. See Archard D, Benatar D, 
(eds.), ‗Procreation and Parenthood‟, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) for instance. 
134 It seems that this intimacy need not be restricted to family members, and could extend to close friends. 
135 Glannon W and Ross LF, (2002) op. cit. p149 
136 Ibid. p157 
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argued that a person suffers two types of death; biological and social137. The order of 
these can vary138, but one might argue that there is still a relationship present until the 
point of social death. If social death occurred after the decision about organ donation 
was made, then this relationship could be used to ground a special obligation. Even if 
one does not accept this concept of two deaths, one could consider a directed donation 
towards a family member/friend as the final act within an intimate relationship, or the 
final discharge of duty (particularly if the decision to direct the donation is made by the 
intimate before she dies).  
Volk and Ubel also suggest that a pre-existing relationship139 between donor and 
recipient can produce a special obligation, although they offer less in support of this 
idea, claiming only that ethicists and evolutionary biologists have argued for years that 
it is the case, and that relationships have shaped human behaviour over the course of 
history140. They suggest that an obligation of this sort ―outweighs concerns about 
fairness and waiting times‖141. 
They also suggest that other patients on the waiting list might not mind being 
bypassed in cases where there is a special relationship between donor and recipient. It 
is true that some people on the waiting list might be particularly selfless and put many 
other people in front of them, but this does not entail that other people should be in 
front of them, as special relationships may just be one factor amongst many to 
consider.    
                                                          
137Sweeting H and Gilhooly M, 'Dementia and the Phenomenon of Social Death', Sociology of Health & Illness 
19 (1997) pp93-117 
138 Ibid. pp93-117 
139 They do not specify the type of relationship, but their mention of ―loved ones‖ suggests close emotional 
relationships. 
140 Volk ML and Ubel PA, (2008) op. cit. p1544 
141 Much has been written about the moral status of human relationships, and how they may warrant extra 
concern or priority over other notions of moral duty. For instance, Williams has argued that there are certain 
ground projects that relate to people‘s sense of identity, and these may include certain human relationships. 
Although utilitarianism may suggest that that abandoning some of one‘s personal projects is obligatory if it 
promotes overall well-being, Williams suggests that it cannot demand that one overlooks one‘s ground 
projects. Smart JJC and Williams B, 'Utilitarianism: For and Against', (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973)  
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 Hilhorst discusses related issues, suggesting that family ties or close 
relationships might motivate people to give permission for their organs to be donated, 
in a way similar to living donation. He suggests that although impartiality should 
remain the main feature of deceased allocation, directed donations should be granted in 
some circumstances. The specific situation to which he refers is a case where a dying 
patient wishes to direct one kidney to a family member/friend and the other kidney to 
the general pool. This would align at least partially with the March 2010 policy revision, 
and according to Hilhorst, would result in a more coherent overall donation system142. 
As will be discussed shortly, however, this sort of situation is unlikely to arise 
frequently, due to the sudden way in which most potential organ donors die.   
 Ankeny adopts a slightly different strategy, and asserts that donating to 
relatives or people with whom one has an emotional relationship is intuitively 
acceptable, and can sometimes be admirable. Unlike the ideas discussed earlier, 
Ankeny does not suggest that it can be obligatory to favour a friend or relative. Ankeny 
takes a broadly utilitarian approach to the issue, suggesting that preferences expressed 
in donating an organ to a relative are strictly personal and because they are generally 
regarded as appropriate they do not ―unduly corrupt the egalitarian basis of 
utilitarianism‖143. She claims that directing living donation is permitted because of the 
partiality of the donor towards the recipient, since the donor serves her own interests 
by saving the life of a loved one. It is not obviously true that conditional deceased 
donations ought to be permitted because they allow the donor‘s interests to be fulfilled, 
but if the donor‘s interests are compatible with the aims of deceased organ donation 
then this provides a reason to allow them to be fulfilled. 
The general idea of special obligations accords with the March 2010 policy 
revision, and clearly features in living donations. Indeed some defenders of directed 
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143 Ankeny RA, 'The Moral Status of Preferences for Directed Donation: Who Should Decide Who Gets 
Transplantable Organs?', Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10 (2001) p392 
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donation towards family members have focussed on the idea that the donation could 
have gone ahead as a directed living donation were the donor still alive144. This would 
only be true for a small set of potential conditional or directed donations however, so 
does not provide a more general argument in favour of allowing them. 
 There is a significant difference between directed living donation and requests 
for directed deceased donation, because in many cases of deceased donation the 
dying/dead person is not in a position to direct her own organs; instead it falls to the 
next-of-kin to make decisions. Interesting cases arise when it is the next-of-kin herself 
who requires an organ and essentially requesting that an organ is directed to her. While 
it may be the case that this is what the deceased would have wanted, the fact that the 
organ is being directed by the next-of-kin to herself raises a question of whether this 
donation decision reflects the special obligation the donor is thought to have had or 
whether it is an act of pure self-interest145. This scenario highlights the difficulty in 
distinguishing between different types of motivation, but also highlights the difficulty of 
determining who the donor is (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), since it is 
hard to see how a dying/dead donor can be considered to be fulfilling an obligation if 
they lack the agency required to do so146. 
Even if one accepts that obligations do exist between family members or friends, 
this is not to say that these obligations are the only consideration; the NHS, as a 
publically funded institution premised on notions of equality of access, may have an 
obligation to impartially allocate healthcare resources according to strictly medical 
factors. For this reason, the NHS may have strong justification for choosing not to 
                                                          
144 Price D, (2008) op. cit. p1541  
145 Pure self-interest should be distinguished from self-interest entangled with others‘ interests. If one agrees 
to donate an organ to a family member, then there is some entanglement of interests. If one agrees only to 
for a deceased relative‘s organs to be donated to oneself, then this is purely self-interested. 
146 One concern is that if it is the next-of-kin making the decision to donate the organs, then the next-of-kin 
is essentially the agent, and there may be an argument that the next-of-kin should be able to direct an organ 
to her friend/family member even if that person is not a family member or friend of the dead patient.  
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facilitate the sorts of directed donations that reflect special obligations between family 
members/friends147.  
The NHS does appear to accept the existence of, and act upon, the special 
obligations that arise between family members and friends, as evidenced by the living 
donation programme in the UK and the March 2010 policy revision. It seems, however, 
that these are regarded only as prima facie obligations, and that other concerns can 
over-ride them. For instance, the 2010 policy revision still gives super-urgent patients 
priority over family members, so although special obligations appear to garner some 
consideration, they are only one of a larger set of considerations. 
2.3.3 Justice/fairness/equality vs autonomy 
The most common arguments against accepting conditional and directed donations 
hinge upon the related ideas of justice, fairness and equality. Pennings, for instance, 
recognises that the positive consequence of saving a life carries some weight, but 
considers directed donations on the basis of non-medical criteria to be violating too 
many deontological constraints to be acceptable148. He asserts that society does not 
want to maximise the number of organs available at any cost, and states that instead it 
wants to maximise the amount of organs available within a set of normative ethical 
rules. The balance between maximising the number of available organs and the 
constraints of the other normative rules is something that Pennings does not 
specifically justify. He does, however, state that some deontological rules express the 
character of the donation, and that by removing some deontological constraints (such 
as altruism or voluntariness) the donation would no longer be a gift.  
 Pennings states that distributive justice comes to the fore when resources are 
scarce, and that for a donation system to be fair and egalitarian, only morally relevant 
                                                          
147 This is not to say that conditional and directed donations should not be permitted however; there would 
perhaps still be scope for them to be permitted outside the NHS, within the realms of private healthcare 
which is not generally grounded on the same ideal of equal access.  
148 Pennings G, (2007) op. cit. pp41-49 
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criteria should be used to make allocation decisions149. Criteria such as race, social 
class and religion are arguably not morally relevant and would be best described as 
subjective non-medical criteria150. The egalitarian position described by Pennings is 
founded on the claim that every person has an equal right to live, and although some 
people may argue that this is a false claim, it is a claim that underpins many aspects of 
public policy.   
 A statement from the Transplantation Society (an organisation aiming to provide 
the focus for global leadership in transplantation151) declares that ―the allocation of 
organs from deceased donors should be based on the principles of justice, equality, and 
utility‖152. Price seems to agree that the transplant system should at least appear to be 
just, saying in relation to a case with racist conditions ―it was correct to reject the gift 
even if the same recipient would have received the organ in any event, as an 
appearance of injustice would otherwise be generated and would be just as potentially 
detrimental to the image of fairness in distribution‖153. 
Conflicting with broader societal concerns such as fairness and equality is the 
respect for individual wishes and preferences that forms an important part of what is 
taken to be autonomy. Pennings states that the principle of autonomy implies that one 
has the right to make important decisions in one‘s own life, and that this includes the 
right to ―do what he or she thinks is right‖154. Some respect for autonomy is present in 
existing law and policy, since consent is sought for organ donation; were autonomy not 
important, routinely retrieving organs without consent may be less objectionable. 
During life, people can choose what they donate time, money or effort to and their 
decisions will often reflect their values and beliefs. Pennings suggests that some people 
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151 Transplantation Society 'Vision Statement', Available at: 
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might consider the right to autonomy to extend to specifying recipients or types of 
recipients, and again such decisions could stem from the individual‘s values and beliefs. 
This sort of argument holds some intuitive appeal, especially when one considers what 
happens generally to possessions and wishes after death. One can choose to whom one 
leaves possessions via a will, and given this is an acceptable means of disposing of 
possessions, maybe the same should apply to organs. Decisions about the disposal of 
possessions can leave a long-lasting memory and impression of individuals‘ lives after 
their deaths, and arguably people should have some control over how they are 
remembered. It is, of course, true that organs are not possessions in the sense of being 
property that is owned, but some control over what they are used for is permitted; an 
individual can choose whether her organs are donated for transplantation or research, 
for instance, which is a variant of direction.  
 Pennings disagrees with this argument, claiming that whilst people are allowed 
to choose who receives their time or money, they are not allowed to choose who lives 
and dies. Pennings‘ claim seems incorrect, however. By choosing to give money to one 
life-saving charity over another, one can effectively choose who lives or dies, or more 
precisely, what type of people live or die. One can choose to donate time or money to a 
famine relief charity which works in Ethiopia, rather than give time or money to an 
earthquake aid charity responding to a specific disaster in Japan, for instance. This sort 
of picking and choosing is allowed and moreover it is commonplace155. It could be 
argued that giving money is not the same as giving an organ, on the basis that an 
organ is itself a life-saving resource whereas money simply allows life-saving resources 
to be obtained. This additional step in the chain does not seem morally relevant, 
however. Donating a food parcel to a disaster relief charity would be donating a life-
                                                          
155 Of course, something is not morally acceptable just because it is commonplace. Lots of wrongdoing is 
commonplace. Highlighting some practices as ‗commonplace‘ or ‗generally acceptable‘ here is merely 
intended to highlight inconsistencies between attitudes to, and perceptions of, conditional and directed 
donations and other practices. It may be that the perceptions of conditional donation are incorrect, but 
equally it may be that the perceptions of other practices are incorrect.  
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saving resource, yet one could still choose a disaster relief charity working in one 
country over another charity working in another. 
 Pennings also fails to make clear the extent to which it is permissible to choose 
who lives or dies, or at least fails to recognise the full implications of his statement. In 
one sense, making a decision about whether or not to donate one‘s organs could be 
seen as making choices about who lives or dies; if one chooses to donate a liver but not 
a heart, then one is choosing to potentially save the lives of people who need liver 
transplants but not people who need heart transplants. So in order for Pennings to be 
consistent, he would have to endorse an ‗all or nothing‘ approach to organ donation, 
where donors either donate all of their organs or none of their organs. Yet even 
choosing to donate or not donate potentially has an effect upon who lives or dies (since 
choosing to not donate organs increases the likelihood of people who need transplants 
dying). A further problem that Pennings encounters is that someone has to choose who 
lives or dies; if it is not the donor, it will fall to medical staff, and it is not obvious that 
their position gives them additional moral authority to decide who should live and die 
(despite the fact that this is routinely what happens in practice, as discussed in Chapter 
10). 
 Pennings goes on to sum up the problem by saying ―[t]he broader philosophical 
question raised by these considerations is to what extent the society should recognise 
specific preferences and value judgements of individual citizens and to what extent the 
society should contribute and support these preferences‖156.  
 Ankeny describes the situation in a similar way: 
A tradition of liberal pluralism grounds respect for individual preferences and 
affirmation of competing conceptions of the good. But we struggle to maintain 
(or at times explicitly reject) this tradition in the face of individual preferences 
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that we find distasteful, suspect, or even repugnant, especially where the 
broader social good or respect for equality is at stake157.  
 
 As Pennings correctly states though, the real issue is about more than just 
autonomy. Donated organs require a transplantation system in order for them to be 
utilised, and certainly under the current system this is a socially institutionalised 
system158. If the autonomy of donors who wish to conditionally donate their organs is 
to be fully respected, then the transplantation system must do more than tolerate 
people‘s wishes – the system must actively facilitate and collaborate with them. 
 
2.3.4 Gifting/altruism 
Volk and Ubel draw some distinctions that they consider to be ethically relevant. First, 
they claim that it is commonplace in our culture to direct gifts towards individuals, 
whilst directing gifts towards certain groups of people can lead to concerns about 
exclusion159. It is certainly true that it is commonplace to direct gifts towards 
individuals, but it is not also true that directing gifts towards certain groups necessarily 
leads to concerns about exclusion (and indeed they do not claim it does). Someone 
donating a large sum of money to a specific charity is unlikely to be particularly 
concerned with exclusion, but it seems inevitable that unless all the basic needs of all 
the world‘s population are being met, there will be an element of exclusion. Moreover, 
Volk and Ubel seem to suggest that it is not objectionable for certain groups (such as 
children) to be favoured so long as this is part of a publically supported allocation policy 
backed up by ethical theory160. This suggests that they are perhaps more concerned 
with the potentially objectionable reasons for wanting to include/exclude certain types 
of recipients rather than merely the consequences.  
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160 Ibid. p1543 
49 
 
Of course, many charities tend to cater for the needs of multiple groups of 
people and it might seem unusual for a charity to accept a donation on the condition 
that it was only used to help specific sub-groups defined by the donor. Some charities 
do have specific campaigns though, and it would not seem wrong (and possibly 
unlawful) to do otherwise, for money raised for a particular campaign only to be used 
to benefit those who were the focus of the campaign. One might argue that charities 
aimed at alleviating famine use images of particular starving children to highlight the 
bigger issue, and that the particular children featured in the marketing materials may 
not be the ones receiving benefit. This may be why charities tend to use language like 
―your donation will help children like [name]‖, rather than naming specific individuals 
as the recipients of aid.  What is also notable is that some charities receive much more 
media exposure than others (Comic Relief, for instance has a whole night of television 
devoted to fundraising), yet it would be absurd to suggest that donations to these 
charities were unethical and should be turned down simply because other charities do 
not have equal access to media coverage. One might argue that some charities receive 
much more exposure than others, and that this is unfair, but this does not make the 
donations to these charities unethical. 
There is a subtle difference between charities and the transplantation system in 
the UK. Because there are many charities to choose between, one can probably ensure 
that one‘s donation can be targeted only to benefit those types of people one wants to 
help. One can be partial, prejudiced and even racist, simply by choosing one charity 
over another. In the UK there is only one system available for organ donation, which 
prevents this degree of choice; if there were parallel donation systems aimed at giving 
organs to specific groups of people, it might be more akin to the charity situation. It 
would seem too strong a claim to argue that NHSBT has an obligation to offer people a 
similar level of choice when it comes to donating organs, but the weaker claim that the 
level of specificity involved in some charitable donations does not render them non-
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altruistic or non-gifting is more reasonable. Indeed, giving to charity is generally 
considered to be altruistic and a good thing even though the charity might arguably be 
considered the wrong161 charity   
Volk and Ubel draw a distinction between conditional (in the iff sense) and 
unconditional donation, by saying ―if organ donation is truly a gift then it should not be 
contingent on certain conditions‖162. The claim here is clearly that something can only 
be considered a gift if it is given without any conditions, yet this need not be the case. 
Children are often given pets by their parents on the condition that they look after the 
pet and keep its cage clean. If a child failed to agree to these conditions they would not 
be allowed a pet. 
 Volk and Ubel may be alluding to the idea that if a gift is contingent upon certain 
conditions, the giver of the gift may be considered to be getting something out of the 
gifting process. Arguably someone who gives someone money to secure a vote should 
not be considered to be generously gifting; they are giving a bribe163. It is also true 
that some gifts are given on the assumption that the giver will get something out of it; 
treating one‘s partner to a romantic weekend for two for her birthday could be a gift, 
but one would expect to be selected as the second attendee – the gift would probably 
rapidly be retracted if one were not. Something like this would be considered a gift by 
many people, yet the giver certainly gets something out of the gifting process. 
Conditional donation is not necessarily like this though, since the donor or donor family 
may receive no direct benefit themselves, other than knowing that the organ has gone 
to someone who they want it to go to (which is presumably also the case for 
unconditional donations, assuming that the donor wants the organ to go to ‗someone 
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who needs an organ‘). The bribe is also different because it is not just contingent upon 
a condition being met; it is entirely motivated by something external being introduced 
into the gifting transaction (a vote in the case of the bribe). Although a conditional 
donation may be contingent upon a condition being met, it need not be motivated by 
the condition. For instance, a person may be motivated to donate her organs by a 
desire to help other people in need, but not want her donation to help people who have 
caused their own poor health. 
Price seems to consider directed donations to be compatible with gifting, as 
suggested by his comments in relation to a scenario presented by Neuberger and 
Mayer164. In the scenario a father has been declared brain-dead, but has a poorly 
daughter who requires a liver transplant. The family agree to donate the father‘s liver 
(and only the liver) on the condition that it is split, and one half of the split liver is 
transplanted to the daughter. Commenting on this, Price says ―(t)here is no self-
servingness here and it is indeed a gift which the father could have made as a living 
donor before death had he been compatible and well enough‖165. Price has sympathy 
for a donation such as this because it is well-intentioned, yet he also describes badly-
intentioned directed donations as gifts, too. Commenting on another of Neuberger and 
Mayer‘s scenarios, this time involving racist directions, he states ―it was correct to 
reject the gift‖166. He goes on to say that ―(s)ome forms of conditional donation might 
indeed be legitimate. It is a gift from the individual after all‖167. This makes an 
insightful point: in everyday life gifts do reflect the specific individual giver‘s 
relationships and values. Gifts are given to friends, families, communities, churches and 
charities – these are all directed, and this direction does not ordinarily detract from the 
gifting nature. Indeed, there are very few gifts that are given to ‗humanity in general‘.  
                                                          
164 Neuberger J and Mayer D, (2008) op. cit. p1529 
165 Price D, (2008) op. cit. p1542 
166 Ibid. p1541 
167 Ibid. p1541 
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  There is clearly disagreement over the nature of gifting and conditional and 
directed organ donation. Volk and Ubel appear to think that ‗if and only if‘ conditionality 
renders a donation a non-gift, yet Price disagrees. Volk and Ubel‘s assessment of gifting 
raises the questions of why it is the concern of individuals to ensure that their gifts do 
not exclude groups of people, and why is it important for organs to be gifted in a way 
that is not exclusive or conditional. In this respect, they appear to be placing 
constraints on gifting within the organ donation context (where gifting seemingly has to 
be impartially disinterested) that do not apply to gifting in everyday life (where gifting 
can involve self-interest and even expectation of reciprocity). It is possible that gifting 
in organ donation means something slightly different from gifting in everyday life.  
 
The gift relationship has been widely discussed since organ donation first 
started168, and at least part of the justification for referring to gifting is to keep organ 
donation separated from organ trading169. Indeed, the way that gifting is used seems to 
suggest that within the context of organ donation, a gift is something that is given 
freely with no explicit restrictions placed on its use170. But this cannot be consistently 
applied, since organs can be donated solely for the purposes of research (which is an 
explicit restriction on the use of the organs), and this is still considered a gift.  
 
2.3.5 Why is this important? 
If conditional and directed donations cause such controversy and disagreement, it may 
be tempting to suggest that the UK is better off rejecting them. Anything that risks 
losing public faith in the transplantation system could result in donation rates 
decreasing, with a subsequent increase in waiting times and deaths on the waiting lists. 
It is possible, however, that allowing some or all conditional or directed donations 
                                                          
168 Titmuss RM, 'The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy', (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1971)  
169 Delmonico FL et al., 'Ethical Incentives Not Payment for Organ Donation', New England Journal of Medicine 
346 (2002) pp2002-05 
170 Volk ML and Ubel PA, (2008) op. cit. pp1542-4 
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might have a positive impact upon donation rates; after all, rejecting organs because 
they have conditions attached is effectively wasting a life-saving or life-improving 
resource. There does appear to be some public support for some conditional and 
directed donation. An Ipsos-Mori poll funded by University Hospital Birmingham 
Charities, and written-up by Neuberger and Mayer171, asked the public a number of 
questions about the acceptability of different kinds of conditional and directed donation. 
The results showed that although support for some groups of people having priority 
was fairly widespread (one question found that 59% of participants believed that 
children should have priority for organs, and another question found that 36% of 
participants believed it was acceptable for family members to have priority), this did 
not extend to controversial conditions such as race-based allocation. 79% of total 
participants felt that it was unacceptable for conditions to be placed on the basis of race 
(but 4% thought it was very acceptable, 9% thought it to be fairly acceptable and the 
remaining 8% answered ‗it depends‘ or had no opinion)172. Whilst these statistics say 
nothing about the likely impact upon donation rates, or indeed whether many people 
would want to place conditions or directions on organs themselves, they do at least 
show that there are large numbers of people who do not agree with the DH report‘s 
conclusion that all conditions are unacceptable, and there are even some people who 
deem race-based conditions to be acceptable.   
Some people are removed from the ODR when they are told that they are not 
allowed to set conditions on their donations. From 1st April – 31st March 2011, a total of 
13,900 people removed themselves from the ODR for reasons other than death, and 40 
of these people were removed173 from the ODR because they set conditions174. 
Although 40 people may seem insignificant when compared with the number of people 
                                                          
171 Neuberger J and Mayer D, 'Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of the UK General Public Findings of an 
Ipsos-Mori Poll', Transplantation 85 (2008) pp1545-47 
172 Ibid.  
173 It is not clear whether these were self-removed or otherwise 
174 Michael Patrick, Statistics and Clinical Audit, NHS Blood and Transplant: Letter to G Moorlock, 25/08/2011 
(Appendix 2) 
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already on the ODR, any loss of potential donors may have an impact on the number of 
lives saved by transplantation. It is worth noting that these 40 people are those who 
were removed from the ODR; there may be many more people on the ODR who would 
want conditions placed on their donations, and there may be people who do not join the 
ODR because they are unable to place conditions on their donation. 
The simple truth, as Radcliffe-Richards suggests, is: ―we have no idea how much 
effect the principle of unconditionality has on supply‖175. There is a risk that permitting 
conditional donations would reduce long-term donation rates, but there is equally a risk 
that continuing to prohibit them may put off some potential donors.  
Regardless of the impact upon donation rates, there may be good reasons to 
permit conditional and directed donations. It is clear from existing policy that 
maximising donation rates is not the over-riding aim of transplant policy (since 
donation rates would increase significantly if organs were compulsorily retrieved from 
dead people), so it may be that other factors such as autonomy are also relevant when 
considering what is acceptable. As discussed, some people have argued that close 
relationships form moral obligations between individuals, and it is possible that by 
prohibiting conditional and directed donations, the state may be preventing individuals 
from fulfilling the obligations that they have.  
 Moreover, the Organ Donation Taskforce made a number of specific 
recommendations relating to organ donation, two of which suggest that further 
research on conditional and directed donation is necessary. Recommendation 3 states 
that: 
  Urgent attention is required to resolve outstanding legal, ethical and professional 
issues in order to ensure that all clinicians are supported and are able to work 
                                                          
175 Radcliffe-Richards J, (2012) op. cit. p178 
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within a clear and unambiguous framework of good practice.176 
 
 Although attempts have been made to produce a clear and unambiguous 
framework of good practice, some of these attempts have served to muddy the waters. 
For instance the 2010 DH Guidance177 attempted to provide clear guidance on handling 
requests for directed allocation of organs, but has actually introduced new principles 
that appear to contradict those of the DH Panel in 2000178.  Inconsistencies still exist 
between the deceased and living donation systems, and these inconsistencies require 
either clear justification or resolution.  
 
Recommendation 13 from the Taskforce‘s report states that: 
 
There is an urgent requirement to identify and implement the most effective 
methods through which organ donation and the ‗gift of life‘ can be promoted to 
the general public, and specifically to the BME [Black and Ethnic Minority] 
population. Research should be commissioned through Department of Health 
research and development funding.179 
 
 If, as some suggest180, conditional and directed donation might incline minority 
groups (such as people of South Asian ethnicity) to donate their organs, then allowing 
these sorts of donations might be an effective method of promoting organ donation to 
BME populations. Conversely, if the prospect of conditional and directed donations 
eroded faith in the organ donation system, or created a perception of increased 
                                                          
176 Department of Health (2008) 'Organs for Transplants: A Report from the Organ Donation Taskforce', 
Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_082122, 
Last Accessed: 31/10/2012 p9 
177 Department of Health (2010) op. cit.  
178 Department of Health (2000) op. cit.  
179 Department of Health (2008) op. cit. p18 
180 Radcliffe-Richards J, (2012) op. cit. p177 
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unfairness, this could have a particularly negative impact upon BME groups for whom 
there is already a mistrust of systems such as the NHS181.  
 In short, a decision has to be made on what the aims of the transplantation 
system in the UK should be. There is a drive to increase the number of donors in order 
to save or improve more lives, yet some donations of medically useable organs are 
turned away in the interests of justice, fairness and impartiality. At the same time, 
within living donation, ideas such as justice, fairness and impartiality seem to be less 
important, with more emphasis on individual autonomy and permissible partiality. 
Deceased donation and living donation have the same aim of obtaining organs for 
transplantation, yet acceptable allocation of the organs differs according to the 
circumstances in which the organs are obtained. 
 Chapters 3-7 will consider some of the philosophical elements of organ donation, 
and in particular conditional and directed donation. The aim of these chapters is to lay 
the groundwork for the qualitative study and perform some of the background 
philosophy necessary for later discussion.  
 
                                                          
181 Morgan M et al., (2006) op. cit. pp226-34 
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Chapter 3 - Philosophical Introduction and Groundwork 
This chapter will start with some philosophical scene-setting, and lay the groundwork 
for further analysis. This is necessary because the concept of organ donation is clouded 
by conflicts and contradictions, some of which need to be resolved decisively so that 
further analysis can be built upon solid foundations. 
Chapter 4 will examine the philosophy of altruism and partiality. Two main 
accounts of altruism will be examined in detail, and Cottingham‘s defence of partiality 
will also be presented. This will provide some theoretical underpinnings for further 
discussion in the next chapter, with particular regard to DH policy on conditional and 
directed donations.  
Chapter 5 will explain and analyse current policy on conditional donation, and 
explore the philosophical reasoning behind the restrictions placed on permissible types 
of organ donation. It will next consider the demands and restrictions that these place 
on individuals and whether these can withstand ethical scrutiny. It will then consider 
whether conditional and directed donation might be compatible with these restrictions, 
or otherwise ethically permissible.  Here it will be argued that the definition of altruism 
used by the DH combines some features of the strictly rational account proposed by 
Nagel, whilst also incorporating features of the more emotional account put forward by 
Blum. This results in the DH appearing to endorse a type of hybrid altruism which is 
incoherent. This can be reconciled by embracing the view that there are different sorts 
of altruism, and that an action is not simply either altruistic or non-altruistic. Instead it 
is suggested that it is possible for one action to be more, or less, altruistic than 
another.  
Chapter 6 will look at conditional and directed donation from the perspective of 
potential organ recipients and will argue that these people have basic obligations 
towards one another. It will be argued that conditional and directed donations would 
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not necessarily conflict with those obligations and that, from the perspective of 
recipients, accepting conditional donations can be viewed as a positive thing. 
Chapter 7 will look in-depth at the responsibilities of the NHS and relevant 
transplant authorities with a view to establishing the impact that conditional and 
directed donation could have upon these. It will be argued that conditional donations 
require more than just allowing and that they need to be actively facilitated. Some 
might claim that this implicates the NHS and transplant authorities in unsavoury 
activities. However, it will be argued that, at worst, the NHS and transplant authorities 
can be accused of furthering wrongful ends, and that the eventual ends (saving or 
improving lives) may justify this as a means. It is argued that it might be justifiable to 
accept donations with even the most objectionable conditions attached, if the 
consequences are sufficiently good. 
3.1 Introduction 
By considering the philosophical aspects of organ donation in more detail, it has 
become apparent that some aspects of the concept of organ donation are potentially 
misleading. This is probably a result of how donation is marketed to the public; the 
aims of marketing campaigns are to increase donation rates, and some of the details 
and technicalities have understandably been sacrificed in order to achieve these aims. A 
very brief analysis of these details now will provide clarity for later in this analysis.     
3.2 The nature of organ transplantation 
It is tempting to regard organ donation as a one-off event that occurs following the 
death of an individual. A person dies, her organs are retrieved, and donation is 
complete. But in reality, and particularly within the context of the UK NHS, organ 
transplantation is a longer process with implications before the death of the donor, 
around the time of death of the donor and after the death of the donor; and these 
implications reach beyond the donor. 
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 Thinking of organ donation as a single event does not accurately reflect the 
complexity of the process, and ignores many morally relevant features of deceased 
organ donation. For instance, a person may make her wishes and decisions about 
donation known during her lifetime and these may have an impact on her life (she 
might enjoy a general sense of wellbeing, a certain comfort in knowing that if she dies 
her organs will go to good use, and she might also enjoy the respect and admiration of 
her friends and family). Leading up to death, treatment to facilitate organ donation may 
differ from the standard end-of-life management of non-donors182. The organ donation 
process might also impact significantly on family members (possibly providing them 
with comfort, distress or worry about whether they are doing the right thing). Thinking 
of organ donation as a process allows these issues to be taken into consideration, 
whereas effectively reducing organ donation to organ retrieval would lead to these 
factors being ignored. 
 Assuming that donation is a process, it starts as soon as an individual expresses 
a wish to donate her organs, be it via the Organ Donor Register (ODR) or a discussion 
with family members. If the process does not start here, it seems difficult to think 
where it could start. One might argue that the process of becoming an organ donor 
starts with whatever causes a preliminary interest in becoming a donor (for instance, 
seeing NHSBT publicity material), but until an individual has taken active measures to 
put their wishes into action (or potential action), it would seem incorrect to think of 
them as an organ donor. Although the physical retrieval of organs starts after a patient 
dies, this cannot be regarded at the start of the process if the notion of donation is to 
be meaningful. Although the deceased person is regarded as the person doing the 
donating, it makes no sense to consider someone performing an action after their own 
death. Donation must, in order to count as donation, require agency on the part of the 
                                                          
182 This treatment is the subject of controversy. Examples include the use of Heparin: Motta ED, 'The Ethics of 
Heparin Administration to the Potential Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donor', Journal of Professional Nursing 21 
(2005) pp97-102, and elective ventilation Browne A, Gillett G, and Tweeddale M, 'Elective Ventilation: Reply 
to Kluge', Bioethics 14 (2000) pp248-53 
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donor, and since agency is absent after death, the donation process must commence 
during life.  
3.3 Who is the donor? 
Consent for organ donation in the UK is generally obtained from the next-of-kin. The 
next-of-kin will ordinarily be told whether or not their relative is on the ODR, and this is 
regarded as an indication of that person‘s wishes. The next-of-kin do not have to 
respect this wish, however, and can veto organ donation if they want to183. Despite the 
fact that it is the next-of-kin who generally make the final donation decision, it is the 
dead person who is regarded as the donor. There is a point to this beyond semantic 
pedantry, and that is that if organ donation is supposed to be altruistic, it is important 
to know who is supposed to be acting altruistically. Also, if organ donation is supposed 
to be a praiseworthy act, it is important to know who should be praised. 
 If a person has joined the ODR and had discussions with their next-of-kin 
making it clear that they would like their organs to be donated if possible, then that 
person should clearly be regarded as the donor. They have clearly thought about 
donation, and taken active measures to ensure that it happens after their death. If 
organ donation is praiseworthy, then this person is deserving of praise.  
A seriously ill or dying person will probably not be on the ODR (as only 30% of 
the UK‘s population are currently registered184). Some people may have expressed a 
wish to donate organs to their family but not joined the ODR. In these cases the most 
promising way of establishing the views of the individual towards organ donation is to 
speak to relatives. In other cases, a person may not have explicitly discussed organ 
donation, but they may have generally lived their life wanting to help other people. 
Their next-of-kin may agree to organ donation on the basis that it is what the person 
                                                          
183 The right to family veto is not protected by law, but in practice it is generally respected. There is much 
debate about whether this is the right or wrong approach. See Wilkinson TM, (2012) op. cit.  
184NHSBT (2012) 'Transplant Activity Report - Organ Donor Register', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/transplant_activity_report/current_activity_reports/ukt/nhs_
organ_donor_register.pdf, Last Accessed: 26/10/2012  
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would have wanted, had they been able to make the decision themselves.  Even though 
the dying patient may not make the final decision herself, it seems correct in these 
instances to regard the patient as the donor, since the decision is based upon her 
beliefs and values as perceived by her relatives. The deceased person is not the 
decision-making agent, but if the decision is made on the basis of the values and 
beliefs of the deceased, there ought to be some recognition of this.  
 In cases where, in life, a deceased person has never spoken of organ donation 
and her wishes, value and beliefs are genuinely unknown, it would fall to her next-of-
kin to make decisions about donation. In an instance such as this, it is less clear who 
should count as the donor. In one sense the body of the deceased person is the vehicle 
for donation, but cases such as these are more complex than this, given how people 
tend to regard organ donation. Donation is marketed as a praiseworthy act and a good 
thing to do, but it would appear absolutely wrong to praise a deceased person for 
something that they have had no control over. It cannot be claimed that the deceased 
person is altruistically motivated, since she is not motivated at all. In these cases, it 
seems reasonable to regard the next-of-kin as being the donors, since it is the next-of-
kin who will ultimately make the decision about whether or not to proceed with 
donation.  
 In conclusion, as this last example suggests, the next-of-kin can be regarded as 
donors in some cases, but it actually makes sense to think of them as donors in all 
cases if one wants to achieve a coherent view of the donation process. The next-of kin 
are able to over-rule the deceased‘s wishes and veto donation, or permit donation even 
if the deceased was opposed (as long as this fact is not disclosed). Indeed, the next-of-
kin generally make the final decision on whether organs are donated, so they ought to 
be considered as being actively involved in the donation. The organ donation process 
involves more than just the physical movement of organs, and acknowledging the 
sacrifices/donation made by the family is important. If organ donation must be 
62 
 
altruistic consideration needs to be given to both the dead person‘s motivations and 
their next-of-kin‘s. 
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Chapter 4 - Altruism and regarding others 
In the 2000 report discussed in the Chapter 2, the DH stated that no organs with 
conditions attached should be accepted, since placing conditions on organs ―offends 
against the fundamental principle that organs are donated altruistically and should go 
to patients in the greatest need‖185. Although described as a single principle, it actually 
expressed two; that organs should be donated altruistically and that organs should go 
to patients in greatest need. It may, therefore, be fruitful first to examine the 
underlying principle of altruism to determine whether this can justify the DH‘s and 
HTA‘s position on conditional and directed organ donation, before moving on to 
consider allocation. 
4.1 Altruism in the philosophical literature 
Although it is often stated that altruism underpins many deceased organ donation 
systems, little attention is given to what altruism actually is. Precise definitions of the 
concept are not offered, although they can be inferred from the way in which the term 
is employed. These definitions may differ from the more complex definitions found in 
the philosophical literature. Altruism features in a number of different theories linked to 
areas as diverse as biology and economics186. The most relevant theories within the 
context of organ donation are those that link altruism to morality, and with this in mind 
the candidates considered in this thesis are going to be philosophical accounts of 
altruism. 
 Two characterisations of altruism will be outlined here, and although there is 
some overlap, these two types will be shown to result in stark differences between 
what does and does not count as altruistic. These two characterisations have been 
chosen because they are the most developed and coherent accounts of altruism in the 
                                                          
185 Department of Health (2000) op. cit. p1 
186 Becker GS, 'Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology', Journal of Economic 
Literature 14 (1976) pp817-26 
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current philosophical literature and because they illustrate how much fundamental 
disagreement there is about what altruism entails.  
4.2 Nagel‘s pure altruism 
Altruism as described by Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism187 can be regarded as ‗pure 
altruism‘ as it is not ‗clouded‘ by emotion or self-interest. Nagel‘s account of altruism is 
particularly demanding and is rather specific; Nagel states that the altruism he 
describes is ―not to be confused with a generalized affection for the human race. It is 
not a feeling‖188.  
 Nagel takes as the basis of his argument some ideas about what motivates us to 
act, and specifically what motivates us to act in the interests of other people. Here he 
aligns himself against the view that the source of all motivation to act is desire189. In 
order to do this, he points out a supposed confusion between motivated and 
unmotivated desires. An unmotivated desire is one that ―simply assails us‖190 and 
includes appetites and certain emotions. Motivated desires, on the other hand, are 
desires that are arrived at after rational deliberation. If one has a sudden thirst, this 
would be an unmotivated desire. If one, on the basis of this thirst discovers that there 
is nothing to drink in one‘s house and has a subsequent desire to go to the shops, this 
can be considered a desire motivated by thirst. Nagel states that in order for the claim 
that desires underlie every act to be true, one must include both motivated and 
unmotivated desires but then this does not say anything about the actual motivational 
force behind an act. When one has a motivation to pursue a certain goal, a desire to 
pursue that goal is a logical consequence, but this does not express anything about 
what the motivation actually is. As Montmarquet states, ―unless a motivated desire is, 
in turn, motivated by an unmotivated one, we don't yet know what the motivational 
                                                          
187Nagel T, 'The Possibility of Altruism', (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1978)  
188 Ibid. p1 
189 Ibid. p27 
190 Ibid. p29 
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source of the action is‖191. Nagel argues that reasons are capable of being this source of 
motivation.  
 In order to act altruistically, according to Nagel, the interests of others must 
provide one with a reason to act in a certain way, and for this to be the case one must 
consider oneself to be one person amongst many. In his own words: ―[i]n any situation 
in which there is reason for one person to promote some end, we must be able to 
discover an end which there is reason for anyone to promote, should he be in a position 
to do so.‖192 
 Nagel‘s definition of a reason for acting is ―a predicate R, such that for all 
persons p and events A, if R is true of A, then p has prima facia reason to promote 
A‖193. He distinguishes between two types of reason; objective and subjective. A 
subjective reason is one where the predicate R contains ―a free occurrence of the 
variable p‖194. The occurrence of the variable p within predicate R entails that the 
reason will only provide someone with a motivation to perform an action if she knows 
her place in the situation. In contrast: ―[a] reason is objective if it commits one to 
valuing certain states of affairs regardless who is involved in them‖195. This is explained 
clearly by Darwall: 
‗A is in one‘s interest‘, ‗A is what one desires‘, or ‗A is good from one‘s own point 
of view‘, if they are reasons to act, are subjective reasons… Objective reasons are 
all reasons which are not subjective; for example ‗A will be in someone‘s interest‘ 
or ‗A will benefit Thomas Nagel‘.196 
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In order to act altruistically according to Nagel, one must act for objective 
reasons197. Nagel gives the example of someone who finds himself in the path of an 
oncoming truck. By removing himself from the path of the truck, this person‘s life can 
be prolonged, which would generally be taken to be in that person‘s interests. That 
person‘s reason to get out of the way of the truck can be formulated objectively as ‗the 
act (of getting out of the way) will prolong someone‘s life‘. This provides an objective 
reason to act, and is therefore a reason that anyone can have to promote that act. 
Someone acting according to this reason, who helps the person get out of the way of 
the truck, can be said to be acting altruistically.  
4.3 Blum – emotions and altruism 
Nagel‘s account of altruism is unflinchingly focussed on rationality and practical 
reasoning, and deliberately avoids basing altruism on ―intermediate factors such as 
one‘s own interests or one‘s antecedent sentiments of sympathy and benevolence‖198. 
In this sense it is a strict and pure version of altruism, unwilling to account for the sorts 
of benevolent emotions that one might experience throughout life. This is not a 
significant criticism of Nagel‘s account as this is exactly what he set out to achieve, but 
there are other forms of altruism that frame other-regarding behaviour and altruistic 
emotions as valuable. 
 One such example is Blum‘s account, in which he argues against the Kantian 
notion that all emotions are ―transitory, changeable and capricious‖ and that actions 
motivated in some significant way by emotions are likely to be ―inconsistent, 
unprincipled or even irrational‖199.  
                                                          
197 The position that Nagel defends shares some similarities with Kant‘s work. Nagel himself notes these 
similarities, suggesting that both he and Kant provide accounts of moral motivation that do ―not rely on the 
assumption that a motivational factor is already present among the conditions of any moral requirement‖ 
(Nagel, p11). A second similarity is that both Nagel‘s and Kant‘s work argue that an aspect of the agent‘s 
conception of himself plays a role in the operation of moral motives (Nagel T, (1978) op. cit. p12). 
198 Nagel T, (1978) op. cit. p16 
199 Blum LA, 'Friendship, Altruism, and Morality', (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) p2 
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 Blum‘s argument is guided by the judgment that ―it is good to be sympathetic, 
compassionate, concerned, and caring for other human beings‖200 and that these 
qualities are linked with morality. Sympathy, compassion, concern and care are what 
Blum terms ―altruistic emotions‖201, and Blum argues that these differ from other 
emotions in a way that allows this link to morality. He claims that true altruistic 
emotions involve a motivational aspect, ―relating to the promotion of beneficent acts 
aimed at helping the other person‖202. Blum distinguishes between altruistic emotions 
and moods which may lead to beneficent action. If one found oneself in a particularly 
cheerful mood, one might feel more inclined to act beneficently towards others. 
However, this mood is exactly the kind of ―transitory, changeable, and capricious‖203 
state that Kant was so wary of. It is also perfectly plausible that this cheerful mood 
might fail to result in beneficent acts, or that one might act altruistically despite being 
in a much less-than-beneficent mood. Altruistic emotions, in contrast to moods, 
―involve an appreciation of another person‘s situation regarding his weal and woe‖204, 
and it is from this appreciation that beneficent acts originate205.  
 The Kantian view, according to Blum, mischaracterises these altruistic emotions 
and denies them the moral weight that they deserve. Blum‘s criticism of Kant here also 
applies to Nagel. Blum argues that altruistic emotions themselves form a part of the 
good of beneficent acts. For example, if one sees someone having problems with a 
computer before a deadline, and one chooses to help them out of sympathy for that 
person‘s plight, that person will receive the good of having their computer problem 
sorted, but in addition would value one‘s act as ―expressive of the human sympathy 
and compassion it showed‖206. If it turned out that one had chosen to help because one 
                                                          
200 Ibid. p7 
201 Ibid. p12 
202 Ibid. p13 
203 Ibid. p2 
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205 For Blum, altruistic emotions lead to beneficent action, but beneficent action alone does not entail the 
presence of altruistic emotions. A joyful mood could also lead to beneficent action, but this, according to 
Blum, would not be altruistic because it is not a genuine altruistic emotion. 
206 Blum LA, (1980) op. cit. p144 
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was an IT professional and expected payment for one‘s services, the lack of an 
expressed altruistic emotion would change the nature and extent of the good given. 
 Blum discusses Kant‘s famous passage in Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals207, which describes a person whose situation has clouded his mind with personal 
sorrow to the extent that he can no longer feel sympathy for the plight of others. 
However, purely out of a sense of duty, this person acts beneficently towards others 
(and in doing this, according to Kant, does something of genuine moral worth). A case 
such as this is designed to illustrate the unreliability of emotions as a moral motive. 
Blum, however, argues that altruistic emotions are not unreliable in this way. 
 Blum distinguishes between altruistic sentiments, emotions and attitudes, and 
argues that some involve a stronger desire for another person‘s good than others. His 
example of a ‗weak‘ altruistic sentiment is that of well-wishing, which although 
involving a regard for another person‘s good, fails to imply a sufficiently strong desire 
to act beneficently if doing so would be particularly inconvenient. Blum‘s differentiation 
between altruistic sentiments and altruistic emotions helps him to justify his claim that 
altruistic emotions are reliable. Altruistic emotions, may involve desires of various 
strengths, but according to Blum have a minimum threshold strength of desire208. 
Anything that falls beneath this threshold cannot be considered an altruistic emotion, 
and the attitudes and sentiments that fall beneath this threshold would be vulnerable to 
criticisms of unreliability. By necessarily entailing a high strength of desire for another‘s 
good, altruistic emotions are reliable moral motives, and the higher the strength of the 
desire, the more reliable they are. 
 Blum further defends the reliability of altruistic emotions by arguing that 
although ―negative moods and states of mind can have an effect on our altruistic 
feelings, they do not typically extinguish existing ones or necessarily prevent potential 
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ones‖209. According to Blum, altruistic emotions can survive negative moods, and be 
responsible for us acting contrary to these negative moods. As a response to Kant‘s 
example, Blum states that personal sorrow would be unlikely to remove one‘s 
sympathy for another person for whom one has previously felt sympathy. If one 
performed an act of beneficence towards this person in these circumstances, it could 
still be performed out of sympathy. He accepts that the beneficent act could be 
performed out of duty (as claimed by Kant), and that a deep sorrow could remove 
one‘s sympathy for another person, but does not see these as necessarily true. Blum‘s 
argument is not that negative moods cannot extinguish altruistic emotions, but that 
they do not necessarily do so. According to Blum, altruistic emotions may be, to some 
extent, affected by negative moods, but are not controlled by them210.     
4.4 Altruism, partiality and self-interest 
These different accounts of altruism, although sharing some aspect of other-
regardingness, differ significantly in the sorts of actions that they consider to be 
altruistic. Nagel‘s strictly reason-based approach to altruism is less permissive than 
Blum‘s emotion-based account, which means that the results of their applications are 
quite different. 
4.4.1 Applying Nagel 
If, as demanded by Nagel, in order to be altruistic one has to consider oneself just one 
amongst many and afford no extra weight to one‘s own subjective reasons, altruism is 
clearly going to involve some level of impartiality. Whether absolute impartiality is 
demanded is, however, unclear. A distinction can be drawn between subjective and 
objective partiality; 
i) Subjective partiality favours one person over another because of 
some feature of them that relates to the agent making the decision 
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ii) Objective partiality favours one person over another because of 
some feature of them that relates to anybody (this is the sort of partiality in 
action when organs are allocated according to greatest need, for example) 
 Subjective partiality is the sort of partiality that Nagel does not permit. If 
confronted with two drowning people, one of whom was one‘s brother, one could not 
choose to favour one‘s brother because he was one‘s brother and still claim for this to 
be altruistic.  
An alternative might be to permit a sort of objective partiality that is not based 
upon one‘s relationship with someone, but instead some impersonal feature of that 
individual. So for instance, if one is presented with two drowning people with whom one 
has no relationship, but one can see that one is very old and the other is very young, 
one might choose to favour the very young person because of one‘s belief that the 
younger person potentially had more life ahead of him. Partiality of this sort is objective 
to the extent that the partiality is not based upon any relationship between the rescuer 
and the rescued. However, this sort of partiality is still, to some extent personal and 
subjective – since it is based on one‘s preference for youth, which may not be shared 
by everyone. Although this partiality is more objective, it may fall short of the strict 
objectivity required by Nagel.  
Nagel discusses some issues relating to partiality in his chapter entitled ‗The 
Consequences‘. Nagel‘s account of altruism outlined thus far provides only prima facie 
reasons for considering others. He describes the difficulty that one faces when one 
considers the interests and reasons of others, especially where they come into conflict 
(and indeed the same conflict arises when one‘s own interests clash with those of 
another person)211. In order to make the leap from prima facie reasons to what one 
should actually do, one requires what Nagel refers to as a ‗combinatorial principle‘212. 
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The problem that Nagel faces in suggesting a suitable combinatorial principle is that 
individuals will have subjective reasons for preferring certain combinatorial principles, 
and this may result in an inability to objectively select a suitable combinatorial 
principle.   
The first type of principles that Nagel rules out are the subjectively appealing 
ones that favour oneself in the conflict between oneself and another. Nagel observes 
that a principle of this nature cannot be universalised without contradiction, as the 
objective version of it would demand that everyone received preferential treatment. 
Nagel argues that this problem will be the same for any subjective principle that singles 
out one individual for preferential treatment, so one could instead seek a principle that 
is already objective and impersonal213. Yet this still would not resolve the issue. 
Individuals might still have subjective preferences for different objective principles and 
might be more likely to favour an objective principle that resulted in a better outcome 
for themselves in any given situation. This suggests that, even given the distinction 
between subjective and objective partiality above, one may still have subjective 
reasons to endorse one supposedly objective form of partiality over another. As Nagel 
says, ―[i]f individuals consider the possibilities subjectively, these factors will influence 
their preference among combinatorial principles according to their assessments of their 
own chances‖214.  
Nagel concedes this is problematic, and proposes a constraint on the choice of 
combinatorial principles available, all of which impose ―uniformity on the informational 
conditions of choice‖215. He discusses four possible solutions, although he believes at 
least two of them are completely inadequate. First, he dismisses the utilitarian 
approach, which according to Nagel attempts to settle conflict between different people 
using the same principles that would be used to settle conflicts within a single person. 
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This entails that in attempting to settle conflict between different people, one should 
treat the competing claims as if they were all due to one‘s own interests. According to 
Nagel, ―to sacrifice one individual life for another, or one individual‘s happiness for 
another‘s is very different from sacrificing one gratification for another within a single 
life‖216, and this combinatorial principle ignores this fact. 
The second principle proposed by Nagel aimed at achieving unanimity proposes 
that each person should choose a weighting system with the assumption that the life 
that she will live is randomly selected, entailing an equal possibility of living the life of 
anyone in the world (and importantly she would have that person‘s preferences, tastes 
and experiences)217. The problem with this proposal, according to Nagel, is that people 
ultimately disadvantaged by the outcomes could argue that their claims and needs 
have not been afforded the weight that they deserve, because they are regarded as 
possibilities rather than realities.  
The third principle that Nagel discusses borrows from the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance218, under which individuals have no knowledge of their identities or position 
within society. Nagel is slightly critical of this approach, suggesting that its emphasis on 
possibilities rather than actualities (similar to the previous proposal) fails to fully take 
into account the interests of the real people who lose out as a result of the veil of 
ignorance. When one considers various lives from behind the veil of ignorance, one 
views them as being possibilities – but Nagel argues that they are actualities, for these 
possible lives are lives that people actually have. This appears to be a more general 
criticism of the veil of ignorance, a full defence and analysis of which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.   
Although accepting that the Rawlsian approach might be salvageable, Nagel 
proposes a fourth possible solution. He acknowledges the obvious difficulty of this 
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solution, stating that ―I do not know how the method I am about to propose can 
actually be applied‖219, but believes that his proposal does offer adequate recognition to 
the claims of every individual being considered. Nagel‘s proposal is that the choice of a 
weighting principle should be made under the condition that ―the chooser expects to 
lead all of the lives in question, not as a single super-life but as a set of distinct 
individual lives, each of them a complete set of experience and activities‖220. This 
seems extremely problematic to conceive of, and therefore less helpful than the veil of 
ignorance. Furthermore, one might conceive of leading all of the lives in question, and 
think that living some particularly disadvantaged lives is justified if some of the other 
lives were particularly good. In other words, one might offset the bad in one life against 
the good in another. This sort of reasoning is inappropriate for a combinatorial principle 
because, in reality, a person only has one life so cannot offset the good or bad against 
other lives in the future or past.   
Acknowledging the shortcomings of the proposals, including his fourth one, 
Nagel does not explicitly endorse any of them as providing the ultimate solution. 
However, he does suggest that his fourth proposal would be likely to bring about very 
similar conclusions to the veil of ignorance (although, for the reasons just discussed, he 
may be mistaken). Despite the ultimate lack of certainty over how one ought to balance 
competing reasons, Nagel has given an account of the conditions necessary for pure 
altruism which can be used to examine altruism within organ donation in more detail.   
4.4.2 Applying Blum 
Blum‘s account of altruism is much more permissive than Nagel‘s in terms of partiality, 
and potentially allows for the sort of familial and friend-related partiality that often 
features in everyday life. The traditional Kantian view does not permit this sort of 
partiality, since ―every human being, simply in virtue of being human, is worthy of 
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equal consideration, and his good is equally worthy of being promoted‖221. The sort of 
favouring of family members or friends, or people of a certain type that one values, is 
generally not considered moral by this view, since choosing to further the good of these 
people can be considered to be acting with regard to one‘s own interests, preferences 
or attachments. In short, according to Kant, for something to be moral it must be 
justifiable from an impartial perspective. Nagel‘s view that for something to be altruistic 
it must be motivated by objective reasons is clearly at odds with Blum‘s account. 
Blum does not entirely condemn this impartial perspective, or fully undermine 
its importance – he merely places limitations on its scope. He argues for the position 
that ―friendship does not typically involve us in situations in which impartiality between 
the interests of our friends and those of others is a moral requirement: hence in acting 
beneficently towards our friends we do not typically violate a duty of impartiality‖222.  
Although Blum focuses his discussion on friends, a lot of what he says also 
applies to family members. He states that there are two aspects of friendship that are 
most relevant to discussion of partiality and altruism. 
i) ―the personal importance which our friends have to us – the fact that friends 
are people we like, enjoy being with, trust and rely on, that they are part of what in our 
lives is valued by us.‖223 
ii) ―friendship involves a substantial concern for the good of the friend for his 
own sake, and a disposition to act to foster that good.‖224 
While the ties between close family members may be different from friends in 
some respects (it would seem incorrect to regard one‘s parents as merely one‘s 
friends), it seems that the majority of what is said here of friends is also true of close 
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family members. It may not be true of distant family members with whom one only has 
a genetic rather than personal relationship, but equally one may be less inclined to act 
partially towards these people.  
Blum discusses three types of case in which one is confronted with more than 
one person in need, one of whom is a friend: 
i) One is required to treat the interests of the relevant parties from a 
strictly impartial perspective in which personal attachments are overlooked; 
ii) One is required to give some weight to the interests of others, but this 
need not be weighted impartially, so some weight can be given to personal 
attachments; 
iii) One is not required to consider the interests of others at all. One is 
morally permitted to act solely for the benefit of one‘s friend, so personal 
attachments can override other considerations.225 
Blum argues that the type of impartiality described in i) is only demanded in 
what he terms ―institutional-role contexts‖226. An example of this is a judge, who is 
required by virtue of her institutional role to be impartial. If she presided over cases 
featuring her friends and family and failed to remain impartial, resulting in unjustified 
leniency or complete injustice, she would clearly be doing something wrong. Blum also 
cites teachers, nurses, doctors, and ship captains as occupying institutional roles that 
demand impartiality.  
Blum uses the example of a train crash to illustrate ii). If one found oneself in a 
train crash but escaped personal injury, one would be in a position to attend to the 
needs of other injured passengers. If one of these passengers was a close friend, Blum 
suggests that it would be justifiable to give one‘s first attention to one‘s friend. 
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Importantly though, he acknowledges that one would also be required to attend to the 
needs of others – so although strict impartiality is not required, one cannot ignore the 
needs and interests of others simply because one has appreciated the weal and woe of 
a friend.  
Blum does not illustrate iii) clearly, but the closest he gets is of someone who 
has duties to various people (a doctor with duties to many patients, for instance) who 
has fulfilled all of his duties at a particular point in time. In this situation, the doctor 
could now dedicate extra time to seeing a patient who is also a friend with no concern 
for the fact that he is spending extra time with one patient. 
As well as arguing that acting in the interests of a friend because she is one‘s 
friend can be entirely appropriate, Blum argues for the more important conclusion, 
within the context of organ donation, namely that acting in the interests of a friend 
because she is one‘s friend can be morally good. His argument has two central claims: 
i) acts of friendship are morally good insofar as they involve acting from regard for 
another person for his own sake (although this is qualified) 
ii) the deeper and stronger the desire and willingness to act in the interests 
of a friend, the greater the moral worth 
He gives an example of what he considers to be a morally excellent friendship, 
in which the levels of altruistic emotions and ―willingness to give of oneself to the 
friend‖227 go far beyond what is ordinarily expected of people. The important point that 
Blum is trying to convey is that close friends have a stronger identification with the 
good of each other than they generally do with non-friends. In addition to this, Blum 
believes that good friends are willing to give of themselves to each other without 
regarding this as a significant sacrifice, and that they consider this to be a part of 
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caring for each other. For Blum it is this willing self-giving that forms the basis of the 
moral excellence of the friendship.  
Not all friendships will have these features, or at least not to the same extent, 
so Blum would presumably concede that not all friendships are morally excellent, and 
that some relationships that might ordinarily be considered ‗friendships‘ might not have 
any particular moral value. One can imagine ‗friendships‘ where one friend is much 
more willing to give of herself and act in the good of her friend than the other, and this 
would intuitively appear a less morally excellent scenario. Blum accepts that some 
people may have no friendships that achieve moral excellence.  
Although until now Blum has talked of friendships that have the capacity to be 
morally excellent, he is also willing to concede that ―genuine devotion to a particular 
group – family, neighbourhood, ethnic community, ethnic group, club – is in itself 
morally good, and becomes morally suspect only when it involves a deficient stance 
towards others‖228. The moral goodness for this stems from the involvement of ―an 
admirable degree of sympathy, compassion, and concern for others‖229.   
If one accepts Blum‘s account of the moral value of friendship, one might still 
have concerns about the conditional nature of the altruism that is expressed when one 
acts partially. This is relevant to conditional organ donation, since the altruism 
displayed should be considered conditional altruism. If one agrees only to donate to a 
family member, one is willing to do for a family member what one is unwilling to do for 
any other. So one‘s actions are arguably motivated not by recognition of the humanity 
of the individuals involved, but instead by the relationship of the individuals to oneself. 
Blum responds to this concern by arguing that conditional altruism of this type does still 
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feature a concern for another person for her own sake, and this is a claim endorsed by 
the likes of Cottingham230 (see section 4.5.2).  
Conditional altruism can, of course, take different forms. There is a difference 
between someone simply favouring a friend or group of friends, and hating or opposing 
those who fall outside this relationship. Blum uses the example of an Italian who has a 
particular concern for helping poor Italians, and who has a real concern for the welfare 
of these people. Blum argues that even though this person might not show the same 
levels of concern for non-Italians, his attitude towards Italians stems from a concern for 
them for their own sake, and therefore has moral value. In contrast, an Italian who 
despises non-Italians and who considers them to be lesser people with interests of 
lesser value has an attitude which, according to Blum, is bad in itself. Also, a negative 
attitude towards people outside of a relationship of some sort, might impact upon the 
motivation for acting in the interests of those within the relationship. If one favours 
one‘s countrymen because one hates everybody else, one‘s favouring one‘s countrymen 
need not be motivated by any concern for their good but rather by one‘s hatred of 
those who may benefit from any alternative action. 
Importantly, Blum claims that if one‘s concern for the good of others is genuine, 
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with conditional altruism; the wrongness in some 
instances of conditional altruism lies in the chauvinistic attitudes that it can represent, 
rather than a moral failing of the conditional altruism itself.   
4.5 Cottingham‘s defence of partiality 
Blum‘s limitations on the scope of impartiality raise some questions about exactly what 
sort of partiality is acceptable. Blum details the sort of partiality that is compatible with 
altruism, but this does not necessarily mean that this sort of partiality is acceptable on 
a wider level, or that there is anything wrong with partiality of certain types. Indeed, 
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Blum states that his view ―allows for the condemning of the despicable attitude towards 
those outside the special relationship and also accords no moral value to the attitude 
towards those within it which does not consist in a genuine regard for the weal and woe 
of the persons in question‖231. So the fact that certain partiality might promote altruism 
does not entail that partiality itself is always good in a broader sense. When considering 
appropriate levels of partiality in organ donation, one needs to narrow down the list of 
all partialities to the list of generally acceptable partialities, and see whether these can 
be compatible with altruism to establish whether the partiality can apply to organ 
donation. 
A defence of appropriate partiality must justify why some people‘s interests can 
be given more weight than others‘ when making decisions about to whom one can 
justifiably allocate one‘s time and resources. Cottingham starts his defence of partiality 
with an attack on impartiality, noting that there are instances when failing to favour 
one‘s own child, for example, is not an admirable or praiseworthy act, but rather the 
actions of a ―moral leper‖232.  
Cottingham refers to partiality as partialism, but in the interests of consistency 
and clarity the term ‗partialism‘ in Cottingham‘s terminology will be replaced with 
‗partiality‘ as this can be done without loss of meaning. Cottingham defines the thesis 
of partiality as: ―unless one is under a direct or indirect duty to be impartial, it is 
morally correct to favour one‘s own‖233. The qualification here is necessary to take 
account of instances where one has a clear duty to remain impartial; for example in 
relation to what Blum calls institutional-role contexts.  
Cottingham explains that there are two possible strategies that could be used to 
justify favouring one‘s own. The argument from bald preference, which Cottingham 
argues is not successful at justifying partiality, is summarised by asking: ―assuming an 
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agent is under no direct or indirect duty to be impartial, is he not morally entitled to 
exercise his preference as he wishes?‖234. If an autonomous moral agent chooses to 
give something that is ostensibly hers (such as time, money, property) to another 
person, there is certainly some intuitive sense in thinking that by virtue of this 
something belonging to her, she is entitled to make decisions regarding its allocation. 
But as Cottingham points out, being in this privileged position does not protect the 
moral agent from criticism. Just because a person is morally entitled to make a choice, 
this does not entail that all choices that flow from that entitlement are equally good or 
immune from moral criticism.  One cannot defend the morality of a choice simply by 
pointing to the fact that one had the right to make it.  
Cottingham suggests that given the failure of this argument, one should instead 
consider a second strategy. He starts with the claim that when making an ethical 
judgment, one must be prepared to explain how one‘s judgment contributes to a 
conception of the good life235. His argument attempts to differentiate between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of partiality by showing how some forms of 
partiality can contribute towards a fulfilled life, on the principle that forms of partiality 
that contribute to a fulfilled life are acceptable and those that detract from a fulfilled life 
are unacceptable. Cottingham lists various kinds of partiality, ranging from the 
intuitively acceptable to the seemingly objectionable. Starting with ‗Familism‘, the circle 
extends to ‗clanism‘, ‗patriotism‘, ‗racism‘, ‗sexism‘, ‗planetism‘ and potentially beyond. 
Each partiality takes the form of ‗S favours X because X is a member of his [group]‘236.  
Partiality that favours someone simply because they are in some sense ‗one‘s own‘ is a 
form of discrimination, and as such requires further justification. One might take racism 
or sexism to be a bad sort of discrimination, whereas favouring one‘s family members 
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is often a desirable form of discrimination. So the challenge for the partialist is to show 
that some forms of discrimination are acceptable, whereas others are improper.  
Cottingham defends three sorts of partiality, of varying degrees of relevance to 
conditional and directed organ donation. These are agent related partiality, self-directed 
partiality and philophilic partiality. Cottingham‘s defence of agent-related partiality 
provides the grounding for philophilic partiality, which is emphasised here due to its 
relevance to altruism. The basis for these defences is the idea of life-plans. A judgment 
that a particular type of partiality is morally acceptable must be backed up by showing 
that this form of partiality links to some defendable concept of a worthwhile and 
flourishing life. 
Before considering Cottingham‘s position further, one might spot a flaw in using 
life-plans to assess the acceptability of partiality in relation to deceased organ donation. 
It is reasonable to presume that the importance of life-plans is diminished by death. 
There are two ways to resolve this issue. First, if life-plans are important, then deciding 
what happens when one dies (and maybe after one dies) is perhaps the ultimate life-
plan. Second, and more convincingly, if one takes organ donation to be a process that 
starts during life, rather than an event that takes place after death, the problem does 
not arise. If one makes a decision during one‘s life about directing one‘s organs, and 
this has consequences for oneself during life, this can legitimately be considered part of 
one‘s life-plans without any apparent objections. One might argue that one‘s life plans 
cease to be important as soon as one dies, but there are many instances where respect 
for the wishes of the dead are respected (wills, burial wishes, even some aspects of 
organ donation). This respect can be justified on the grounds that respecting the wishes 
of the dead provides solace to the dying. If the convention of respecting the wishes of 
the dead was not operated, then life would overall be worse because one would have 
no confidence that those who remain alive would follow through on one‘s life work or 
final wishes. 
82 
 
4.5.1 Agent related partiality  
Cottingham gives an example of partiality that many people would be willing to accept: 
partiality towards one‘s own projects. He argues that to afford priority to one‘s own 
projects just because they are one‘s own is an important part of being a person. In his 
words: ―[t]o be a person – one who has continuing desires, plans, projects – is to have 
commitments, to be involved‖237. If one was determined to maximise overall utility at 
all times and would embark upon any new project to achieve this with no regard for 
one‘s current projects, one would be falling short of achieving any sense of individuality 
or personality. Insisting that one sacrifices one‘s own individuality in order to achieve 
maximum utility or some other moral goal would result in a sort of moral sainthood, 
which, Wolf has argued, entails a life dominated by morality to the extent that an 
identifiable sense of self either cannot exist or is necessarily denied238. Cottingham 
refers to this sort of partiality as Agent Related Partiality, and argues that showing 
some preference for one‘s own projects is an integral part of any reasonable conception 
of the good life because having commitments is part of being a person with continuing 
desires, plans and projects239 – having life plans requires this sort of partiality.  
4.5.2 Philophilic partiality 
Cottingham takes the general form of agent-related partiality into more specific 
territory by exploring philophilic partiality, which is best expressed as follows: 
in deciding whether to promote the interests of X or Y, I may legitimately assign 
a certain moral weight to the fact that X is my loved one240 
What sets this partiality apart from others that Cottingham discusses (and aligns 
it in part with partiality that Blum endorses), and also makes it interesting within the 
context of organ donation is that it allows for partiality to be considered altruistic. 
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According to Cottingham, despite the reference to oneself in the definition of this sort of 
partiality, to love someone ―is to desire his/her happiness for its own sake‖241. 
Cottingham believes that parental love is an example of this because it frequently 
includes a desire on the part of the parent that her child should flourish even after her 
own death. He doesn‘t just restrict this to parental love though; any love that involves 
a desire of someone‘s happiness for its own sake would fall into this category of 
permissible partiality.  
Favouring certain people simply because one happens to love them might be 
regarded as questionable; it suggests a special feature of love that raises it above other 
failed attempted justifications for partiality such as favouring one‘s own race. 
Cottingham‘s answer is that giving certain people special consideration is a pre-
requisite for the close relationships that most people regard as a ―source of major 
psychological enrichment‖242. This appears fairly uncontroversial243; there is something 
intuitively convincing about the idea that a life devoid of any close relationships would 
be a sorry existence. It seems equally true that these close relationships require some 
special consideration of certain people‘s interests by virtue of their position in that 
relationship (indeed this may form a part of how these relationships are defined).  
Where Cottingham‘s and Blum‘s views on partiality start to differ is in the sorts 
of relationships that they consider can allow one to further the good of another for her 
own sake, or desire the happiness of another for its own sake. Blum suggests that this 
concern for the interest of another for her own sake can exist within the relationships 
between family members, members of the same neighbourhood, ethnic community, 
ethnic group or club. Cottingham, suggests that ―genuine love‖244 is required in order to 
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desire the happiness of another for her own sake, and philophilic partiality can only 
occur where there is genuine love.  
Cottingham‘s list of relationships that allow partiality is therefore shorter than 
Blum‘s, as it seems unlikely that genuine love exists between members of the same 
ethnic group (simply by virtue of their shared ethnicity), for instance. So whilst a white 
person might claim to love all other white people, it seems unlikely that this would be 
the sort of genuine love that Cottingham endorses, since Cottingham speaks of the 
special relationship between the loved one and the agent245. Although Cottingham does 
not define ‗special relationship‘, merely sharing an ethnic identity with someone does 
not denote a sufficiently close and personal relationship to be morally significant in the 
required sense.    
Blum‘s view is that genuine devotion to a particular group can bring about the 
concern to further the good of another for her own sake. Cottingham‘s view is that 
genuine love is required to further the good of another for her own sake. It seems that 
only one of these views can be correct, and it may be that empirical psychological 
research could shed light on this. In the absence of this, Cottingham‘s view is more 
convincing, as Blum appears to conflate concern for a group with concern for an 
individual. The link between genuine devotion to a particular group and a concern to 
further the good of another within this group does not seem as likely as Blum makes 
out; in favouring a member of a group to which one is devoted, one is acting out of 
concern for the group rather than the individual, and devotion to a particular group 
does not require devotion to all the individuals who comprise it. Using Blum‘s own 
example, someone devoted to the Italian nation might wish to further the good of 
Italians. But this is not because of a particular concern for the good of specific Italians, 
rather it is borne of a concern for the general group.  
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Cottingham‘s view suggests that while Blum may be right that partiality between 
many groups is compatible with altruism this does not entail that this sort of 
favouritism is acceptable on a broader moral level. Cottingham‘s view that philophilic 
partiality is acceptable and compatible with altruism is convincing – allowing one to 
favour those who one genuinely loves, in a way that is compatible with Blum‘s altruism. 
4.6 Other accounts of altruism/beneficent behaviour  
Nagel and Blum are not the only philosophers writing about altruism, and they do not 
necessarily discuss all motivation/action that might ordinarily be considered altruistic. 
Some definitions of altruism are much more simplistic, although the common feature is 
other-regardingness to some extent. Wilkinson, for example, defines altruism as being 
roughly ―a non self-interested concern for the interests of others‖246.  Another common 
feature of most conceptions of altruism is that it is virtuous, and should be praised and 
encouraged. Guidelines for ethical practice relating to organ donation in Australia for 
instance state that ―altruism is a universal human virtue that is extolled as part of our 
Australian culture‖247.  The meaning of altruism in this case entails that: ―[o]rgans and 
tissues are given by donors and their families without expectation of reward or even 
acknowledgement by those who benefit‖248, which is more simplistic than the 
philosophical accounts outlined above. De Wispelaere states that altruism is a 
―motivational disposition, according to which an intention or motivation to furthering 
other persons‘ good is both the necessary and sufficient condition for an act to classify 
as altruistic‖249. Daar opts for a bald definition: ―behaviour meant to benefit 
another‖250, although he believes that altruism is not necessarily negated by self-
interest. Although these definitions of altruism have not been looked at in detail, they 
                                                          
246 Wilkinson TM, (2003) 'What‘s Not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?' op. cit. p163 
247 Australian Government (2007) 'Organ and Tissue Donation after Death, for Transplantation – Guidelines 
for Ethical Practice for Health Professionals', Available at: 
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250 Daar AS, 'Altruism and Reciprocity in Organ Donation: Compatible or Not?', Transplantation 70 (2000) 
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are mentioned here to illustrate that the set of behaviours that can be classed as 
altruistically motivated goes beyond those described by Nagel and Blum.  
A recent addition to the altruism debate can be found in the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics 2011 report251. Here it is argued that altruism is compatible with some forms 
of payment for organs, whereas in transplantation policy documents it is generally 
considered to be incompatible with any kind of financial reward. The Nuffield Report 
also accepts that the intended beneficiaries of altruistically motivated donation need not 
be the organ recipients. The Nuffield Council‘s report argues for altruism-based 
donation on the grounds that ―an altruistic basis for donation helps underpin a 
communal, and collective, approach to the provision of bodily material for others' 
needs, where generosity and compassion are valued‖252. They define as altruistic 
actions that are ―motivated by concern for the welfare of the recipient of some 
beneficent behaviour, rather than by concern for the welfare of the person carrying out 
the action‖253. This definition obviously lacks some of the detail of Nagel‘s and Blum‘s 
accounts, but does seem to capture what altruism is taken to mean in general parlance 
as suggested by a dictionary: ―disinterested and selfless concern for the well-being of 
others‖254. 
 The Nuffield Report definition is, however, at odds with the understanding of 
altruism used by DH, since it permits forms of payment. It also allows for conditional 
and directed donations to be considered altruistic. Moreover, compatible with altruism 
in the Nuffield Report is ‗directed altruism‘ provided this is at least partly motivated by 
the desire to benefit specific people – which is more in line with Blum‘s account. The 
Report notes that a decision to join the ODR could in part be motivated by a financial 
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incentive (in this case funeral expenses255) and still be altruistic. The payment of 
funeral expenses, for example, would not benefit the individual donor, but would 
benefit her family. This leaves open the possibility that the directed altruism involved in 
some conditional donations, for example wanting an organ to be transplanted to a 
member of one‘s religion, could be regarded as altruistic. The Report‘s understanding of 
altruism accommodates the likelihood that some donors act from mixed and complex 
motives, rather than a straightforward and exclusive desire to help others. 
4.7 Sliding scale of altruism 
A range of actions and motivations can be considered altruistic depending upon the 
definition used, and there are disagreements over what altruism is. Both Nagel‘s and 
Blum‘s accounts of altruism have strengths and weaknesses, but both, in different 
ways, capture motivations and behaviour that one would want to consider to be 
altruistic. It may therefore, be helpful to assume that there is a variety of types of 
altruism, all of which are morally praiseworthy to some extent, rather than a single 
monolithic definition. The important and basic element, consistent across all definitions 
of altruism (although it is represented in various ways), is a genuine concern for other 
people and their interests for their own sake. Where definitions differ is the extent to 
which self-interest and partiality can feature in altruism, but it is, perhaps, reasonable 
to hold that as self-interest increases in relation to regard for the interests of others, 
altruism is likely to decrease because self-interest may counter a regard for others‘ 
interests. In real life, motivating factors for considered actions are likely to be complex 
and difficult accurately to establish (indeed it is difficult to see how they could be 
accurately established), and self-interest can never be ruled out in many actions that 
would ordinarily be considered altruistic (one need only look at some of the debate on 
egoism256. 
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Nagel‘s altruism is rigid and demanding, and referred to above as ‗pure altruism‘ 
because it is devoid of self-interest or emotion257. Nagel‘s focus on objective reasoning 
removes room for self-interest and personal attachments, resulting in an account of 
altruism that is arguably difficult to meet. Blum‘s version of altruism, though less 
demanding than Nagel‘s, reflects the weight and value generally attached to altruistic 
emotions. Nagel‘s focus on rationality and objectivity provides an account of how pure 
altruism can exist, but one could argue that his account does not reflect the importance 
of families and personal relationships to individuals. Blum‘s account accommodates the 
moral significance afforded to these relationships. Blum himself suggests that altruism 
can take many forms258, and recognises the value of the pure altruism proposed by 
Nagel.  
Beneath Blum‘s account in the hierarchy of altruism, one can consider situations 
where actions are beneficent (and possibly still altruistic) but where self-interest plays 
an increasingly significant role. It seems likely that people‘s reasons for acting are 
thoroughly mixed and will involve a combination of self-interest and other-
regardingness. The organ donor who wants to be remembered in a positive light might 
be partly motivated by the idea of helping others, but also by a self-interested concern 
for how she wants to be remembered. There is an altruistic element to a donation of 
this nature, because there is a wish to help other people, but there is also a degree of 
self-interest which counters this somewhat. But this illustrates the complexity of 
donation decisions, and a strict insistence upon purely altruistic or even emotionally 
altruistic donations might wrongly rule out a significant number of deceased organ 
donations. The Nuffield Report‘s account of altruism could conceivably be placed around 
here on a sliding scale of altruism, with the possibility of mixed and non-altruistic 
motivations featuring alongside more altruistic ones.  
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4.8 Altruism tracking morality 
Two accounts of altruism have been presented here in some detail, but an important 
limitation of altruism has not yet been mentioned. Due to its Kantian grounding, 
Nagel‘s altruism aligns altruistic actions with morally right actions259. Other accounts of 
altruism, including Blum‘s are unable to do this to the same extent. De Wispelaere 
describes this as a failure of altruism to track moral demands260. The problem is that 
although an action may be other-regarding and altruistic in a general sense, there may 
be other factors that prevent it from being morally good. Giving money to charity can 
generally be considered to be altruistic, but if a person decided on their chosen charity 
on the grounds that it helped people of a certain race (and this person was a racist 
bigot with a preference for people of this race), then this does not seem like a morally 
good action. Under many accounts of altruism (Nagel excepted) something can be 
altruistic yet still morally questionable. Similarly, something can be non-altruistic and 
still be morally permissible (even under Nagel‘s account). Affording some additional 
weight to one‘s own interests in some situations may be entirely permissible (although 
not necessarily praiseworthy). It might be altruistic to dedicate one‘s spare time to 
charity work, for instance, but choosing to spend some of one‘s spare time doing things 
for oneself does not seem impermissible (even though it is non-altruistic). 
4.9 Conclusions  
This chapter has presented two contrasting accounts of altruism, and introduced 
Cottingham‘s justification for partiality. It has been argued that altruism ought to be 
understood as a spectrum, and that partiality and self-interest can influence where 
particular altruistic acts fall on this spectrum. The discussion in this chapter will provide 
some of the theoretical underpinnings for discussion in the next chapter, which will look 
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at how the DH has used altruism and other principles in relation to conditional and 
directed donations. 
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Chapter 5 - The DH‘s Position on Conditional and Directed Donations 
The previous chapter explored two competing philosophical accounts of altruism, and 
explored Cottingham‘s ideas on agent-relative partiality. This chapter will look at how 
the DH has used altruism, greatest need, and equitable treatment to control practice 
relating to conditional and directed donations. The DH‘s claim that placing conditions on 
a donation renders it a non-altruistic act warrants scrutiny because this was given as a 
justification for banning all conditional donations. This chapter will argue that the DH‘s 
principles are used inconsistently, and therefore cannot provide coherent justifications 
for prohibiting conditional donations. 
5.1 Why the DH does not permit conditional donations 
The DH revised policy on directed donation (March 2010) states that there are two ―key 
principles which underpin the UK organ donation programme‖261; absence of 
conditionality and equitable treatment. Taken together with the principles stated in its 
2000 Report, four key principles for deceased organ donation are supported by the DH: 
i) Organs should be donated unconditionally262 
ii) Organs should be donated altruistically263 
iii) Organs should go to patients in the greatest need264/according to agreed 
criteria265  
iv) Organs should be donated in a way that permits equitable treatment266 
Each of these will now be scrutinised to assess their suitability and robustness as 
principles for deceased organ donation. 
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5.2 Organs should be donated unconditionally 
According to the March 2010 guidance, ―[t]he fundamental principle of all deceased 
donation is that, it must be unconditional‖267. This principle is derived from the claim 
that conditionality ―offends against the fundamental principle that organs are donated 
voluntarily and freely and should go to patients according to the agreed criteria‖268. In 
order for the principle of unconditional donation to be justifiable then, it must be shown 
that conditionality does indeed offend against the principle of organs being donated 
voluntarily and freely, and being allocated according to the agreed criteria. Taking each 
part of the principle in turn, it will be argued that conditionality does not necessarily 
entail offending against any aspect of it.  
 ―Voluntarily‖ and ―freely‖ are not defined in the DH documents, and are 
therefore open to interpretation. Although they may normally be considered separate, 
albeit related, concepts, the DH appears to entangle them. Used together, they 
underscore the need to ensure the absence of coercion (which could include undue 
influence created by commercial practice), but this interpretation would not seem to be 
an issue specific to conditional donations269. ―Freely‖, in particular, could also be taken 
to mean ‗without constraint‘, but this would be inconsistent with the constraints that 
are routinely placed on donations. For instance, one may request that one‘s organs are 
only used for transplantation rather than research, or that some organs are donated on 
the condition that others are not. It therefore cannot be the case that ―freely‖ simply 
means ‗without constraint‘. A charitable interpretation of ―freely‖ that provides 
consistency and links to conditionality, could be that ―freely‖ means ‗without constraints 
on who the organs can be allocated to‘. There would, however, need to be further 
justification for why it is important that donations do not have constraints like this. One 
justification could be that placing constraints prevents organs being allocated according 
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269 Conditional donations need not be any more likely to involve coercion than unconditional donations, and 
prohibiting conditional donations would be a rather heavy-handed approach to ensuring an absence of 
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to the ‗agreed criteria‘, with some further justification of why it is important that the 
agreed criteria are adhered to. But it is not the case that conditions necessarily prevent 
organs being allocated according to these criteria. The 1998 case featuring racist 
conditions is a good example: the conditions did not affect who the organs were given 
to (white people were at the top of the waiting lists). 
 It is not the case that conditional donations necessarily result in donations that 
are neither voluntary nor free. The principle that organs must be donated 
unconditionally, then, appears to lack justification. It may be preferable that organs are 
donated unconditionally (this will be discussed in the Chapter 7), but this does not 
provide a reason why organs must be donated unconditionally. 
5.3 Organs should be donated altruistically 
The DH regards altruism to be a fundamental principle for organ donation, and altruism 
is common to many organ donation systems throughout the world (the World Health 
Organization, for instance, refers to altruism in its guiding principles of organ 
donation270). The DH offers no definition of altruism, but a working definition can be 
gained from how the term is used by the DH to justify refusing certain donations or 
describing them as impermissible. 
5.3.1 2000 report points towards Nagel 
The 2000 report states that all conditions offend against the principle that organs are 
donated altruistically, and uses this as a reason to ban all conditional donations. 
Conditional donations can be other-regarding, so it cannot simply be a lack of other-
regardingness that renders these donations non-altruistic. It also cannot simply be the 
outcomes of the donation/allocation that are regarded as altruistic. Some conditions 
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have no impact upon the eventual allocation, so it would be wrong to describe all 
conditional donations as non-altruistic on these grounds271.  
If placing conditions on a donation is non-altruistic, it could simply be that 
having an interest in who the eventual recipients are is considered contrary to altruism. 
This understanding would be compatible with the naming and practice of ‗altruistic‘ 
living kidney donations where, unlike living-related donation, the donor cannot specify 
the recipient. If altruism requires that one is disinterested in the identity of eventual 
recipients, it may be that it is impartiality that is being aimed for here: when a certain 
recipient or type of recipient is requested by a donor, the donation is no longer 
impartial, and therefore not altruistic. If so, the DH‘s account of altruism accords with 
Nagel‘s altruism, which requires impartiality. 
5.3.2 The DH cannot consistently require pure altruism 
The DH cannot consistently be using Nagel‘s account of altruism, however. The reason 
that Nagel‘s altruism does not permit partiality is because one‘s own subjective reasons 
are motivations, which results in self-interest and prevents pure altruism. The pure 
altruism described by Nagel requires no self-interest or ulterior motives, but it seems 
probable that some degree of self-interest or ulterior motive is present in many 
unconditional donations that are currently accepted. If the DH permits these levels of 
self-interest, then it is not consistently applying Nagel‘s account of altruism. Moreover, 
if some self-interest is permissible, then it also has to be shown that partiality either 
introduces too much self-interest or is non-altruistic for other reasons. 
Exploring the claim that some self-interest may be present in many organ 
donations reveals some of the inconsistency. When registering for the ODR, one may 
be genuinely moved to act by objective reasons and the interests of others. Equally, 
however, one may be partly motivated by a desire to appear to others as a generous 
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and altruistic person. This introduces a self-interested component which is incompatible 
with Nagel‘s altruism. Similarly, someone agreeing to donate a loved one‘s organs in 
the hope that bringing about something positive from a terrible situation will help them 
come to terms with the situation is acting with a degree of self-interest. Even agreeing 
to donate a loved one‘s organs because one believed it was what they would have 
wanted should not be considered purely altruistic. 
There are other instances where motives that fall short of pure altruism feature 
in people‘s decisions to donate organs. Organ donation can have positive impacts upon 
donors (during their life, and perhaps afterwards if one accepts the existence of 
posthumous interests272), and donor families273. A distinction can be drawn between 
three types of positive consequence that can emerge from organ donation: 
unforeseeable positive consequences that cannot and do not feature in the decision 
making process; foreseeable positive consequences that do not feature significantly in 
the decision making process; and, foreseeable positive consequences that do feature 
significantly in the decision making process. These distinctions are relevant when 
determining the level of self-interest, and thus the level or type of altruism in donation 
decisions. 
 If a deceased person‘s family chooses to donate their relative‘s organs to the 
general pool, and by chance the organ is transplanted to a friend who they did not 
know required a transplant, this could have unforeseen positive consequences for the 
deceased person‘s relatives. For instance, whilst the positive feelings resulting from 
helping a friend might not lessen the impact of grief, they may nonetheless help to 
make some sense of the loved one‘s death. The positive consequences here would have 
no impact upon how altruistic the donation was, since they were not known at the time 
of donation. In a different situation, the same family might be aware that their friend is 
                                                          
272 Wilkinson TM, (2012) op. cit. p85 
273 Batten HL and Prottas JM, 'Kind Strangers: The Families of Organ Donors', Health Affairs 6 (1987) pp35-
47 
96 
 
on the transplant waiting list, but they would have donated the organs anyway. That 
their friend might be the recipient had no impact upon their donation decision. In this 
scenario, although the positive consequences are foreseeable, they do not detract from 
the altruistic nature of the donation by introducing a new level of self-interest into the 
donation. However, if the family choose to donate because they know their friend 
stands a chance of receiving the organ (or that someone else might receive an organ 
and their friend might move up a place on the waiting list), and they are aware that 
their interests are also served if he is the recipient (insofar as their friend‘s interest in 
staying alive is an interest shared by them), and there is a level of self-interest which 
renders the donation not purely altruistic.  
It is not obvious that conditional donation always results in more self-interest 
than unconditional donations. Knowing during life that one‘s organs are going to go to a 
particular group of people might have some benefits for oneself; if one planned on 
placing conditions specifying that one‘s organs could only be transplanted to members 
of the local community, one might feel more happily integrated with that community274, 
happy that one will be performing a positive action that will help one‘s friends (or 
friends of friends), and comfortable in the knowledge that when one dies, one‘s organs 
will be going to someone who will contribute towards something that one values. It 
seems plausible that this could also apply to unconditional donation, however. One 
could feel more integrated with one‘s community (albeit a community on a larger scale, 
e.g. national community); one could also be happy that one will be performing a 
positive action to help others (even if these are strangers), and one could also be 
happy to know that one‘s organs will contribute towards something that one values (life 
itself, perhaps). These could be just as self-interested as explicitly conditional or 
directed donation. It seems unlikely that a donation of this nature would be refused, 
even though a strict interpretation of pure altruism suggests it should be. 
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The DH‘s concern may be that allowing more self-interest to feature in allocation 
decisions would result in donors being motivated by potential rewards during their 
lifetime. The sort of rewards that would contravene the HTAct are primarily financial or 
other material rewards, but these would probably never materialise. Since few people 
actually die in a way that allows organs to be donated, it would have to be a very 
wealthy individual, group or community that could afford to reward a sufficient number 
of potential donors to theoretically assure that a certain recipient would receive a 
directed organ. It would be possible, in theory, for someone to approach a very 
recently (or imminently to be) bereaved next-of-kin and offer them rewards for 
directing an organ to a certain individual, but there would be practical obstacles in the 
way of this occurring (such as gaining access to intensive care units). 
It seems then, that although the DH state that deceased organ donation must 
be altruistic, they routinely accept donations that may feature a degree of self-interest. 
These donations cannot be purely altruistic, and therefore the DH cannot be using 
Nagel‘s account of altruism. The March 2010 policy revision also suggests that this is 
not the case. 
5.3.3 March 2010 recommendation points towards Blum 
The March 2010 revision permits partiality to family members and close friends of 
longstanding in exceptional circumstances, echoing the norm in the majority of living 
donations, which are directed to specified family members or friends. These exceptional 
circumstances are largely confined to cases where the deceased was being ‗worked-up‘ 
to become a live donor to the named individual, but died before the donation was 
completed. This revision allows donations that clearly conflict with Nagel‘s pure 
altruism, and align much more with Blum‘s. Both DH documents, however, oppose the 
‗conditional altruism‘ that Blum‘s position would include as altruistic. The March 2010 
revision states, in agreement with the 2000 report, that donation must remain 
unconditional. In cases where there is someone in the ‗Super Urgent‘ category on the 
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transplant waiting list organs will be made available to this person instead of the 
nominated recipient, so it is not possible to agree to donation if and only if the organ is 
allocated to the specified recipient. Blum allows someone acting out of altruistic 
emotions in the interests of another person because of a friendship/relationship with 
that person to be considered altruistic. One might do for a loved one what one would 
not be willing to do for a stranger; so if one considered organ donation to be a 
significant sacrifice, one may not be willing to donate for just anyone, and hence 
donate iff conditionally. Blum would consider this altruistic, but the DH would not 
permit it. 
5.3.4 Pick and mix altruism and its implications 
Table 1- Policy and accounts of altruism 
 Nagel Blum 
Impartiality (DH Report) Yes No 
Unconditionality (DH report 
and March 2010 guidance) 
No (a condition placed 
for objective reasons 
could be permitted) 
No 
Permits directed donation to 
family/friends 
No Yes 
 
The table above illustrates the conflicting requirements of DH policy and the two 
accounts of altruism. UK transplant policy seems to borrow features from Nagel‘s and 
Blum‘s accounts of altruism, without fully endorsing either, and moulds these borrowed 
features into one hybrid account. This is not likely to be a conscious decision, but even 
if it was it would be difficult to defend. Nagel‘s and Blum‘s accounts are not open to a 
‗pick and mix‘ approach as each is underpinned by a radically different and 
incompatible account of morality (the strictly rational and impartial Kantian grounding 
of Nagel, compared with the partial, emotional basis of Blum). A sensible way of 
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resolving this situation is to accept, as proposed in the previous chapter that there are 
different types of altruism, and that donations with conditions or directions attached 
can be altruistic to varying degrees.  
Conditions might, therefore, communicate something about the level of altruism 
present in a certain donation – insofar as they may introduce self-interest - but they 
generally cannot in and of themselves shed light on whether a donation is or is not 
altruistic. A donation with conditions attached stating that the organs can only be given 
to a specific friend is not purely altruistic in Nagel‘s sense, but it is still other-regarding 
and motivated by a desire to help someone else. If this donation was motivated by 
altruistic emotions, such as sympathy or concern for a friend, this falls within Blum‘s 
account of altruism.   
 Blum‘s account of altruism has even more significant implications for conditional 
and directed organ donation, since it permits an extended level of partiality in altruistic 
motivation and acts. For Blum an act is altruistic if it stems from one‘s concern for the 
good of another for its own sake, and this allows the sorts of partiality that the DH has 
previously forbidden. Blum gives a list of the special attachments that he believes can 
be the source of stronger sympathy, concern and willingness to help others, which 
includes ―family member, neighbour (in the non-Christian sense), fellow worker, 
comrade, fellow member (of various organisations), member of same ethnic group or 
community, regular frequenter of the same pub, fellow citizen, or countryman‖275. 
There are, however, reasons to object to at least some of these on grounds that are 
independent of altruism. For instance, favouring someone because they are a member 
of the same organisation could be compatible with altruism, but external factors may 
still render this morally unacceptable – favouring a member of the Ku Klux Klan and 
giving additional weight to the interests of them over anybody else would seem dubious 
if it furthered the racist ends of the Ku Klux Klan. So whilst some partiality might be 
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morally good insofar as it facilitates altruistic emotions, it can still result in decisions 
that are bad for other reasons.  
This difficulty is addressed by Cottingham‘s view that partiality on a personal 
level should be philophilic and stem from a genuine love for those whom one is 
favouring. This limits the ways in which one can justifiably restrict one‘s donation – one 
is no longer justified in favouring one‘s countrymen since one cannot claim to have a 
genuine love for each and every one of one‘s countrymen. The genuine love required 
for philophilic partiality cannot exist between strangers; it requires a knowledge and 
understanding of the other person, complete with some personal relationship. This 
restricts the types of conditions and directions that one may legitimately place on one‘s 
organs. The restrictions implied by philophilic partiality would likely be the same as the 
current DH restrictions on directed allocation, so permissible partiality would be limited 
to close friends and family. The important thing to note here is, however, that it is not 
altruism that is acting as the guiding principle so much as the limits of acceptable 
partiality. Using the proposed sliding scale of altruism without further restrictions as the 
guiding principle for organ donation may permit some conditional donations that are 
altruistic, but nonetheless morally wrong.   
5.4 Organs should go to patients in the greatest need/according to agreed criteria 
The DH Report states that it is a fundamental principle of transplantation that organs 
are allocated according to greatest need276. Stating that organs should be allocated 
according to greatest need requires a clear definition of greatest need before it can 
provide guidance for organ allocation, but the panel does not provide this. When 
detailing the allocation process for organs, the DH Report does not mention greatest 
need, and instead refers to factors that seem unrelated, such as tissue matching, organ 
size and donor age277. Greatest need therefore remains open to interpretation. 
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 To say that someone needs a transplant is to say something quite specific. A 
person with minor liver damage may theoretically receive some benefit from a 
transplant, but this does not mean that they need one. A person with severe liver 
damage who requires a transplant to stay alive could be considered to need a 
transplant, but this need is related to something else: staying alive. Need is determined 
in relation to having some goal. So, for instance, a person with no immediate danger of 
death but a severely restricted quality of life could need a transplant to have a 
reasonable quality of life; a person who is bed-bound without a transplant may need a 
transplant in order to attend their sister‘s wedding; a person may need a transplant in 
order to be eligible for the Transplant Games278. Looking at this list one may think that 
some of these goals are more important than others, so one needs to determine what 
the appropriate goals for transplantation are. An obvious candidate is to save life or 
improve poor quality of life. 
Taking liver transplantation as an example shows how life-saving is factored in. 
Within liver transplantation, there are ways in which medical need is calculated. ‗Model 
for End-Stage Liver Disease‘ (MELD) - and more specifically within the UK, UKELD – 
scores are used to give numerical representations of medical need. Neuberger states 
that ―need may be considered a surrogate for likelihood of death while awaiting 
transplantation‖, and that MELD ―has been widely adopted as a surrogate of need‖279. 
Neuberger describes MELD scores as objective, and to some extent this is true – MELD 
scores consider the same factors from person to person and provide a consistently 
reproducible result that is true regardless of perspective. As the right measure of 
medical need however, MELD may fall short. This is illustrated by the fact that there is 
disagreement over which factors ought to be included in the calculations280, and that 
                                                          
278 A sporting event where competitors have to be transplant recipients. 
279 Neuberger J, 'Transplant Benefit in Liver Transplantation: Right Time or Too Premature?', Organs, Tissues 
and Cells 14 (2011) pp81-85 
280 Bernardi M, Gitto S, and Biselli M, 'The MELD Score in Patients Awaiting Liver Transplant: Strengths and 
Weaknesses', J Hepatol 54 (2011) pp1297-306 
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the UK uses a different calculation from other countries281. It is uncertain whether 
MELD always calculates the correct likelihood of dying on the waiting list282, let alone 
whether this is a true surrogate for need. The key point here is that although it is 
stated that organs should be allocated according to greatest need, and the definition of 
need in transplantation seems to focus around urgency and life-saving, there is room 
for disagreement over what greatest need is.  
Even though MELD/UKELD scores appear to consider a single factor (likelihood 
of dying on the waiting list), other factors also feature. A person who has become so ill 
that their post-transplant prognosis has worsened may not even be considered for a 
transplant. This person may still need a transplant in order to survive, even if the 
additional lifetime gained would not meet the thresholds outlined in policy. By excluding 
individuals whose urgency of need results in them having particularly poor predicted 
transplant outcomes, the concept of greatest need incorporates a qualification relating 
to prognosis. Stating that organs must be allocated according to greatest need is 
therefore a slightly misleading over-simplification: organs are allocated according to a 
very specific definition of greatest need that is disputed. 
 
5.4.1 The impact of conditions and directions 
Accepting conditional donations would often result in organs being allocated contrary to 
greatest need (as currently defined within UK transplantation). There could be 
instances, however, when due to specific circumstances, the conditions would make no 
difference to allocation. For instance, if a condition specified that donated organs were 
only to be allocated to men, and men were at the top of the waiting lists and the best 
                                                          
281 Neuberger J, (2011) 'Transplant Benefit in Liver Transplantation: Right Time or Too Premature?' op. cit. 
p82 
282 Neuberger J, 'Allocation of Donor Livers — Is MELD Enough?', Liver Transplantation 10 (2004) pp908-10 
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tissue matches283. It is not true that conditional donations always prevent allocation 
according to greatest need. 
It is true, however, that conditional and directed donations are likely to result in 
situations where those with the greatest need receive lower priority than those with 
lesser need. Research suggests that, aside from greatest need, factors that may be 
considered by donors are: age, gender, ethnicity, marital status and educational 
achievements284. Allocating according to these factors rather than greatest need would 
probably result in more people dying on the waiting list than if the organs had been 
donated unconditionally, since those most likely to die would not be given priority. This 
provides a reason to favour unconditional donation over conditional donation. It does 
not, however, provide a reason to reject conditional donations if there is no possibility 
of unconditional donation.    
5.4.2 Need and other principles 
Allocating organs according to greatest need is important to the DH, but the needs of 
recipients are not considered important enough to override respect for the deceased‘s 
or next-of-kin‘s wishes about organ donation285. This is true by virtue of the system 
being opt-in286. If a deceased person or their next-of-kin have refused consent for 
donation, then the needs of recipients carry no weight in this decision. In living-related 
donation, the needs of recipients other than the intended recipient are not considered 
at the time of allocation. The March 2010 guidance also permits the allocation of organs 
contrary to greatest need in some instances: only recipients with urgent clinical need 
are given precedence over the requested directed recipient. The guidance states that 
directed allocation can be considered provided that ―that there are not others in 
                                                          
283 This was a feature of the 1998 racist donation: the conditions specified white people and white people 
were at the top of the waiting lists. 
284 Neuberger J and Mayer D, (2008) 'Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of the UK General Public Findings 
of an Ipsos-Mori Poll' op. cit. pp1545-47 
285 Pattinson SD, 'Directed Donation and Ownership of Human Organs', Legal Studies 31 (2011) p394 
286 This is currently true for the UK, although Wales is proposing a move to an opt-out system. See: Draft 
Human Transplantation (Wales) Bill, available at: 
http://wales.gov.uk/consultation/dhss/organ2/item;jsessionid=vvpkQ71C9C46B9lXBTwZr1G7fHDNQKCK8pQ
71rTqbpv95JfWJP5m!-1203216161?lang=en (last accessed 13/10/2012) 
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desperately urgent clinical need of the organ… who may be harmed by a request for the 
organ to be allocated to a named individual going ahead‖287. This suggests that the DH 
would consider it potentially harmful to allocate an organ contrary to greatest need if it 
was possible to do otherwise. This does not entail that it would also be harmful to 
allocate an organ contrary to greatest need if the alternative was to turn the organ 
away288. 
This all suggests that tensions between principles are resolved differently in 
different situations, but more importantly that there are some instances when 
allocating contrary to greatest need is considered acceptable. 
5.4.3 The shift to ‗agreed criteria‘ 
A subtle shift in terminology occurred between the DH‘s 2000 Report and 2010 
guidance. The 2000 Report refers to greatest need whereas the more recent document 
stated that organs ―should go to patients according to the agreed criteria‖289. This 
latter, vaguer statement allows ‗best match‘ to also be a consideration, amongst a 
range of other factors (which are not specified in the guidance). It is not clear why the 
terminology has changed, but one might speculate that it lends an element of medical 
justification to directed allocation. Justifying directed allocation in terms of a stronger 
tissue-matching may be an attempt to side-step some of the wider ethical issues.   
5.4.4 Why should donors care? 
Although it may be important for the NHS to allocate according to greatest need, the 
question of why donors ought to be concerned about greatest need remains 
unanswered. In many other areas of life (including living organ donation), individuals 
do not feel obliged to allocate their efforts and resources according to greatest need, 
and there are good reasons for thinking that some forms of partiality are desirable or 
                                                          
287 Department of Health (2010) op. cit. p2 
288 Unless one accepts that all organ allocation is harmful, since it entails some people missing out benefits 
they could have had if the organs had been allocated differently. 
289 Department of Health (2010) op. cit. p4 
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necessary (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4).  Given this, it is unclear why, in the case 
of deceased organ donation, the principle of greatest need (which is itself an expression 
of partiality in favour of those with the most acute health problems) should take 
automatic precedence.  
One might instead prefer to give one‘s organs to those one considers most 
deserving, or those who will contribute most to society in future, or those with whom 
one has a personal relationship. From an individual‘s perspective, a range of different 
allocation principles may be morally justified, including some recognition of the 
recipient‘s merit or worth. Given the option of saving the life of an unemployed 
bachelor who has no family, friends, or intention of ever contributing anything 
significant to society, or saving the life of a leading scientist who has managed to juggle 
the responsibilities of her day-job of trying to find a cure for cancer with the 
responsibilities of bringing up a young family, there would be strong utilitarian reasons 
for favouring the scientist. Her contribution to society in future is likely to be greater, 
and she has children who depend on her and would very much benefit from her being 
alive. The unemployed bachelor on the other hand is less likely to make significant 
contributions to society, and has no family or friends who would be affected by him not 
having his life saved. All other things being equal, it would be difficult to criticise a life-
saver for choosing the scientist over the bachelor.  
The NHS‘s responsibilities are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, but for 
now it will suffice to say that from a donor‘s perspective there can be morally justifiable 
reasons to want one‘s organs allocated contrary to greatest need. 
5.5 Equitable treatment 
The DH states that organs should be donated in a way that allows equitable 
treatment290, and conditional donations have the potential to prevent equitable 
treatment. Not all conditions necessarily fall foul of this, however, so a coherent 
                                                          
290 Ibid. p4 
106 
 
argument against all conditions cannot be put forward on this basis. One could imagine 
a scenario in which an awkward organ donor agreed to donate her organs on the 
condition that her organs were allocated according to the HTA‘s organ allocation 
policies. This would still be a conditional donation, so under a strict interpretation of 
policy should not be accepted. Yet conditions of this nature would make no difference to 
whom organs were allocated. This is also true of the 1998 case, where white people 
were at the top of the relevant waiting lists, so the conditions specifying only white 
recipients did not affect allocation. It is therefore not possible to justify a blanket ban 
on all conditional and directed donations on the grounds that they prevent organs from 
being allocated in an equitable way.  
A distinction ought to be drawn here, along similar lines to Wilkinson291, 
between offering and accepting organs. Individuals are generally free to offer resources 
according to the principles that they choose, but it is up to the receiving organisation to 
determine the principles under which such offers are accepted. It may be that a donor 
placing certain conditions is morally wrong, but this does not necessarily mean that it is 
also wrong to accept those conditions. One can see why the NHS may have a duty to 
generally allocate organs in an equitable way, because it is a publically funded 
institution bound by equality legislation. In some cases of conditional donation, the aim 
of treating people equitably will be in tension with another aim of saving lives. In cases 
of conditional donation, treating people equitably can come at the cost of treating 
anybody at all if the organs are turned away. This tension (and ‗levelling down‘ more 
generally) will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. It is true to say that not all 
conditional donations prevent equitable treatment, and that there may be other factors 
that are more important than maintaining equitable treatment.   
 
 
                                                          
291 Wilkinson TM, (2003) 'What‘s Not Wrong with Conditional Organ Donation?' op. cit. pp163-64 
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5.6 Conclusions 
As far as the four statements made by the DH are concerned, it is clear that conditional 
and directed donation do not always or necessarily contravene the principles that the 
DH sets out as fundamental to ethical donation. Conditional donation does not 
necessarily offend against the principle that organs should be donated altruistically – it 
has been argued that some conditions are compatible with the account of altruism used 
by the DH. As discussed in the previous chapter, altruism is not always a good measure 
of the moral worth of an action. A racist donation may be altruistic, but this is only one 
consideration when assessing its moral worth. Given this limitation of altruism, its 
suitability as an absolute principle of acceptable organ donation is restricted. The 
concept of altruism certainly does not seem able to do the work that the DH tries to use 
it for in relation to conditional donation292. The principle that organs should go to 
patients in the greatest need might be a reasonable general policy for the DH to hold, 
but the March 2010 revision and living-related donation allow allocation contrary to 
greatest need, so the principle is not consistently enforced to override other principles. 
The fourth statement relating to equitable treatment may act as a reason to prohibit 
some conditions, but it is not the case that all conditional donations prevent equitable 
treatment (as illustrated by the 1998 case). Accordingly, the principle that organs 
should be donated unconditionally seems fairly redundant, since there is nothing wrong 
with conditions per se – conditions will not always conflict with the other principles. 
One outcome of the discussion in this chapter is that the DH‘s stated reasons for 
prohibiting cases like the 1998 racist condition situation look unconvincing. If the 
principles discussed above can be applied differently to accommodate different 
situations (in some situations it is considered acceptable to allocate contrary to greatest 
                                                          
292 Although this chapter has criticised the use of altruism as a guiding principle for organ donation, it is 
important to note that this is different from using the idea of altruism to promote organ donation. Altruism 
may be the best way to promote organ donation, but it is invalid to conclude that this is therefore the only 
acceptable motive for donation.  
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need, for example), then it is unclear why they are being used as a barrier to 
conditional donations. The 1998 donation could fall under the broad category of 
altruistically motivated actions, the organs were donated in a way that permitted 
equitable treatment, and they were allocated to those with the greatest need. The only 
principle that it falls foul of is that organs must be donated unconditionally, but the 
justification for this principle relies upon false assumptions (that conditionality means 
that organs cannot be allocated according to medical need, for instance). By focussing 
its justifications for prohibiting donations like the 1998 case on altruism and other 
fundamental principles of organ donation, the DH could be accused of skirting around 
the glaringly obvious issue. The feature that made the 1998 donation particularly 
unpleasant was the fact that it was racist (and indeed this is also what made it illegal). 
The leap from objecting to one racist donation to objecting to all conditional donations 
goes too far, and the DH‘s justifications for taking this step are inadequate. 
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Chapter 6 - Recipient Obligations and Waiting One‘s Turn 
The previous chapters looked at conditional and directed donation from the point of 
view of donors and related this to the DH‘s stance on altruism and partiality. This 
chapter will focus on conditional and directed donation from the perspective of 
recipients. It will be argued that recipients have obligations to one another in light of 
their shared plight. Three key obligations will be explored: 
i) Waiting one‘s turn 
ii) Avoiding negative loss 
iii) Removing oneself from the list when one has an opportunity to do so 
It will then be argued that conditional and directed donations would not necessarily 
conflict with any of these obligations, and that therefore there is little, if anything, 
wrong with recipients accepting a conditionally donated or directed organ.  
6.1 What recipients owe to one another 
Being on a transplant waiting list in the UK means that one has a need for a life-saving 
or life-enhancing organ transplant. Organs are a scarce resource, and once ‗listed‘, one 
is competing with a number of other potential recipients for each compatible organ that 
becomes available. The UK allocation policies aim to ensure that organ allocation is 
consistent, but the allocation principles applied are contested, and may - as will be 
argued shortly - fall short of maximising the efficiency of the transplantation system. 
 Potential recipients are competing for scarce resources, yet are in some sense 
‗all in this together‘. Although recipients may never meet each other, as soon as they 
are listed, they become part of a collective resource allocation system intended to 
either save, or improve the quality of, their lives. For this reason, it is arguable that 
actions and behaviour whilst on transplant waiting lists are constrained by mutual 
responsibilities to each other and the group (of people listed) in general. These 
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responsibilities reflect what potential recipients owe to each other by virtue of their own 
conditions, recognition of and moral respect for plight of others, and a shared reliance 
upon the same system for relief from their respective plights. These responsibilities 
should guide acceptable behaviour when it comes to choosing to receive organs.  
It could be argued that potential recipients are justified in applying an ‗every 
man for himself‘ principle, and that from a recipient‘s perspective the right person to 
receive an organ is always himself, but this level of self-interest is difficult to justify. It 
is tempting to say that when one‘s life is in danger, one need not concern oneself with 
the plight of others and that one‘s own interest in surviving should over-ride concerns 
for anything else. But not everyone on the transplant waiting list is in immediate 
danger of death; some can spend months or years waiting without being in immediate 
danger of dying (or even experiencing anything roughly comparable).  Focussing one‘s 
attention only on one‘s own situation would represent a failure to recognise and 
acknowledge the plight of other potential recipients whose lives are in immediate 
danger293. Although as someone needing an organ, one might experience degrees of 
suffering, discomfort and worry, it is likely that at any time there will be people 
experiencing the same things to a greater or lesser extent.  
To recognise that one is just one amongst many is an important part of many 
systems of morality (see discussion of Nagel in previous section), and the 
responsibilities between potential recipients need to be acknowledged explicitly. This is 
not to say that these responsibilities arise from the sort of altruism described by Nagel 
in the previous section; these responsibilities can instead arise from a form of 
enlightened self-interest, in which co-operation and agreement with basic principles 
results in a better system for everybody involved.  
 
 
                                                          
293 For those people whose lives are in immediate danger, their urgent need for organs could justify them 
working on an ‗every man for himself‘ basis. It might be altruistic, even heroic, for them to consider the 
welfare of people in similarly bad positions, but this consideration would be too demanding to be obligatory. 
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6.2 Scarcity 
When there is competition for scarce resources, there are a number of ways in which 
the people competing for these resources might want them to be allocated and organs 
are no exception. With resources such as precious metals there is a finite amount 
available. With organs, however, there is a potentially limitless number over the course 
of time, but there is no assurance that any will be available at a given point or 
specifically the point at which one‘s life is at risk. This is a distinction that Kamm draws 
with great clarity, differentiating between three types of scarcity: 
i) True scarcity – If an organ is given to one person rather than another, no organ 
will ever become available for that other person until it is too late for that 
person to benefit. 
ii) Temporary scarcity – If the organ is given to one person rather than another, 
the other person will have to wait for an organ, possibly at cost to herself, 
but she will receive an organ. 
iii) Uncertainty – In a state of uncertainty, it is not known whether the scarcity is 
temporary or true294.  
At present, the type of scarcity most frequently experienced by people on the 
transplant waiting lists is uncertainty; there is no guarantee that a suitable organ will 
become available before a potential recipient‘s health deteriorates to the extent that 
they are too ill to receive a transplant, or they die. This is the type of scarcity that 
could potentially have a significant impact upon what potential recipients owe to each 
other. If true scarcity existed, it would be very demanding to suggest that a potential 
recipient is obliged to refuse an organ because there is someone in worse health than 
she is; the fact that whoever does not receive the organ will die seems to be the most 
relevant feature in true scarcity.  
                                                          
294 Kamm FM, 'Morality, Mortality Volume I: Death and Whom to Save from It', (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) p233 
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If temporary scarcity more accurately represents the situation on the waiting 
list, it would seem more reasonable to think that there is an obligation on recipients to 
wait their turn, as determined by previous and future costs to themselves and others. 
The fact that uncertainty is prevalent, though, complicates obligations and 
responsibilities to other recipients somewhat, albeit not beyond potential resolution. In 
a state of uncertainty, the obligations that would arise under true scarcity and 
temporary scarcity are in tension. This being the case one might argue that the less 
demanding obligations of true scarcity should take priority. The consequences of 
uncertain scarcity proving to be true scarcity would likely be much more severe than 
uncertain scarcity proving to be temporary scarcity, so this could be viewed as erring 
on the side of personal caution. However, this is not a particularly compelling argument 
– without the transplantation system, the type of scarcity would not matter – 
everybody needing an organ transplant would suffer greatly, die prematurely or both. A 
maximally effective transplantation system relies on the hope that the uncertain 
scarcity would prove to be temporary scarcity, and this should be reflected in the 
obligations that recipients have towards one another. All potential recipients involved in 
the transplantation system have a rational interest in a maximally effective system. If 
the transplantation system relies upon the hope that uncertain scarcity proves to be 
temporary scarcity, recipients should share this hope.  
6.3 Queuing 
Discussion of organ donation within the UK often mentions the idea of waiting lists, and 
the problems associated with demand exceeding supply. In other areas of life, waiting 
lists are relatively simplistic affairs. Those who have been on the waiting list the longest 
generally move furthest up the list as a result of people in front of them being taken off 
so that they are eventually next in line for whatever is being allocated. It is easy to 
conceive of a waiting list as being a queue, with people joining the back of the line 
when they require whatever good is being queued for. The transplant waiting list does 
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not operate on a simple ‗first come, first served‘ basis, and other factors impact upon 
one‘s position in the queue. Someone who has been on the waiting list for a long time 
will be behind others who enter the queue nearer the front, or jump forward, due to 
factors such as medical priority or better tissue match. The term ‗queue jumping‘ will 
be used in the following discussion to denote re-ordering of a queue, and not just 
wrongful re-ordering of a queue.  
 Not all organs are suitable for all people; for instance a heart donated from a 
child might not be suitable for a fully grown adult and vice versa. Similarly, relative risk 
has to be considered when allocating organs. It might be reasonable to expect a 
potential recipient with a particularly urgent need for a liver transplant to accept a 
lower quality liver than someone who is not in such urgent need of a transplant, 
because receiving any liver is better than the possible alternative of receiving no liver. 
Queues in organ allocation perhaps have to be conceived of in a fairly dynamic 
way. In essence, each time an organ becomes available for transplantation, a new 
queue is formed on the basis of the various criteria that are used to allocate organs. 
Some patients may not be suitable for a specific donated organ so will not feature in 
this queue. Other patients may be more or less suitable, so will be ordered accordingly. 
Some patients may have been waiting much longer than others, and will also be 
ordered accordingly. It is this ‗queue‘ for each organ, rather than the waiting list in 
general, that is of concern.  
 Before queuing can be discussed further, the necessity of queuing needs to be 
justified. Perhaps the strongest justification can be made on consequentialist grounds; 
queuing, and ensuring that organs are given to appropriately matched recipients (since 
mismatched organs are unlikely to be transplanted successfully) at the right time 
(however this is ultimately defined), brings about better overall consequences than 
alternative options. An alternative non-consequentialist justification could be made on 
the grounds of fairness; scarce resources should perhaps be distributed and allocated 
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fairly, and this means that relevant and impartial criteria295 (however defined) should 
be used to decide the right people to receive them. Without a fair system of organising 
and ordering potential recipients, people who only have a moderately urgent need for 
an organ might receive transplants before people who have a very urgent need for a 
transplant with the result that the latter may die before another suitable organ 
becomes available. Although there are arguably worse things than dying and death, 
preventing a severely ill person from dying seems to be a more worthy aim than 
enhancing the life of a moderately ill person. This is a point supported by MELD/UKELD 
allocation systems which aim to minimise deaths on the liver waiting list296. A lack of a 
fair system would also mean that those who have waited the longest to receive an 
organ would not necessarily be amongst the most likely to receive organs in future, so 
there would be no attempt to equalise waiting times.      
In day-to-day life queue jumping is often considered rude and objectionable, as 
it results in additional waiting and inconvenience for those behind the queue jumper. In 
cases where queues are organised on a first-come first-served basis, there is also likely 
to be some resentment towards the queue jumper because she will not have ‗earned‘ 
her place in the queue. Queue jumping in organ donation is more than just 
inconvenient though; the stakes are high. Failing to respect the queue can result in 
resources not being made best use of, and this can result in needless death. 
There are some cases, however, where queue-jumping is apparently 
unobjectionable. There is nothing wrong with queue jumping if the person at the front 
of the queue is unable to take advantage of the good at the front of the queue. In the 
context of transplantation this could occur when the person at the front of the queue 
cannot be contacted, or is too far away from a transplant centre to receive the 
transplant in time, or too poorly on the day to be transplanted. Even though this person 
may have earned their place at the front of the queue, rigidly maintaining the order of 
                                                          
295 This can also appeal to consequentialists, if the relevant impartial criteria featured maximal effectiveness.  
296 Neuberger J, (2011) 'Transplant Benefit in Liver Transplantation: Right Time or Too Premature?' op. cit. 
pp81-85 
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the queue and refusing to allocate the organ to anybody else would be unreasonable. 
Similarly there is nothing wrong with moving to the front of a new queue from any 
position in an existing queue if one is the person nearest the front of that existing 
queue able to utilise the good at the front of the new queue. To give an every-day 
example, supermarket checkouts are prime queuing locations, with many queues 
consisting of several people, some of whom have trolleys full of shopping whilst others 
may only have a few items in a basket. If a new ‗Ten items or fewer‘ checkout is 
opened (and this was the only other checkout type available in the store), no-one with 
a trolley could reasonably resent someone with a basket moving over to this new 
queue. This would mean that people in the original queue would get to the front of that 
queue more quickly (presuming that the individuals with ten items or fewer were in 
front of them). If more than one person had ten items or fewer, the people with few 
items would expect the order from the old queue to be transferred to the new queue297. 
This is not wrongful queue-jumping; it is just a flexible approach to queuing to make 
best use of available resources. This flexible approach to queuing could be utilised in 
organ allocation to ensure the best use of resources in a situation where conditional 
and directed donations were permitted. 
 
6.4 Waiting one‘s turn 
If recipients could be assured that the type of scarcity present in transplantation was 
merely temporary scarcity, and that ultimately everybody would receive an organ, then 
it would be best for everyone if everybody waited their turn. The neediest people would 
receive organs before less needy people, and this would work to minimise the time 
people spent in the most severe of health conditions. If one knew that one was 
definitely going to receive an organ, one would presumably feel inclined to let the 
neediest people have first claim on suitable organs. If everyone viewed this as a mutual 
                                                          
297 In practice it is often the person who is most alert or who moves quickest who gets to the front of the new 
queue – but the resentment one feels when someone does this may suggest it is perceived as being unfair. 
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responsibility to each other, people could be assured that if they became sufficiently 
needy, their claim for an organ would have higher priority than those who were less 
needy, and their time spent in this needy state (where suffering and risk of death is 
likely to be higher) would be minimised. In this sense, the general principle of waiting 
one‘s turn is better for everybody.  
 Due to the uncertain nature of organ scarcity, the idea of waiting one‘s turn is 
potentially more problematic. Waiting one‘s turn does not entail, as it would do if the 
scarcity was temporary, that one is only accepting that one will undergo a degree of 
suffering; when one waits one‘s turn when the type of scarcity is uncertain, one accepts 
that there is a risk that the scarcity might prove to be true scarcity and that turning 
down an organ, or an organ being given to someone more urgent that one is now, 
might result in one‘s death. The degree of risk of the scarcity proving to be true 
scarcity is contingent upon a number of factors, including how long one could live 
without a transplant, the commonness of the type of organ that one requires, and the 
number and medical characteristics of people ahead of oneself on the waiting list. 
However, the risk of the uncertain scarcity becoming true scarcity is, for organs such as 
livers where urgency is a significant factor in list order, likely to be greater for people 
ahead of oneself on the waiting list (since their health is likely to be worse, so they will 
be able to live for less time without a transplant). It seems reasonable, then, that one 
should not ordinarily accept an organ unless one is in a position that has the highest 
(relative to anyone else eligible for the organ) risk of the uncertain scarcity proving to 
be true scarcity. This would appear to be the sort of thing that everyone on the 
transplant waiting list might agree to if they were behind a veil of ignorance.  
 Generally, the principle of queuing is accepting one should not queue-jump 
without good reason, but as will be discussed shortly, there can be good reason to not 
always wait one‘s turn. 
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6.5 Avoiding negative loss 
An important goal of the transplant community should be to minimise negative loss; 
that is a loss of benefit for somebody without a corresponding increase in benefit for 
somebody else. Given that organs are a scarce resource that can save or improve lives, 
and the consequences of not using them effectively are severe (additional people may 
die), it is important that potential good that organs can provide is not wasted. In simple 
terms this means that every effort should be made to utilise donated organs. Whether 
attempts to attain this goal should be unconstrained is questionable though, since there 
may be other relevant factors that should be taken into account. A more qualified goal 
of the transplant community could be ‗to minimise negative loss in a way that is 
ethically acceptable‘. 
In simplistic consequentialist terms, avoiding negative loss by any means is 
superficially desirable. It is in nobody‘s immediate interests for a medically useable 
organ to not be utilised. Under the current system, if someone wishes to donate an 
organ with conditions attached that restrict the recipient to a certain type of person, 
this organ would not be accepted. Rejecting a donation of this sort constitutes a 
negative loss – a benefit is rejected and lost, without a corresponding increase in 
benefit for somebody else (this is true at least in terms of simple immediate 
benefits)298. 
One could argue that a recipient rejecting an offer of a conditionally donated 
organ would have other benefits, such as keeping their hands clean of any wrongdoing 
reflected by the conditions. One might suggest that this benefit of moral rectitude 
outweighs the benefit of life-saving. A potential recipient might feel virtuous because 
she had preserved her integrity and not accepted an organ offered according to 
unacceptable partiality, but this integrity may come at the cost of other people‘s lives. 
                                                          
298 This chapter is only considering negative loss from recipients‘ perspectives. It will be looked at in more 
detail from the NHS‘s perspective in Chapter 7 
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Her integrity may be a form of self-interest, which may partly undermine the reason for 
rejecting a conditional donation.    
If the system was changed to permit the acceptance conditional donations that 
would otherwise be turned away, negative loss could be minimised. This would be at 
odds with the general principle of waiting one‘s turn though, so accepting such an 
organ may be contrary to the obligations of potential recipients just outlined. If 
recipients are obliged by their responsibilities to one another to wait their turn, yet at 
the same time have a duty to help avoid negative loss, then there is some tension 
surrounding what they should actually do. 
Accepting an organ with conditions attached would not just be of immediate 
benefit to the eventual recipient: everybody behind the potential recipient on the 
waiting list also benefits, because there is one person fewer standing between them 
and the top of the waiting list. The people ahead of the eventual recipient on the 
waiting list also receive some benefit, since there would be one less person competing 
for the organ. Waiting lists are relatively dynamic, and a person can move up the list 
quickly if their condition worsens, so it is in everyone‘s interests to have fewer people 
on the waiting list. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how anybody could be immediately 
harmed by accepting a donation of this type (and following the conditions), since if the 
conditions were not granted the organ would not be donated anyway.  
 Accordingly, where an organ is directed to a specific person or type of person, 
and the donation is conditional upon the recipient being this person or this type of 
person, we can conclude that the recipient does nothing wrong, on consequentialist 
grounds, if she accepts this organ. As discussed earlier, this is not queue-jumping in 
the conventional sense because the item being queued for is not suitable (by virtue of 
its conditions) for anyone in the queue ahead of the intended, or intended type of, 
recipient.  
 This approach clearly focuses on consequences to a large extent, but this does 
not seem unreasonable. When the stakes are so high (risk of death and certain 
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continued suffering), it would seem fair for the aim to be to bring about the best 
consequences from a situation that might otherwise be non-ideal. A person who 
receives priority for a donated organ because of an objectionable condition could be 
criticised for tacitly endorsing the condition and furthering the wrongful ends of the 
donor. This assumes that the recipient would be told about the condition, and this need 
not be the case (see 6.7 below). 
Potential recipients may object to a medically suitable organ becoming available 
and not being offered to them because of non-medical conditions attached. Given, 
however, that this organ would never have been made available to them anyway 
(because it would had to have been rejected), they would appear to have little cause 
for complaint.  Indeed, continuing to object in these circumstances appears to be a 
form of ‗if I can‘t have it, nobody should have it‘ reasoning, which is very difficult to 
justify. 
 
6.6 Getting off the list and staying off the list 
Linked very closely to the idea of avoiding negative loss is the idea that potential 
recipients should do what they can to remove themselves from the list. Each person 
who is already on or added to the transplant waiting list is an additional person 
competing for the same scarce resources. Each additional person competing for the 
same scarce resources increases the likelihood of uncertain scarcity proving to be true 
scarcity for recipients further down the waiting list. It is therefore in the interests of 
potential recipients to have as few people competing for these scarce resources as 
possible, and when potential resources are made available, recipients should utilise 
them. 
 This should be qualified however, since there are ways to remove oneself from 
the list that would seem unreasonable to expect a potential recipient to do. For 
instance, asking an otherwise healthy young person with a non-life-threatening liver 
condition to accept a low-quality organ that may fail might remove her from the waiting 
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list, but would probably not significantly extend her life, might result in her returning to 
the list relatively quickly (which is fairly self-defeating), and may leave her actually 
worse off as a re-transplant patient299,300. Although not strictly linked to conditional 
and directed donation, it is worth mentioning that there may also be an obligation for 
people who have received organs previously thereby benefitting from the 
transplantation system, to take reasonable measures to keep themselves from 
returning to the waiting lists in future.   
  
6.7 Information for recipients – do they need to know about conditions? 
The prospect of permitting conditional and directed donation raises the issue of 
potential recipients being offered organs with conditions attached that conflict with their 
own values and beliefs, to varying degrees. There are two separate questions that need 
answering here; should potential recipients be informed of the conditions attached to 
an organ that they are offered? And, are potential recipients obliged to accept an organ 
with conditions attached even if these conditions conflict with their own values and 
beliefs? 
 The first question links to recent debate about how much information recipients 
should be told about their donors301. Broadly speaking, recipients are told little about 
their donors, as this would run the risk of compromising the anonymity that forms a 
key part of the deceased transplantation system in the UK. However, the lack of 
information required by the importance of anonymity is in tension, in part at least, with 
the demands of information required for informed consent.  
                                                          
299 European Liver Transplant Registry (2010) 'Mortality and Retransplantation', Available at: 
http://www.eltr.org/spip.php?rubrique37, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
300 Self-killing would also remove a person from the waiting list (and could even supply additional organs), 
but would be too onerous to be obligatory. 
301 NHSBT (2011) 'Guidelines for Consent for Solid Organ Transplantation in Adults', Available at: 
http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/pdf/guidelines_for_consent.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
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 A full discussion of what recipients need to know about their donors and the 
circumstances surrounding the donation is beyond the scope of this thesis302, but there 
is at least one good reason for not telling potential recipients about any conditions 
placed upon an organ that they are offered: it would potentially place a significant 
burden on someone who would already be very ill. Making someone decide whether 
they are willing to accept an organ with conditions attached to it that they find 
objectionable presents them with an awful dilemma: accept an organ offered against 
their principles, or stay on the waiting list and potentially die or become even more ill 
before receiving an organ. Equally, potential recipients might feel uncomfortable about 
receiving organs ‗out of turn‘, even though this can be ethically justified with reference 
to avoiding negative loss. Explaining the idea of negative loss would promote 
understanding, but this may run the risk of then pressuring recipients to go against 
their own principles for the good of others. It is clearly not satisfactory to say that 
‗ignorance is bliss‘, but it would appear that there are certainly some reasons to not 
inform recipients about conditions attached to donations. 
 
6.8 Conclusions 
In this section it has been argued that potential organ recipients have some basic 
obligations to each other. The general importance of waiting one‘s turn has been 
defended, to draw the conclusion that as a potential recipient one should not normally 
‗queue-jump‘. It was then argued that the principles of avoiding negative loss and 
removing oneself from the transplant waiting list could provide justifications for not 
waiting one‘s turn (and that this need not be considered queue-jumping).  
Conditional and directed donations would require recipients to behave in certain 
ways in order to maximise the utility of these donations, but this is not particularly 
troubling. It would therefore appear that there is not necessarily anything wrong with 
                                                          
302 Recently this debate has focussed on the use of marginal organs, and whether recipients ought to be told 
about donors‘ lifestyles or causes of death. – ibid.  
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conditional and directed donation from the perspective of recipients and potential 
recipients.  
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Chapter 7 - The NHS, its options and furthering wrongful ends 
Conditional and directed donation has thus far been explored from the perspectives of 
organ donors and organ recipients. It has been argued that, from these perspectives, 
conditional and directed donation is not necessarily a bad thing. The final perspective to 
explore is that of the UK transplant authorities and NHS. This chapter will explore the 
implications of permitting conditional and directed donation from the perspective of 
these organisations. It will be argued that this perspective provides few reasons to 
object to such donations, and that permitting and facilitating them can be justified in 
some circumstances. 
7.1 A preliminary note on efficiency 
Efficiency is a concept that features in the following discussion, so a clear definition is 
required. In simple terms, efficiency is the ratio of input to output, but input and output 
in the context of transplantation require definition. Input could be measured in donated 
organs: these are what are ‗put in‘ to the transplantation system via donation. This is 
not useful in determining efficiency, however, since output should consider more than 
just the number of organs successfully transplanted. Moreover, not all organs are of 
equal quality, and differences in quality result in different transplant outcomes. 
Alternatively, organs can be regarded as sources of potential good. Each donated organ 
has the capability to produce some good, and some organs can produce more good 
than others. A top quality organ from a young, healthy donor will have the capacity to 
produce more good than a poor quality organ from donor with a history of chronic ill 
health. Efficiency, for these purposes, then, refers to the ratio between the maximum 
potential good achievable by an organ and the good that is actually realised by that 
organ. This definition of efficiency leaves open the question of how ‗good‘ ought to be 
defined. A full exploration of this complex issue is not possible here, but a suitable and 
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practical candidate is the Quality Adjusted Life Year303. A transplantation system 
working at maximum efficiency would be one that brought about the most possible 
QALYs from its available donated organs. Although QALYs have been criticised
304
, they 
are currently used in cost-benefit analyses produced by the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence
305
 and it would be consistent with other areas of the NHS to use 
them in relation to organ allocation. 
Efficiency is not the only consideration when allocating organs
306
, but a simple 
example illustrates its importance. Transplanting a top quality liver into a patient who is 
going to die within 6 months from other causes would be an inefficient (and therefore 
poor) use of that organ if there were other potential recipients with a post-
transplantation life-expectancy of ten years.  
7.2 A defence of unconditional donation 
Now that efficiency has been outlined, it is possible to defend an important claim: that, 
from a neutral perspective, unconditional donation is generally preferable to conditional 
donation. This starts with the assumption that the NHS‘s allocation criteria are, all 
things considered, the best criteria currently available. They are undoubtedly not 
perfect, and ought to be continuously scrutinised and questioned, but they take into 
account and balance many complex factors and they have been developed over time by 
people who understand transplantation. Many conditional donations will prevent organs 
being allocated according to the usual criteria. This is likely to result in compromised 
transplant efficiency, because tissue matching and other medical factors may not be 
given appropriate consideration. It may also result in deaths on the waiting list that 
                                                          
303 Sassi F, 'Calculating Qalys, Comparing QALY and DALY Calculations', Health Policy and Planning 21 (2006) 
pp402-08 
304 Harris J, 'Qalyfying the Value of Life', Journal of Medical Ethics 13 (1987) pp117-23 
305 Nice, 'Measuring Effectiveness and Cost Effectiveness: The QALY',  (2010)  
306 Fairness operates as a constraint on efficiency for some organs, so someone who has been waiting a long 
time for a kidney transplant could be allocated an organ ahead of someone who has not been waiting as long 
but who has more predicted QALYs. 
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could have been avoided if the organs were donated unconditionally. In these 
instances, conditional donations are not ideal.  
Where attached conditions do not make a difference to organ allocation, this 
objection fails. In the 1998 case of conditional donation involving racist conditions, the 
organs were allocated to the people at the top of the waiting list anyway. This suggests 
that conditional donation per se does not always cause non-ideal allocation. However, 
at the time of donation, conditions should still be considered non-ideal insofar as they 
may prevent the organs being allocated according to standard criteria. Although some 
conditional donations may not compromise the final allocation, at the time of donation 
the final implications of the conditions may not be fully known.  
There is also a risk that conditional donations, even if accepted, may result in 
wastage. If a donor stated that they were only willing for an organ to be transplanted 
to a specific person, or a particularly specific type of person, it may prove to be 
impossible to follow this request.   
7.3 Conditional donation and the supply of organs 
Successful transplants are a good thing because they save, or significantly improve, the 
lives of the people who receive them, and NHSBT, the DH and HTA are constituted to 
achieve these goods to the best of their ability and resources, and within the law. There 
is a consistent drive to increase the number of organ donors in order to meet demand. 
The impact on organ supply of permitting conditional donations is unknown. In 
simple terms it may increase the number of organs, decrease the number of organs, or 
have negligible effect. In more complex terms, it may lead to more donations overall, 
but fewer unconditional donations. Conditional donation may encourage some people to 
donate who otherwise would not, but this may be offset by other people choosing to 
not donate organs if they perceive the system to be unfair. Even if they do not 
significantly increase overall donation rates, there is something to be said for accepting 
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conditional donations, since they will provide an organ that otherwise would not be 
available, and would remove at least one person from transplant waiting lists. This 
would potentially benefit many other people on the lists. Allowing conditional and 
directed donation, however, might compromise some of the key ideals of a publically 
funded institution such as the NHS. Just as a survival lottery307 might be one way of 
meeting the demand for organs, objections to it
308
 suggest that organ donation should 
not necessarily be maximised by any means, and that there are other considerations 
beyond immediate positive consequences for the recipients that need to be considered. 
7.4 The NHS‘s role 
Transplants in the UK rely on the transplantation system that is in place, and this 
transplantation system seems unlikely to change significantly in the immediate future. 
Transplants are not simply a product of donor and recipient meeting in a dark alley and 
organs being passed from one person to another. Skilled surgeons are needed in sterile 
operating theatres, with appropriate pre and post transplant care packages available to 
recipients.  
This renders the question of whether conditional and directed donations should 
be allowed rather meaningless. Allowing is not the issue here since allowing implies, 
superficially at least, a level of non-interference. Transplants require interference by the 
NHS and transplant authorities, so the NHS allowing conditional and directed donation 
would have little impact (presuming that a privatised system of transplantation is not 
on any UK Government‘s immediate agenda309). Instead the important questions are 
whether the NHS should accept conditional and directed donations and facilitate or 
perform transplants on the basis of these conditions or directions. 
                                                          
307 Harris J, 'The Survival Lottery', Philosophy 50 (1975) pp81-87 
308 For instance, people question what life would be like in a world where any innocent person could be killed 
for their organs at any moment. Others question the acceptability of killing one person to save others. 
309 Buggins E (2009) 'Allocation of Organs to Non-UK Eu Residents', Available at: 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_103515, 
Last Accessed: 31/10/2012 p7 
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 The NHS and transplant authorities are involved in the process of accepting and 
allocating donations, and performing transplants. Bearing in mind those conditional and 
directed donations will often reflect objectionable personal preferences (the 1998 case 
featured racist conditions, for instance310), there is an instant temptation to suggest 
that the necessary level of involvement that the NHS and transplant authorities have in 
organ donation would dirty the hands of these organisations to an unacceptable extent. 
There is a legal requirement that organisations such as the NHS should not be racist or 
indeed unjustly discriminatory on any other grounds
311
.  
7.5 The NHS‘s options 
If one accepts that unconditional donation is preferable, then one can argue that the 
NHS ought to promote unconditional donation. This, however, leaves open the question 
of how the NHS ought to respond to conditional offers of organs if they do occur. There 
are many reasons why the NHS should not operate a general policy of allocating organs 
according to desert, responsibility, ethnic origin or similar conditions
312
. There is a 
difference, however, between having a general policy of allocating organs according to 
these factors, and having a general policy of allowing donors a say in who the recipients 
of their organs are, and fulfilling these wishes.  
The term ‗allocative authority‘ is used here to refer to control over to whom 
donated organs are transplanted. Transplant authorities can only work with what they 
are given, and if they are given organs with conditions attached that constrain their 
allocative abilities, they can: 
 i) Accept the donation but lie to the next-of-kin and ignore the conditions; 
 ii) Turn the organs away and provide no benefit to transplant recipients; 
 iii) Allocate within these constraints and provide benefit to transplant recipients. 
                                                          
310 Department of Health (2000) op. cit.  
311 Equality Act (C 15) 2010 
312 Ho D, 'When Good Organs Go to Bad People', Bioethics 22 (2008) pp77-83 
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Each of these options will now be examined in turn. It will be argued that the first two 
are worse options to choose than the third.  
7.5.1 Lie to the next-of-kin and ignore the conditions completely 
One possible way to handle conditional donations would be to accept the donation, 
allocate the organs according to standard criteria, but lie to the next-of-kin so that they 
think their conditions have been followed. This would have the advantage of not having 
to turn away medically useable organs, and would maintain the freedom for the NHS to 
allocate according to the principles that it considers correct. This option can be rejected 
on both ethical and legal grounds. 
First, one might simply consider it unethical to lie to the next-of-kin. Kantian 
moral theory would suggest this was the case, but a consequentialist may argue that 
lying in these circumstances is justifiable if it brought about good consequences. 
Allocating organs according to medical criteria is, in very simple terms, likely to bring 
about better transplant outcomes than allocating according to non-medical factors. A 
consequentialist may also have to consider lying in these circumstances to be wrong, 
however, since organ donation relies upon public trust and good will. The Organ 
Retention Scandal
313
 has shown that being dishonest about what happens to body parts 
after death can cause great upset, and this sort of upset could harbour mistrust and 
cause a consequent decline in donated organs. Although in principle it could remain a 
secret, the risk of it entering public knowledge should be sufficient to rule out such a 
policy. 
 More importantly, if consent for organ donation is given on the basis that the 
organs are only allocated to certain types of people, then accepting the organs and 
then allocating them contrary to this would undermine the consent. Cronin and Douglas 
suggest that ―If a donor‘s consent has been limited to specific situations, it follows that 
any allocation of organs contrary to such limitations vitiates that consent and amounts 
                                                          
313 'Royal Liverpool Children‘s Inquiry Report',  (2001) Available at: 
http://www.rlcinquiry.org.uk/contents.htm, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
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to dealing with the organs without consent‖314. The HTA‘s Code of Practice for consent 
states that consent can be limited to specific situations
315
, and conditional donation 
would be an example of this
316
. Given that authorised activities (of which donation for 
transplantation is one) are only lawful if done with appropriate consent317, it would be 
unlawful to accept a conditional donation and then allocate contrary to the conditions.  
 
7.5.2 Turn the organs away and provide no benefit to transplant recipients 
The option of turning away organs with conditions attached is the one currently 
exercised in the UK. As discussed in Chapter 5, the justification given for this is to 
preserve the fundamental principle of organs being donated altruistically in a way that 
allows them to be allocated to people in greatest need. It has been argued in Chapter 5 
that conditional donations can still be altruistic, so this by itself cannot provide a reason 
to turn away conditional offers of organs. 
Insisting that organs are allocated according to greatest need also cannot 
provide a reason to turn all away conditional offers
318
. An important distinction made by 
Wilkinson is the difference between allocating according to an impartial principle and 
allocating according to an impartially defensible method319. Under the current system, 
adherence to the impartial principle of allocating according to greatest need entails that 
organs with conditions or directions attached to them are turned away. Taking the 
direct method of achieving impartiality (following the impartial principle of ‗allocate 
organs according to greatest need), the medical needs of recipients are actually met 
less well than they otherwise could be. One might argue that accepting and allocating 
                                                          
314 Cronin AJ and Douglas JF, (2010) 'Directed and Conditional Deceased Donor Organ Donations: Laws and 
Misconceptions' op. cit. p295 
315 Human Tissue Authority (2006) 'Code of Practice - Consent', Available at: 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/_db/_documents/2006-07-04_Approved_by_Parliament_-_Code_of_Practice_1_-
_Consent.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
316 Cronin AJ and Douglas JF, (2010) 'Directed and Conditional Deceased Donor Organ Donations: Laws and 
Misconceptions' op. cit. p294 
317 Human Tissue Act (C 30) 2004 
318 For one, not all conditions prevent this anyway. 
319 Wilkinson TM, (2007) 'Racist Organ Donors and Saving Lives' op. cit. pp63-74 
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according to the conditions on a donation may prevent the very neediest from receiving 
a transplant, so even accepting the donation does not meet greatest need. This does 
not, however, provide a reason to turn away a donation, rather than offer it to an 
eligible person with greatest need. An unconditionally donated organ may not be the 
right tissue-type for the patient with greatest need, but this does not mean the organ 
should be rejected and not offered to people with the correct tissue-type but lesser 
need. Wilkinson argues that accepting conditional and directed donations could allow 
for need to be better met and that ultimately this fulfils the reason for having impartial 
principles in the first place320.    
Fairness 
One possible reason to reject conditional donations is because they are unfair. For this 
objection to be valid, it must be true that the current allocation system is fair, or at 
least fairer than accepting conditional donations would be. Wilkinson argues that an 
appeal to fairness is not a valid objection321. Due to the scarcity of organs, it is a reality 
that some people receive a benefit that others do not. A fair way to deal with this 
problem would be to give everyone the same treatment, but due to organs being scarce 
this could only be achieved by treating nobody. Wilkinson suggests that few people 
would support banning transplantation on these grounds because saving lives trumps 
rigid adherence to fair allocation. If this is the case accepting conditional donations also 
trumps fairness (since accepting conditional donations saves lives), or fairness must be 
conceived of differently322.   
 Wilkinson goes on to discuss the possibility that when organs are scarce, 
transplantation per se ought not be considered fair or unfair, but that if it is going to 
happen then it ought to be done fairly. Fair allocation systems may include, amongst 
others, a lottery, or a fair queue. A fair queue would need to be based upon the fixed 
                                                          
320 Ibid.  
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principle of a substantive fairness criteria, such as ensuring equal waiting time323. It 
would then be unfair for an organ to be allocated in a way that did not respect the 
order of the queue. As Wilkinson points out, however, waiting lists generally (and this is 
true of the UK) take into account factors other than waiting time, such as transplant 
benefit, and this can be considered trading off other factors (efficiency, in the case of 
transplant benefit) against absolute fairness. If this is the case, it is not clear why the 
additional transplant benefit gained by accepting conditional donations cannot be taken 
to outweigh a loss of fairness.     
Levelling down 
If it was possible for the NHS to allocate according to its own relatively fair (see above) 
allocation policy, and it chose to allocate according to other factors, then this could be 
considered unfair and unacceptable. With conditional donations, however, the NHS is 
faced with a different situation: allocate the organs according to other possibly unfair 
factors, or preserve fairness and do not allocate the organs at all.   
Turning away organs in order to preserve fairness, in this situation, would be a 
form of levelling down
324,325, insofar as it makes some people worse off without any 
subsequent gain for others. This relates very closely to the concept of negative loss 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
Using a common form of thought experiment may show that levelling down is 
counterintuitive. One can imagine a publically-owned swimming pool, in which a 
number of children are unfortunately drowning. A passer-by is a strong swimmer and 
offers to save as many children as he can. Unfortunately he is also a racist, and makes 
it clear that he is only willing to save the white children. It is uncertain whether any 
other life-savers will arrive in time to save the children. The pool manager is faced with 
                                                          
323 Ibid. p71 
324 Parfit D, 'Equality and Priority', Ratio 10 (1997) pp202-21 
325 Wilkinson TM, (2012) op. cit.  
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a dilemma: allow some of the children to be saved but accept that they are being 
selected on the grounds of race, or turn down the offer of life-saving and accept the 
possibility that additional children may drown. It would take a fairly inflexible 
egalitarian to suggest that the life-saving offer should be turned down in this case. 
Although the swimming pool manager could quite rightly be asked to justify why only 
white children were saved, an explanation of the alternatives would surely vindicate 
him. 
It would seem reasonable to think that sometimes levelling down is appropriate. 
For instance, if one changes the scenario to a school where a generous donor is offering 
book-tokens to pupils, but only to white children, then the school would be justified in 
turning down the book tokens. The difference between this example and the swimming 
pool is the severity of the consequences. By turning down book-tokens, a few children 
will miss a relatively insignificant benefit. By turning down organs, people may die or 
endure additional severe illness. Where the consequences are this severe, and the need 
so acute, levelling down is the wrong thing to do. 
7.5.3 Accept the conditions and allocate accordingly 
It has been argued that the first two options available to the NHS would be the wrong 
course of action to follow. The third option available to the NHS is to accept conditional 
donations and allocate according to the conditions. This can have benefits for all people 
waiting to receive organs, but could also cause harm. These potential benefits and risks 
will now be considered. 
Accepting is better for all transplant recipients 
Having additional organs available for transplantation is beneficial to people waiting for 
transplants, and this is true even if the organs are donated conditionally. More organs 
available for transplantation means more lives can be saved or improved, and this 
benefits the people who actually receive these additional organs. Everybody on the 
133 
 
waiting lists behind the people who receive the organs will effectively be moved up a 
place on the waiting list, so these people also benefit. 
Conditions attached to these additional donations may mean that the people at 
the top of the waiting lists according to standard criteria are deemed ineligible for these 
organs. One could argue then that accepting conditional donations is bad for these 
people because they are overlooked during the allocation of certain organs. This is 
wrong, however, because the organ would not have been available for donation were 
the conditions not accepted. This being the case, it is actually better for the people 
ahead of the eventual recipient if the donation is accepted, because it removes 
somebody else from the waiting list who could potentially move ahead of them in 
future. Removing people from the waiting list benefits everybody on the list, as there is 
less competition for organs. Accepting conditional donations when they occur is, for 
recipients, better than turning them away. 
7.6 Accepting the unobjectionable 
As discussed earlier, some conditions that an individual might choose to place on the 
use of organs can be morally acceptable and compatible with the altruistic principles of 
deceased donation in the UK. Indeed, in some instances it might be more than 
permissible that conditions or directions are placed on an organ, it might be required, 
as we have seen in the discussion above about the mother failing to direct an organ to 
a needy offspring326. 
 The March 2010 revision to guidance
327
 regarding deceased donations directed to 
family members goes some way towards permitting similar levels of the ―partial 
autonomy-driven rationale‖ that underpins live donations328. It has been argued that 
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this level of partial autonomy can ―create and sustain intimate personal relationships‖329 
within the context of live donation, and it seems equally plausible that this can occur 
with deceased donation. In living donation this power to create and sustain intimate 
personal relationships generates exceptions to impartial allocation, and it is reasonable 
to also apply this to deceased donation. The relationship obviously perhaps be between 
the deceased person and the recipient (although one might argue that something 
positive can still be produced here, such as a positive and meaningful memory), but as 
discussed earlier it does not always make sense to think of the deceased person as the 
donor anyway. A father who directs his deceased wife‘s organs towards their needy 
child might sustain the intimate personal relationship between him and his child, and at 
the same time strengthen the memory that the child has of its mother.   
 This is not to say that impartial justice is not an important ethical principle; it is 
just an acknowledgement that it is not appropriate in all situations and that there can 
be other things that are of greater importance. Given that this is the case for living 
donation, then it is inconsistent for this to not also be the case for deceased donation. 
7.7 Accepting the objectionable 
Although some people may wish to place conditions or directions on organs for morally 
acceptable reasons, it is probable that some people would have less noble reasons for 
doing so. Some people will want to allocate organs according to race, gender, sexuality 
or lifestyle and often this might reflect unjustifiable prejudice against groups or 
individuals. It is possible that someone might choose to allocate organs according to 
any of these criteria with good intentions, but it seems implausible that ‗true‘ intentions 
could ever really be accessed and/or known by the transplant authorities. The most 
difficult donations to justify accepting are those that appear morally unacceptable – the 
spiteful homophobe who does not want her organs to be transplanted to a homosexual, 
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or the anti-Islam bigot who deliberately and intentionally wants to deprive Muslims of 
her organs. These are the sorts of donations where allocative authority is misused, and 
the values represented are at odds with the norms of a decent and equality-based 
society.  
7.8 Involvement in the wrong 
When it comes to accepting organs with morally objectionable conditions attached, the 
question appears not to rest on any account of immediate harm to potential recipients, 
but instead on whether it is acceptable for the NHS to be complicit in wrongdoing and 
to further wrongful ends - which could cause harm, perhaps on a wider scale.  
Complicity in wrongdoing has two main components: assistance and shared 
intentions
330
. The wrongdoing in the case of a racist conditional donation is complex, 
but can be considered on two levels. First, it is wrong to attempt to deliberately 
disadvantage people on the basis of race. Second, it is wrong for people to actually be 
disadvantaged on the basis of race. By accepting a donation with racist conditions 
attached, the NHS would not be deliberately attempting to disadvantage people on the 
basis of race, but it would be helping to bring about the disadvantaging of people on 
the basis of race. The NHS can therefore be considered to be assisting, but not sharing 
intentions. 
The extent to which the NHS should be considered complicit varies according to 
the extent that its actions help to achieve the racist end. The racist end in this case 
cannot be achieved without the assistance of the NHS, so the NHS must be considered 
relatively complicit. It could be more complicit, if, for example, it deliberately made it 
easier for people to place racist conditions, or even promoted the idea. There are also 
ways in which it could make itself less complicit (see section 7.10). Kluge has argued 
that ―[i]f a first party engages in an unethical act which, as act, becomes materially 
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possible only through the aid of a second party, then the second party shares in the 
guilt of the first to the degree that its participation is instrumental in allowing the act to 
take place‖331. If one accepts that it is unethical to make a racist conditional offer of 
organs, one might argue that this act only becomes materially possible through the aid 
of the NHS. Even if the NHS does not accept the donation, however, the act of 
conditionally offering organs has still been performed. By implementing a consent-
based framework for organ donation, the NHS is instrumental in allowing the act 
(conditionally offering organs) to take place, yet consent is currently considered 
fundamental332 for organ donation. The NHS is therefore in a difficult position: 
supporting the principle of consent for organ donation is instrumental in allowing people 
to act unethically (which implicates the NHS in the wrongdoing, according to Kluge), 
but abandoning a consent-based system would also be considered unethical by 
many333. If one accepts Kluge‘s general principle, yet still supports consent for organ 
donation, one must accept that although the NHS allows and aids people to act 
unethically and therefore shares some of the guilt for their unethical actions, other 
principles (such as consent) are more important than complete non-complicity in 
wrong-doing. 
In terms of shared intention, the situation is simpler. The NHS cannot be 
considered complicit. There is the possibility of a shared intention, insofar as both the 
donor and the NHS may act because of a wish to save lives, but the relevant bad 
intention - to deprive certain people of organs on the basis of race - would not be 
shared by the NHS. The NHS and transplant authorities would merely be making use of 
available resources to save or improve lives, and this need not reflect anything 
negative about the views or wishes of these organisations.  
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 If the NHS and transplant authorities did decide to accept donations with 
objectionable conditions attached, they should still strive to bring about the fairest and 
most medically-justifiable allocation of organs within the constraints of the conditions. 
For instance if someone donated a liver with the condition that it was only transplanted 
to white people, this would still provide scope for the transplant authorities to allocate 
the organ to the most medically suitable white person. By doing this it would be very 
clear that the aim was purely to make the best use of available resources. 
7.9 Negotiating with terrorists 
Allocating according to constraints might be akin to paying a ransom to release a 
hostage – insofar as the NHS has to concede to the wishes of the donor in order to be 
able to use the organs - but the alternative situation of the organ going to waste might 
render this acceptable. Although one might argue that ‗negotiating with terrorists‘ is 
wrong, it need not be framed like this. The NHS may have to pay drugs companies 
inflated prices for life-saving medication, and this may be undesirable insofar as it uses 
up finite financial resources. In an ideal world, the NHS would not have to pay such a 
price for medications, but it is forced to do so in order to obtain the life-saving 
resources that it needs. Similarly, in an ideal world the NHS might not want to follow 
donor‘s conditions, but it may have to in order to obtain the life-saving resources that it 
needs.   
7.10 Minimising harm and possibilities for offsetting 
If indeed, as is proposed, even objectionable conditional and directed donations are 
acceptable due to the good consequences that they result in, consideration has to be 
given to any potential harm that they may cause. Something that has positive 
consequences in terms of donation rates might have negative consequences more 
broadly conceived. In a country like the UK where racial tension has historically been a 
significant issue, and still continues to be, there is the risk that a public organisation 
such as the NHS facilitating racist donations and furthering the ends of racists might be 
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viewed as symbolically supporting racism, and this could have farther-reaching 
implications that impact negatively upon different ethnic groups. The same could be 
said of conditions that discriminate against other minority groups who may already feel 
alienated from mainstream society.  
 It is difficult to predict the precise harms that accepting donations such as these 
might cause. It does seem likely though that at least some harm would be caused, and 
although this may be justified in terms of the removing barriers to life-saving or 
improving organ donations, it would seem sensible for some efforts to be taken to 
minimise the harm of accepting these donations. 
 The simplest method of minimising harm would be to release a statement each 
time a conditional or directed donation was accepted. The statement need only declare 
the NHS‘s position on the conditions placed, and reiterate the preference for 
unconditional donations. If an organ was accepted with racist conditions attached, the 
statement might declare that the NHS and transplant authorities do not support racism, 
but that organs are such a precious resource that they feel justified in accepting the 
donation. It might also mention that within the constraints of the conditions, the fairest 
allocation of organs was sought. If the reasons for accepting these donations were clear 
and transparent, it would seem difficult for people to consider the NHS and transplant 
authorities to be racist or otherwise unjustly discriminatory. It could also be 
emphasised that people of any ethnic group could place conditions or directions on their 
organs, although one might rightly be concerned that this might result in ‗tit-for-tat‘ 
conditions being placed on donations. Other forms of offsetting or harm minimisation 
could also be considered. One such option would be to attempt to offset the 
discriminatory effect of some conditions. For example, if a donor specified that her 
organs could only be allocated to white people, the NHS could ensure that the next 
available organ was allocated to a non-white person. This would obviously be 
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dependent upon tissue-matching, but it does suggest that the negative impacts of 
conditional donations can be reduced.   
7.11 Issues of equality 
It has been argued there are justifications for accepting conditional donations. But one 
might argue that the current donation and transplant system works well, is 
appropriately principled, and that there is nothing to be gained by changing to a policy 
that compromises valued principles and potentially allows people to act ‗badly‘. 
However, there are problems with the current policy, and one of these is the way in 
which organs are currently distributed. 
Whilst it is correct to say that current organ allocation is fair in some sense, 
there is another sense in which organ allocation in the UK is unfair. Ethnic minority 
groups in the UK tend to donate fewer organs than majority groups, so for organs 
where shared ethnic origin leads to a better tissue match, there are fewer organs 
available for ethnic minority potential recipients. This situation is exacerbated by high 
demand for these organs from those very groups. This system has resulted in a 
situation where people of South Asian ethnic origin stay on kidney transplant waiting 
lists for three times as long as people of other ethnicities. This does not occur as a 
result of direct prejudice or discrimination, but when outcomes are as unequal as this, 
consideration should be given to any alternative that might result in a more even 
distribution of available organs, or a system that improves the lot of those that tend to 
fare particularly badly.  
One might be tempted to argue that because this situation arises from low 
donation rates from these communities it is somehow acceptable, but this essentially 
holds people responsible for the actions (or lack of actions) of other people where the 
only link is shared ethnic origin.  It does not seem right to say that it is acceptable for 
South Asian people to wait a long time for organ transplants simply because fewer 
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South Asian people choose to donate organs, because this is like saying ‗people like you 
can wait longer to receive organs because people like you are less likely to donate 
organs‘, where the ‗like you‘ refers to a feature that is beyond the control of the 
individuals concerned. It is not necessarily unfair for South Asian people to have to wait 
longer for transplants, but the inequality in waiting times suggests that action is 
required to specifically promote organ donation to groups that currently have low 
donation rates.  
 One option to resolve the situation could be to permit conditional donation 
amongst groups with low donation rates, if this was likely to remove a barrier to 
donation. If, for instance, allowing South Asian donors to direct their organs towards 
fellow South Asians would result in an increased number of South Asian people 
donating organs, then this would provide a reason for permitting it. If, however, other 
ethnic groups thought this unfair they may feel less inclined to donate into the same 
system. Some white people may insist that they will only donate if their organs are 
given to other white people, which would result in the organs being turned away if 
white people were not permitted to place conditions334. 
 A ‗one-size-fits-all‘ unconditional approach to organ donation may not appeal to 
all types of people equally. The extent to which conditional and directed donation might 
result in increased equality of outcome is an empirical matter. But a system that does 
not maximise the amount of organs available harms those in need of an organ335, so 
consideration should be given to ways that donation rates can be maximised. 
Permitting people to make these donations might result in donations that would 
ordinarily be unconditional and purely altruistic becoming conditional and 
discriminatory. One potential outcome of this could be that certain groups of people 
(perhaps those already on the fringes of society) experience a much reduced access to 
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organs for transplantation, increasing healthcare inequality. This would be undesirable, 
and it is difficult to see conditional and directed donation being acceptable if this were 
the case. However, it is challenging to predict how likely this would be and one would 
hope that there would still be a sufficient supply of unconditional donations to cater for 
the needs of those excluded by the majority of conditions (if such a pattern emerged).  
It is worth noting the earlier discussion that even under the current system 
some groups are severely disadvantaged, so the notion that conditional and directed 
donation might result in some groups being disadvantaged is not a knock-down 
argument against it; this would all depend upon the scale and reach of the 
disadvantage, and this could only accurately be known by gathering empirical data. 
7.12 Conclusions 
This section has looked at conditional and directed donation from the perspective of the 
NHS and attempted to approach the issue with an open mind. It has argued that there 
are good reasons why the NHS should accept conditional donations. In situations where 
the donor‘s conditions are morally acceptable and compatible with altruism, it has been 
argued that these donations should be accepted. The more difficult donations to justify 
accepting are those that are not necessarily altruistic
336
 and represent morally 
questionable prejudice on the part of the donor or their family. Accepting donations of 
these sorts, however, does not necessarily reflect badly on the NHS and transplant 
authorities so long as they are accepted for the right reasons.  Furthermore, efforts 
must be made to allocate the organs as fairly as possible within the constraints of the 
conditions or directions, and further reasonable efforts must be made to reduce any 
consequent harm caused by accepting these donations. 
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Chapter 8 - The Embedded Study 
Having completed the initial philosophical exploration of the issues, the next step was 
to conduct an empirical study. The aim of the empirical study was to gather data to 
inform and enhance further philosophical discussion of conditional and directed 
donation, as detailed in Chapter 1. As discussed, a purely philosophical approach can 
potentially suffer from a number of shortcomings that limit practical application, so the 
empirical study was designed to gather specific data to help overcome these 
shortcomings. 
8.1 Study Aims 
This study aimed to gather data on the attitudes of potential organ donors, potential 
organ recipients and transplant staff towards conditional and directed organ donation. 
In order to produce a practically useful philosophical analysis, it was important 
to access stakeholder‘s moral intuitions, considered judgments and to gain an insight 
into the sorts of reasons they appeal to when thinking about directed and conditional 
donation in order to uncover new lines of argument, and to have ‗encounters with 
experience‘337 that could enrich the philosophical analysis. Taking a qualitative 
approach allowed for the gathering of this sort of data and for an in-depth picture of 
participants‘ views to be obtained.  It was important not just to discover participant‘s 
views on conditional donation, but also to determine how and why these views have 
been reached, which made a qualitative approach appropriate338. Undertaking a 
quantitative survey could have provided data about popular support for certain 
conditions, for instance, but it would not have provided the depth of information 
needed to help explore new lines of argument.    
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A review of the literature and the philosophical analysis in Chapters 3-7 revealed 
several areas of potential interest and uncertainty. Based on these, a series of empirical 
research questions were generated, the answers to which could be used to inform the 
ongoing philosophical analysis: 
1. How acceptable is directed and conditional donation to potential organ donors, and 
what ethical considerations inform these views? 
2. How acceptable is directed and conditional donation to those practitioners working in 
transplantation in the UK NHS, and what ethical considerations inform these views? 
3. How acceptable is directed and conditional donation to those awaiting a transplant in 
the UK NHS, and what ethical considerations inform these views? 
4. What factors do participants think should be used to allocate organs, and why? 
5. How do participants conceive of concepts such as fairness, justice, altruism and 
medical need? 
A qualitative design was appropriate to answer these questions because 
qualitative research allows for the gathering of detailed and in-depth data that can go 
beyond simply describing surface views and preferences.  It has the potential to obtain 
data on the reasons that lie behind peoples‘ views and preferences, how strongly the 
views are held, and to understand them in the context of the unique experiences of 
each participant.  The approach used was tailored to the needs of the project, with the 
qualitative intervention (in this case interviews – see 8.5) being undertaken in a way 
that is more akin to a philosophy seminar than a research encounter.  This approach 
was first used by Alderson, Williams and Farsides (albeit in focus groups rather than 
interviews) in their studies of prenatal screening and testing339, the ambiguous status 
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of the foetus340, and just and equitable services341. A key benefit of this approach, 
particularly relevant to the aims of this empirical study, is that discussion can be 
focussed on principles and values342.  Similarly, in this project, given that the empirical 
study aimed to gather data useful for philosophical discussion this more questioning 
and challenging approach to interviewing is warranted, and facilitates a research 
encounter that encourages participants to articulate the (sometimes previously 
unconsidered) reasoning behind the views they hold, and explores how consistently, 
and vehemently, those reasons are adhered to.  This approach to data collection aimed 
to enable participants to engage with the topic and their own existing beliefs. The 
nature of the interviews led to some participants changing their minds throughout the 
interview, and revising earlier statements to avoid inconsistency. There is a possibility 
that this critically engaged approach led to the co-production of data that did not 
accurately represent the views or types of reasoning that participants use on a day-to-
day basis. Critical engagement with the issues during interviews, however, led 
participants to reach judgments that were more carefully considered and justified than 
their initial intuitive responses to scenarios, and is likely to lead to more considered 
lines of argument that better serve the aims of this project. Participants in the Alderson 
et al studies valued having a facilitator who was non-judgmental and non-partisan343, 
so it was important for Moorlock as interviewer to not appear to endorse or reject 
particular viewpoints.  
8.2 Setting 
The study took place in the West Midlands. Some participants for the study were 
recruited from a large inner city hospital in the West Midlands with expertise in solid 
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organ transplantation. Other participants were recruited from the general 
Birmingham/West Midlands population via snowballing. 
Birmingham has a relatively high proportion of South Asian residents, with 5.8% 
of the population identifying as ‗Asian or Asian British: Indian‘, 9.7% ‗Asian or Asian 
British: Pakistani‘ and 2.5% ‗Asian or Asian British: Bangladeshi‘344. This made it 
particularly suitable given the various issues surrounding organ donation and BME 
communities (such as low donation rates and high demand for organs, see Chapter 2). 
8.3 Sampling, participants and recruitment 
The study sought to obtain the views of people with specific relationships to, and 
experiences of, the research topic so purposive sampling was used based upon criteria 
derived from the research questions. Participants were recruited from 3 main groups; 
potential donors, potential recipients and NHS transplant staff.  It was felt that 
potential donors, potential recipients and transplant staff were likely to be most 
affected (and most directly affected) by conditional and directed donations, and that 
each of the groups was likely to contain individuals with interesting and relevant 
perspectives and experiences. Transplant staff, for example, would be affected by 
conditional and directed donations insofar as they could potentially have to facilitate 
transplants using organs with conditions attached to them; they may also have 
experienced requests for conditional or directed donations in the past and be able to 
discuss their reactions to such requests. In addition, they care for patients who never 
get transplanted. The perspective of potential recipients is of importance because they 
would be the people receiving (or not receiving, if conditions so specified) the organs. 
The views of potential donors were sought because it was important to understand the 
sorts of reasoning that people use when making decisions about donation. The 
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philosophical analysis in Chapters 3-7 suggested several justifications for placing 
conditions or directions on donations, but by speaking to potential donors one can 
explore how important these are to the individuals involved. The potential donor group 
consisted of two sub-groups, divided on the basis of ethnicity. It was particularly 
important to obtain the views of members of the South Asian population, given that 
they are over-represented on transplantation waiting lists, under-represented as 
deceased donors, and that permitting conditional donations may remove a barrier to 
them choosing to donate organs345.  
Participants within each purposive group, where possible, were selected for 
maximum variation, in order to obtain a wide range of demographic characteristics. For 
instance, it was desirable to interview a variety of different types of transplant staff, 
since differing job-roles may have led to different perspectives on the topic. Similarly 
there was a need to adequately represent the views of Birmingham‘s South Asian 
population within the potential donor category, and to interview people from a variety 
of South Asian backgrounds. 
Although efforts were made to interview a variety people, no attempt was made 
to achieve statistically representation – which is typical of this research paradigm346. 
Qualitative research is nonetheless often criticised for not being strictly generalisable347. 
Generalisability is defined as ―the extent to which findings from a study apply to a wider 
population or to different contexts‖348, and the criticism is that one might not be able to 
confidently generalise findings from one‘s data to a broader population because of the 
generally small and statistically non-representative sample. Mays and Pope say that 
―(t)he nature and extent of the data will ascertain which conclusions can be drawn 
about what‖349. For this project, the data have been used to provide new lines of 
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inquiry and to act as a springboard for further philosophical discussion. When data are 
employed for this purpose, the problem of generalisability is less pressing because no 
claim is being made that people in a broader population share the views elicited. The 
data have also been used to suggest what sort of things people might find 
acceptable/unacceptable, and this has played a role in determining the final 
recommendations. Generalisability is more of a problem here, and this is borne in mind 
when the final recommendations are stated in Chapter 12.  
The sampling strategy and size was intended to elicit a range of responses. 
Undertaking more interviews could enhance transferability, but practical constraints 
acted as a limiting factor. The timescale of the project and the rate of recruitment 
ultimately dictated the sample size. Because this was a qualitative study, formal sample 
size calculations did not apply. Due to time and resource limitations, it was decided that 
a maximum of 15 interviews would be conducted for each group as this would be likely 
to result in varied, if not saturated, data.  
Sampling for the potential recipient and transplant staff groups was an ongoing 
process that was driven by the data. If the ongoing analysis of collected data suggested 
that the views of a certain type of staff member or potential organ recipient might 
prove particularly interesting, participants of this type were sought. This was conducted 
according to the model of theoretical sampling outlined by Glaser and Strauss350. This 
process occurs when ―the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and 
decides what data to collect next and where to find them‖351. This was a desirable 
approach because it permitted the deliberate targeting of specific viewpoints and 
perspectives in order to either confirm existing hypotheses, or provide new and 
different views. This was not possible for the potential donor group due in part to the 
recruitment method, and partly due to difficulty obtaining sufficient numbers of 
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participants; potential participants for the potential donor group were initially selected 
from GPs lists and invited to take part via a mass-mailing, and it would not have been 
practical to perform subsequent more targeted mailings. Due to the recruitment 
difficulties, which will be discussed shortly, it was impossible to actively seek out 
certain types of potential donor. 
8.4 Participants  
8.4.1 Transplant staff 
The inclusion criteria for transplant staff were as follows: 
i) Staff at a large inner city hospital in the West Midlands with expertise in 
solid organ transplantation who are involved in the transplantation 
process, or the care of donors/recipients involved in the transplantation 
process. 
 
Members of staff were only excluded if it proved impossible to arrange a mutually 
convenient interview. 
 
8.4.2 Potential donors 
The group of potential organ donors was split into two sub-groups, with the aim of 
recruiting fifteen participants to each. One sub-group consisted of people of South 
Asian ethnicity (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan), and the other was people 
of any other ethnicity. Since anybody can potentially be an organ donor, the inclusion 
criteria for this category were broad. 
 
i) Eligible members of the general adult population registered with a GP at 
selected practices within the Birmingham area, who could potentially choose 
to donate their organs when they die.  
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To recruit these selected practices, a presentation on the study was given to a Host 
Nurse meeting. Host Nurses are nurses embedded in research-active GP practices with 
the aim of facilitating research activities. Following this presentation, 3 practices agreed 
to assist with the selection of potential participants.   
 
There were several exclusion criteria: 
i) Individuals with underlying health conditions relating to major transplantable 
organs. It was important to maintain distinct boundaries between the groups 
of people to be interviewed. Individuals with health conditions relating to 
major transplantable organs may require a transplant in future, and 
therefore might occupy the boundary between potential donor and potential 
recipient (to a greater extent than most). It was important, as far as 
possible, to avoid the risk of participants who were taking part as donors 
answering questions from the perspective of becoming a potential recipient 
in the near future.  
ii) Individuals with family members on transplant waiting lists because they were 
likely to be influenced by their family member‘s condition rather than having 
the views and perspective of ‗standard‘ potential donors. 
iii) Individuals in poor health because the intention was to recruit members of the 
generally healthy population, since these are people who are most likely to 
be able to donate their organs after death. As a potential donor category, 
people who are unlikely to be able to donate organs were excluded. Poor 
health for these purposes was defined as attendance at a GP practice within 
the last 12 months (except for Family Planning).   
iv) Individuals known to their GP as being potentially volatile or aggressive in order 
to mitigate the risks to the researcher. 
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v) Individuals under the age of 16 or adults without the capacity to consent. 
Special considerations apply to the donation of organs from deceased minors 
and adults without capacity to consent during their lifetime352 which were 
beyond the scope of this study. 
  
Non-English Speaking South Asian Potential Donors 
Birmingham‘s Asian population includes a number of non-English speakers. Although 
data specific to Birmingham or the West Midlands was not available, national data 
suggests that speaking English is commonplace for younger Asian males, but rarer for 
Asian females, particularly older ones. A study that looked at English speaking ability 
and literacy353 found that 93% of men of Indian ethnic origin aged 30-49 in the UK 
speak English, whereas only 80% of women of Indian ethnic origin aged 30-49 speak 
English. This disparity increases with age, with only 47% of women of Indian ethnic 
origin aged 50-74 speaking English, compared to 86% of men. These figures are 
echoed amongst other Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, with the latter having particularly 
low rates of English speaking. Only 21% of women of Bangladeshi origin aged 30-49 
speak English, and this figure declines to 10% for women aged 50-74. English literacy 
followed a similar pattern for these groups, which would have restricted non-English 
speakers‘ ability to read and understand the study materials (information sheets, 
consent forms, invitation letters) 
Because there was a possibility that non-English speaking South Asian 
participants may be less ‗culturally integrated‘ than English speaking South Asians, and 
therefore of value to the study, efforts were made to accommodate non-English 
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speakers. South Asian potential donors were asked to pass on information to non-
English speakers, and communication between interested non-English speakers and 
Moorlock would be facilitated by either an English-speaking family member or an 
interpreter. Anecdotal advice suggested that most people who do not speak English will 
have a family member who is able to translate for them, but an interpreter was offered 
as an additional measure. Although measures were in place to accommodate non-
English speakers, and attempts were made to recruit them, no non-English speakers 
expressed an interest in taking part in the study. Interpreters were also available to 
facilitate the recruitment and interviewing of non-English speaking potential recipients, 
but again, no non-English speakers expressed an interest in participating. 
8.4.3 Potential Recipients 
Potential recipients were identified as being patients who were currently on, or might 
soon be on, the transplant waiting lists for livers or kidneys. Although conditional and 
directed donations would also likely affect people waiting for other major organs, the 
decision was made to focus on livers and kidneys for two reasons. First, potential liver 
and kidney recipients were easier to access, and many patients suitable for interviewing 
in the chosen setting were expected. Second, because there are other potential factors 
that influence people‘s thinking relating to other organs (hearts in particular are 
sometimes thought to be have particular symbolic meaning354), these factors might 
serve to muddy the waters in terms of thinking about conditional and directed donation 
specifically.  
Inclusion criteria were: 
i) Competent adult patients from an inner city hospital in the West Midlands 
undergoing transplant assessments, or dialysis, and who were either on the 
                                                          
354 Mai FM, 'Graft and Donor Denial in Heart Transplant Recipients', American Journal of Psychiatry 143 
(1986) pp1159-61 
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organ transplant waiting list or expected to be placed on the waiting list in the 
near future. 
 
Recruitment of potential recipients started in the Liver Unit of an inner city hospital in 
the West Midlands. Initially it had been planned to recruit people undergoing inpatient 
liver transplant assessments and outpatient renal dialysis, but it soon became apparent 
that this would yield insufficient participants. The reason for this was just prior to study 
commencement there had been a change to the way patients were classified as 
inpatient/outpatient, resulting in fewer inpatients being available for recruitment. The 
initial protocol stated that only inpatients would be recruited, so a substantial 
amendment was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee to allow the recruitment 
of transplant assessment outpatients. 
Exclusion criteria were as follows: 
i) Patients currently in poor health as determined by the Transplant Recipient 
Coordinators. Patients undergoing transplant assessments, particularly for 
liver transplantation, are often very unwell, and participating in an interview 
would be unduly burdensome. Transplant Recipient Coordinators acted as 
gatekeepers to very ill patients, because they had knowledge of patients‘ 
conditions.  
ii) Anyone thought likely to become particularly distressed by the interview and its 
content was excluded. Transplant assessments involve intensive medical 
tests, consultations and education sessions, and naturally this can make 
them a stressful experience. Discussing transplantation with people 
undergoing assessments potentially makes them consider their own 
mortality and poor health, and this could have been distressing for some 
people. Transplant Coordinators were therefore asked to highlight anybody 
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who had been finding the assessment experience particularly difficult, and 
these people were not approached for involvement in the study. 
8.5 Interviews 
According to Kvale, ―(q)ualitative research starts from the idea that methods and 
theories should be appropriate to what is studied‖355. Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen as the method for data collection because semi-structured interviews provide a 
balance between consistency across multiple interviews and scope for additional 
probing and unscripted questions. Qualitative interviewing is seen as being ―particularly 
useful as a research method for accessing individual‘s attitudes and values‖356 and this 
makes it appropriate for answering the research questions for this study. Interviews 
have been described as ―a conversation that has a structure and a purpose determined 
by the one party – the interviewer‖357. Semi-structured interviews, however, allow for 
the direction of the interview to be decided to some extent by the interviewee, since 
the interviewer will react and respond to the interviewee‘s answers, and the subsequent 
shape of the interview is dictated by those answers.  
A feasible alternative to interviews would have been focus groups. One 
advantage of focus groups compared to interviews is that although some interviewees 
may be more inclined to ‗open up‘ in interviews, others may be intimidated, and 
therefore more reserved, in a one to one encounter. Focus groups bring together a 
group of people with shared experiences, which can make participants feel more 
comfortable about disclosing personal information358,359. Focus groups would have been 
inappropriate for this research, however, for several reasons. First, there was little 
reason to think that groups of, for example, potential recipients, would be sufficiently 
similar, by virtue of that shared experience, to create a comfortable environment to 
                                                          
355 Kvale S and Flick U, 'Doing Interviews', (London: Sage, 2007) pxi 
356 Seale C, 'Researching Society and Culture', (London: SAGE, 2004) p182 
357 Kvale S and Flick U, (2007) op. cit. p7 
358 Kitzinger J, 'Qualitative Research: Introducing Focus Groups', British Medical Journal 311 (1995) pp299-
302 
359 Kvale S and Flick U, (2007) op. cit.  
154 
 
disclose personal information. The same could be expected of groups of potential 
donors, and transplant staff. Second, focus groups seem particularly unsuitable for use 
with transplant staff, because individual staff may be reticent to voice honest and 
perhaps controversial opinions if there were other (perhaps more senior) members of 
transplant staff present. Third, it would have been very difficult to organise focus 
groups for participants who potentially require organ transplants in future. These are 
people who are generally in poor or fluctuating health, and using interviews allowed 
more flexibility in terms of scheduling (and rescheduling), and allowed for data to be 
obtained in a way that minimised the burden for participants (where possible, patients 
were interviewed whilst they were already attending hospital for other reasons). 
The flexibility offered by semi-structured interviews (as opposed to rigidly 
structured interviews or questionnaires) allows potentially sensitive or controversial 
topics to be broached in a way that ―opens up a dialogue‖ and produces ―fuller 
accounts‖360. This is particularly important for a topic such as conditional donation, 
because questions are likely to touch on potentially controversial areas of prejudice. 
The topic is also, by its nature, potentially sensitive because it involves thinking about 
death and dying, and the measures one is willing to take to avoid death. This flexibility 
also allows for other sensitive issues to be dealt with appropriately; for instance, asking 
someone who needs a transplant a set of rigid questions about transplantation may 
cause distress. Although these sorts of topics and questions do have to be covered 
even in semi-structured interviews, the option to pursue lines of questioning further or 
to phrase questions differently if they appear to be causing distress allows for sensitive 
topics to be covered in a way that does not isolate, offend or needlessly distress the 
interviewee. Structured interviews also run the risk of appearing to the interviewee as 
an interrogation, who might feel bombarded by questions that aren‘t appropriately 
reactive to answers already provided. 
                                                          
360 Ibid.  
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A concern throughout the interview process was that the interviewer might, on 
occasion, be regarded as an expert or authority on the issues surrounding conditional 
donation. Although Moorlock did not disclose information regarding his academic 
training during interviews, some of the staff participants were aware of his background, 
and had attended talks and presentations by him in the past (albeit not on the specific 
research topic). A careful line needed treading between appearing sufficiently 
knowledgeable to discuss the issues in sufficient depth and detail, without ever claiming 
a degree of expertise over what is right or wrong. There are many arguments about the 
rightness or wrongness of claiming ‗moral expertise‘361,362,363 but the concern for the 
purposes of these interviews went beyond this. First, the use of counterfactuals and 
counterexamples, though a conventional and widely used technique in philosophy, 
could potentially lead participants to think that the interviewer was actually disagreeing 
with them and telling them that their views were wrong, rather than simply exploring 
their views in more detail. Indeed, adopting a typical philosophical technique might 
even appear abrupt and confrontational. However it has been suggested that thought 
experiments and counterfactuals are an important part of the research process364,  so 
incorporating them into the interview was desirable, and their use is neither novel nor 
controversial365,366 . Where inconsistencies in someone‘s responses were present, 
suitable questions and prompts were devised to make these inconsistencies apparent to 
the participant rather than merely have the interviewer telling the participant that their 
views were inconsistent. Although the process was one of critical engagement, it was 
undertaken with tact and sensitivity in order to help participants explore their own 
beliefs. Second, there was a risk that participants might be inclined to express what 
                                                          
361 Crosthwaite J, 'Moral Expertise: A Problem in the Professional Ethics of Professional Ethicists', Bioethics 9 
(1995) pp361-79 
362 Archard D, 'Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts', Bioethics 25 (2011) pp119-
27 
363 Singer P, 'Moral Experts', Analysis 32 (1972) pp115-17 
364 Brady HE and Collier D, 'Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards', (Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2004) p163 
365 Alderson P, Farsides B, and Williams C, (2002) 'Examining Ethics in Practice: Health Service Professionals‘ 
Evaluations of in-Hospital Ethics Seminars' op. cit. pp508-21 
366 Ives J 'Becoming a Father/Refusing Fatherhood:  How Paternal Responsibilities and Rights Are Generated', 
(PhD, University of Birmingham), (2007)  
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they thought was the ‗correct‘ answer to questions, rather than an answer that 
reflected their own personal views, values and experiences. Care was therefore taken 
to avoid appearing to endorse specific views or opinions in order to minimise the risk of 
imposing personal values upon the interviewee. 
8.6 Topic guide and scenarios - development 
A topic guide was devised, based upon three hypothetical scenarios involving 
conditional and directed donations. These scenarios (see Table 2) were intended to 
provide a basis for discussion, and the topic guide detailed a number of questions to be 
asked. Although by no means exhaustive, the scenarios were intended to illustrate the 
different types of conditions that people might want to place on organs, as well as the 
different motivations behind these conditions. The first scenario featured conditions 
based upon deservingness and responsibility, the second scenario featured conditions 
based upon religious preference, and the final scenario featured conditions based upon 
immigration status. The same scenarios were used for all participants, in line with the 
semi-structured format. 
The decision to use scenarios was made because of the nature of these sorts of 
donations. Looking at the issues from an abstract and theoretical perspective serves 
some purpose, but it was felt that participants may find it easier to talk about ethical 
issues when related to a concrete example rather than an abstract discussion of moral 
theory. These scenarios were designed to put donation decisions into a context, and to 
some extent, to humanise the issues. The scenarios provided specific context, but it 
was then the task of Moorlock, as interviewer, to ensure that discussion covered more 
abstract principles and values in a way that participants could engage with and feel 
confident talking about. 
Although the scenarios were designed to put these sorts of donations into 
context, care was taken to avoid personalising them too much or making them too 
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specific. A lot of discussion of conditional and directed donation tends to focus on 
conditions relating to either alcoholism or race, but basing scenarios on these sorts of 
specific conditions would run the risk of causing offense to some interview participants. 
Many people who need liver transplants, for instance, will require these as a result of 
alcoholic liver disease, and it would have been unfair to present these potential 
recipients with scenarios suggesting, however implicitly, that they might be less 
deserving of treatment. The scenarios were therefore designed to illustrate more 
generic conditions that might be placed on organs, and it was decided that some of the 
more potentially sensitive topics would only be discussed in interview only if raised by 
the interviewee. The scenario focusing on religious conditions was originally designed to 
include a reference to a specific religion (in this case Islam), but it was felt by the 
Research Ethics Committee that the scenario should be made more generic. The 
scenario was therefore modified so that it did not refer to any specific religion. Another 
scenario was originally intended to include racist conditions, but this was modified to 
instead refer to immigrants in order to make it less specific. Although in some ways it 
may have been interesting to use specific examples as these may have provoked 
stronger or more emotional responses, this had to be balanced against the risk of 
offending or upsetting participants. 
Specific questions were devised for the three categories of participants, with a 
number of more general questions that would be asked to all participants (see 
Appendix 3). Some questions could only be asked to certain types of people (for 
instance a question about how the participant would feel if they received an organ with 
conditions attached would really only be relevant to potential recipients). Because of 
the semi-structured nature of the interviews, not all of the questions were necessarily 
asked, and additional questions were often asked in order to probe or clarify 
interviewees‘ responses. 
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8.7 Recruitment 
8.7.1 Staff 
Transplant staff were invited to participate in the study by an email sent by a 
Consultant with an interest in the project who had access to staff email addresses by 
virtue of working for the same organisation. The participant information sheet was 
attached to the email, and people interested in participating were asked to contact 
Moorlock directly. The Consultant was asked to send an initial invitation email to the 
following categories of staff: 
Specialist Nurses – Organ Donation (SNODs) 
Renal and Liver Recipient coordinators 
Renal and Liver transplant surgeons 
Psychiatric Nurse attached to the unit 
The doctors involved with transplant recipients both pre & post surgery 
Anybody associated with the listing of potential recipients 
 
The email was sent to 35 members of staff, and the Consultant requested that 2 
selected members of staff forwarded the email to members of their teams.  7 members 
of transplant staff responded to the initial invitation email, expressing a willingness to 
take part in the study. A further 2 individuals expressed an interest in participating 
once their colleagues had participated; presumably as a result of discussions with these 
colleagues.  A further email was sent out at a later date in an attempt to recruit further 
participants, and this resulted in 2 additional participants. 
8.7.2 Potential donors 
Initially, Practice Managers and Host Nurses performed a database search of patients 
registered at their practice and selected potential participants using the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. These potential participants were then sent invitation letters and a 
Participant Information Sheet, along with a covering letter from their GP introducing, 
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but not endorsing, the study. People interested in participating were asked to complete 
and return a brief form using a stamped addressed envelope to Moorlock, confirming 
their initial interest in participating, and providing contact details and details of 
convenient times to contact them to arrange interviews. Alternatively, people wishing 
to participate could also telephone, text or email Moorlock. A mutually convenient time 
and location for interview would then be arranged, and confirmed via the participant‘s 
preferred method (post, email, text message, and telephone). A reminder was to be 
sent out to each participant approximately one week before the interview was due to 
take place. 
In addition to this, snowballing was to be used to recruit South Asian speakers 
of languages other than English. Letters sent to potential participants of South Asian 
ethnicity recruited via GP‘s lists included a request that the invitation and information 
was relayed to non-English speaking members of the South Asian community who were 
known to the recipient (anticipated to be close friends or family members). Interested 
individuals were asked to contact Moorlock by telephone (using the assistance of a 
family member if necessary), at which point filter questions would be asked to establish 
suitability (based upon the inclusion/exclusion criteria). Once suitability was 
ascertained, a convenient time would be arranged for an interpreter to telephone the 
potential participant to organise an interview and talk the potential participant through 
the Participant Information Sheet in their own language.  Any English speaking South 
Asian person responding to the letters as a potential participant would be asked if s/he 
had any non-English speaking friends or relatives who may be interested in the study, 
and to pass Moorlock‘s contact details onto these people.    
 A second letter was sent to the potential participants two weeks after the initial 
letter, to remind potential participants to respond if they were interested in taking part. 
This letter was sent to all of the recipients of the original letter (including those who 
had already responded), since for data protection reasons it was not possible to 
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compare a list of people who had already responded (only available to Moorlock) with 
the list of all people invited (only available to GP practices).  
It was intended that 200 people would be selected and contacted in this way, 
with the aim of recruiting a total of 30 people. After an initial mailing from one GP 
Practice to 100 people (50 South Asian, 50 non-South Asian) yielded no responses, it 
was decided that an alternative recruitment method might prove more fruitful. An 
application for ethical approval was submitted to the University of Birmingham (see 
8.12 and Appendix 1) in order to gain permission for more direct recruitment methods. 
The first alternative method involved Moorlock approaching people in specified 
public locations in Birmingham and speaking to them about the study. Although many 
people were approached, only 12 people took information packs containing information 
sheets and contact details, and this yielded no participants.  Accordingly, it was decided 
that snowballing would be used instead. Moorlock provided friends and colleagues with 
information packs and requested that they pass these on to their own friends. This was 
immediately successful and ultimately provided 10 participants for the non-South Asian 
potential donor category, and 3 for the South Asian potential donor category. 
Due to the low recruitment for the South Asian potential donor category, an 
advert was placed in the University of Birmingham College of Medical and Dental 
Sciences weekly email newsletter, seeking interested participants, particularly of South 
Asian ethnicity. The advert also encouraged anyone who knew of anyone else who 
might be interested in taking part to pass on Moorlock‘s contact details. This yielded an 
additional 7 participants for the South Asian potential donor category. This method was 
not ideal because it predictably resulted in a relatively unvaried sample (the limitations 
of this are discussed in more detail in Chapter 11), but it was necessary in order to 
obtain sufficient numbers of participants. Attempting earlier recruitment methods had 
taken a substantial amount of project time, and the deadline for the completion of data 
collection meant that a compromise had to be made. 
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8.7.3 Recipients 
Once identified by transplant co-ordinators as suitable for recruitment, potential 
participants were approached by Moorlock on the transplant assessment ward and 
given a brief oral overview of the research, an invitation letter and participant 
information sheet. Potential participants were then given at least 24hours to decide 
whether or not to participate. Generally potential participants were initially approached 
on Tuesdays (since this provided sufficient time for Transplant Co-ordinators to 
determine whether patients were suitable for the study), and then interested 
participants were approached again on Wednesday to see if they wanted to take part in 
an interview the following day. Because these potential participants were in hospital to 
undergo a number of tests and procedures, it was not always possible to meet with 
them again on the Wednesday. On these occasions, efforts were made to speak to 
potential participants early on Thursday morning to see if they would be willing to 
participate in an interview later that day. A restrictive factor was that due to the 
number of tests and procedures that these patients have to undergo, time available for 
interview was limited to a ‗window of opportunity‘ on a Thursday afternoon. This 
problem was exacerbated by patients often wanting to leave hospital quickly once their 
tests had been completed, so some people who earlier in the week had agreed to take 
part in interviews had changed their mind by Thursday. These factors combined to 
make recruitment much slower than hoped, so alternative methods were developed (for 
which ethical approval was obtained).  
 The alternative method used was the same as above, but recruitment took place 
at transplant clinics. If a potential participant was interested in participating, Moorlock 
obtained their contact details and contacted them a few days after the initial 
conversation to see if they were still interested in participating, and if so, to arrange an 
interview. These interviews were arranged to coincide with a future transplant clinic 
appointment, or at a convenient time in their own home. This recruitment method 
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proved to be much more successful and resulted in an additional 7 participants, 
compared with just 2 by using the original approach.  
8.8 Location of interviews 
The location of interviews varied. Transplant staff were interviewed in their offices 
where possible, otherwise an available private meeting room was used. Potential 
recipients were offered interviews in private rooms, although 2 preferred to conduct the 
interview sitting on their hospital bed367. Potential recipients recruited via transplant 
clinics often chose to have the interview conducted in their own homes. Potential 
donors were offered interviews in their own homes. If anyone from the 3 groups 
preferred an alternative location for their interview, this was arranged on an ad hoc 
basis368.  
8.9 Recording 
Interviews were audio recorded. If particularly important or telling non-verbal cues 
were exhibited by the participant at any time, a note was made so that they could be 
reflected in the interview transcript. 
8.10 Consent 
All potential participants were provided with a participant information sheet when they 
were invited to participate in the research or expressed an interest in participation, and 
were given sufficient time (more than 24 hours) to consider participating and 
opportunities to ask any questions.  Signed consent was obtained from participants 
prior to interviews taking place, using a consent form. 
It was important that this study attempted include speakers of languages other than 
English, so appropriate measures had to be in place to take consent from non-English 
                                                          
367 Conducting interviews at the bedside presented some challenges to privacy, due to the open nature of the 
ward and close proximity to other patients. The ward was busy, the screen was drawn around the patient‘s 
bed, and there was constant background noise/conversation. Participants were, however, made aware of the 
limitations to their privacy and were offered a more private setting. It was not obvious that privacy limitations 
had any effect on the participants‘ answers, but it should be acknowledged as a possibility.    
368 Two potential donor participants requested that their interview took place coffee shops. 
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speakers. A separate consent form was devised, which an interpreter would sign to 
confirm that verbal consent had been obtained from the participant. The interpreter 
would also sign to confirm that the participant had understood the information given to 
them (as explained by the interpreter) and had been given the opportunity to ask any 
questions they might have had. 
8.11 Method of analysis 
Transcripts were analysed using NVivo software. Analysis started by adopting a 
relatively open-ended approach to coding, described by Saldana as Initial Coding369. 
This involved going through the interview transcripts, and breaking them down into 
smaller sections, often only a single sentence, according to the subject of that section. 
This is a common and accepted starting point for qualitative analysis, and it serves to 
organise ideas emerging from the data370. This process started before all data had been 
collected, which facilitated a degree of theoretical sampling. Although coding was 
largely led by the data in order to permit the emergence of original ideas371, the codes 
used tended to relate closely to accepted philosophical concepts. For instance, codes 
such as ‗fairness‘ and ‗consequentialist reasoning‘ emerged quickly. This was because of 
the underlying aim of the qualitative study, which was to provide data to enhance 
further philosophical analysis. Coding the data along the lines of philosophical concepts 
helped manage the data to facilitate an analysis of the way in which arguments were 
made and concepts used. It was, however important to not restrict coding to 
philosophical concepts, in order to allow subtleties to emerge from the data372. The 
codes used were not pre-determined, and tended to evolve and develop as coding 
progressed. For instance, if it became apparent that a code was becoming too broad 
and incorporating things with subtle but significant differences, then the code could be 
broken into two or more separate codes in order to better reflect these variations. 
                                                          
369 Saldana J, 'The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers', (London: SAGE Publications, 2009) p81 
370 Strauss AL, 'Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)  
371 Charmaz K, 'Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative Analysis', (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2006)  
372 Silverman D, 'Interpreting Qualitative Data', (London: SAGE Publications, 2011)  
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Conversely, if it became apparent that there were multiple codes relating to the same 
concept, then these codes would be merged together. 
Some sections of text were attributed multiple codes if they referred to more 
than one concept. In contrast, some sections of text were not linked to any codes if it 
was felt that they were entirely irrelevant to the focus of the study. Additional codes 
were introduced as necessary during this process, which resulted in some codes being 
used in later transcripts that were not used in earlier ones. Early transcripts were 
therefore re-coded as part of an iterative approach once a more complete framework of 
codes had been developed373. As more codes were introduced, it became possible to 
organise related codes into themes374. These themes were again fairly dynamic, and 
were sometimes merged with one another or separated if there was significant overlap 
or differences appearing.  
Small samples of transcripts were coded by Ives and Draper in order to ensure 
that the impact of researcher bias was minimised, and this has been suggested as a 
way to improve rigour375.  Although there was minor variation in the exact codes used, 
the general themes emerging from the data were the same. It is unlikely that Ives or 
Draper approached the topic with the exact same background views and perspective as 
Moorlock, so it is likely that Moorlock‘s choice of codes and themes were not chosen as 
a result of his own personal biases (for more detail on this, see Chapter 12). 
8.12 Ethical approval and NHS permissions 
Favourable opinion was granted by the West Midlands Research Ethics Committee on 
25/05/2010 – ref: 10/H1208/34 (Appendix 1). The West Midlands Research Ethics 
Committee gave a favourable opinion to the substantial amendment on 31/01/2011 – 
                                                          
373 Weitzman EA, 'Analyzing Qualitative Data with Computer Software', Health Services Research 34 (1999) 
pp1241-63 
374 Ritchie J and Spencer L, 'Qualitative Data Analysis for Applied Policy Research', in The Qualitative 
Researcher's Companion, ed. M.B. Miles and M. Huberman (London: SAGE Publications, 2002)  
375 Barbour RS, 'Checklists for Improving Rigour in Qualitative Research: A Case of the Tail Wagging the 
Dog?', BMJ 322 (2001) pp1115-17 
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ref: AM01 (Appendix 1). A ‗Letter of NHS Agreement for Participant Identification 
Centres‘ was issued on 19/08/2010 (Appendix 1).  The University of Birmingham‘s 
Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Ethical Review Committee gave a 
favourable ethical opinion on 19/09/2011 – ref: ERN_10-0900 (Appendix 1).  
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Table 2 - Interview scenarios 
Scenario 1 
Two young men are killed in a car accident. The driver was driving recklessly and above 
the speed limit, which caused him to lose control of his car and crash, killing both 
himself and his passenger. The parents of the passenger are very distressed that their 
son was killed by someone acting so recklessly and are angry and upset that two lives 
have, in their eyes, been wasted. 
The parents of the passenger are very keen that their son‘s organs should be donated, 
but they have concerns about the sort of person that his organs might be transplanted 
to. They would like their son‘s organs to be transplanted to people who will look after 
them and live responsibly, and they consider young people to be risk-takers who are 
less likely to act responsibly than slightly older people with families. They therefore 
request that their son‘s organs are only transplanted to people who are over the age of 
25 and have children. In the parents‘ opinion, these are likely to be responsible people 
who will look after themselves and deserve the improvements to quality of life that an 
organ transplant can bring.  
Staff at the hospital tell the parents that they are not allowed to say who their son‘s 
organs will go to, and that decisions like this are made by medical staff on the basis of 
medical considerations. If the organ donation is to go ahead, the organs must be 
donated without any restrictions being placed on who the organs can be transplanted 
to. 
The parents decide that because of the chance that their son‘s organs will go to people 
who they consider don‘t deserve them, they won‘t give permission for their son‘s 
organs to be donated. 
Scenario 2 
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A young woman dies following an accident. All of her organs are suitable for 
transplantation. This woman‘s faith and religious beliefs shaped how she chose to lead 
her life, and she placed great value in being what she considered a good member of her 
religion. Her parents know that her religious beliefs were very important to her, and are 
confident that, given a choice, she would have preferred for her organs to go to another 
member of her religion. Her parents therefore give consent for their daughter‘s organs 
to be donated, but request that priority is given to members of their daughter‘s 
religion. This request is not motivated by any dislike for a particular group of people; it 
is made simply because the parents believe that their daughter would prefer for her 
organs to go to people with similar beliefs and values to her own. 
The hospital staff explain that these sorts of requests cannot be complied with under 
existing policy, which states that organs will be given to the people who are in greatest 
need and who are the best match. 
 
Scenario 3 
A man has died in an accident. All of his organs are suitable for donation, and his family 
are very keen that his organs should be donated. Prior to his death, the man had 
expressed concerns about the number of immigrants that had moved to his area. He 
believed that a lot of the immigrants were taking jobs, benefits and resources that 
would otherwise be given to local people. He believed that people like himself who have 
lived in the area all of their lives should have everything that they need before things 
are given away to people who have arrived from other countries. 
 The man had made clear, prior to his death, that if he died he wanted to donate his 
organs, but that he didn‘t want his organs to be transplanted to immigrants.  Knowing 
that their relative held these views, the next-of-kin agree to donation only if the organs 
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do not go to immigrants.  
Staff at the hospital tell the next-of-kin that they are not allowed to say who the organs 
should or should not go to, and that if the organs are going to be donated they have to 
be donated to the general pool. The family insist that they will not agree to donate the 
man‘s organs if there is a risk of them going to immigrants, as the deceased man would 
have been opposed to this. 
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Chapter 9 - Results 
9.1 Participants 
40 participants were interviewed for the embedded study as detailed in Table 3. To 
preserve anonymity, each participant has been allocated a unique identifier consisting 
of an acronym denoting the category to which they belong and a number.  
Table 3 – Outline demographics 
 Acronym Number Gender Other Information 
Transplant 
Staff 
TS 11  2 x Consultant 
Anaesthetists/Intensivists  
3 x Specialist Nurses – Organ 
Donation 
2 x Liver Recipient Transplant 
Co-ordinators 
2 x Liver Transplant Surgeons 
1 x Liver Consultant Physician 
1 x Clinical Nurse Specialist in 
Addiction Psychiatry 
 
South Asian 
Potential 
Donors 
SAPD 10 9 female, 1 male  
Non-South 
Asian Potential 
Donors 
PD 10 4 female, 6 male  
Potential 
Recipients 
PR 9 4 female, 5 male 4 x liver, 5 x kidney 
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The genders of staff participants have not been reported due to the risk of identifying 
individual participants. This risk does not apply to non-staff groups. 
9.2 Overview 
The mind map (Figure 1) gives an overview of the themes and how they are related to 
each other. The key argument against conditional and directed donation used by 
participants is that it would prevent organs being allocated according to medical 
criteria. There was some disagreement over exactly what ‗medical criteria‘ entails, with 
some participants thinking that transplant outcomes are most important and others 
thinking that organs should be allocated to those in greatest need or the most urgent. 
These ideas were closely tied to themes of objectivity and impartiality, which many 
people thought were necessary for a fair transplant system.  
The main theme in favour of conditional and directed donation was not so much 
outright acceptance, but rather a willingness to at least consider accepting organs 
offered with conditions/directions. Many participants thought that conditional or 
directed donations were not ideal and thought that organs should be donated without 
restrictions, but in cases where the organs will only be donated if the restrictions are in 
place, transplant staff should at least look at the waiting list and see what the effect of 
accepting them would be. These views were justified with reference to avoiding waste; 
if organs are offered, and there‘s generally a significant shortage of donated organs, it 
is a waste to turn away these potentially life-saving organs.  
Specifying the number of respondents who held views under each of the sub-
themes reported has generally been avoided.  Numbers alone can present a potentially 
misleading image of respondents‘ views: it does not, for example, indicate strength of 
view or how important something was to a particular participant. Maxwell discusses 
some of the problems of including these figures, suggesting that they can lead to 
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invalid inferences about improved generalisability (by reader or researcher), and a 
tendency towards the variance-style thinking employed in quantitative research376.  
Additionally, the results presented in this chapter are intended to provide a range of 
views, so conflicting views will be presented that may only have been held by one or 
two participants if they were felt to be particularly important.  In this context, whether 
not a particular view was prevalent is not an indication of importance, and providing 
numbers adds nothing to the analysis377. 
 In order to aid clarity, quotations have had non-meaningful utterances such as 
‗er‘ and ‗um‘ removed. Where it has been necessary to remove other extraneous words 
or short phrases, this will be indicated with ‗…‘378.  
  
                                                          
376 Maxwell JA, 'Using Numbers in Qualitative Research', Qualitative Inquiry 16 (2010) pp475-82 
377 Ibid. p480 
378 Sainsbury ACR, (2006) 'Using Verbatim Quotations in Reporting Qualitative Social Research: Researchers‘ 
Views', 2006 p18 
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Figure 1 - Mind Map 
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9.3 Medical decisions and allocation – keeping the medical ‗medical‘ 
There was a general feeling that organ allocation decisions are best made by medical 
staff using medical criteria: 
“They should leave that type of judgment for scientists who have the data to 
back up those kinds of claims…they should be guided by numbers and 
science…and not opinion. People [the public] can‟t be trusted to make good 
decisions, I think we all know that” – PD6 
Many participants across all groups thought that medical criteria are likely to bring 
about the best transplant outcomes, and that medical staff are in the best position to 
use and understand these criteria. This view was particularly prevalent in the staff 
group; participants here were generally unwilling to allow non-medical criteria to 
feature in allocation decisions. But this was a view also held by the majority of 
participants in other groups (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3 - Unwillingness for non-medical criteria to feature in allocation decision 
It should just be done on greatest need… and I think it‟s the job obviously of the team 
behind transplantation to say how the organs should be allocated – TS1 
I think people in the medical profession are just best placed to decide, you know what I 
mean, people with the right training will be able to look at it,  decide who‟s got the 
most chance of coming out of it better – PD1 
 
Many of the non-staff participants, particularly within the potential donor groups, and 
some in the potential recipient group, trusted medical staff to make the right decisions 
despite not having an in-depth knowledge of allocation procedures (see Table 4).  
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Table 4 - Faith in medical staff 
I put a lot of faith in science and scientists and people who should know better, 
although there are blips in the system and things do go wrong, I do think that a medic 
should have an overall…there should be someone in the whole chain that can sit there 
and look at the details and go well actually no this needs to go here for whatever 
reasons. – PD1 
If that‟s how they feel, they‟re worried about who the organs go to and whether the 
organs will be used well, they should leave that type of judgment for scientists who 
have the data to back up those kind of claims. – PD6 
I think it‟s up to the medical staff to actually decide who gets that organ…. Because I 
think they have a better idea of who‟s out there and which class of people actually need 
a liver transplant  - SAPD4 
You‟ve got to rely on, not necessarily the law, you‟ve got to rely on the surgeons and 
the national list – PR4 
  
Although non-staff participants had faith in medical staff‘s ability to make the right 
decisions, transplant staff appeared to put their faith in medical criteria producing the 
right decisions. Some medical staff suggested that medical decisions are objective and 
absolute (see Table 5). 
Table 5 - Staff's faith in medical criteria 
as long as the principles on which you do the allocation is transparent, and it‟s 
objective, so that you can justify why you give it to A or B or why C doesn‟t get a 
chance at getting the organ, I think that‟s the best you can do – TS4 
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It‟s impossible for us to open that gate even a little bit, that chink even a little bit, to 
allow directed sort of donation because that would allow unfairness to be built into the 
process from the beginning and what we desperately try to do is be fair, and that‟s why 
we use all these calculation scores etc and we try and make it objective  – TS5 
  
Most participants could sympathise with the donor families featured in the interview 
scenarios, and could understand that there might be emotional reasons for wanting to 
place restrictions on donations. This sympathy and understanding was present in all 
groups, and participants thought that stressful and traumatic situations might give rise 
to decisions or requests that, with hindsight, might be considered irrational (see Table 
6). 
Table 6 - Emotional factors 
Yeah, because the problem here is that…their reasoning for wanting to donate the 
organs to a specific demographic are, their reasoning is kind of biased, it may not be 
logical, they‟re going to be in shock, so that might impair their judgement - SAPD1 
There are obviously a lot of emotional factors involved but generally the medical 
principles are that organs go to people in greatest need - PR1 
 
Many participants believed that decisions about organ allocation should ideally be 
objective, made by transplant staff, and devoid of emotional involvement. This view 
was particularly prevalent amongst transplant staff, but was present in all groups (see 
Table 7). 
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Table 7 - No emotion in allocation decisions 
Yes I do, I really do…you‟ve gotta take emotion out of the argument and I think that‟s 
the only way to do it, is try and get someone who hopefully has a more objective view 
than the family of the deceased. – PD2 
I‟m hoping the medical community will make them without bias and on medical needs, 
somebody who needs an organ in order to survive or a better quality of life, rather than 
somebody‟s more deserving… I think that it should be allocated on medical needs. It 
shouldn‟t be, you shouldn‟t have incentives, you shouldn‟t say I‟m only going to give it 
to x people or y people, you‟re then setting conditions, what if the right person isn‟t 
available, then the organ‟s being wasted anyway so how is that a donation – SAPD8 
…we‟re all human at the end of the day, and … if you‟ve got very strongly held beliefs 
about a situation, I‟m sure it can be difficult to be totally impartial, which is why it‟s 
good it‟s a team decision as to who we transplant and who we don‟t because that way 
hopefully everything will be fair and as impartial as it can be. – TS6 
 
This notion of objectivity links with a view shared by participants across all groups that 
the NHS should, in principle, treat people equally and not let non-medical factors 
influence treatment. By using what the participants regarded as objective measures, 
factors that were generally considered to be irrelevant are excluded, which participants 
thought would reduce prejudice and provide more equality within the NHS (see Table 
8). 
Table 8 - Ignore irrelevant factors 
if you had two people and one was white and one was black, I‟d like to believe that I 
would…or most medics would ignore the fact that one is black.  PD1 
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[treat] everybody as if they‟re the same and … other factors should just be completely 
ignored, all they‟re really there to do is to make people healthy regardless of any of 
their history – PD4 
There shouldn‟t be any restriction of these people.  Everybody should get a chance. – 
PR5 
  
One staff participant was concerned that using non-medical criteria may result in legal 
action against the NHS (possibly on the grounds of unjust discrimination), and that 
using purely medical criteria acts as a safeguard against this as it can be considered 
justifiable discrimination. This is further evidence that participants thought that medical 
decisions are objectively justifiable and cannot be argued with. 
Then maybe I could foresee a scenario that parents of the 16 year old then sue 
maybe the Trust and say when my daughter was on the super urgent list, why 
didn't she receive it? You know, there's all sorts of dreadful scenarios, and 
without any underlying law it's difficult to position yourself isn't it? So for us the 
easiest position is first rule should be that just purely just to do it on the base 
on medical need. – TS10 
9.3.1 What are ‗Medical Criteria‘? 
There was much support amongst participants for using medical criteria to allocate 
organs, but there was disagreement about exactly which criteria should be used and 
how ‗greatest need‘ should be defined. 
9.3.1.1 Transplant Outcomes 
Some participants thought that transplant outcomes were an important factor in 
allocating organs, and felt that allocating according to non-medical criteria may 
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compromise transplant outcomes (see Table 9). These views were particularly prevalent 
within the staff group. 
Table 9 - Support for transplant outcomes 
if you take any random organ and then put it into another person the body‟s not going 
to accept it, there‟s a very big chance it‟s going to be rejected straightaway so you 
have to go on that method and that criteria will fit and it‟s the best way to do it.  It‟s 
also the best way to, best way to ensure the survival of the patient as well– SAPD5  
what‟s their chances of survival, what‟s the chances of the graft surviving, as long as 
you know a reasonable length of time and they‟re then allocated onto the list in that 
way, on that basis – if however their chances of survival are so small or less then you 
wouldn‟t transplant, if we all put our hand on our heart and said we just don‟t think this 
patient‟s going to make it and have a meaningful life after yet another transplant then 
we‟d say no I don‟t think it‟s appropriate and we‟ve done that before – TS5 
I still think that the decision should be made medically on perhaps who is less likely to 
reject it and who is more… likely to come out of it successfully. – PD1 
 
9.3.1.2 Greatest Need 
Most participants within all groups agreed that recipients in greatest need should be 
prioritised. Conceptions of greatest need were fairly consistent, and urgency tended to 
be the main feature (See Table 10). Urgency was associated with saving lives of those 
likely to die soonest, rather than the urgency of improving the poor quality of a life. 
Table 10 - Greatest need as urgency 
In the sense of fair play, probably the case you give to the most urgent case first. – 
PR3 
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I guess at the end of the day it‟s got to be, it can‟t be that important, it‟s got to be 
done on merit hasn‟t it and need and the urgency and suitability I suppose, as far as 
size and things go. – PR4 
I … guess it‟s a return to a normal life… return to a, reasonably healthy state.  And the 
nearer you are to losing that I guess they‟ve got to be fastest.  – PR2 
at the end of the day I think it must regardless of who that individual is and what they 
might have done, it has to be based on medical, medical need. – SAPD3 
 
There was a general feeling across all groups that urgency, defined in terms of 
closeness of death without a transplant, plays a significant role in determining medical 
need:  
there may be somebody who‟s who hasn‟t got very long to live, who‟s a super-
urgent person on the waiting list, and needs the organ more than that person – 
TS6 
Nevertheless, one potential recipient had an alternative conception of need, which 
regarded saving an immediately threatened life as much less important. This view did 
not require increased urgency to result in higher priority for transplantation, and 
appeared to be grounded in the idea that urgency can change very rapidly. 
you can be in the situation where one day you can be fine, and the following day 
you could be in that urgent medical need, so I don‟ think that again should come 
into it really, that‟s wrong, if you‟re in the condition that you need a transplant, 
you‟re as much in need of that as somebody else. You know, I mean, whether 
you‟re you know it‟s imperative that you get it within months or whether you get 
it within 12 months, you know, it‟s not, to me you‟re both in a similar situation. 
– PR4 
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A member of transplant staff also had alternative views on medical need, and 
suggested that medical need is actually a subjective thing with competing definitions. 
This participant did not express support for a particular definition, but instead 
supported the idea that people may reasonably have different conceptions of greatest 
need: 
Should it go to greatest need? Greatest need by whose definition, that‟s my 
problem. Who‟s defined the greatest need, you know, what because they‟re 
hooked onto a hundred million life support machines, you know what about the 
greatest need of someone‟s gonna be left without a husband, so you know, once 
again it‟s been by definition. What we all interpret as greatest need is different 
for us all. – TS6 
9.3.2 Fairness 
Most participants felt it was important that organ allocation was a fair process with fair 
outcomes.  
I think it‟s important that it‟s done in a fair basis, how you decide fair is another 
question but I think if it was done on medical need basis. – SAPD4 
 
But conceptions of fairness varied. Most participants thought that the fairest way to 
allocate organs was according to broadly medical criteria, and this seemed to tie in to 
the belief that medical criteria are the most objectively justifiable. It was felt that if 
organs are allocated according to objective criteria, then this must be a fair process. 
Ok, to me fair would be based on like I say if you have your waiting list, you 
have an organ come in, I think it should all be based on effectively percentage 
chance of…of survival‟s the wrong word but being able to lead a reasonable life 
afterwards… so that would be the definition, you know, with some more medical 
and correct terms for that. – PD9 
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One individual thought that a fair process should consider the reasons why somebody 
needs an organ in the first place. 
Fair is I don‟t know what I‟ve already mentioned, like based on how the person 
and why the person requires the organ in the first place, based on how they‟re 
willing to live their life and yeah I can‟t think of anything more for that.- PD 
 
Another participant thought that a fair way of allocating organs would be to allow all 
donors to specify who they would the recipients to be: 
 
I suppose the only fair way of doing it would be for the person actually donating 
their organ to specify where they would like it to go – PD2 
9.3.3 Who am I to judge? 
Some participants within all categories were willing to give examples (―Alcoholics‖ – 
PD2, ―drug abusers‖ – PD9) of types of potential recipients who they considered less 
deserving, but were also aware that other people may have different beliefs about this.  
This was often viewed as problematic, and left many participants suggesting that since 
there is likely to be disagreement over who is a deserving recipient, donors ought not 
to judge (see Table 11). This reasoning is interesting given that there is also room for 
disagreement about how medical criteria should be applied, yet the similarities here 
were not generally acknowledged. 
Table 11 – Donors are not in a position to judge  
I don‟t think as individuals we should then have that right to say well somebody 
deserves it more than somebody else, so from that point of view I kind of thought well 
maybe no it‟s not such a good idea. – SAPD3 
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I think sometimes actually when you meet individuals who are desperately looking for it 
and you can see that they‟re very ill and unfortunately possibly lived a very good life 
actually and you think to yourself in actual fact yes they do, but on the whole who‟s to 
say in actual fact how people will turn out actually, eventually so you know, I don‟ think 
it‟s for us to make that decision actually to a certain extent actually. – TS7 
I think donation should be on medical need rather than somebody‟s more deserving. 
Who are you to judge somebody being deserving or somebody having children or not 
having children, somebody may be infertile, so does that make them irresponsible.– 
SAPD8 
 
 
9.3.4 Such serious decisions should not be left to individuals 
As well as concerns about the prospects of disagreement and the difficulties of 
individuals making value judgments, some participants just thought that it is wrong or 
distasteful for donors or donor families to make these kinds of decisions (see table 12). 
When asked what was special about organ donation, and why donors ought to be 
concerned with ideas such as greatest need, many participants appealed to the idea 
that organ donation is a matter of life and death and that choosing recipients or types 
of recipients is akin to playing god.  
Table 12 - Donors should not choose who lives or dies 
That gets into some dangerous territory doesn‟t it, because you‟ve got life and death 
panel then haven‟t you? – PR3 
I think it‟s mainly because of it‟s that life and death thing isn‟t it?  As opposed to just 
cash or whatever.  Just giving stuff away… you could give it to anybody couldn‟t you?  
Him on the street if you wanted.  But when it comes to a matter of life and death it‟s a 
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different issue. – PR2 
Probably from a religious side I think there‟s only one God that can judge whether a 
person is good or bad… we‟re not in a position to judge – SAPD2 
 
9.4 Factors beyond the medical 
9.4.1 Family partiality is acceptable 
Most participants thought that favouring family members is acceptable (see Table 13). 
Participants often struggled to articulate justifications for this, but suggested that you 
often do things for family members that you would not do for strangers, and that you 
should naturally want to ‗look after your own‘. 
Table 13 - Support for family partiality 
I think that extends in to every… aspect of your life, you know lots of things you do for 
family and loved ones that you would never ever do for random people and I don‟t 
think that‟s a bad thing on the whole. – PD1 
I think naturally for anyone, first of all it would be your family kind of you know blood‟s 
kind of thicker than water and you would naturally reach out to those who mean 
something to you but you know a life‟s a life and if you can save anybody‟s… Because 
they mean something to me obviously and they are kind of nearest, dearest or your 
kind of closest to you so naturally someone was needing something in the family then 
you would probably do that whilst you were alive let alone when you consider 
something later. – SAPD6 
 
Some participants, particularly potential recipients who have a basic understanding of 
tissue matching, justified priority for family members in more clinical terms, citing an 
increased likelihood of tissue match. 
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I think it‟s probably a good, a good thing that they could because I mean you‟ve 
got more chance of it being a match as well because of being like a family 
member, you can obviously, I presume your blood groups going to closer match 
than and so on, so it‟s less chance of rejection and so on.– PR4 
  
9.4.2 Responsibility for condition  
Many people felt that those who are responsible for their ill-health are less deserving, 
but this did not always translate into favouring conditional donation. Sometimes this 
was grounded in the idea that people who have brought about their own illness may 
find it difficult to change their behaviour and will therefore have increased risk of 
recidivism: 
I suppose the risk is that if someone‟s an alcoholic they have messed up their 
liver, they get a new liver, if they‟re just going to carry on abusing that one, is 
that fair? – PD2 
When asked whether they thought any types of people were less deserving of 
receiving transplants, several people singled out alcoholics. Partly, this was grounded in 
a belief that alcoholics may find it hard to change their lifestyles and will therefore have 
an increased risk of needing further transplants (and this is related to the idea of waste 
mentioned shortly).  
More often, however, there was a sense that someone who has made certain 
choices in life that are known to be carry health risks ought not to be as high a priority 
as someone who is just unfortunate (see Table 14). 
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Table 14 - Support for lower priority for those responsible for illness 
I think it does, I think if someone has had the choice and has you know actively put 
theirselves [sic] in a position where they damage their body and they‟ve chosen to do 
that then I think they should be further down the list in comparison to someone who 
was actively you know not done that and mistreated their body. – PD5 
if there‟s one who is sort of a life-time alcoholic, drug abuser perhaps and then the 
other one is a 20 something up and coming athlete, do you know what I mean then you 
can perhaps go well yeah he‟s going to make more use of it but I think that‟s quite a 
unique situation that.- PD1 
And if people are just gonna say oh knocked down again, oh waste time of getting up, I 
find that quite difficult to cope with.   If there‟s a deficiency in genes and it‟s a proved 
illness then perhaps I‟d be more able to accept it. – PR8 
 
9.4.3 Priority for Children 
Some participants felt that children should have priority for organs (see Table 15). For 
some participants this was based upon the idea that children have lived less life and 
could have more life ahead of them.  
Table 15 - Support for priority for children 
if the child‟s received a potential organ and it helps them kind of lead a you know 
healthy life, they‟ve got kind of a long lifespan ahead, I would think, you know, that 
maybe a child‟s more deserving than perhaps a senior member – SAPD5 
Just because a child has I don‟t know, they‟ve arguably probably got more of their life 
to lead, they have had less of a life because they‟re younger than you know someone 
older and I don‟t know I guess they‟d be seen as being more vulnerable, weaker, which 
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is not necessarily true, but they‟ve just got more of their life to live, haven‟t they? – 
PD5 
 
Some participants failed to provide justification for giving children priority, yet still held 
firm beliefs. 
Just is.  That‟s, that‟s the way I think, children should always come first. – PR6 
Other participants were more interested in helping other parents avoid the pain of 
bereavement that would be caused by a child dying before receiving a transplant, and 
seemed to think that being able to direct their child‘s organs to another child it might 
help to bring about something good from a negative experience for donor-parents. 
But potentially I‟d want my child‟s organs to go to another child and I‟d probably 
feel quite strongly about that because you wouldn‟t want another parent to go 
through what you‟d gone through and if you can save a child‟s life at the 
expense, albeit at the expense of your own, you‟d probably want that to happen 
– PD2 
Some transplant staff also thought that it might be acceptable for requests for priority 
to be given to children, so long as the donation was not contingent upon the request 
being granted, a caveat that reflects the March 2010 policy revision379. Given that 
organs are matched for size, and children already have priority for transplants, staff 
may have been aware that a request like this would probably not make a difference to 
how the organ was allocated. 
So that‟s one direction that I‟d probably feel comfortable, a lot of these 
directions would  be that you know, I‟d like it to go to a child you know, first, if 
it can‟t go to a child then that‟s fine – TS6 
                                                          
379 Department of Health (2010) op. cit.  
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9.4.4 Future Behaviour/Willingness to Change 
Many participants, particularly amongst the non-staff groups focussed on future 
recipient behaviour and willingness to change as being related to deservingness (see 
Table 16). Many participants thought that there is no point in giving an organ to 
someone who will not look after it. Participants within the staff group were not explicitly 
concerned with future behaviour, perhaps because they are aware of the safeguards 
that are already in place when deciding which potential recipients are placed on 
transplant waiting lists. 
Table 16 - Support for future behaviour being important consideration 
I:I think there should be a predefined set of restrictions they can put on it, not allow 
people to freewheel it so to speak. 
G: So what sort of restrictions do you think may be included in that? 
I: also you know willingness to change I suppose, people who are who are completely 
selfish and not willing to do anything about their problem or people that are actively 
trying to solve that problem – PD7 
Yeah, the only one I can think of really is if, but then you can‟t do it „cause you 
wouldn‟t know.  Is … ensuring someone is going to respect the additional years they‟ve 
been given as opposed to abusing them. – PR2 
I think somebody who‟s blatantly in actual fact not taking on board actually advice 
that‟s been given actually and you know obviously not looking after their health and 
possibly would not look after a new liver in actual fact so yes in that case, yes.” – TS7 
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9.5 Inaccurate Conditions 
While transplant staff tended to oppose conditional donations because they would 
interfere with the usual medical allocation of organs, non-staff participants objected to 
the conditions presented in the scenarios because they deemed them to be inaccurate 
or incorrect (see Table 17). This was not a moral criticism of the condition, and is 
instead a claim about the factual premise for the condition (e.g. a condition may state 
that organs are not to be given to young people, on the grounds that they are 
irresponsible, even though young people can be as responsible as older people). There 
may be a moral component to this objection, insofar as excluding people from receiving 
transplants on the basis of something that is factually incorrect could be unfair, but 
non-staff participants did not tend to focus on this aspect.  
Table 17 - Concerns about factual accuracy of conditions 
Yeah I think it should be objective because just because someone‟s slightly older and 
got kids doesn‟t actually, you know, doesn‟t necessarily mean they‟re a nice person – 
they might hit their kids – PD2 
It may be that younger people are risk takers, but it may also be that someone over 
the 25 who‟s got children might you know, use coke, at the weekend and may damage 
the heart anyway – SAPD7 
It seems very arbitrary and I don‟t know, the person over 25 could be more reckless 
than the person at the top of the list so I think the only fair way to do it is to look at 
who needs it the most. - SAPD4 
 
These participants were concerned that some conditions, such as the ones in Scenario 1 
(Table 2) where the family request that organs are only allocated to people over the 
age of 25, cannot be applied without unfairly excluding other potential recipients. So 
while participants did not necessarily object to the idea of more responsible people 
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being favoured by a condition, they were concerned that a condition like this may also 
accidentally exclude responsible people under the age of 25. 
9.6 Life-Saving and Waste 
9.6.1 Life-Saving is paramount 
Participants who favoured a more flexible approach appeared to do so because of the 
life-saving consequences. Although these participants generally thought that other 
principles such as fairness and equality were important, saving lives was more 
important to them (see Table 18). This view was most prevalent within the potential 
recipient category, with the most participants within this group holding it. 
Table 18 - Support for life-saving being important 
at the end of the day it‟s better to save some than to throw a chance away that, you 
know I mean, people could last another 10, 20 years with the treatment and what you 
have, a heart transplant could carry somebody‟s life on for another 20 years, a kidney 
transplant again could carry on somebody‟s life for another 20 years, so it‟s giving 5 to 
6 people a chance to live that little bit longer in life and probably enjoy their lives – PR4 
Well the people who were you know judging this basically thought well you know, we‟d 
rather that it went to the people than we just flat out refused, so I think they were 
probably in the right there. – PD7 (this was in the context of discussing the 1998 case 
of conditional donation) 
 
For some participants, saving life is of sufficient importance that it may justify the NHS 
lying to donor families. These participants thought that the NHS should accept 
conditional donations, tell the donor family that they would act according to the 
conditions, and then allocate the organs in the usual manner, ignoring the restrictions.  
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It seems like they should accept them, but secretly, so not; because, or maybe 
they should just say to the family, okay, we‟ll do that but then actually not 
necessarily give them to the people that they want them to be given to 
because...otherwise it‟s just a waste – SAPD1 
This was not a view that featured at all in the staff interviews. The staff were conscious 
of the need to maintain public goodwill towards transplantation (in relation to taking 
organs without consent: “there would be a backlash and negative publicity, which 
would do organ donation a great deal of harm” – TS1) and would presumably regard 
this strategy as potentially damaging to that good will. 
 A number of participants in all groups felt that one way to handle conditional 
donations would be to allow them as and when they do occur, but not to promote or 
encourage conditional donation more generally (see Table 19). This is linked to the idea 
of these donations being non-ideal, and a reluctance to promote something that brings 
about sub-optimal transplant outcomes.  
Table 19 - Support for accepting conditional donations as a last resort 
I think again it has to be a last resort kind of situation, I don‟t think in general we 
should say put any restriction you want on because that way more people will donate, I 
think we should try our very hardest to get unrestricted donations – SAPD4 
so you wouldn‟t be given a choice in the donation conversation but if a family came 
forward with those restrictions then I think they should be respected. But unless they 
come forward I don‟t think it should be given as a choice –TS2 
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9.6.2 Wastage 
Support for more flexibility regarding conditional and directed donations was also based 
on the idea of avoiding waste, which was closely linked to saving lives. 
The idea of wasting organs was used in two ways; first, turning away medically useable 
organs was considered to be a waste. Second, allocating organs to people who will not 
look after them was considered to be a waste – there are some similarities here with 
9.6.1. 
 Some people considered the first form of wastage to be wrong on the part of the 
donor/donor family (due to the potential loss of life associated with wasting organs), 
and others considered it wrong for the NHS to waste organs in this way. Others, 
particularly transplant staff, viewed this wastage as being an unfortunate necessity in 
order to maintain other principles (see Table 20. 
Table 20 - Views on waste 
our society at the moment is prepared to pay the price of losing the occasional organ in 
this situation because of the, you know, the greater good and the overriding principle 
really – TS3 
In this instance they‟re not giving them at all [as a result of not being permitted to 
place conditions], so they‟re being wasted really. It could have brought someone a 
better or prolonged life, its just being totally wasted – PD3 
At the end of the day it‟s better to save some than to throw a chance away – PR8 
 
Despite the view that wasting medically useable organs is a bad thing, and that some 
principles could be compromised in order to avoid waste, participants, when asked, 
were unanimously in favour of respecting donor/donor family wishes and not removing 
organs without consent, for instance. So the idea of avoiding waste in this sense 
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appears only to apply to organs that have actually been offered for donation, and 
cannot be generalised to changing to an opt-out system or routinely taking organs 
without consent.  
 The second way in which ‗waste‘ was used was primarily a forward-looking 
concept, concerning the future behaviour of recipients rather than their past behaviour 
(see Table 21). This conception of waste did not arise in the transplant staff group, 
possibly because they are aware that policies are already in place to ensure that organs 
are only given to people who are likely to abstain from potentially damaging lifestyles. 
Table 21- Waste and future behaviour 
I can understand if you like the feelings of the parents about not wanting their 
son‟s organs to be wasted and feeling that they want someone who really 
deserves them to get them  - PD2 
I don‟t care whether they‟re gays, fags, Pakis, I don‟t care what they are, there‟s 
got to be a fair system but like, but their life chance survival has got to be; if 
he‟s just going out and drinking again, what is the point, it‟s just wasting a good 
kidney and all our time, do you know what I mean, there must be some sort of, 
I‟m not saying an ethical committee but there must be some sort of...just a 
committee, but I don‟t really want to set up a jury. – PR3 
 
9.6.3 Donor Wishes and Flexibility 
Some participants within each group thought that donor wishes or donor-family wishes 
should be given some consideration, but generally not over-riding consideration (see 
Table 22). It was not always clear to what extent participants thought donor wishes 
could or should be respected, particularly when the wishes conflict with usual medical 
allocation procedures. 
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Table 22 - Respecting donor wishes  
They should have authority to, you know, give a donation to who they like, you know? 
They should have a freedom.-  PR2 
I think that well I think that people have a right to, to some extent to be able to say 
where their organs are going and how they would be used – PD2 
Several participants suggested that if someone places a condition on a donation, 
transplant staff should check the waiting lists to see whether that condition can be 
complied with without depriving anybody of an organ who urgently needs one (see 
Table 23). This approach offers a compromise between allowing donor wishes to be 
listened to and using usual medical allocation procedures. 
Table 23 - Support for considering the implications of specific donations 
Yeah, yeah I do think yeah, they should be given a say in the matter but again in the 
heat of the moment, you know, you do make some irrational decisions when you‟re in 
that situation, I know first hand, so you know, things that you sit back later and think 
that probably wasn‟t the right thing to do but … if the family views are taken on board 
to be rational decisions, not just something absolutely ridiculous then yeah I think they 
should be should be listened to and looked up. – PD3 
you would think that doctors could look at the list of very needy people and chose the 
person nearest the top who fulfils their requirements so that…so the organs would go to 
somebody who definitely was desperate and needed them and would fulfil the 
requirements of the family who‟s been bereaved. – PD8 
 
Although most participants were opposed to the idea of more widespread conditional 
and directed donations, some participants (particularly within the non-staff groups) 
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thought that the general ban on these sorts of donations might be too rigid. Some 
participants (including two members of transplant staff) thought that although 
conditional and directed donations deviate from the ideal, they may be acceptable if 
they encourage people to donate organs who otherwise would not (see Table 24). 
Table 24 - Conditional donations more acceptable if they increase donation rates 
in an ideal world, yes I think people should say I donate or no I don‟t, you know it 
should be black and white, yes I am willing to donate but if you believe everything you 
read in the papers about there not being enough organs and the quality of people‟s 
lives being absolutely terrible, then you have to say to yourself well is there any way 
you can encourage more people to donate and if it is by having a stipulation like that, 
then fine – PD8 
Well I think if directed donation helps to improve the number of donors we‟ve got then 
that‟s why I feel it should be something that should be considered, … to try and 
increase the number of potential donors. - TS8 
 
Some participants believed that the NHS should be more flexible about conditional 
donations, and consider each case on its own merits (see Table 25). This view was 
particularly popular within the potential recipient group and potential donor groups. The 
potential recipients may be particularly aware of the consequences of a rigid policy that 
involves turning away offered donations, and the potential good that can be achieved 
by transplants. Several participants thought that accepting conditional donations should 
be viewed as a last resort, but can be justified if the alternative is turning away a 
donation.  
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Table 25 - Accept conditional donations if the alternative is turning donations away 
I think it‟s a good overall generalised policy and I think they should try their very 
hardest to implement it and I think if someone tries to put restrictions on they should 
go to the policy and say they‟ve got a policy  but I think maybe there comes a stage 
where if you really can‟t get through to someone just take the organ. – SAPD4 
it‟s quite ludicrous that you bin … a useable organ and let somebody die because some 
over-zealous adherence to legal niceties – it‟s like saying sorry the patient died but I 
didn‟t want to stop at the red light to take the patient to hospital – it‟s just ludicrous – 
TS3 
I think for the sake of a recommendation, I think that your default position should be 
on medical needs and only if they are risking to lose organs, then maybe as a kind of 
sub parameter, perhaps a back door, we should allow the donor actually to voice 
conditions or direct the donation. – TS10 
they should say alright, thanks for your input, thanks for your advice, we‟ll see what we 
can do, but we can‟t guarantee that, we can‟t guarantee that it‟ll go to Joe Bloggs 
character type, I mean there‟s a small chance it might go to a young person, a person 
with a child, and in theory you‟re not lying to them, there is a small chance that would 
happen, and you can say yeah we‟ll take into consideration, but just do what you want 
with it. – PD10 
By throwing them away… or discarding them, you‟re stopping somebody aren‟t you, 
with the potential to have a good life.   And maybe it goes against everything I‟ve said… 
No, I think the NHS should take them. – PR8 
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9.7 Other Considerations 
9.7.1 Reasons behind donation 
The motivation for donating organs was often regarded as being important, but reasons 
other than pure altruism were considered to be acceptable.  
 Transplant staff appeared to be more in favour of altruism as a motivation than 
members of the public, which is perhaps because they are more embedded in the 
culture of organ donation where altruism is a central principle of policy. Even amongst 
this group, however, there was suggestion that the focus on altruism may be 
unnecessary or misplaced (see Table 26). 
Table 26 - Staff views on altruism 
Well I‟ve already said that I think that people should have, you know… some say if they 
really feel they want it, but I think I think it‟s very important that organ donation is 
altruistic. – TS8 
I do empathise with families who are in that position, but I still I still don‟t believe it 
has anything to do with altruism – altruism I don‟t believe is the right word. I think it‟s 
all about you know providing the families feel better for it, but whatever itch it 
scratches or whatever hole it fills, it‟s not an altruistic thing – TS5 
I think actually it‟s a bit more theoretical actually, because people don‟t know that 
donation‟s supposed to be altruistic, they‟re doing it for the reasons they want to do it 
for, so I think I‟m not sure that it would actually affect it that much because people 
don‟t know, they don‟t think in that way when they‟re donating – TS11 
 
For some participants, motivation was important, but not as important as obtaining 
organs per se. 
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I think the most important thing is that they‟re donated but I think underneath 
that I would prefer that there was good reasons but I think if you‟re going to get 
them you‟re going to get them. – SAPD4 
The 1998 case of conditional organ donation was criticised for being non-altruistic, but 
some participants thought that the staff did the right thing by accepting the donation 
anyway because of the greater good that resulted in terms of saving lives (see Table 
27). Everybody expressed some degree of disgust with the donor family‘s wishes in this 
case, and participants were quick to condemn the apparently racist motivation behind 
it. 
Table 27 - Views on 1998 case 
I think they did the right thing in the fact that they save people‟s lives again, but again 
it‟s down to well basically racial politics isn‟t it - PR4 
ultimately again from a sort of clinical point of view, they were completely right to do it 
because they took that sort of emotional side out of it and said you know your reaction 
is this is probably wrong, this is wrong, but look at the good we could ultimately do. -
PD4 
Yeah I remember that happening erm, I, it was quite disgusting really, I find it pretty 
disgusting and...it‟s not a bad thing that the organs went to help other people - SAPD1 
 
9.7.2 More Information  
Some participants from all groups, but particularly the staff, thought that wanting to 
place conditions on organs stemmed from a lack of knowledge or understanding about 
organ donation and the organ allocation process (see Table 28). When prompted, most 
participants thought that if a family made a conditional offer of organs, it would be 
quite reasonable to speak to the family about organ allocation procedures and request 
that they reconsider their conditions.  
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Table 28 - More information might prevent conditions 
But I think maybe with a little bit more counselling or something they might actually 
come round to the idea that, you know, they can‟t go into that much detail – PR2 
 I would hope that there would be a bit more effort put into trying to explain why 
maybe someone under the age of 25 who doesn‟t have children would be equally as 
deserving. – SAPD4 
maybe if somebody spoke to them and saying that there are lots of young people who 
are very responsible, I‟m sorry, not all young people despite all the media are 
irresponsible… – SAPD8 
I think people do it they say, from a point of view of ignorance really about the whole 
donation process and where the organs go, and most people, once you explain… how 
patients are assessed and they go to the most suitable patient and with hopefully the 
best outcomes… - TS11 
 
9.7.3 The Slippery Slope/Setting a Precedent 
Almost every participant was concerned about the potential slippery slope from allowing 
conditions that may be regarded widely as acceptable to allowing other much more 
objectionable conditions (see Table 29).  
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Table 29 - Concerns about slippery slopes 
but the thing is when you start on, you‟re setting a precedent, you accept these on this 
condition, what happens if another, say I don‟t want to give it to anybody over 50… or 
why you wanna give it to this, aren‟t you therefore wasting the time in sort of making 
sure the organ goes straight away to somebody who needs it rather than, cos where do 
you stop – I see that as a slippery slope. – SAPD8 
do you take that, you know, and how many caveats can you put in, you know, one 
minute it‟s sort of ok you've gotta be over 25, well then you start asking people who 
are earning a certain amount of money and things like that, I just don‟t think it‟s a 
good idea – PD1 
One staff participant actually thought it important, in terms of consistency, that if you 
allow some conditions, you allow them all. 
I think if you allow conditions, then they should be allowed unconditionally…so I 
think if you open Pandora's box and say conditions are allowed, then conditions 
should be allowed. – TS11 
Although there was widespread support for favouring family members, some staff 
participants were even concerned about the precedent that this set in terms of 
compromising the principle of unconditional donation and starting a slippery slope. 
But I think so far as sticking to things objectively I would say that even that is 
the thin end of the wedge and is… a danger really that the principle will be lost 
because once you start to breach this question of unconditional altruistic 
donation then it‟s very difficult to know where to stop really. – TS3 
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9.7.4 Reduced access to organs 
Many participants, particularly within the potential donor categories, were concerned 
that allowing people to place conditions might encourage some people who would 
otherwise have donated unconditionally to donate with conditions attached. These 
participants were concerned that general acceptance of conditional donations might 
reduce access to organs for those likely to be consistently on the wrong side of 
individuals‘ direction decisions (see Table 30). 
Table 30 - Concerns about access to organs 
although next thing you know everyone has signed this register and everyone‟s put 
in some caveat and then you end up with this kind of marginal sub-section of society 
- PD1 
No, I think if you start doing that then you‟re going to have a load of people that will 
be on that list, that will have higher priority than everybody else just because 
they‟ve got kids of they‟ve got such and such going on in their life and then you‟ll 
find there‟ll be a handful of people that will just be waiting around, waiting around 
and waiting around– SAPD 5 
 
9.7.5 Recipients‘ views on receiving conditional donations 
Recipients‘ views on receiving a conditional donation were mixed, ranging from strong 
opposition to not being concerned at all. Recipients views have been singled out here 
for separate discussion because if recipients were completely opposed to receiving 
conditionally donated organs, then there would be little reason to accept them anyway. 
The following comment was from a participant who had already received one 
liver transplant but required a subsequent re-transplant, and had a good understanding 
of the transplant system and how organs are allocated. Despite the severity of her 
201 
 
condition, this participant thought it absolutely essential that the allocation process was 
fair. This desire for a generally fair system was common amongst recipients. 
…actually I would have felt pretty terrible.   I‟ve never ever thought about that 
before but yeah I would have done, I would have thought that it [receiving an 
organ because of a condition other than medical need] was most unfair. – PR9  
A theme that emerged from potential recipients was that many would be willing to 
accept a conditional donation. What varied amongst potential recipients was the extent 
to which they considered this to be potentially selfish. Some justified accepting an 
organ on the basis that it would be better for everyone, while others seemed to think 
that the severity of the situation can justify some selfishness. The quotation below 
illustrates some of the tensions that a potential recipient could experience. On the one 
hand there is the desire to survive (coupled with his wife‘s desire for him to survive), 
but he would also have the issue of deservingness in his mind. This person also 
appreciated the bigger picture, where potentially everyone would benefit if more organs 
were donated as a result of permitting conditional or directed donations. 
Being selfish you‟d take it, got well again.  But I guess it, it would be tinged with 
a feeling of „Am I deserving‟ wouldn‟t it? …It would have happened eventually, it 
would come along eventually I suppose.  So there‟s that feeling.  It‟s all a bit, 
yeah, tricky one isn‟t it? Because I know what my wife would say.  She‟d say 
„Grab it while you can‟...  You get all these relations would say that wouldn‟t 
they? …. And I think probably the ethics have to take over.  If the law was 
different and people were able to do that, and it did increase the number of 
organs donated significantly, I guess everybody would benefit wouldn‟t they? – 
PR2 
Another participant was undergoing a liver transplant assessment, and had not yet 
been told whether s/he would be placed on the waiting list. The views of this participant 
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suggest that the severity of a condition can eventually outweigh concerns one might 
otherwise have (for justice or fairness, for instance). 
I suppose if you were told, see that‟s another thing to deal with and you really 
could do without that cos you have a lot to deal with anyway. But how would I 
feel? I dunno, „tall depends on what physical state and emotional state I was 
…because I wouldn‟t give a monkey‟s cos… it‟s a dog eat dog world out there, 
it‟s very competitive and it‟ll only ever get worse but you know when things get 
critical, you know, you‟ll do what you have to do. – PR1 
Another participant, who was on the kidney transplant waiting list, had more 
straightforward views and was more interested in just getting a transplant than 
worrying about the origins of the organ or its allocation: 
I wouldn‟t care…It‟s just an organ isn‟t it, you can look into the politics at its 
deepest part but really, at the end of the day, it‟s just an organ isn‟t it, and it‟s 
got no views of its own has it? - PR3 
9.7.6 Role-based differences 
Staff participants‘ views varied according to their professional role. For instance, one  
transplant recipient coordinator was in favour of some conditional donation as long as it 
did not compromise overall fairness (and it increased the amount of organs available 
for recipients). 
I‟m a cog in the machine and there are other people in the machine who‟ve got 
more responsibility for donor families and less responsibility for recipients, but 
my own particular responsibility I think I have more responsibility for recipients 
than donors – TS7 
In contrast, a (SNOD) felt that she had more of an obligation towards the donor family, 
saying: 
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I would have to be professional but I in my professional capacity of someone 
that‟s cared for people that are bereaved I would have to be on their side to 
some degree. I‟m their advocate, I believe that, I‟m not advocating for the 
recipients – TS5 
The same participant still seemed to value the importance of the impartial perspective 
overall (even though her own perspective, as an advocate for donor families might not 
be impartial), but felt that it would be difficult to obtain from someone involved in the 
transplantation process: 
Yeah, as long as it‟s not a transplant surgeon on them, because they‟d never be 
able to make sort of, they‟d never be able to view it from, that‟s the problem 
isn‟t it – when you say experts, I agree they need to be experts that can look at 
that completely outside the box, you know, whereas I‟m stuck in front of a 
family that are grieving I can probably see their point of view, transplant 
surgeon can see the point of view of the recipient waiting, it‟s getting a group of 
people that can view it as it is. – TS5 
9.7.7 Professional obligations 
Although the non-staff groups have faith in transplant staff to allocate organs, many 
staff participants acknowledged that they had personal views about some people being 
more deserving of organ transplants than others; the justification for these generally 
centred on responsibility for condition and likelihood of treating the transplanted organ 
well. Even those staff who did feel that some people are more deserving than others 
felt that allocation decisions should be based purely on medical criteria, so there may 
be some tension between their personal views and the responsibilities and public 
expectations of their job roles (see Table 31). This reflects the ideas of Cottingham and 
Blum, who both suggest that there can be contexts where one‘s institutional role 
demands impartiality380,381.  
                                                          
380 Blum LA, (1980) op. cit.  
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Table 31 - Staff's professional obligations 
Probably as an individual I do, I mean cuz we all have our prejudices and people we 
you know we don‟t like either …you talk about alcohol or they‟re smokers or they‟re 
obese …so individuals will have prejudices against a number of other individuals but I 
think that we have to put that aside really and we have to objective about it – TS6 
you can‟t voice that because you have to be impartial, but there are people who I‟ve 
thought, I wouldn‟t give you my liver – TS1 
 
9.8 Conclusions 
These results suggest that although there is support for an allocation system broadly 
based on medical criteria, there could be some support for conditional and directed 
donations in some circumstances. There was particular support for the avoidance of 
waste, where waste is something that occurs when an organ could be used to save or 
improve lives but is not. One would expect both the staff and recipient groups to be 
generally pro-transplantation and in favour of increasing the amount of organs 
available. Although the potential donor categories may not share the perspectives of 
these two other groups, without exception everyone was pro-transplantation (although 
some had not decided whether to join the ODR themselves). This may have had an 
impact on the views expressed, and will be discussed further as a potential limitation in 
Chapter 11.  There were very few people who thought that a generalised policy of 
allowing conditional and directed donations was a desirable situation. 
The results presented in this chapter detail what a relatively small number of 
people think about conditional and directed donation. In Chapter 10, these results will 
be discussed in conjunction with the philosophical analysis presented in Chapters 3-7 
and the existing literature.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
381 Cottingham J, (1986) op. cit.  
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Chapter 10 - Discussion  
The philosophy chapters of this thesis looked at several aspects of conditional and 
directed donation. It was argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that the DH‘s reasons for 
prohibiting conditional donations are unconvincing, and that the DH‘s reliance on 
altruism to prohibit conditional donations has resulted in confusing inconsistencies, 
particularly in relation to conditional donation. It was then argued in Chapter 6 that 
accepting conditional donations would be compatible with the obligations of recipients 
to each other. Accepting a conditional donation rather than turning it down is better, in 
some way, for everyone on the waiting list. Recipients ought not to feel like they are 
queue-jumping by accepting an organ with conditions attached, as this can simply be 
considered making the most of available resources. It was then argued in Chapter 7 
that there are good reasons for accepting conditional donations in some circumstances. 
This was justified on the grounds of avoiding levelling down/negative loss. While some 
(but not all) conditional donations reflect moral failings in the donor or next-of-kin, it 
was also argued that the NHS is not responsible for the placing of conditions and would 
only be bringing about the best outcomes from a non-ideal situation.  
The empirical study collected a large amount of data relating to these and to 
other aspects of conditional donation. This chapter will consider these data in 
conjunction with the philosophical conclusions drawn in Chapters 3-7 and existing 
literature in accordance with the method described in Chapter 1. The aim is to use the 
data gathered by the embedded study alongside further philosophical discussion to 
produce practical recommendations that can guide ethical practice in relation to 
conditional and directed deceased organ donation. The first section will look at what the 
participants said about the specific conditions they focussed on. This has raised lines of 
argument that were not considered in the philosophy chapters. These lines of argument 
were charitably constructed and then subjected to rigorous philosophical scrutiny. 
Where the arguments were shown to be robust they were worked into the final 
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recommendations. If the arguments could not withstand scrutiny, they have no place in 
recommendations for policy. The second section will build a defence of accepting any 
conditional donation, regardless of the content of the condition, supported by the 
participants‘ ideas of avoiding waste and the earlier philosophical discussion in Chapter 
7. The third section will use results from the embedded study to formulate potential 
criticisms of and opposition to this position, ultimately concluding that although these 
concerns need taking into account, they do not provide compelling reasons to prohibit 
conditional donations.  
Throughout this chapter, ‗conditional donation‘ will refer to donations that are 
contingent upon a request being followed. Donations that include an expressed 
preference for a certain kind of recipient, but will go ahead even if the request is 
not/cannot be followed need different attention and will be discussed in the final section 
of this chapter, under the heading ‗Preferences‘. 
‗Condition content‘ is used throughout to refer to the specifics of the restriction 
imposed by the condition, as opposed to making conditions per se. For instance the 
condition content of a condition restricting a donation to children would be the 
restriction to children. It will be argued that few conditional donations can be justified 
on the basis of their condition content. 
10.1 Ideas Arising from the Data 
As discussed in 1.3.1, one reason to collect qualitative data from stakeholders was to 
consider new lines of argument that were not considered in the philosophy chapters or 
other literature. This ensures that arguments beyond those considered relevant by 
Moorlock are given due consideration, and results in a more complete philosophical 
analysis. The philosophy chapters did discuss some specific conditions (such as those 
that involve racism, or directed donation to family members), but three additional lines 
of argument emerged from the interviews, relating to specific conditions: 
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i) Priority for children; 
ii) Lower priority for people responsible for their own illness; 
iii) Priority for family members 
In line with the empirical bioethics methodology described in Chapter 1, each of these 
will now be explained and assessed in turn below. Consistent with the argument 
provided in Chapter 7 that it is preferable for donations to be unconditional, for the 
content of any of these conditions to be acceptable it must provide good reason to 
over-rule the general policy of unconditional donation.  
10.1.1Priority for Children 
Some participants thought that it was acceptable for children to receive priority for 
transplants, and donors to specify this preference. Some participants had the interests 
of paediatric recipients in mind, on the grounds that children have lived less life, and 
potentially have a lot of life ahead of them. Other participants thought that allowing 
these sorts of conditions/directions could help bereaved families during difficult 
circumstances; a bereaved parent could at least take comfort that their child‘s death 
was helping other parents avoid a similar bereavement.  
Neuberger and Mayer reported that 59% of their respondents thought that it 
was very or fairly acceptable for donors to request that priority is given to children382. A 
similar study conducted in Australia found that 65.5% of participants thought that, all 
other things being equal, a younger person should receive priority for transplantation 
over an older person (0.8% thought an older person should receive priority, and 33.6% 
thought it should make no difference)383. This suggests widespread public support for 
favouring children. 
                                                          
382 Neuberger J and Mayer D, (2008) 'Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of the UK General Public Findings 
of an Ipsos-Mori Poll' op. cit. pp1545-47 
383 Browning CJ and Thomas SA, 'Community Values and Preferences in Transplantation Organ Allocation 
Decisions', Social Science and Medicine 52 (2001) pp853-61 
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Children do tend to receive priority for transplantation of some organs, although 
the grounds for this can be broadly construed as ‗medical‘. Where the size of organs is 
important, organs donated from children will generally be allocated to children, for 
example. This is partly because there are so few paediatric donors (there were 43 in 
the financial year 2011-2012384). Splitting livers so that both a paediatric recipient and 
an adult recipient can benefit could also be construed as putting the interests of 
children ahead of adults because doing so has a negative effect on the transplant 
outcomes for the adult recipient when compared with the outcomes had they received a 
whole liver385. Other medical reasons can also justify prioritising children. Children with 
renal failure, for example, can experience neurodevelopmental and growth delays which 
can potentially affect them for their lifetime386. This provides a reason based on 
maximal effectiveness to give children priority over adults for kidney transplants. A 
study conducted in Canada found that giving priority to children dramatically reduced 
paediatric waiting times, yet because children only represent a small proportion of 
people on the waiting list, had negligible impact on adult waiting times387.  
Other arguments supporting the prioritisation of children will now be examined. 
10.1.1.1 Fair Innings 
The claim that children have lived less life and have their whole lives ahead of them can 
be broken into two separate arguments. First, it is trivially true that a child has lived 
less life than an adult. In order for this to be developed into a claim about priority for 
organs it must be supported by the premise that those who have had less life should be 
given more life ahead of those who have either reached an acceptable baseline or who 
have just had more life. Tong‘s systematic review found that some participants used a 
                                                          
384 NHSBT (2012) 'Latest Statistics', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/latest_statistics/latest_statistics.jsp, Last Accessed: 
31/10/2012  
385 Merion RM et al., 'Predicted Lifetimes for Adult and Pediatric Split Liver Versus Adult Whole Liver 
Transplant Recipients', American Journal of Transplantation 4 (2004)  
386 Crafter SR, Bell L, and Foster BJ, 'Balancing Organ Quality, HLA-Matching, and Waiting Times: Impact of a 
Pediatric Priority Allocation Policy for Deceased Donor Kidneys in Quebec', Transplantation 83 (2007) pp1411-
15 
387 Ibid.  
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‗fair innings‘-style argument, claiming that people are entitled to a reasonable/normal 
life span388.  This view was not explicitly referred to by the participants in this study, 
but it is worth considering as it may provide justification for prioritising children. 
The fair innings argument, in its basic form, asserts that there is some amount 
of life that is considered reasonable to have, and that those who have not had this 
amount should be given priority for resources over those who have. This approach may 
appear to systematically discriminate against older people and result in unfairness, but 
this is mistaken if years already lived is a concern of fairness389. The fair innings 
argument has, however, received support specifically in relation to kidney allocation, 
with Reese and Caplan arguing that this approach actually enhances fairness390. They 
claim that ―everyone old on the waiting list had a chance to be young, but the young 
patients on the waiting list deserve every chance to become old‖391. If, however, the 
fair innings threshold is set at 70 years, then two individuals aged 40 and 50 would 
both have not reached the threshold, but would be entitled to an equal chance of 
reaching it. This simplistic interpretation of the fair innings argument would not support 
the prioritisation of children per se, but would instead support priority for all people 
under the age of 70 ahead of those over 70.  
Veatch presents a variation of the fair innings argument, which he calls the 
―justice-over-a-lifetime argument‖392. This argument separates two conceptions of 
worst off: the ‗slice-of-time‘ perspective and the ‗over-a-lifetime‘ perspective. The slice-
of-time perspective considers who is worst off at a given point in time, roughly akin to 
current allocation based upon greatest need. Veatch gives the example of a forty year 
old and a seventy year old who are both dying of heart failure. From a slice-of-time 
                                                          
388 Tong A et al., 'Community Preferences for the Allocation of Solid Organs for Transplantation: A Systematic 
Review', Transplantation 89 (2010) pp796-805 
389 If x amount of life years is a fair amount to have, then a person who already has x years but wants x + y 
years is not obviously treated unfairly if the resources that it would take for her to gain y years are allocated 
to help someone else achieve x years. 
390 Reese PP and Caplan AL, 'Better Off Living—the Ethics of the New UNOS Proposal for Allocating Kidneys for 
Transplantation', Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 6 (2011) p2311 
391 Ibid. p2311 
392 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit. p340 
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perspective they are equally badly off, but from the over-a-lifetime perspective the 
patient who has reached seventy years of age is better off than the person who has 
reached forty. According to Veatch, justice therefore demands that ―we target organs 
for these younger people who are so poorly off that they will not make it to old age 
without being given special priority‖393. This also entails that the younger a person is 
the stronger their claim to preferential allocation. 
A problem with this fair innings argument is the apparently necessary inclusion 
of an ‗all other things being equal‘ clause394. Veatch does not specify this, but without 
it, his version of the fair innings argument could be too simplistic. A forty year old who 
has, up until that point, had an exceptional quality of life, should arguably not be 
considered badly off when compared with a seventy year old who has endured the 
previous forty years with a miserable quality of life. While having a longer life is better 
than having a shorter life, all other things being equal, it seems that other factors will 
prevent cases from being equal. The introduction of an ‗all other things being equal‘ 
clause reduces the clarity of the fair innings argument and makes it more difficult to 
apply. The fair innings argument may function sufficiently as a tie-breaker when all 
other things are equal, but as Rivlin argues, there are so many other factors to consider 
that it unlikely that tie-breaking situations will be required395. Veatch suggests that his 
fair innings argument should be just one of the factors used to allocate organs, and 
that although age should be taken into account, it should not dominate396. A conditional 
donation giving priority to children would act as a dominating factor, so would be 
difficult to justify using a fair innings argument.  
If the fair innings argument is given a decisive role in allocating organs via 
conditional donations, there is a chance that it could impact negatively upon efficiency. 
A child could be given priority over an adult for a particular organ even if their 
                                                          
393 Ibid. p341 
394 Rivlin M, 'Why the Fair Innings Argument Is Not Persuasive', BMC Medical Ethics 1 (2000) p4 
395 Ibid. p341 
396 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit. p343 
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predicted post-transplant outcomes with that organ were not particularly good. If that 
transplant then failed, the child would then require a further transplant, which, as a re-
transplant, would have less likelihood of being successful. A child‘s aims of achieving 
old age could be better served by ensuring that the organ best-matched to her 
according to medical criteria is allocated to her, so it is not clear that giving children 
priority over adults for all organs would necessarily be the best way of achieving a fair 
innings.  
The participants in this study appeared to favour priority for children, rather 
than those of a younger age relative to other contenders for a specific graft. They 
would not necessarily think, then, that a 35 year old should receive priority over a 40 
year old nor that younger children have priority over older children. The claim that 
children have their whole lives ahead of them and should therefore receive priority 
could perhaps be justified on the grounds of prognosis and transplant efficiency. The 
situation could potentially get very complicated, however; a liver transplant could give 
a 40% chance of an increased quantity of life (n) to a ten year old, or an 80% chance 
of an increased quantity of life equal to n/2 for a 50 year old. The child may have the 
most life to gain, but their chances of doing so could be equal to or less than an older 
adult – if the argument for giving a child priority is on the basis of prognosis and 
transplant efficiency, it is not obvious in a case like this that the child should have 
priority. There are, of course, potential answers to these kinds of problems in terms of 
QALYs, but it is unlikely that QALYs would support over-riding priority for children in all 
cases.   
10.1.1.2 Vulnerability and Sympathy 
Some participants suggested that children are vulnerable, and felt increased sympathy 
or even obligation towards them. A special obligation to provide support to the most 
vulnerable could perhaps be defended in other contexts, but the vulnerability here must 
be carefully considered. Children may be generally more vulnerable than most adults, 
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but vulnerability in other areas does not necessarily justify special obligations in organ 
allocation397. The relevant vulnerability here would be a vulnerability to death (or 
appalling quality of life/future life) as a result of needing an organ transplant, and in 
this respect adult potential recipients may be just as vulnerable. Vulnerability to death 
or appalling quality of life already plays a role in how waiting lists are organised, and 
those likely to die soonest or who are experiencing the worst quality of life tend to be 
prioritised. Giving additional priority for children on the basis of vulnerability in this 
sense, therefore, is unjustified because their relevant vulnerability is no greater than 
adults‘. One might suggest that another meaning of vulnerability could be intended, but 
it is difficult to think of one that should make a difference to organ allocation398. 
A further concern with allowing organs to be directed according to conditions 
derived from sympathy for certain types of people is that there is a strong possibility 
that the same types of people will tend to benefit from or suffer the consequences. One 
of the common objections to solicited directed donation via media appeals is that they 
benefit certain types of people more than others399, and that this can be related to the 
appeal of the potential recipient. This means that cute children are likely to receive 
priority over middle-aged adults, not on the basis of medical or morally relevant 
criteria, but instead on their appeal to donor families. Many participants in the 
embedded study thought that emotions should play no role in organ allocation, and the 
argument from vulnerability or sympathy fails to provide a rational justification to 
favour children.  
 
 
                                                          
397 A child may be more vulnerable to becoming corrupted by playing violent computer games, and one may 
have an obligation to protect the child from exposure to these games, but this does not mean they should 
receive priority for medical treatment.   
398 For completeness it should also be noted that some adults can be considered generally vulnerable in the 
way that children are (such as those with severe learning difficulties), and there was no suggestion from 
participants that vulnerable adults should receive priority. 
399 Ross LF, (2002) op. cit. pp329-37 
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10.1.1.3 Helping bereaved families 
Some participants suggested that being able to donate specifically to children could 
provide comfort to donor families because they would know that they were helping 
other families to avoid a similar sort of bereavement. It may provide comfort to donor 
families, but this does not itself provide a convincing reason for allowing it. Allocating 
organs according to racist wishes could provide comfort to a donor family if they felt 
that their dead relative would have wanted this to happen, but this can still fail to 
provide justification for doing so if there are other relevant countervailing factors. The 
argument also seems to imply that it is more important to prevent some kinds of 
bereavement than others. Prioritising a child may mean that some other parents do not 
suffer the loss of their child, but it could result in another child suffering the loss of 
their parent (if that parent was the patient at the top of the waiting list who was 
overlooked for transplantation due to a condition). It would be difficult to suggest that 
one bereavement here was obviously worse than the other.  
The arguments discussed suggest that conditions giving children priority are 
questionable. Although it may sometimes be clinically appropriate400 to give children 
priority, an idea reflected by allocation policy, conditional donation is not an appropriate 
way to achieve this. Although it is important to consider the emotions and wishes of the 
bereaved, this does not entail that their requests should be granted just because it 
makes them feel better401.  
10.1.2 Responsibility for condition 
Many participants, when asked whether they thought some people were less deserving 
of receiving transplants, replied that people who were responsible for causing their own 
                                                          
400 The size of organs from adult donors can make them unsuitable for paediatric recipients, but some smaller 
organs from paediatric donors can be suitable for adult recipients. Children have a smaller pool of available 
organs available to them than adults, so it is reasonable to give children priority for organs that are suitable 
for children. Because organs suitable for paediatric recipients are relatively rare, waiting for the next organ to 
become available is more likely to result in death than it would do for an adult. This argument does not just 
apply to children, however, and also works for any person who requires an organ with a relatively rare 
property.   
401 There may, however, be other good reasons to accept a condition if the donation would otherwise be 
rejected. This will be discussed in section 10.2.4 
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ill health could be so regarded. Those included in this broad group were alcoholics, drug 
users and people with risky lifestyles (people who take part in extreme sports, for 
example). This would tend to support findings in other studies, where participants‘ 
views on allocation have been influenced by whether recipients are thought to be 
responsible for their own condition402,403. Alcoholics were frequently singled out by the 
participants, possibly because of well publicised cases like that of George Best404. A 
previous study by Neuberger and Meyer405 found that 38% of participants considered it 
acceptable for donor families to place conditions on donations which prevented 
alcoholics from receiving the donated organs.  
The reasoning behind these views in the embedded study appeared to be based 
on both past and future behaviour. There was a concern that post-transplant behaviour 
would revert back to that which caused or contributed to the original organ failure, and 
also a belief that if one knowingly indulges in risky behaviour one should not expect to 
be bailed out when the adverse risks are manifested. The first of these arguments can 
be considered to be an argument based on effectiveness, whereas the second is more 
of a moral claim (although there is inevitably moral content in the first argument).  
To highlight some of the difficulties encountered when allocating resources 
according to responsibility, the following discussion will focus on alcoholism. This was 
also the condition most frequently discussed by participants. Much of what is said can, 
however, be applied to other risky lifestyles. In the interests of precision, a distinction 
should be drawn between alcoholics and reformed alcoholics. The term ‗alcoholic‘ is 
used here to describe someone who currently suffers from alcohol addiction. A 
                                                          
402 Ubel PA, Baron J, and Asch DA, 'Social Acceptability, Personal Responsibility, and Prognosis in Public 
Judgments and Transplant Allocation', Bioethics 13 (1999) pp57-68 
403 Ubel PA et al., 'Allocation of Transplantable Organs: Do People Want to Punish Patients for Causing Their 
Illness?', Liver Transplantation 7 (2001) pp600-07 
404 BBC News (2005) 'Best: Decline of the Golden Boy', Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4090840.stm, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
405 Neuberger J and Mayer D, (2008) 'Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of the UK General Public Findings 
of an Ipsos-Mori Poll' op. cit. pp1545-47 
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‗reformed alcoholic‘ refers to someone who has successfully overcome an alcohol 
addiction406.  
A preliminary assumption for the following discussion is that the behaviour in 
question is voluntary, and that the consequences are foreseeable. There is debate over 
the nature of alcoholism and similar addictive illnesses, but the strongest argument in 
favour of allocating according to responsibility for illness must be formulated on the 
assumption of voluntariness407. Even given this strong starting position, it will be 
argued that organs should not be allocated according to responsibility. 
One participant (a potential recipient) summed up the general line of argument  
when she claimed that it was unfair that she had lived her whole life responsibly 
without drinking or taking drugs, yet people who have indulged in these things and 
damaged their own bodies are just as entitled to a transplant as she is. 
Much has been written about allocating healthcare resources according to past 
behaviour408,409,410. Glannon, writing specifically about the allocation of organs, argues 
that people who are responsible for their own condition are less deserving of receiving 
treatment411. He bases his argument on the claim that the more control over one‘s 
health one has, the more responsible one is for negative health consequences that 
result from one‘s choices. Veatch outlines a deontological justification for giving lower 
priority to people who are responsible for their own condition. He claims that 
deontologists are concerned about ―equality of opportunity of well being‖412. A logical 
implication of equality of opportunity is that when two people have a health problem 
                                                          
406 One might argue that once someone is an alcoholic, they are always an alcoholic even if they have 
succeeded in abstaining for many years. While this may be true, it seems reasonable to treat someone who 
has successfully given up alcohol the same way as someone who is not an alcoholic. Just as a reformed 
alcoholic may revert to drinking, a non-alcoholic could become an alcoholic in future. 
407 Setting aside the deeper philosophical issues of free will and determinism, it is not unreasonable to claim 
that, generally, for someone to be considered responsible for something, they must have engaged in it 
voluntarily.   
408 Smart B, 'Fault and the Allocation of Spare Organs', Journal of Medical Ethics 20 (1994) pp26-30 
409 Glannon W, 'Responsibility, Alcoholism, and Liver Transplantation', Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 23 
(1998)  pp31-49 
410 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit.  
411 Glannon W, (1998) 'Responsibility, Alcoholism, and Liver Transplantation' op. cit. pp31-49 
412 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit. p313 
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and are deemed to be equally needy, if one of those people had an opportunity to avoid 
the health problem then they have a weaker claim to well-being413. Veatch makes it 
clear that his argument is not about judging the morality of actions and then punishing 
wrongdoers, but is instead about holding people responsible for the consequences of 
their actions when it impacts upon a health care system414.  
Brudney offers a general summary of Veatch‘s and Glannon‘s positions with the 
following principle: 
An agent is responsible for knowingly, voluntarily, and repeatedly engaging in 
easily avoidable conduct that might significantly contribute to that agent‘s 
needing a scarce, lifesaving resource. An agent who is responsible for such 
conduct may legitimately be given a weaker claim on scarce, lifesaving 
resources if her need for such resources is due to such conduct.415 
 
This idea of responsibility aligns well with the NHS constitution, which states 
that ―You should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, 
and your family‘s, good health and well-being, and take some personal responsibility 
for it‖416. Taking responsibility does not, however, necessarily entail suffering all of the 
consequences of it if they can be avoided417, which is presumably why healthcare under 
the NHS is not generally allocated according to personal responsibility.  
 Walker has presented a more detailed and precise argument for treating people 
differently according to responsibility for illness when resources are scarce418. He 
                                                          
413 Ibid. p313 
414 Ibid. p313 
415 Brudney D, 'Are Alcoholics Less Deserving of Liver Transplants?', The Hastings Center Report 37 (2007) 
p42 
416 NHS (2012) 'NHS Constitution', Available at: 
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Documents/nhs-constitution-
interactive-version-march-2012.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012 p10 
417 A cyclist might be responsible for getting knocked off their bike, but this does not entail that they should 
be left in the road to be run over. 
418 Walker T, 'Who Do We Treat First When Resources Are Scarce?', Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2010) 
pp200-11 
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outlines a principle for justifying treating Person A over Person B in cases where they 
have similar needs, but the following conditions are true of A and not B: 
i) A is ill as a result of a competent, voluntary choice; 
ii) A would not be ill if she had not made this choice; 
iii) A has not adequately attempted to ensure that her becoming ill would not diminish 
supply of resources (organs in this context) needed to help others; 
iv) Treating A first would decrease the amount of organs available for others; 
v) A could reasonably have known that making this choice could lead to her becoming 
ill;  
vi) There were realistic alternatives available to Person A at the time she made the 
choice and these carried less risk; 
vii) Person A could have been expected to know about these alternatives and to know 
they carried less risk. 
Walker argues that, if all seven of these conditions are met, it is reasonable to 
treat person B over person A. This is justified on the basis that if A and B were given 
equal priority, then A‘s taking part in risky behaviour would indirectly put the lives of 
others at risk (because taking part in the risky behaviour has a fair chance of using 
scarce life-saving resources). It seems wrong to think that by choosing to take part in 
risky behaviour A is permitted to put other people‘s lives at risk. Walker‘s way of 
resolving this is to give A lower priority than people who have not taken part in the 
risky behaviour, so that A‘s actions are not able to deprive these people of a scarce life-
saving resource.  
Assuming Walker‘s argument is theoretically valid, applying it is not straight-
forward. First, it is not clear where the causal chain of choices starts. Someone having 
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their first drink as a teenager may be starting a causal chain leading ultimately towards 
alcoholism, but it is not reasonable to expect the average teenager to know that this 
first drink could lead them to become ill in later life. Of the many people who drink 
alcohol, only 9% of men, and 4% of women in England show signs of alcohol 
dependence419. This suggests that drinking alcohol only leads to alcoholism for a 
minority of people, and the proportion of these people who then require transplants will 
be smaller still. Consumption of alcohol in moderate quantities is even recommended 
by some studies for its health benefits420, so it is not obvious that drinking alcohol 
should always be considered risky behaviour.  Expecting someone considering their first 
drink to therefore foresee and consider the possibility of a subsequent need for a 
transplant seems particularly demanding. If the causal chain is considered to start 
later, it is not obvious where this should be. It seems unlikely that there is a single 
point at which one changes from being a non-alcoholic to an alcoholic, or a single drink 
that pushes a person over the line between not having Alcoholic Liver Disease (ALD) 
and having ALD. There could, however, be a point at which a person is advised by a 
health professional to stop drinking because of impending negative health effects. If a 
person, having been given this advice and knowing the likely health effects, freely 
chose to continue drinking, then it would seem reasonable to think that this person was 
responsible for future drinking-related illness.  
Although Walker‘s argument is difficult to apply in some cases, Veatch‘s and 
Glannon‘s arguments, as summarised by Brudney‘s principle, are easier to apply. It 
does seem true that many alcoholics have knowingly and repeatedly engaged in easily 
avoidable behaviour that has led to them requiring a transplant. If the behaviour is also 
voluntary, then Veatch‘s and Glannon‘s arguments would entail that alcoholics have a 
weaker claim to lifesaving resources. There is, however, evidence that genes influence 
                                                          
419 The NHS Information Centre (2011) 'Statistics on Alcohol: England, 2011', Available at: 
http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/publications/003_Health_Lifestyles/Alcohol_2011/NHSIC_Statistics_on_Alcohol
_England_2011.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
420 Thakker KD, 'An Overview of Health Risks and Benefits of Alcohol Consumption', Alcoholism: Clinical and 
Experimental Research 22 (1998) pp285-98 
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alcoholism and evidence that alcoholism may result from behaviour learned from role 
models at a young age421, suggesting that this behaviour is not entirely voluntary. 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that even individuals predisposed towards alcoholism 
have some opportunity to change their lifestyles for the better. Sufficient scope for 
voluntary decision-making could render individuals responsible for their alcoholism even 
where there is a genetic or learned component. The question is whether there is 
sufficient scope at the point that continuing drinking is identified as posing a risk to 
one‘s health, as one may already be in the grasp of addiction and therefore not acting 
completely voluntarily. This is open to debate, but there are other good reasons to not 
permit conditions based upon responsibility for illness. 
An objection to these arguments can be formulated based on the proportionality 
of the consequences. One may concede that people responsible for their condition, all 
other things being equal, should receive lower priority than people who are not 
responsible for their condition. There is, however, a need to consider how this should 
be weighed against other factors when all other things are not equal. Walker‘s 
argument specifically refers to two patients with ‗similar needs‘, and it is only 
simplistically true that people on transplant waiting lists have similar needs. They all 
need a transplant, but the degree of need varies from patient to patient. For example, 
if patient A (a recovering alcoholic) requires a transplant within 24 hours, and patient B 
(someone with genetically-caused liver failure) can wait without immediate risk to his 
life for several months for a transplant, they have quite different levels of need. Patient 
A could be considered to need that organ, whereas patient B can wait for another to 
become available. It would be wrong to give patient B priority over A in this instance 
simply because A is responsible for his illness; if responsibility is to be taken into 
account, it is just one consideration amongst many. Similarly, if patient A has been on 
the waiting list for twice as long as patient B, and A still has much better expected 
                                                          
421 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit. p317 
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transplant outcomes than patient B, it would not seem obvious that B ought to get 
priority over A. If B did get priority over A, efficiency would be compromised, as would 
the fairness criterion of waiting time. Placing a condition to exclude alcoholics from 
receiving a particular organ would make responsibility an exclusion criterion, and this 
goes beyond the tie-breaking factor in ‗all other things being equal‘ situations that the 
above arguments support. Such a condition introduces an irrelevant criterion into 
allocation, but it would be giving a relevant criterion too much weight, which could be 
considered to be just as bad, because it means that the other relevant criteria are 
denied the weight that they ought to be given.   
For some participants there was a related concern that introducing moral 
judgments into medical decisions is not right when the stakes are so high. While 
medical decisions do contain moral content, it could be argued that introducing 
backward-looking considerations into allocation is wrong. There appeared to be a 
concern that it is somewhat cruel to say to someone who needs a transplant that 
because they have caused their own condition they will receive lower priority than 
people who may need a transplant less urgently422. Some participants in the study were 
sympathetic towards alcoholics, and suggested that people should not be punished for 
something that ultimately may have come about through only one or two bad decisions 
in the past. These participants thought that people deserve a second chance in life, and 
that a liver transplant could be just what is needed for an alcoholic to turn her life 
around. This finding corresponds roughly with Tong‘s systematic review, which found 
that some participants thought that no matter what the cause of the illness, everyone 
deserves a chance423. This perception of transplantation as a second chance perhaps 
expresses an attitude that transplantation allocation exists to best satisfy need rather 
                                                          
422 One may argue that it is also cruel to remove very seriously ill people from transplant waiting lists, or to 
exclude some cancer patients from transplantation, but this could be considered in the best interests of those 
patients insofar as transplantation would no longer be deemed a suitable treatment for them. Transplanting 
someone with little chance of post-transplant survival could be considered to be putting a patient through an 
inappropriate treatment. Similarly, transplanting cancer patients introduces additional complications for that 
patient because of the need for immunosuppressant medication.  
423 Tong A et al., (2010) op. cit. pp796-805 
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than to judge people‘s reasons for that need. Glannon, Veatch and Walker could all 
deny that their arguments entail judging the moral status of the actions that caused the 
need for a transplant, but refusing to help someone in need because of some bad 
decisions they have made does deny them the opportunity to learn from their mistakes.  
According to Johri and Ubel, some research suggesting that members of the 
public think ―people with controversial behaviours are simply less deserving of scarce 
transplantable organs‖424 reflects prejudice rather than morally defensible argument. 
They go on to state that public attitudes that are a result of prejudice deserve no place 
in transplantation policy, as they do not express considered moral judgments425. 
Participants in the embedded study did not overtly appear to be seeking to punish 
people for controversial behaviour, and seemed keen to hold people responsible for 
their behaviour only when it was absolutely certain that they were responsible. There 
was a tendency to single out alcoholics and drug users, and whilst this may superficially 
suggest a desire to punish behaviours that society deems less acceptable it might 
equally be because these are obvious examples that are known to have long-term 
health implications. Elsewhere it has been suggested that attitudes vary according to 
the nature of the behaviour. Risky behaviour that is generally approved of is treated 
differently from risky behaviour that is not approved of426. For instance, choosing to 
become pregnant carries risks, yet it seems unlikely that people would favour lower 
priority for people with complications arising from pregnancy. Someone who showed 
some symptoms of illness but who was scared of visiting their GP could also be 
considered responsible for their condition if their condition significantly worsened as a 
result of them delaying treatment. This shows that sometimes there are other factors 
that lead one (still voluntarily) towards risky behaviour, and that these may make it 
unreasonable to hold someone responsible for their behaviour. The fact that 
                                                          
424 Johri M and Ubel PA, 'Setting Organ Allocation Priorities: Should We Care What the Public Cares About?', 
Liver Transplantation 9 (2003) p879 
425 Ibid. p879 
426 Wikler D, 'Personal and Social Responsibility for Health', Ethics & International Affairs 16 (2002) p52 
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participants in the embedded study chose to focus on certain obvious risky behaviours 
suggests that there is a chance that certain behaviours could be singled out, while 
other risky behaviours are overlooked. If responsibility is viewed as a valid allocation 
criterion, it ought to be consistently applied427. Relying on conditional donations to 
enforce allocation according to responsibility would likely result in the principle being 
inconsistently applied, which could result in arbitrary unfairness.  
Argument from effectiveness 
The effectiveness argument, in contrast to the moral one, is somewhat simpler. It is, at 
this stage, important to acknowledge that some form of filtering happens before organs 
are allocated. Potential recipients who require a transplant due to behaviours such as 
excessive drinking or intravenous drug use will only be accepted onto, and continue on, 
transplant waiting lists if they abstain from drinking/drug-use, and are regularly tested 
for compliance. Some participants, however, appeared to be unaware of this and 
viewed conditional donation as a means of preventing those who may damage or 
destroy their transplanted organ from receiving one. Current listing practice, however, 
renders such conditions redundant, because they have already been applied. This is 
perhaps a situation where donors and their next-of-kin ought to defer to the expertise 
of medical staff in determining which potential recipients are suitable, and where 
transplant staff ought to inform the next-of-kin that organs are not allocated to 
alcoholics who cannot commit to abstinence. The fact that certain people are excluded 
from receiving transplants suggests, however, that the desire to exclude alcoholics who 
are still drinking is not morally objectionable428 just unnecessary. 
Most participants‘ views were suggestive of concurrence with the argument from 
effectiveness. In contrast, although many participants thought that, in principle, people 
                                                          
427 The NHS could potentially have a consistent policy that judged some risks to be acceptable or non-
acceptable, but there would obviously be some disagreement over what activities would fall into which 
category. 
428 Or if it is, so too are current listing practices. 
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who are responsible for their own condition are less deserving of transplants, very few 
were in favour of this being factored into allocation policy. 
The arguments in favour of allocating organs according to responsibility, 
although theoretically valid, are difficult to apply in practice, and leave open the 
question of how much weight responsibility ought to carry in allocation decisions. They 
suggest that responsibility should carry some weight, but not ultimate weight. The 
important question is whether there are good reasons to allow conditions based upon 
responsibility. On the basis of other research429, it does seem likely that only certain 
types of illness would be the focus of conditions like this. A condition specifying a 
preference that those responsible for their illness should receive lower priority would 
not necessarily be objectionable, but a condition specifying that only alcoholics or drug 
users should receive lower priority could be arbitrarily targeting certain behaviours. 
Moreover, it may be difficult to establish causal responsibility and voluntariness in 
many cases, which could again mean that certain behaviours where responsibility was 
more clear cut would be unfairly targeted. 
10.1.3 Family Partiality 
Many participants in this study, like those who objected to the decisions made in the 
Laura Ashworth case430, believed that it was acceptable to direct an organ towards a 
family member or a close friend. The reasons for this were: 
i) blood is thicker than water; 
ii) you have to look after your own first; 
iii) you do things for your family or friends that you would not do for others. 
 Neuberger and Mayer reported that 36% of their respondents thought it was 
very/fairly acceptable to request that a liver is only given to a family member and not 
                                                          
429 Ubel PA et al., (2001) 'Allocation of Transplantable Organs: Do People Want to Punish Patients for Causing 
Their Illness?' op. cit. pp600-07 
430 BBC News (2008) 'Mother Denied Daughter's Organs', Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bradford/7344205.stm, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
224 
 
to anybody else on the waiting list (even though the family member may not be top of 
the list); 24% thought that it was not very acceptable, and 26% thought it was not at 
all acceptable431. In the Neuberger and Mayer study, the donation would only go ahead 
if the direction was granted, so was ‗iff conditional‘, which may explain why only a 
minority of participants in that study thought that it was acceptable.  
The three reasons outlined above tend to support slightly different arguments 
relating to directed/conditional donation to family members.  
10.1.3.1 Blood is thicker than water 
The claim that ‗blood is thicker than water‘, although largely rhetorical, suggests that 
ties between family members are more important (or literally, one supposes, stronger) 
than the ties between strangers. This could be interpreted as a lay appeal to familial 
partiality, and although it does not itself possess any real justificatory power, it 
suggests that participants consider there to be something special about family 
members that does not apply to strangers. This, then, leads to two more detailed 
arguments.   
10.1.3.2 Looking after your own first 
The idea of ‗looking after your own first‘, could be used to formulate an argument in 
favour of a request for directed allocation, roughly akin to policy since March 2010. One 
might express a preference that one‘s relative is given priority for a transplant, but if 
the organ is not compatible then other people are given an opportunity to receive it432. 
Slightly more tenuously, this type of reasoning could be linked to someone agreeing to 
donate the rest of their organs unconditionally if one of the organs is transplanted to 
their relative; a donation such as this may effectively communicate ‗once my loved one 
has been looked after, you can give the other organs to whoever you like‘. The idea of 
                                                          
431 Neuberger J and Mayer D, (2008) 'Conditional Organ Donation-the Views of the UK General Public Findings 
of an Ipsos-Mori Poll' op. cit. pp1545-47 
432 This may seem an obvious position for someone to take, but there was a case where the next-of-kin was 
initially adamant that the organ could only be donated if it was transplanted to him: Neuberger J and Mayer 
D, (2008) 'Conditional Organ Donation-Case Scenarios and Questions' op. cit. pp1527-29 
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prioritising your own loved one‘s interests can be justified on the grounds of 
Cottingham‘s philophilic partiality433. 
Hilhorst writes specifically about the parallel living and deceased Dutch donation 
systems, but due to largely similar systems his comments will also apply to the UK. He 
suggests that ―it is hard for many people to understand why they are allowed to donate 
to a relative before they die but not afterwards‖434, something which many participants 
in this study also thought. Hilhorst suggests that turning down requests for directed 
allocation of organs to family members (offers that he considers to be morally decent) 
harms ―partial values‖435 because it calls into question the meanings of personal loyalty 
and relationships. Interestingly he also suggests that prohibiting these donations may 
harm impartial donations as well, if doing so reduces people‘s willingness to donate 
organs after death. To establish the validity of this concern would require empirical 
evidence, but it is at least plausible.  
Ankeny suggests that directed donation to a family member can be considered 
admirable even after death436. According to Ankeny, a directed donation towards a 
family member would reflect a personal preference that would not ―corrupt the 
egalitarian basis of utilitarianism‖437 because these sorts of preferences are generally 
deemed to be appropriate. Moreover, given that it is morally correct to favour one‘s 
own in some circumstances, then any policy prohibiting conditional/directed donation to 
family or close friends could be standing in the way of people doing the right thing with 
their organs. The question remains, however, of whether organ donation is one of the 
circumstances in which it is permissible to favour one‘s own loved ones, and if so, how 
much weight one can give to this. Ankeny states that it is such a situation, and makes 
                                                          
433 Cottingham J, (1986) op. cit. pp357-73 
434 Hilhorst MT, '―Living Apart Together‖: Moral Frictions between Two Coexisting Organ Transplantation 
Schemes', Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2008) pp484-88 
435 Ibid. p485 
436 Ankeny RA, (2001) op. cit. p392 
437 Ibid. p392 
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this basis on the claim of accepted practice in living donation438. It would certainly take 
a staunch impartialist to assert that one ought, if faced with the prospect of saving a 
family member or a stranger, to not give additional weight to the family member. 
Cottingham‘s claim for partiality is that ―unless one is under a direct or indirect duty to 
be impartial, it is morally correct to favour one‘s own‖439, and it is difficult to see why 
one would be under a duty to donate one‘s organs impartially after death. 
10.1.3.3 Doing for family what one would not do for others 
At present, policy only permits deceased directed allocation towards family members or 
close friends, and does not permit truly conditional donations featuring these requests: 
request can be ignored if there is someone who urgently requires a transplant. Using 
the line of argument that one does things for one‘s family that one would not do for 
others, one could make an argument for changing the March 2010 guidance to also 
accept iff conditional donations. If organ donation is considered by an individual or their 
next-of-kin to be particularly burdensome (for whatever reason) then they may only be 
prepared to accept this burden to benefit specific people. The conditionality on which 
living donation is often based is not considered offensive, so it is inconsistent that it is 
considered problematic within deceased donations. One possible justification of the 
March 2010 guidance‘s refusal to allow truly conditional donations to family members is 
that the DH wanted to incorporate family partiality into deceased donation without 
setting a precedent for permitting conditional donations more generally. As established 
in Chapter 5, there is nothing inherently non-altruistic or ethically unacceptable about 
conditionality, especially not when conditions represent philophilic partiality. If it is 
acceptable for donors to request that their organs are directed towards a family 
member over other needier people (i.e. to circumvent standard medical allocation of 
organs), the added aspect of conditionality does not make the situation any less 
acceptable.   
                                                          
438 Ibid. p392 
439 Cottingham J, (1986) op. cit. p358 
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 These arguments have suggested that conditional donations to family members 
should be accepted, and it would be reasonable to extend this to friends with whom one 
has particularly close relationships. In a departure from current policy, it has been 
argued that there is nothing inherently objectionable about a iff conditional donation to 
a family member or close friend.  
10.1.4 Section conclusions 
The arguments for allowing donors to place conditions giving children priority 
are not convincing. Although children are already given priority in some situations, 
there are good medical reasons for this, and these are quite distinct from the 
arguments put forward by participants. Conditions relating to priority for children, then, 
cannot be justified on the basis of the condition content.   
Allowing donors to specify conditions based on responsibility for illness is also 
problematic. As well as a practical difficulty in establishing whether the specified 
behaviour cited in the condition is truly causally linked to a need for a transplant, the 
arguments provide limited guidance over how things should be weighted when all other 
considerations are not equal. The arguments may be applicable in tie-breaking 
situations, but this does not entail that conditions based upon responsibility are 
acceptable. 
In contrast, there are very good reasons to permit directed donations towards 
family members. In a departure from current policy, however, there seems little reason 
to not also permit iff conditional donations towards family members. The principle of 
unconditional donation lacks justification once the greatest need principle is relaxed.  It 
therefore fails to provide a reason to prohibit truly conditional donations to family 
members. 
This section has examined new lines of argument that were put forward by 
participants. It has been argued that most of these arguments cannot withstand 
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scrutiny. Although this means that these arguments have not directly impacted upon 
the final recommendations, they have been given the fair consideration described in 
Chapter 1.  
  
229 
 
10.2 Life-Saving and Avoiding Waste 
The previous section has looked at specific conditions and whether there are good 
reasons for accepting these donations on the basis of the condition content. This 
section will build upon the philosophical discussion in Chapter 7, where it was argued 
that there are good reasons to accept conditional or directed donations regardless of 
their content. The following discussion will draw on data from the embedded study that 
supports the arguments in Chapter 7. It will be argued that the arguments in favour of 
accepting conditional donation in Chapter 7 are supported by the views and reasoning 
of participants, and this provides a strong and practically applicable argument in favour 
of accepting conditional donations. 
10.2.1 Avoiding Waste 
The concept of negative loss was introduced in Chapter 6, where it was defined as a 
loss of benefit for somebody without a corresponding increase in benefit for somebody 
else. Participants in this study, rather than referring to negative loss, tended to talk 
about wasting organs. The idea of waste is closely linked to negative loss, and was 
used to make two points: 
i) allocating organs to people who will not look after them is a relative waste 
ii) turning away organs that could be used is an absolute waste 
These will now both be examined in detail. 
Allocating organs to people who will not look after them is a relative waste 
The first way that organs could be wasted is by allocating them to recipients who will 
not look after them. There is an assumption here that the recipient is likely to damage 
the organ, and not make the most of the potential benefit that it could provide. This 
would not be an absolute waste, as some benefit may still be gained from the 
transplant, but the benefit would not be as great as if the organ had been allocated to 
someone who lived in such a way as to maximise the life of their graft.  Safeguards 
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already exist to exclude from listing anyone who is engaging in behaviour likely to 
damage their future graft, so there is some protection against relative waste factored 
into policy.  
 Relative waste could be defined as the difference between the good that an 
organ could provide if it was allocated in order to maximise its use, and the good that 
the organ provides when it is allocated according to current criteria. Wastage, defined 
like this, may be deemed necessary in order to promote fairness. Generally, organs are 
allocated to the sickest recipients first, as this is a way to minimise the number of 
people who die on the waiting list. This may result in sub-maximal transplant 
outcomes, but it means that fewer people die while waiting, which seems desirable440. 
Many participants thought that the most important aim of transplantation should be 
saving lives. There was support for the idea that saving lives is a consideration that can 
trump others. If relative waste is construed as a failure to maximise potential 
transplant benefit, and it is generally desirable to avoid this, then a good reason is 
necessary to not allocate solely according to transplant benefit. Saving lives can 
provide this reason441. Tying this conception of waste into conditional donation reveals 
two different lines of argument. In principle, someone could place a condition specifying 
that their organs should only be allocated according to best predicted transplant 
outcomes. Here conditional donation would be contributing to the avoidance of relative 
waste by achieving maximum transplant benefit. Conversely, however, they can also 
generate relative wastage. A condition specifying that recipients must only be white 
could result in people with better predicted transplant outcomes being excluded from 
receiving those organs. Bearing in mind that safeguards are already in place to ensure 
that organs are not allocated to people whose behaviour is are likely result in relative 
                                                          
440 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit.  
441 Indeed it could be argued that using a life-saving resource to improve the life of someone who is not in 
immediate danger of death is a waste of a life-saving resource. 
231 
 
waste, it seems likely that allowing conditional donations would cause more of relative 
wastage than it would prevent.   
Just as allocating an organ to somebody may be a relative waste, there may be 
some threshold at which it should be deemed an absolute waste to allocate an organ to 
somebody. Currently liver transplantation is only generally considered as a treatment 
option where there is at least a 50% chance of survival beyond 5 years post-
transplant442, which suggests that the medical profession thinks that allocating an 
organ to anybody with less than a 50% chance of 5 year survival is a poor use of 
organs. It seems probable that organs are donated by people in the expectation that 
they will be used effectively, and allocating an organ to someone with a predicted a low 
QALYs score could be considered a relative waste of that organ. The threshold at which 
an allocation is considered to be an absolute waste is obviously open to debate, 
however, and could vary from organ to organ and situation to situation443. 
10.2.2 Turning away organs is a form of absolute waste 
Many participants thought that turning away medically useable organs when they could 
be used to save or improve lives was an absolute waste of a valuable resource – the 
failure to use the organs at all to save life. By itself, the view that refusing organs 
constitutes waste does not provide an argument for accepting conditional donations. As 
discussed, relative waste may be a necessary by-product of maintaining other 
principles. Nonetheless, in the non-staff groups particularly, participants felt it desirable 
to avoid absolute waste and thought this could be achieved by accepting the conditional 
donation.  
                                                          
442 NHSBT (2007) 'UK Liver Transplant Group Recommendations for Liver Transplant Assessment in the 
Context of Illicit Drug Use', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/pdf/uk_liver_transplant_group_rec
ommendations_for_liver_transplant_assessment_illict_drug_use-2007.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
443 A poor quality organ could potentially be used to ‗tide over‘ a recipient until a better quality organ became 
available. Although the QALYs gained from that particular organ could be low, it is not obviously a waste. 
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Turning away organs with conditions attached is a clear example of negative 
loss. Somebody loses the benefit (primarily the person(s) who would have received the 
organ(s) according to the conditions, but also everybody else on the waiting list), and 
there is no directly corresponding gain for anybody else444. The non-staff participants in 
this study were generally keen to avoid this negative loss, and this was particularly true 
amongst the potential recipient group.  
10.2.3 Flexibility avoids absolute waste 
To prevent absolute waste, some participants suggested that the NHS should take a 
more flexible approach to conditional and directed donations. In particular, some 
participants suggested that transplant staff could look at the transplant waiting lists and 
see what the impact of accepting the donation would be – for instance, to establish 
whether following the condition would deprive someone at the top of the waiting list of 
an organ. This solution would be contrary to the DH Panel‘s 2000 report, which stated 
that conditional donations are unacceptable regardless of the implications in terms of 
allocation.  
The willingness of the participants to endorse this suggests that although many 
conditional donations can be considered bad, wasting the organs would be even worse. 
Few people thought that saying ‗I will only donate if…‘ was completely unacceptable, 
possibly because it is still an offer of a life-saving resource. Conditional donations may 
(but do not always, as in the 1998 case) offend again the principle that organs are 
allocated according to medical need, but many of the participants felt it better that 
organs were allocated contrary to this principle than refused and absolutely wasted.  
If the impact of the conditions is taken to be important, then some 
consequences must be considered acceptable and others not. An obvious candidate for 
                                                          
444 One might argue that the system gains benefit from remaining fair and keeping its hands clean, but this 
would not be a corresponding gain in benefit. This would merely be the avoidance of a loss of benefit (and it 
was argued in Chapter 7 that the loss of fairness is outweighed by the gain in organs): the transplant system 
would be no fairer than before the conditional donation was offered.    
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an acceptable consequence would be if the conditions made no difference to organ 
allocation (as in the 1998 racist case). Unacceptable consequences may include the 
most urgent candidates being excluded from receiving those organs and dying as a 
result (although these patients would also die if the donation was refused), and loss of 
fairness in allocation as a result of this. Excluding the most urgent candidates and 
introducing unfairness into allocation are certainly prima facie undesirable 
consequences, but further consideration will show them to be the best available 
consequences in some circumstances. A donation that has to be allocated according to 
non-medical constraints and excludes the most urgent potential recipients is not ideal. 
If the NHS is offered a conditional donation, it is faced with a choice: accept the 
donation and help some people (even though this may be unfair), or turn down the 
donation and help nobody. Turning down the donation may preserve fairness, but it 
would be an instance of levelling down.  
10.2.4 Accept any donation – regardless of condition 
By looking at waiting lists and assessing the likely consequences of accepting specific 
donations with conditions attached, the positives and negatives of accepting the 
donation in a particular situation can be best assessed. There is, however, a sense in 
which the positives and negatives are relatively fixed. One obvious positive is that if the 
donation is accepted, some people will receive transplants and lives can be saved or 
improved. One obvious negative is that the organs may be allocated in a way that is 
unfair, unjust or otherwise undesirable. If this positive can, on the basis of reasonable 
background assumptions, be taken to outweigh this negative in all cases, then this 
provides a reason to accept any conditional donation. The negatives of accepting 
conditional donations will be discussed in the final section of this chapter, but it will be 
argued that they are unlikely to outweigh the positives. 
Levelling down was discussed in Chapter 7, where it was argued that levelling 
down is, in some situations, the wrong thing to do. In particular, it was argued by 
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analogy with drowning children in a swimming pool that refusing life-saving offers is 
wrong, even if the offer is only to save some lives (even if the motivation behind the 
choice of lives saved is morally wrong). Applying this to conditional organ donation is 
straight-forward. To turn away a conditional donation is to turn away a life-saving 
resource. Even if it is the case that the organ can only help some people, it is better to 
help these people than nobody. This argument should be convincing by itself, but there 
is an added argument in favour of accepting conditional donations. Everybody on the 
waiting list receives some benefit, so even though the primary benefit may be 
distributed unfairly, even those who are treated unfairly are better off than they would 
have been if the organ was turned away. The person who receives the organ is better 
off because they have received an organ, and the people behind that person on the 
waiting list all move up a place so are also better off. Even the people above the actual 
recipient on the waiting list are better off, since it is better to have fewer people 
competing for available resources.   
10.2.5 Avoiding waste may cause waste 
As discussed, waste can be thought of in two ways – relative and absolute. A 
consequence of accepting conditional donations is that donated organs could be 
allocated contrary to standard medical criteria, and this may result in sub-optimal 
transplant outcomes which can be construed as relative waste. Avoiding absolute waste 
by accepting conditional donations and allocating according to the conditions may 
therefore cause some relative waste. This relative waste, however, in each individual 
case, is less than the absolute waste involved in turning a donation down (since it is a 
loss of some benefit rather than all benefit). If only a minority of donations were 
conditional, then accepting them would prevent more waste than it caused.   
10.2.6 Section Conclusions 
This section has built on the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7, where the ideas of 
negative loss and levelling down were introduced. Accepting conditional donations in 
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the interests of avoiding waste, negative loss and levelling down was supported by 
many participants. Although accepting conditional donations and allocating according to 
the conditions forces a deviation from the usual principles of allocation, and is not an 
ideal situation, the alternative is to refuse to accept the organ, meaning no allocation is 
made to anyone. Saving or improving lives was more important to most participants 
than maintaining a rigid allocation system based on current principles. A similar 
argument was proposed in Chapter 7, which suggested that when the consequences of 
levelling down are that people die, saving lives provides a good reason to avoid 
levelling down. It is therefore argued that, in the light of some participants‘ views, 
regardless of the actual content of the condition, all conditional donations should be 
accepted. Other views of participants have raised some concerns about this proposal, 
however, and these will be discussed in the next section. 
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10.3 Concerns and Barriers 
It has been argued in Chapter 7 that avoiding levelling down and negative loss can 
justify accepting any conditional donation, even if the content of the condition is 
morally objectionable. The previous section in this chapter discussed this in light of 
participants‘ views on waste, and made the same proposal: conditional donations ought 
to be accepted regardless of the specific condition. This is a bold claim, and contrary to 
existing policy and practice. The acceptability of this argument to stakeholders has to 
be carefully considered. Participants in the embedded study raised a number of 
concerns about conditional donations that need to now be considered in light of the 
proposal to accept all conditional donations. Each concern will be considered as a 
potential barrier to permitting conditional donations, and will be assessed to establish 
whether it is insurmountable. It will be argued that although some of the concerns 
suggest measures need to be taken to minimise the potential negative implications of 
conditional donations, they do not provide compelling reasons to prohibit conditional 
donations. 
10.3.1 Recipient views: avoiding negative loss and queue jumping 
An initial potential concern is the views of potential organ recipients. These are 
ultimately the people who would be offered conditional donations, so it is important to 
establish how they would view them. It was argued in Chapter 6 that avoiding negative 
loss can be in the interests of recipients, since it can be said to improve efficiency. 
Prioritising the avoidance of negative loss would entail a form a queue-jumping, and 
some potential recipients may object to this. Although avoiding negative loss may 
appear desirable to a neutral bystander, there may be other concerns for people who 
are waiting for organs. The results of this study suggest that recipients‘ views regarding 
conditional donations were mixed. When asked how they would feel if they were offered 
an organ that had been conditionally donated recipients‘ views varied from a feeling 
that it would be unfair (PR9), to a feeling that one would have to accept it but 
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potentially feel selfish and less deserving (PR1), to simply not caring (PR3). Most 
potential recipients were keen to avoid absolute waste, but this was not universal. 
 The fact that there was not universal support amongst participants does not 
necessarily act as a barrier to conditional donations, but does suggest that some 
recipients personally think that fairness is still an important consideration, possibly 
more important than avoiding negative loss. This may seem like a barrier to permitting 
conditional donations, but could be handled as a matter of personal choice. Potential 
organ recipients are currently permitted to exclude themselves from receiving certain 
organs445, and could add organs which have been offered conditionally or organs with 
specific conditions attached that they find objectionable to this list. They would need to 
be free to reconsider their position periodically, as their state of health may change and 
have an impact upon their willingness to accept some organs. There is, of course, a 
question about whether recipients would need to be told about conditions placed upon 
organs that they received. One participant (PR1) thought that it would just be another 
thing for recipients to worry about and that additional worry was something that they 
could do without. Most other potential recipient participants seemed to assume that 
they would have to be told about any conditions. Assuming donor anonymity could be 
preserved, there would seem to be little harm446 in giving potential recipients the choice 
about whether they were willing to receive organs with specific conditions attached. 
10.3.2 Slippery Slope 
Nearly all the participants were concerned that accepting some conditions or directions 
would be a slippery slope towards accepting all conditional or directed organs. Some 
                                                          
445 Some organs retrieved from marginal donors carry an increased risk of complications or failure post-
transplant. Patients are able to request that they are not offered organs according to certain risk factors. 
NHSBT (2011) 'Guidelines for Consent for Solid Organ Transplantation in Adults', Available at: 
http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/pdf/guidelines_for_consent.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
446 Aside from an additional psychological burden of having to choose whether or not to accept a ‗morally 
dubious‘ donation.   
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participants were worried that even allowing the seemingly morally acceptable directed 
donations as specified in the March 2010 policy revision would be the start of the 
slippery slope leading to less acceptable donations. 
There are two ways of viewing this. First there is the logical slippery slope447, 
that accepting some seemingly acceptable conditional/directed donations logically 
implies accepting any (however objectionable) conditions. As chapters 3-7 have 
argued, however, not all conditions are equal. For instance, the partiality displayed 
between family members is justifiable and acceptable in some instances of organ 
donation, whereas the partiality displayed between members of the same race is not. 
The differences between these donations mean that it is logically consistent to permit 
donations that display familial partiality and to prohibit donations that display racist 
partiality. 
The second way of looking at the slippery slope, called the empirical slippery 
slope448, uses an empirical claim that permitting some seemingly acceptable conditions 
or directions does not necessarily lead to more objectionable conditional donations 
being accepted, but that it probably would. For instance, permitting directed donation 
to family members may result in directed donation to friends being considered 
acceptable and then to friends of friends, and so on. In due course, directed donation to 
strangers of the same race could potentially be permitted, as the concept of conditional 
donation becomes more familiar and routine. The validity of the empirical claim is 
difficult to ascertain without actually trialling conditional and directed donations, but 
recent developments in living donation suggest that there is some basis for thinking it 
may be correct. Over the last few years the HTA has gone from only permitting living 
related (or friend of longstanding) donations, to also allowing altruistic donations to 
strangers. Recently it has been considering the implications of allowing more remote or 
                                                          
447 Van Der Burg W, 'The Slippery Slope Argument', Ethics 102 (1991) p44 
448 Ibid. p51 
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less substantial relationships to count as qualifying relationships, and this has included 
friends of friends, or Facebook friends who have never met outside of the virtual 
world449. While this could be the result of reasoned thought, and is not necessarily a 
slippery slope, it does suggest that the boundaries of what is considered acceptable can 
have a tendency to expand. 
While participants in the study were concerned about slippery slopes, their 
concerns were based on the premise that some conditions are more acceptable than 
others, and that allowing some conditions may lead to less morally acceptable ones 
also being permitted. It has been argued in this chapter, however, that there are good 
reasons to allow any condition so long as it results in organs being donated that 
otherwise would not be. In effect, what some people considered the peril at the end of 
the slippery slope (accepting objectionable conditions) must now be considered at the 
top of another slippery slope. This therefore raises the question of what the perilous 
consequences of accepting any condition could be. An undesirable scenario that could 
occur if all conditional donations were permitted is that the majority of those who would 
otherwise have donated unconditionally now donate conditionally making most or all 
donations conditional. This could reduce access to organs for certain types of people, 
cause a loss of faith in the transplantation system and result in fewer organs being 
donated. Although it is not clear that this would happen, it is certainly something that 
requires consideration - accepting conditional donations has the potential to have 
negative consequences as well as positive ones, so careful data monitoring would be 
required to detect changing patterns of donation at the earliest stage. If conditional 
donation looked likely to result in largely reduced transplant efficiency, then the reason 
to permit it would be undermined.  
                                                          
449 Human Tissue Authority (2011) 'Review of the Year', Available at: 
http://www.hta.gov.uk/newsandevents/htaevents.cfm/993-Public-Authority-meeting-and-review-of-the-year-
2011.html, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
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In summary: the logical slippery slope argument against conditional and 
directed donation does not provide a sound argument against permitting at least some 
forms of conditional and directed donations. A potential slide to the overwhelmingly 
frequent conditional donation is at least plausible, but a lack of empirical evidence 
makes it difficult to assess this risk. The potential threat does, however, provide a 
reason to carefully monitor the impact that conditional donations have if it is thought 
that they may result in widespread undesirable patterns of allocation. 
10.3.3 Conditions arise from lack of understanding 
Many participants, particularly transplant staff, thought that conditional donations 
generally arise due to a lack of understanding about organ donation and allocation. 
When asked how transplant staff should handle conditional offers of donation, it was 
often suggested, by all types of participant, that transplant coordinators should counsel 
the family and explain how organ allocation works, and why it is important that organs 
are donated unconditionally. Many staff participants thought that doing this would help 
donor families to see why conditional donations are undesirable (see Chapter 7) and 
would help them to change their mind and donate unconditionally. This would be a way 
to avoid both absolute and relative waste without compromising other principles, which 
on the face of it would be preferable to accepting conditional donations. 
Some staff felt that nobody in possession of full knowledge about organ 
allocation would want to donate their organs conditionally. Whether this is true is not 
known. Certainly,lack of knowledge and understanding of organ donation, allocation 
and transplantation has often been suggested as a key factor in people choosing to not 
donate their organs450. Campaigns aimed at segments of society with relatively low 
donation rates have traditionally focussed on raising awareness and providing 
information. Clearly some conditions may reflect a lack of understanding about organ 
                                                          
450 Morgan S and Miller J, 'Communicating About Gifts of Life: The Effect of Knowledge, Attitudes, and 
Altruism on Behavior and Behavioral Intentions Regarding Organ Donation', Journal of Applied 
Communication Research 30 (2002) pp163-78 
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allocation, for instance individuals excluding alcoholics on the basis that alcoholics 
would waste the organs may not be aware that unreformed alcoholics are already 
excluded from the transplant list. In this case, explaining the listing process may 
persuade the donor/donor family to donate unconditionally, which would be the ideal 
situation. 
Not all conditions, however, necessarily stem from a misunderstanding of the 
process, and the specific examples mentioned at the start of this chapter illustrate this. 
Wanting to prioritise people who are not responsible for their illness, for example, need 
not arise from a misunderstanding of organ allocation, and may instead represent an 
individual donor‘s views on responsibility. Explaining organ allocation processes in this 
instance may have no impact on their wishes. Similarly, deeply-held racist beliefs are 
unlikely to be challenged by more information or education about organ donation and 
there may be little that could be done to convince them to donate unconditionally. 
Convincing racists of the wrongs of their fundamental belief, which may be what it 
takes to change their views, is not the responsibility of transplant staff451. 
 The extent to which transplant staff ought to try to convince donor families to 
change their mind about donating conditionally raises its own difficulties, as there is a 
fine line between persuasion and coercion452. Elsewhere it has been stated that 
―persuasion aims to enlist the patient's reason by providing information and coercion 
aims to manipulate the patient's decision by influences which undermine independent 
reasoning‖453. If handled sensitively and with compassion, it would seem reasonable for 
transplant staff to at least explain the reasons why unconditional donation is generally 
desirable and to correct any obvious misunderstandings about organ allocation. 
                                                          
451 Indeed it could be contrary to the NHS constitution: ―We value each person as an individual, respect their 
aspirations and commitments in life, and seek to understand their priorities, needs, abilities and limits. We 
take what others have to say seriously‖ NHS (2012) Available at: 
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Documents/nhs-constitution-
interactive-version-march-2012.pdf, Last Accessed: 31/10/2012  
452 It also raises questions about the role of SNODs and whether their overriding concern/loyalty should be to 
the donor and donor family or to transplantation more generally. 
453 Gillett GR, 'Informed Consent and Moral Integrity', Journal of Medical Ethics 15 (1989) p118 
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Although unconditional donations may be desirable, this outcome has to be balanced 
against the potential for causing additional distress to individuals who are already in 
emotionally taxing circumstances. If the next-of-kin are, having been given additional 
information, unwilling to donate unconditionally, then the conditional donation ought to 
be accepted. 
10.3.4 Furthering Wrongful Ends 
Chapter 7 explored whether in accepting condition and directed donation, the NHS may 
be furthering wrongful ends. Participants did not explicitly mention wrongful ends, but 
some participants were concerned that the NHS could be perceived to be ‗getting its 
hands dirty‘ if it became involved in conditional donations.  
If the NHS accepts a conditional donation and facilitates the discriminatory 
wishes of a racist, for instance, it would be furthering a wrongful end, insofar as it is 
active in manifesting a racist outcome. One could argue that in order to ‗keep its hands 
clean‘ the NHS ought to reject such a donation but it should be borne in mind that in 
doing so the racist donor‘s wishes are still partially fulfilled: turning down the donation 
also means that members of the undesirable-to-the-donor race do not receive those 
organs. The racist donor has deprived a certain race of a transplant, and the NHS has 
ensured that every race has been deprived of a transplant. In effect, as soon as a 
conditional donation has been offered, the NHS is placed in a position where it has to 
act. Not accepting a donation is still acting – it is not merely an omission – so the NHS 
must consider the consequences of doing so. One might argue that if a conditional 
donation is accepted, the NHS has to then do more to further the wrongful ends – the 
wrong is not specifically in the acceptance, but instead lies in allocating organs 
according to the conditions (assuming that the conditions are morally wrong). However, 
if the condition was formulated in a negative sense (the donation will go ahead on the 
condition that people of type x are not allocated the organs), turning away the donation 
ensures that the condition is still met. This unwanted effect may provide an additional 
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reason to further the wrongful end by accepting the donation. If a wrongful end is going 
to be furthered regardless of whether the donation is accepted or not, then it is 
reasonable to choose the course of action that also brings about the most good.   
Permitting conditional and directed donations could introduce unfairness into the 
allocation process, but it would not be NHSBT introducing it – rather it would be the 
individuals placing the conditions or directions. One participant commented that 
‗decisions are made on the basis of what your options are‘ (PD6), and although it is 
obvious, it also makes a useful point. If the NHS was to accept a donation with some 
objectionable conditions attached to it – racist conditions, for instance – and then 
allocated the organs according to the conditions, should the NHS be considered to be 
racist? Certainly the donor‘s wishes may be, but as far as the NHS is concerned, this 
could just be considered a narrowing of options. Sometimes organs are only medically 
suitable for certain recipients. If an organ is donated that, by virtue of tissue-matching, 
is only suitable for people of a certain race, the NHS would not be acting partially or 
unfairly if it allocated the organ to somebody of that race. The allocation to a certain 
race would be because of the nature of the organ. Similarly, conditions attached to a 
donation could be considered to change the nature of the organs. There is agency 
involved in the placing of racist conditions, whereas there is not in tissue-matching, but 
the agency is the donor‘s or next-of-kin‘s – the NHS is would merely be allocating 
according to the options available to it with that specific organ. 
If the NHS allocates according to the options available, it is bringing about the 
best outcomes from a non-ideal situation. There is, quite clearly, the possibility that the 
NHS‘s actions could be wrongly interpreted by the public. If its reasons for accepting 
conditional donations are clear, it distances itself from the objectionable aspects of the 
donation, and it has made reasonable attempts to obtain an unconditional donation, it 
would be unfair to accuse the NHS of acting in a racist or otherwise discriminatory way. 
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Although the NHS can legitimately claim to have ‗clean hands‘, it is likely to have to 
take active measures to make this clear to the public. 
10.3.5 Staff views on waste 
Staff participants‘ viewed waste and life-saving slightly differently from non-staff 
participants. Although they still generally thought that it was a shame that medically 
useable but conditional donations might be refused and absolutely wasted, many 
viewed this as being necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the system. One 
participant said: 
our society at the moment is prepared to pay the price of losing the occasional 
organ in this situation because of the, you know, the greater good and the 
overriding principle [greatest need] – TS3 
Whether occasionally turning away donated organs serves the greater good is 
open to speculation;  it seems prima facie mistaken to think that turning away a rare 
and potentially life-saving resource can be good at all, but the broader impact of 
accepting conditional donations is unknown454. The medical needs of those who require 
transplants may be better met, in some circumstances, by accepting donations that 
would otherwise be turned away. Despite this participant‘s assertion that society is 
prepared to pay the price of losing occasional organs, many other participants 
considered this to be waste and not a price worth paying to preserve the principle of 
greatest need and fair allocation.   
One reason for the difference between staff and non-staff views here may be 
that staff are more concerned about the need to maintain public faith in the 
donation/allocation systems, and fear that public perceptions of unfairness may lead to 
decreased donation rates. Trust is often cited as being of paramount importance to the 
                                                          
454 Radcliffe-Richards J, (2012) op. cit.  
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success of the organ donation system, and staff were understandably concerned about 
the implications of something they felt could reduce public trust.    
For staff, the best way to avoid the absolute waste of turning away conditional 
donations was to convince the next-of-kin to donate unconditionally. Failing this, staff 
generally viewed the resulting negative loss as a necessary evil to preserve public faith 
in the system. This view certainly needs taking seriously, as it is possible that accepting 
conditional donations would reduce faith in the transplant system; this rests, however, 
upon an empirical claim, the accuracy of which is unknown. Although the accuracy of 
the empirical claim is unknown, one can still weigh up the risks involved. This links 
closely to the ideas of transparency and perceived fairness, which will now be 
discussed. 
10.3.6 Transparency and perceived fairness 
Participants generally considered it important that organ allocation is a transparent 
process, and there appeared to be an implied link between transparency and fairness – 
specifically that a transparent system is more likely to be a fair system.  
 Research conducted in the USA has suggested that transparency and perceived 
fairness is linked to willingness to donate organs; the greater an individual‘s 
understanding of the transplant system and greater their perception of fairness, the 
more likely they are to be willing to donate their organs455. The healthcare system in 
the USA is clearly very different to that in the UK, and there are some different issues 
in play (like unequal access to healthcare) but it would seem reasonable to think that 
the same links between transparency, perceived fairness and willingness to donate 
could be drawn in the UK.  
If a perception of fairness affects donation rates, then one needs to consider 
how transparency may affect perception of fairness. It is useful to draw a distinction 
                                                          
455 Boulware LE et al., (2007) op. cit. pp1778-87 
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between transparency and understandability. A transparent process could be 
completely incomprehensible to lay members of the public due to its complexities. If 
the process was assessed, monitored and regulated by trustworthy, independent and 
appropriate people/organisations who did understand the process, then this could still 
be regarded as transparent and perceived as fair if the appropriate people declared that 
it was. It seems likely that a desire for transparency is partly to ensure that nothing 
underhand can go on ‗behind closed doors‘. Transparency on this level does not require 
the public to understand the process, but does require a willingness to defer to 
expertise. Transparency could be further enhanced if processes are more readily 
understandable, as this would remove the need for deference to expertise, and more 
people would be able to assess the fairness of processes themselves if they wished to. 
Persad et al state that in order for an allocation system to be perceived as legitimate, it 
ought to be ―publicly understandable, accessible, and subject to public discussion and 
revision‖456.   
Organ allocation in the UK is transparent insofar as allocation policies are 
publically available on the NHSBT website457, and these are devised in an open way. 
Organ allocation, however, is a complex process which is often articulated using 
technical language. Allocation can be explained in simplified terms such as ‗best match‘ 
and ‗greatest need‘, but this can result in simplification that obscures relevant details 
(such as what ‗greatest need‘ means). Allocation in the UK is, then, transparent but 
unlikely to be fully understood by many. If transparency and understandability are 
important, one has to consider the impact of permitting conditional donations. 
Conditional donations need not have a negative impact upon transparency or 
understandability, if handled correctly. If the NHS was found, in several years time, to 
have been secretly allocating organs according to clearly non-medical criteria based 
                                                          
456 Persad G, Wertheimer A, and Emanuel EJ, 'Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions', The 
Lancet 373 (2009) p429 
457 NHSBT 'Organ Allocation', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/about_transplants/organ_allocation/organ_allocation.asp, Last 
Accessed: 23/10/2012  
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upon race, sexuality or responsibility for condition, one might expect there to be a 
backlash and reduced trust in the system. But this would be because the NHS had 
failed to be open and transparent about its allocation policies. If, in contrast, the NHS 
anonymously published details of all conditions placed on donations every month and 
how these affected allocation, this would be open and transparent. 
Permitting conditional donations would not appear to make organ allocation any 
less understandable either. It might even make it more understandable if the public 
knew that a recipient had been given higher priority due to meeting a simple condition 
as opposed to a complex combination of tissue matching, waiting time and prognosis. 
A transparent system is not necessarily a fair system, and a fair system need 
not be transparent or readily understandable – but perhaps having a transparent 
system is likely to lead to a fair system since the people who set allocation principles 
are aware that their policies can be scrutinised. Introducing conditional donations could 
result in people perceiving the system as unfair, if as a result of its willingness to 
accept conditional donations, they thought that the NHS was engaging in discriminatory 
practices. This is a significant concern. If perceived fairness affects the motivation to 
donation, then it is obviously important to avoid things that reduce perceived fairness. 
It has been argued in 7.8 that the NHS need not be considered to be acting wrongly by 
accepting conditional donations, but there is still a risk that even after a full explanation 
of why conditional donations are accepted, the public could perceive the NHS as acting 
wrongly and unfairly. It has been argued that this perception would be mistaken, but it 
still has to be taken seriously, as it is perceived unfairness rather than actual unfairness 
that will affect donation rates.  
If handled correctly, permitting conditional and directed donations need not pose 
a threat to transparency or understandability, so this does not provide reasons to 
prohibit them. There is, however, a possibility that accepting conditional donations may 
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create a perception of unfairness surrounding organ allocation, and this could have 
subsequent effects upon donation rates. Careful monitoring of public attitudes towards 
donation, and any fluctuations in donation rates, would therefore be necessary to 
ensure that the justification for accepting conditional donations (that they increase the 
number of organs available for transplantation) still held true.  
10.3.7 Introducing non-medical factors 
Most participants, though aware of other factors that could be used to allocate organs, 
were reluctant to endorse a system based upon anything other than medical criteria. 
Many participants viewed medical criteria as providing objectivity, and there was a 
concern that allowing donors to specify the types of people who could receive their 
organs would introduce non-medical factors into allocation decisions. There was a 
desire to keep non-medical factors out of medical practices. 
A systematic review by Tong et al included 15 studies examining community 
preferences for the allocation of organs for transplantation458. The reviewers identified 
seven themes underlying community preferences: maximum benefit, social value, 
moral deservingness, prejudice, fair innings, first come – first served and medical 
urgency. These findings contrast with the views of participants in the embedded study, 
who generally wanted to keep factors such as moral deservingness and social value out 
of allocation decisions.  
Non-medical factors do, however, already play a significant role in organ 
allocation. As Veatch points out, allocation of resources such as organs is unavoidably a 
moral issue459. A superficially objective measure upon which to base allocation could be 
transplant benefit, so that people likely to accrue the most transplant benefit will 
receive priority for transplants. The problem is that transplant benefit is not something 
that can be determined purely from medical data:  
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459 Veatch RM, (2000) op. cit. p279 
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[o]ne patient may have the greatest chance of survival of acute illness, another 
may have the greatest predicted years of survival; still another may receive the 
greatest relief from suffering or morbidity; and another get the most 
satisfaction. Medical facts alone cannot tell us which of these patients will 
benefit the most from transplant.460 
While it may be possible to argue that one of these patients will experience the 
greatest transplant benefit, this argument will rely on the balancing of several non-
medical claims such as whether avoiding pain is more or less important than having the 
longest possible life. Given this, the claim that medical data alone can provide a 
carefully considered allocation system seems much weaker. Like Veatch, Parsad et al 
point out that allocation cannot be based upon purely clinical facts, and that although 
these can provide information about current condition and prognosis ―responding to 
these facts requires ethical, value-based judgments‖461. 
There was a lack of awareness amongst the participants in the embedded study 
about the role that non-medical criteria already play in allocation based upon medical 
criteria, and this was present across all groups including transplant staff. This belief in 
the objectivity of allocation appeared to be a key reason why most participants were 
reluctant to see an allocation system that routinely deviated from medical allocation.  
Given that non-medical factors already feature in allocation decisions, 
participants‘ concerns here do not provide a convincing objection to conditional 
donations. Conditional donations may give certain non-medical factors additional 
weight, which could result in allocation contrary to usual allocation policy, but this could 
be justified on the grounds of avoiding absolute waste/negative loss. It is better to 
allocate contrary to usual allocation policy in exceptional circumstances than it would be 
to not allocate the offered organs at all. 
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10.3.8 No room for emotion 
Closely linked to the reluctance for non-medical factors to influence allocation was that 
allocation decisions should be based on rationality rather than emotions. Participants 
generally displayed sympathy for the individuals in the interview scenarios, and could 
understand their reasons for wanting to place conditions. Most participants thought, 
however, that conditions were likely to be irrational emotional responses to the 
traumatic situations that they found themselves in, and that these should have no 
bearing on organ allocation. 
One explanation for rejecting supposedly irrational and emotional responses 
could be they introduce irrelevant considerations into allocation and that this would bias 
the system making it unfair. Ordinarily it is possible to draw a distinction between 
organ donation and organ allocation: a decision to donate organs may not be entirely 
rational, but so long as the donation is unconditional, the organs can still be allocated 
according to rational criteria. Conditional donation blurs the boundaries between the 
donation and allocation decisions. It is not obvious that all donation decisions are 
completely rational, since they occur at a time of (normally sudden) bereavement and 
emotional turmoil. They are unlikely to be completely irrational, but it is likely that 
emotion will be high in many donation situations.  
As a barrier to conditional donation, objection to emotion affecting allocation 
decisions is not impossible to overcome. In an ideal situation, organs would be donated 
unconditionally and emotional factors would be kept out of the allocation of organs462. 
If, in some situations, a donation can only go ahead if emotional or irrational factors 
are taken into account, then, as discussed, the donation can be accepted and allocated 
according to the conditions in the interests of avoiding waste/negative loss.  
 
                                                          
462 Emotion could, of course, play a significant role in choosing to donate unconditionally. One could, for 
emotional reasons, want emotions to not influence which recipient is chosen. 
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10.3.9 Who am I to Judge? 
Although many participants from all groups were willing to specify types of people who, 
in principle, they considered less deserving of transplants, very few participants 
actually thought that organs should be allocated according to their own views on 
desert: they felt they were not in a position to cast judgment. The ‗who am I to judge‘ 
view was used in two ways. The first way reflected an acknowledgement that different 
people have different beliefs, and that using one‘s personal beliefs to decide who is 
worthy of receiving a transplant would be wrong. The second way was simply that a 
lack of information about specific circumstances would render accurate judgment 
impossible. 
Who am I to judge - Playing God 
 Some participants likened making judgments about who ought to receive 
transplants to ‗playing God‘, or having a ‗life and death panel‘. There appeared to be a 
concern that these decisions ought not to be based on the views of individuals, or even 
groups of individuals. Pennings makes a similar claim, stating that: 
 
 We allow people to decide what to do with their time and money but we do not 
allow people to decide who will live and who will die. That decision is, like 
decisions regarding the spending of health care resources, a choice that has to 
be negotiated within society.463 
 
Someone has to choose who lives and dies: the important questions are whether 
placing conditions on a donation amounts to choosing who lives or dies, and if so, 
whether it is right for individuals to make these decisions. First, it may be helpful to 
consider living donations, where directed donation to family members is the norm. In 
living donation, one can choose to donate one‘s kidney to one‘s sibling, even if it means 
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that the most urgent patient on the transplant waiting list is overlooked. There are not 
any calls to prohibit directed living donation on the grounds that donors can choose 
whose life to save. This may, however, only show that it is acceptable to choose a 
relative over a stranger, rather than one stranger over another. In deceased donation, 
one can choose to donate some organs but not others – this could be construed as 
choosing what sort of people to save or not save (insofar as one might choose to save 
people who need a heart transplant, but not those who need a liver transplant). Again, 
however, this is not an example of an individual choosing one stranger over another for 
a particular resource. Pennings appears to suggest that it is because the stakes are so 
high that these decisions should not be made by individuals – this is presumably why 
he differentiates between time/money and saving lives. If allocating an organ to one 
person over another, or many others, on the basis of individual preferences is 
objectionable, then perhaps it should be considered objectionable for individuals to 
have any say over whether their organs are donated at all. If choosing one person over 
another is construed as choosing that the other potential recipients will die, then 
choosing to not donate at all should be construed as choosing that all potential 
recipients of one‘s various viable organs will die. By the same token, choosing to not 
accept conditional donation would be choosing for all potential recipients of that organ 
to die.    
It is also worth noting that although there are policies that fairly rigidly 
determine how organs are allocated, and to some extent these could be considered to 
‗automate‘ the process, it is wrong to think that individuals are therefore not choosing 
who lives and dies. The policies are created by people, and people agree to be bound 
by them. This still, however, involves judgement, and someone ultimately has to act as 
judge. Whether a transplant will go ahead for a particular patient depends upon the 
transplant surgeon. Participants‘ reluctance to be the judge might reflect a moral stand 
against such judgement having to be made (which would seem unreasonable since the 
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only way to avoid such a judgement when the demand for an indivisible resource is 
greater than supply is to not give the resource to anyone). Alternatively it might reflect 
an unwillingness to make those kinds of decisions, and a desire to have someone else 
do it so that they do not feel personally responsible.  Indeed, there is a sense in which 
this latter explanation might form a central part of participants‘ general desire to rely 
on an objective system of medical allocation criteria.  Whether intentional or not, the 
use of, and reliance on, an external and objective set of decision-making tools serves to 
distance the individual from the decision and moral responsibility for the allocation. 
Who am I to judge - Factual Accuracy 
The second way in which ‗who am I to judge‘ was used has significant overlap with 
another concern – factual accuracy. The most common objection to the donations 
featured in the interview scenarios was that the conditions may be based on factually 
incorrect beliefs. For example, many participants suggested that not all people under 
25 are irresponsible and not everyone over 25 are responsible. This is perhaps the most 
obvious objection to the restrictions placed in the scenarios, but it links with ideas 
about fairness and wrongly excluding potential recipients. The objection is not about 
the placing of conditions, but more about outcomes. If a person under 25 who happens 
to be responsible was excluded from receiving a transplant because a donor had 
specified that they only wanted responsible people (in this case the donor believed that 
only people over the age of 25 are responsible), then that potential recipient would be 
excluded on the basis of something factually incorrect. 
This finding is interesting because objections to conditional donation in the 
ethical literature tend to focus on the use of morally irrelevant considerations being 
used to allocate scarce resources, rather than the practical application of the irrelevant 
consideration. The main objection from participants in this study was not that a 
condition may be irrelevant, but that it may be incorrect. This concern led some 
participants to claim that conditions they thought were morally relevant (such as 
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responsibility for illness) should never be acted upon because of the risk of applying 
them incorrectly. Some participants were concerned that it is difficult to ascertain 
causal responsibility for illness, and that this may therefore result in people being held 
wrongly responsible. 
This does again provide a consideration that has to be taken seriously in cases 
of conditional donation. One can imagine a situation where a patient becomes aware 
that they are being wrongly excluded from receiving an organ on the basis of 
something factually incorrect. Not only would this be unfair (with the consequent 
potential for negative media stories), but there could also be legal implications. 
Individuals might consider legal action against the NHS if they felt that they had been 
incorrectly excluded. There are two ways in which this sort of error could be made. 
First, if the donor had placed a condition based upon factually incorrect assumptions. 
Second, given the relatively short window of opportunity in which organs can be 
allocated and transplanted, the NHS may be unable to ensure that some recipients do 
or do not meet the donor‘s criteria. This does not provide a reason to not allow 
conditional donations, however. Patients willing to accept organs that had been 
conditionally donated could perhaps have to agree in advance that they accepted that 
conditions could be based upon factually incorrect assumptions, and that there was a 
possibility in mistakes being made at the time of allocation.  
Although participants may feel uneasy about the idea of ‗life and death panels‘ 
or individuals making decisions about who lives and dies, this is already the unfortunate 
reality of organ allocation and determining who is placed on or removed from transplant 
waiting lists. If these decisions were made on the basis of conditions attached to 
donations, it is true that factors other than those ordinarily used may be considered. 
The importance of avoiding negative loss and absolute waste, however, would suggest 
that although it is not ideal for irrelevant factors to be considered, it is better than 
turning down the offered organs. 
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 The potential for factual inaccuracy is almost unavoidable when conditions are 
placed on donations that consider things like past behaviour and responsibility for 
illness. Because terms like this are vague, there is room for generous interpretation, 
which could allow flexibility during allocation. This might allow organs to be allocated 
closer to the standard principles, but would also introduce a risk of the next-of-kin 
perceiving their conditions to have been ignored. A condition specifying that people 
under 25 should not receive the organs is, in practice, more concrete than a condition 
stating that those responsible for their own illness should not receive the organs. 
Although this raises concerns, they are not insurmountable. Next-of-kin could be 
disgruntled if they felt their wishes were not followed accurately, but it could be 
explained to them that there is a risk that this could happen. Potential recipients may 
also justifiably be disgruntled by individual injustices, but hopefully they would see that 
the gains of accepting conditional donations outweigh the negatives.  
10.3.10 Impartiality 
The partiality in living donation allocation decisions was supported by many 
participants, yet impartiality was generally felt to be desirable in deceased donation. 
This presents a potential barrier to conditional donation, since conditional donations 
tend to reflect partiality. Sometimes this partiality is morally acceptable, but other 
times (racist preferences being a prime example), it clearly is not.  
 This barrier may be overcome by considering who is expected to be impartial. It 
would be wrong for transplant staff to allocate organs according to their own partial 
preferences: some people have a duty as part of their institutional role to remain 
impartial464, this ought to apply to medical staff employed by a publically-funded state 
institution to serve a diverse public. There is a potential tension between impartiality 
and conditional donation; the conditions imposed could require transplant staff to 
behave in a way that suggests partiality in contradiction to their obligation to be 
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impartial. The partiality in question would probably not the agent-relative partiality of 
the transplant staff; instead it would be the partiality of the donor or her next-of-kin. 
 It is not always considered wrong for transplant staff to act in accordance with 
the partiality of donors. Wilkinson suggests that one of the reasons organ 
donation/allocation is associated with impartiality is the involvement of the state (and 
NHS in the UK), but he also states that this link cannot be consistently applied due to 
the partiality considered acceptable in living donation465. If it is acceptable for 
transplant staff to facilitate partiality in living donation, staff are not consistently 
required to act impartially.  
Cronin and Price state that once an organ is donated after death it ―slips into the 
net of public resource and impartial allocation‖466, and the view that deceased organ 
allocation is impartial is relatively commonplace. Often partiality in organ donation is 
discussed as a contrast between the partiality generally present in living donation and 
the impartiality present in deceased donation. Impartiality is also sometimes required in 
living donation in cases of altruistic donation, and partiality is sometimes permitted in 
deceased donation. This is evidenced in the March 2010 policy revision permitting 
requested directed allocation of organs, which permits staff to facilitate directed 
donation that reflect partiality for family and friends. That impartiality and partiality are 
both sometimes required in living and deceased donation suggests that there is nothing 
special about a donor being alive that requires partiality in all cases, and nothing 
special about a donor being dead that requires impartiality in all cases.  
A distinction drawn in Chapter 7 was between impartial principles and impartially 
justified allocations. This is an idea discussed by Wilkinson467. An impartial principle 
might be to allocate organs according to greatest need, with the person in greatest 
need being defined as the person in most imminent danger of death. Yet rigidly using 
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466 Cronin AJ and Price D, (2008) 'Directed Organ Donation: Is the Donor the Owner?' op. cit. p129 
467 Wilkinson TM, (2012) op. cit.  
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this principle, and rejecting any organs that cannot be allocated according to it, may 
result in need not being met as well as if the conditional donations had been accepted. 
If it is impartially important to meet need, and accepting conditional donation meets 
need better than rejecting them, then one ought to accept the conditional donations.  
As discussed in section 2.3.2 and 4.5, some forms of partiality expressed by 
conditional donation are morally legitimate and can, according to Wilkinson, be 
considered impartially defensible (and were considered acceptable by many 
participants). Although impartiality in organ allocation may generally be desirable (for 
the same reasons that it is desirable to have unconditional donations – see 7.2), 
allowing partiality in some circumstances can help to achieve an end that it is 
impartially desirable. In the case of conditional organ donation, that end is saving or 
improving more lives.  
10.3.11 Fairness and Justice 
Participants seemed to consider fairness in three ways: overall fairness of distribution, 
fairness of each allocation, and fairness from the donor family‘s perspective. The 
concerns relating to overall fairness of distribution were not based on equality as such, 
but were more about organs being allocated using the right factors (and ‗right‘ was 
mostly construed as the medical factors that currently guide allocation). The general 
view seemed to be that so long as these factors were used, nobody could reasonably 
complain about organ allocation being unfair.   
 As an argument against conditional donation, fairness may appear superficially 
convincing. Although there is debate within philosophy over what fairness entails, it 
would seem reasonable to think that conditional donations risk compromising it.  Carr 
gives a non-exhaustive list of conceptions of fairness containing ideas such as not 
disadvantaging others, being unbiased and impartial, adhering to rules and treating 
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equal cases equally468. In comparison to unconditional donations, conditional donations 
are likely to disadvantage others469, be biased and partial, promote inconsistent 
allocation rules and treat equal cases differently on the basis of irrelevant 
considerations. If fairness is particularly important, conditional donations may be 
unacceptable. 
 Given that organs are a scarce and, split livers aside, indivisible resource, a 
strictly fair way to treat people (insofar as it treats everybody exactly equally) would be 
to not give organs to anybody. This would require a demanding account of fairness and 
would be levelling down to the extreme. This would be an undesirable situation though, 
as it would rank absolute fairness above all other considerations, which would benefit 
nobody.  
Wilkinson discusses the idea of fairness with some clarity, suggesting that one 
fair way to handle allocation would be to have a queue based upon substantive fairness 
criteria, such as ensuring that recipients wait the same amount of time for 
transplants470. As Wilkinson points out, the waiting list systems in most countries, 
including the UK, take other factors into account, such as urgency and transplant 
benefit. The presence of these other factors may be contrary to strict fairness, but they 
promote life-saving as a consideration. If this can be the case for these factors, a 
concern for fairness should arguably not stand in the way of the potential for the 
additional lifesaving that could be gained by accepting conditional donations rather than 
refusing them. Just as abandoning transplantation altogether would be levelling down, 
so would turning away a conditional donation that could not be allocated fairly. If an 
organ is made available in such a way that it can be donated fairly, then it ought to be. 
But if the available options are to allocate the organ unfairly or not allocate the organ 
                                                          
468 Carr CL, 'On Fairness', (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) p2 
469 Although accepting conditional donations benefits everybody on transplant waiting lists, one might argue 
that because the wrong factors may be used to allocate organs, the wrong people receive the most benefits. 
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at all, it seems reasonable to accept some compromise in fairness in order to promote 
life-saving.   
 Some participants‘ conception of fairness took into account non-medical factors, 
such as how recipients have lived their life, and their likely future behaviour. This was 
both backwards and forwards looking, but was more to do with individual 
deservingness than overall fairness. On this account of fairness, if a patient does not 
deserve an organ, then it is unfair if they receive one. There is room for disagreement 
about what deserving an organ entails; for some participants, simply needing an organ 
was enough, whereas a minority of participants brought in factors such as past and 
future behaviour, which itself raises issues of fairness. This idea of fairness can work for 
or against conditional donation. On the one hand, if one thinks that deserving an organ 
is related to past and future behaviour, then conditions relating to this could serve to 
enhance fairness. Equally, however, if one construes deserving a transplant as simply 
needing a transplant, then bringing in other factors may make allocation less fair.  
 One participant viewed fairness quite differently from others, saying: 
  
I suppose the only fair way of doing it would be for the person actually donating 
their organ erm to specify where they would like it to go – PD2 
 
 This participant was discussing this in the context of giving everyone equal 
opportunity to place conditions on donation. This appears to view fairness as being a 
concern for donors rather than the outcomes of organ allocation.  It seems more 
concerned with treating donors equally and giving them ‗fair‘ control over their organs. 
Although allowing people to specify the recipients of their organs may introduce 
unfairness into the distribution of organs, it could be considered fair insofar as all 
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donors/donor families would be given the same opportunity to allocate their organs in 
this way.   
 Fairness certainly needs to be taken seriously, given the link between perceived 
fairness and the motivation for donation. If conditional donations remained the 
exception, rather than the rule, overall fairness of allocation would not be significantly 
compromised, and any loss of fairness could be justified by an increase in life-saving or 
life-improving transplants. The two alternative views of fairness put forward by 
participants are not convincing. The first of these, which takes into account non-medical 
factors, is vulnerable to the same criticism as overall fairness; a compromise in fairness 
(however conceived) for one donation may promote other desirable outcomes. The final 
conception of fairness was as an issue for the donor family. Allowing conditional 
donation would be fair insofar as anyone could have the opportunity to place 
conditions, but this does not really speak for or against allowing conditional donations. 
   
10.3.12 Urgency and loss of life 
Allocating organs according to the conditions placed by donors or their next-of-kin 
would mean that organs might not be available for those with most urgent need. The 
interference of conditional donation on allocation according to urgency emerged as a 
theme from the interviews. The urgency discussed by participants was related to loss of 
life, rather than any other sort of urgency (participants did not mention within this 
context, for instance, the urgent need for somebody with terrible quality of life to 
receive treatment to make their life bearable).   
Under the March 2010 policy that permits requests for directed allocation to 
family members471, urgency is given a pre-emptory role. If there is someone on a 
transplant waiting list who as classified as ‗super urgent‘472, then that person will be 
                                                          
471 Department of Health (2010) op. cit.  
472 This is the highest priority category, and generally refers to people who will die unless they receive a 
transplant promptly. 
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given priority over the specified directed recipient. A donor is allowed to direct their 
donation provided doing so is unlikely to cause another potential recipient to die as a 
result of missing out on that organ. These donations are not, however, strictly 
conditional, so the donation goes ahead on the understanding that the request for 
direction may or may not be followed. This allows urgency to have a trumping status 
over family partiality, which is in contrast to living related donation where urgency 
plays no role and the organ is given to the individual indentified by the donor, 
regardless of their place on the waiting list, and regardless of whether someone else 
could have benefitted more (by having their life saved). 
Organs being generally allocated according to urgency is desirable, because it 
minimises the number of people who die while waiting for a transplant. Since the 
introduction of MELD/UKELD rankings (a measure of urgency) for liver allocation, for 
instance, mortality on transplant waiting lists has generally reduced473. Although the 
DH‘s policy for requested directed allocation of organs is clever because it allows 
urgency to be a trumping factor (so to some extent allows partiality to family members 
and the impartial, greatest need principles that drive deceased organ donation to 
coexist), it offers little assistance when an offer of organs is truly conditional. Indeed, 
according to this policy, truly conditional donations must still be rejected.  
This, again, amounts to levelling down. If one assumes that fairness dictates 
that those with the most urgent need for a transplant are given priority, then it is 
obviously desirable that the most urgent patients receive transplants first so that they 
can avoid death. If no organs at all are donated in time, it is unfortunate but not unfair. 
If no organs suitable for these patients are donated in time, it is again unfortunate, but 
not unfair. If organs are donated that are suitable for these patients, but cannot be 
allocated to them due to conditions attached, this is again unfortunate. There is 
                                                          
473 Neuberger J, (2011) 'Transplant Benefit in Liver Transplantation: Right Time or Too Premature?' op. cit. 
p82 
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perhaps an argument to suggest that this is also unfair, since there is nothing inherent 
to the physical nature of the organs that makes them unsuitable for the most urgent 
patients. As far as the NHS is concerned, however, it is unable to allocate the organs to 
the most urgent patients; it is not as if it has the option but is choosing not to. It is 
certainly unfortunate that organs with conditions attached cannot always be allocated 
to the most urgent patients, but this does not provide a reason to not accept the 
donation and allocate according to the conditions. 
10.3.13 Donor Motivation -  Altruism 
Although deceased donation is (according to the DH) supposed to be altruistic, there 
was some disagreement and confusion amongst participants about what altruism is. 
Most participants were unable or unwilling to engage with the concept on a technical 
level, so the collected data cannot add much to a technical discussion of altruism. This 
may not be surprising, given the complex and nebulous nature of the concept. 
Transplant staff (more so than other groups) generally felt it was important that organ 
donation was altruistic, but their conception of altruism seemed to be specific to 
transplantation, featuring phrases such as ‗freely given‘ that do not occur in 
philosophical definitions but are a feature of DH policy documents474. 
 One staff participant suggested that donors/donor families do not know that 
deceased donation is supposed to be altruistic: 
people don‟t know that donation‟s supposed to be altruistic, they‟re doing it for 
the reasons they want to do it for, so I think I‟m not sure that it would actually 
affect it that much because people don‟t know, they don‟t think in that way 
when they‟re donating – TS11 
Some participants thought the motivation behind a donation is important, and that 
altruistic motivations are preferable, but also believed that the most important thing is 
                                                          
474 Department of Health (2010) op. cit.  
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that the organs are actually donated, regardless of the motivation. Although 
participants were specifically asked about altruism, few suggested that a lack of it was 
a reason to not allow conditional donations, and many seemed to regard it as being of 
little relevance or interest.  
One reason that conditional and directed donations have been prohibited is 
because they are considered non-altruistic475. It was argued in Chapter 5, however, 
that it is not necessarily the case. Actions are rarely either altruistic or non-altruistic, 
but there is instead is a sliding scale of altruism, such that many conditional and 
directed donations could contain an element of altruism. The fact that some staff 
referred to aspects of altruism that are implied by DH policy documents (such as ‗freely 
given‘) suggests that staff are aware that altruism is supposed to be a principle of 
organ donation. That there is a lack of clarity about the concept, evidenced by 
disagreement and confusion about what altruism means, even among transplant staff, 
may point to its unsuitability as a guiding principle for organ donation, however.    
It may be desirable for organ donation to primarily be altruistic, and good 
reasons for this have recently been put forward by a Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
panel476. For instance, it seems generally preferable to live in a society where people 
are motivated by the health needs of other people, rather than self-interest or financial 
gain. Altruism need not be the only acceptable motivation for donations, however. 
Perhaps the most important thing to come out of the collected data, in relation to 
altruism, is that many participants do not even think of organ donation in terms of 
altruism. Some staff participants also suggested that some donor families do not think 
in terms of altruism when they choose to donate organs, and these participants did not 
suggest that this made those donations unacceptable. Concepts such as reciprocity and 
                                                          
475 Department of Health (2000) op. cit. p1 
476 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, (2011) op. cit.  
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solidarity have received support in the ethical literature477, so these could be other 
acceptable reasons to donate organs. For the reasons discussed in chapters 4 and 5, 
altruism is not a convincing guiding principle for organ donation, particularly in relation 
to conditional donations. It is not true that all conditional donations are non-altruistic, 
and it is also not true that all altruistically motivated donations are ethically acceptable.  
10.3.14 Preferences 
Until now, discussion has focussed on donations that are truly conditional. That is, 
unless the conditions or directions are granted, the donation will not go ahead. One 
outcome of the preceding discussion has been that accepting these donations can be 
justified on the grounds that they avoid waste. Some conditional or directed donations 
do not take the iff form, and instead merely express preferences. Someone may 
request that people of type x are given priority for the donated organs, but that if this 
is not possible the organs should be allocated to other people. 
Some participants found these sorts of requests more acceptable than iff 
conditional donations, and the March 2010 DH policy update also permits requests that 
organs are allocated to family members ahead of strangers. The primary reason for 
accepting iff conditional donations is to avoid absolute waste, but in cases where the 
request is merely for priority, the organs will be donated even if the request is not 
followed. The justification of avoiding absolute waste therefore does not apply, which 
means there is less reason to act upon the request than the truly conditional donations. 
In cases where a request for priority is made, there is no good reason to turn down the 
donation, but equally there appears limited reason to follow the donor‘s or next-of-kin‘s 
wishes.  
This presents an interesting problem. Despite some participants considering 
preferences more ethically acceptable than iff conditions, there is actually less of a 
                                                          
477 Saunders B, 'Altruism or Solidarity? The Motives for Organ Donation and Two Proposals', Bioethics 26 
(2012) pp376-81 
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reason to follow the preference. But, if the NHS refuses to follow the preference, the 
donor family could ‗convert‘ the preference into an iff condition and have their wishes 
followed. A pragmatic solution is therefore required. 
If allocating according to the preference would mean that someone with the best 
match and super-urgent clinical need would not receive an organ and would probably 
die, then allocating according to the preference would be undesirable. This could be 
explained to the next-of-kin, in the hope that they would agree for the organ to be 
donated unconditionally. But if allocating according to the preference would not deprive 
anyone with a particularly urgent need of a transplant and was therefore relatively 
harmless, then it seems reasonable to allocate according to this preference, given that 
refusing to do so might ‗force the donor family‘s hand‘ and result in an iff conditional 
donation/no donation at all. With a preference rather than an iff condition, the donor 
family may be more amenable to counselling which could result in an unconditional 
donation, and this would seem like the appropriate first course of action to be 
attempted.  
There may also be circumstances where following the request for priority is 
entirely or relatively harmless. This may be the case if doing so deprives nobody who 
urgently needs an organ, or if the request follows acceptable partiality. In these cases, 
although efforts should be made to encourage the donor family to donate 
unconditionally, it would be reasonable to allocate according to these preferences. 
Where the request for priority has more negative effects, however, it would seem 
undesirable to allocate according to the request if doing so is avoidable. In this situation 
it should be explained that there are particularly needy patients who require transplants 
urgently, and that the organs will be allocate to these people contrary to the 
preferences. The donor family may then convert their donation into an iff conditional, 
but in terms of practical consequences this would result in nothing worse than following 
the preferences to begin with. 
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10.3.15 A note about South Asian potential donors 
South Asian potential donors were included as a distinct category for the empirical 
study due to particular problems with low donation rates from this community478. The 
Organ Donation Taskforce report states that more work is needed to ―establish how 
best to encourage engagement with the option of organ donation after death‖479 for 
BME groups, and some people have suggested that allowing conditional donation may 
be one way to do this480. This was not something reflected in the views of the South 
Asian participants in this study. The views of the South Asian participants were not 
generally different from the views of non-South Asian participants. There certainly did 
not appear to be a desire to choose deserving recipients, and many South Asian 
participants shared the view that donors ought not to judge the deservingness of 
recipients. Elsewhere, others have speculated that the concept of solidarity may prompt 
conditional donations restricted to ethnic groups481 but this view did not emerge in this 
study. 
 It should be noted that due to recruitment difficulties (discussed in Chapters 8 
and 11), the sample of South Asian potential donors for the embedded study was not 
typical of the larger South Asian population. Most participants were fairly westernised, 
educated, and there were no first generation immigrants. There were also no non-
English speakers. This study makes no claims to have obtained an in-depth 
understanding of the concerns and perspectives of the South Asian community. This is 
a clear limitation of the study, and is discussed in Chapter 11.   
10.3.16 Section Conclusions 
A number of potential barriers to permitting conditional donations have been presented. 
It has been argued that none of them provide good reasons to prohibit conditional 
                                                          
478 NHSBT 'South Asian Organ Donation Campaign', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/campaigns/other_campaigns/detail.asp?id=3, Last Accessed: 
31/10/2012  
479 Department of Health (2008) op. cit.  
480 Radcliffe-Richards J, (2012) op. cit. p117 
481 Saunders B, (2012) op. cit. pp376-81 
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donations, but some of them need to be taken into account when making policy 
recommendations. For instance, it is important that potential recipients have a choice 
about receiving conditionally donated organs, so that they are not forced to accept 
donations with conditions attached that they find objectionable. 
It is also important that the potential negative aspects of conditional donation 
raised by perceived fairness and slippery slopes are given due consideration. Although 
it has been argued that the positives of accepting conditional donations can outweigh 
the negatives, this has the potential to change. If the public started to distrust the 
transplantation system as a result of conditional donations, fewer people may donate 
organs. For this reason it is essential that the negative effects of conditional donations 
are monitored and minimised. These concerns need to be taken into account when 
making recommendations for policy. 
In chapter 12, a series of recommendations will be put forward, summarising 
what has been discussed and concluded in this chapter. First, the limitations and 
positive aspects of the project will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 11 - Limitations, transferability and positives 
11.1 Limitations 
Although the embedded study met the aim of gaining the views of a variety of key 
stakeholders, its limitations must be acknowledged, as these will have had an impact 
upon the results.  
Most of the limitations arose from difficulties with recruiting participants, which 
was a longer process than anticipated. Recruitment for the potential donor categories 
proved problematic, and ultimately this led to a less varied sample than was desired. 
The original recruitment method of sending letters to people registered at 
specific GP practices failed to recruit any participants. One possible explanation for this 
could be that the study was likely to appeal most to those who were pro-donation. A 
relatively small proportion of people register to donate organs (under 30% of the UK 
population482, and many fewer from the South Asian population). It is not clear whether 
there was any correlation between unwillingness to register and unwillingness to 
participate. It is also possible that people who had not visited their GP in the last 12 
months did not feel engaged with the medical research community. Another study 
found that response rates are relatively high (even in hard to reach groups) if 
telephone contact can be established as well as mailed invitation being sent483. This 
would have proved difficult for this study because Moorlock did not have access to the 
telephone numbers of potential participants, for reasons of data protection, but it could 
be an effective method in other studies.  
11.1.1 South Asian Potential Donors 
It proved particularly difficult to recruit South Asian potential donors, and the final 
sample was not gender balanced. Of the 10 people interested in participating, 9 were 
                                                          
482 NHSBT 'Homepage', Available at: http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/, Last Accessed: 23/10/2012  
483 Kiezebrink K et al., 'Strategies for Achieving a High Response Rate in a Home Interview Survey', BMC 
Medical Research Methodology 9 (2009) p46 
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female. A more balanced sample would have been desirable, as it is possible that men 
view things differently to women. Similarly, the final method of recruiting South Asian 
potential donors (advertising in a University of Birmingham weekly email newsletter, 
and snowballing from these participants) meant that several of the participants in the 
South Asian potential donor category were well-educated, with links to the University. 
Participants‘ levels of education were not recorded so it is not possible to give precise 
details. This data could have proved useful in ensuring that a more varied sample of 
participants was obtained, so it was a mistake to not record it. This recruitment method 
also meant that the South Asian participants were generally fairly integrated with 
British culture, so the data gathered in my study will only represent a small proportion 
of views of the varied South Asian population in the West Midlands. It would have been 
preferable to obtain a wider variety of views, but the study still captured some relevant 
and useful perspectives.  
Arrangements were in place to include non-English speakers in the study, to 
include those who may be less culturally integrated and therefore have different views 
from English-speaking South Asians, and also to reflect the composition of the waiting 
list in terms of race and age. As discussed in Chapter 8, literacy rates and English 
speaking rates for this South Asians in the UK were investigated, and it was clear that 
excluding non-English speakers could exclude large proportions of potential 
participants, particularly older people and females. Unfortunately, no non-English 
speaking people expressed an interest in taking part in the study, so none of these 
views were represented. South Asian participants were requested at the time of 
interview to speak to friends and family about the study, and particularly people who 
didn‘t speak English. Although all participants agreed to do this, it did not yield any 
non-English speaking participants.  
Mixed advice was given about trying to engage with the South Asian 
community; one academic researcher with experience of working with the South Asian 
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community advised that it would be difficult unless there was an Asian person on the 
research team, due to a supposed mistrust of white academics. This was not something 
that could be addressed within this study, as this was a single-researcher project and 
there was no scope to recruit and employ a South Asian researcher to conduct 
interviews with South Asian participants. Very late in the study, two South Asian 
participants of different faiths suggested that a good way to recruit participants would 
be to visit places of worship. They did not foresee it being difficult to access places of 
worship or to gain the trust of the South Asian community (contrary to the advice from 
the academic researcher mentioned earlier). Regrettably, by this stage it was too late 
in the project to do any further data collection, but this approach could have yielded a 
more varied sample of South Asian participants, and perhaps given increased access to 
non-English speakers.  
As a result of recruitment difficulties, the sample that comprised the South Asian 
potential donor group is, therefore, probably too homogeneous to be considered 
transferable in any way to the South Asian population of the West Midlands, as it has 
almost certainly missed out on capturing the variety of views that this larger population 
holds. This is particularly disappointing as one of the aims of the project was to have 
some focus on this population an attempt to establish whether conditional donation 
may be a potentially effective ways of increasing donation in this group. 
11.1.2 Potential Recipients 
The sample for the potential recipient group only included potential liver or kidney 
recipients, and the views expressed by these individuals may differ from people who 
need heart or lung transplants. The proportion of liver to kidney recipients was 4:5, 
which does not reflect the proportions of the waiting lists (the kidney waiting list has 
twelve times more patients than the liver list). Within this very small sample there did 
not appear to be a noticeable difference between the views of kidney and liver 
recipients, but this may not be the case amongst these patients more generally. A 
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relevant difference could be that people can be kept alive for some time after kidney 
failure using dialysis484, whereas there is no similar treatment for liver failure. A further 
difference is that living donation provides an additional relatively low-risk supply of 
kidneys, whereas living liver donation is a riskier and rarer event485. One might 
speculate that these factors may have an impact upon how these recipients regard 
need and urgency, for instance. 
 The reasons for focussing on liver and kidney potential recipients were 
practical; there are more of these potential recipients, so a larger pool of potential 
participants. A further reason for focussing on these recipients was that staff from 
these departments were forthcoming with assistance, and provided access to patients 
during clinics. Also, the number of donated livers and kidneys each year suitable for 
transplantation is much greater than for other organs486(a person can generally donate 
two kidneys once dead, and livers can also be, though are not always, split in two). 
Since the majority of transplants from deceased donors in the UK are liver or kidney, 
focussing the study on these meant that views from individuals belonging to majority of 
those on the waiting list were obtained. 
A further limitation of the sample for the potential recipient group was that 
seriously ill potential recipients were excluded because of the risk that interviews would 
prove particularly burdensome. Participants then, although ill enough to be potential 
candidates for transplantation, were not in urgent need of a transplant. It is possible 
that the views of people who urgently require transplants could differ from those whose 
need for a transplant is less urgent. This necessary consideration for the potential 
                                                          
484 Kusiak A, Dixon B, and Shah S, 'Predicting Survival Time for Kidney Dialysis Patients: A Data Mining 
Approach', Computers in Biology and Medicine 35 (2005) pp311-27 
485 Simpson MA and Pomfret EA, 'Checking the Harness: Safety for Living Liver Donors', Liver Transplantation 
18 (2012) pp15-19 
486 NHSBT (2012) 'Latest Statistics', Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/latest_statistics/latest_statistics.jsp, Last Accessed: 
31/10/2012  
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burden of participation may have prevented access to a potentially different set of 
views. 
11.1.3 General 
Due to the difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of participants across all 
categories except staff, it was not easy to actively seek out participants who had 
specific characteristics; ultimately it was necessary to settle for those who were willing 
to participate.  
The study may have been improved by using more controversial scenarios 
during interviews. Alternative scenarios could have been presented, featuring more 
explicitly the sorts of conditional donations that people might be expected to find 
objectionable, controversial, or feel strongest about. However, a balance had to be 
struck between provoking strong reactions and concerns for welfare of the participants. 
Having a scenario based upon alcoholism for example could, however, be upsetting to 
participants who have experience of alcoholism, particularly potential recipients. The 
scenarios were therefore designed to be less specific, and talked about responsible 
lifestyles, for example, instead. Similarly, one of the scenarios originally referred to a 
specific religion, but the Research Ethics Committee requested that this be changed to 
something more generic to avoid potential offense to participants. Although avoiding 
offending participants is obviously important, part of the problem of conditional 
donations is that they can be offensive. By altering the scenarios to be more generic 
some of the strongest reactions to specific conditions may have been missed by the 
study because the participants were not prompted to comment on them, and may not 
have thought to do so. On the other hand, this more open approach did have an 
advantage; it allowed participants to explore their own ideas of offensive conditions, 
which reduced the risk of the researcher‘s pre-conceived ideas influencing the findings.  
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11.2 Transferability of conclusions 
As discussed, in section 8.3 qualitative research is often criticised for not being 
generalisable.  This is a particularly difficult criticism to avoid when the sample size is 
small, not representative, and therefore unlikely to elicit the full range of views held by 
the population from which the sample was drawn. It is not, however, the purpose of 
qualitative research that its results are generalisable. 
 Using qualitative methods was appropriate for this project, given the aim of 
producing good quality philosophy that can provide practical recommendations for 
policy. To expect the findings and conclusions to be generalisable in the way that the 
conclusions of a quantitative study may be is to misunderstand the research paradigm. 
Rather than comparing the research and conclusions to quantitative research, the 
success and limitations of using qualitative data are best established by comparing the 
project to a traditional applied philosophy approach.   
When compared with conventional applied philosophy, the project seems to 
build on the strengths of this approach, yet avoid some of the weaknesses. The 
qualitative data were given a relatively restricted role, and were mostly used to provide 
and challenge potential lines of argument. Arguments were first assessed according to 
their rational justifications rather than widespread support amongst participants, and it 
is rational justification that provides generalisability in philosophy. By providing 
additional lines of argument the data lead to a more complete philosophical analysis 
than would otherwise have been achieved. For instance, some participants thought that 
it was acceptable to give priority to children, and this was something not originally 
considered in the philosophy chapters. Although this argument was ultimately rejected, 
it was given fair consideration. This meant that arguments beyond those originally 
conceived by Moorlock were considered. This is not to say that every conceivable line of 
argument has been pursued or considered. Indeed it seems likely that, in virtue of the 
difficulties with the South Asian sample, that some particularly interesting lines of 
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argument may have been overlooked. This could be an interesting area for future 
research, particularly given the need to engage the South Asian population with organ 
donation. 
Qualitative data were also used to gain some insight into the acceptability of 
certain lines of argument. For example, the argument in Chapter 7 for avoiding levelling 
down and negative loss was very similar to an argument put forward by participants for 
avoiding waste. This suggests that this line of argument may receive support from 
some stakeholders, which played a role in deciding the final recommendations. 
Nonetheless, caution is required when making claims about the transferability of 
the empirical conclusions. Although it would seem reasonable to think that they could 
apply to transplantation on a broader level within the UK, this is not necessarily the 
case. 
11.3 Positives 
Despite its limitations this project also has some strong positive features. First, taking a 
philosophical approach to interviews was generally successful in engaging the 
participants with the underlying principles. This resulted in data that was generally very 
suited to the purpose of being used alongside philosophy, and also made for some 
interesting discussions during interviews. Not all participants were able or willing to 
engage to the same level, but many participants appeared to enjoy debating the issues, 
and several participants commented afterwards that it had ‗really made them think‘487. 
The semi-structured interviews lent themselves well to this philosophical approach, 
because it made it possible to pitch interviews at the appropriate level. Some 
participants were capable of very sophisticated ethical thought, whereas others‘ 
responses seemed much more driven by gut reaction and intuition. Engaging with 
participants on an appropriate level was necessary to elicit the most useful data from 
                                                          
487 Transplant staff, in particular, seemed to appreciate the opportunity to discuss ethical issues, and 
Moorlock has since been invited to facilitate ethical discussion and present at Reflective Practice Days for 
transplant coordinators.  
275 
 
them. Occasionally during interviews, questions were pitched at the wrong level, which 
resulted in blank expressions or confusion from the participant, so it was necessary to 
have the option of rephrasing questions to make them more understandable.    
 A further positive feature of the study is the variety of transplant staff that 
participated. Nursing staff from donation and recipient perspectives were represented, 
as were surgeons, physicians and intensivists. This meant that a fairly wide range of 
perspectives was obtained from this category, and this led to some variation in views, 
as mentioned in Chapter 9.  
 Despite its limitations, the project has resulted in the development of 8 key 
recommendations, which are presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 12 - Framework and Conclusions 
The discussion in this thesis has resulted in 8 key recommendations, which are now 
presented (see also Table 32) and explained. The conclusions to the thesis overall are 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
Recommendation 1 
Altruism should no longer be regarded as the only acceptable motivating factor for 
deceased organ donation. Not all altruistically motivated donations are ethically 
acceptable, and not all non-altruistically motivated donations are unacceptable. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 concluded that altruism alone cannot consistently be used to 
determine whether organ donations are ethical or not. There are competing 
philosophical accounts of altruism and disagreements over what it means for something 
to be altruistically motivated. It is clear, however, that an altruistic act is one 
motivated, to some extent, by a genuine concern for the interests of other people. The 
DH‘s policies on conditional and directed donations seem to reflect the view that 
altruism can take different forms, and the recent Nuffield report also endorsed this 
view. The set of behaviours that could be classed as altruistically motivated is large. To 
say that all altruistically motivated acts are ethically acceptable is too simplistic. For 
instance, donating one‘s time to a charity may be altruistically motivated, but it would 
not necessarily be ethically acceptable if it meant that one neglected one‘s children.  
Under a broader definition of altruism that the DH would have to use in order to 
remain consistent, altruism cannot by itself determine the ethical acceptability of 
something. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the DH ought to accept that altruism can be 
rationally or emotionally motivated, and that there can be a sliding scale of altruistic 
motivations ranging from pure altruism to more self-interested but still other-regarding 
reasons. The Nuffield Council‘s report defines altruistic behaviour as being ―motivated 
by concern for the welfare of the recipient of some beneficent behaviour, rather than by 
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concern for the welfare of the person carrying out the action‖488, and this would be a 
suitable account of altruism for the DH to adopt. Crucially, however, it only considers 
whether an action is altruistically motivated or not – other principles may be required to 
justify why things such as payment are not considered acceptable. This may make the 
principle of altruism inappropriate for single-handedly defining which donations are 
acceptable, but this simply reflects the limited scope of the concept.  
 It is also misguided to regard altruism as the only ethically acceptable motivator 
for organ donation. The primary aim of the organ donation system is not to promote 
altruism, but to obtain organs. Living in a society where all organ donation was 
altruistically motivated would be desirable, but so would living in a society where there 
were more organs available for transplantation. Motivators such as solidarity, 
reciprocity or even a degree of self-interest would not necessarily reduce the amount of 
altruism in society, but may increase the number of donated organs. It seems contrary 
to the primary aim of the organ donation system, then, to insist that only altruistic 
donations are acceptable. As altruism is ingrained in transplantation practice a bold and 
sudden change of policy in favour of accepting other motives may meet resistance. 
However, this alone is not an argument for failing to embrace change. Recent 
marketing campaigns by NHSBT have appealed to other motivations489 and this can be 
seen as both reflecting and shaping changing attitudes.  
Recommendation 2 
Accept conditional donations where the alternative is turning away medically useable 
organs (subject to the conditions set in Recommendations 7 and 8).  
  
                                                          
488 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, (2011) op. cit. p139 
489 Recent marketing on organ donation has explicitly appealed to reciprocity. This is stated in: NHSBT (2009) 
'National Organ Donor Campaign Board Paper', Available at: 
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Campaign Leaflet', Available at: https://ww3.access-24.co.uk/Downloads/OLC209P-1.PDF, Last Accessed: 
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When a donation is ‗iff‘ conditional, transplant staff are faced with a choice of either 
accepting the donation (and therefore the conditions) or turning the donation down. It 
has been argued in Chapters 7 and 10 that rejecting the organ is levelling down and 
benefits nobody. Accepting a conditional donation that otherwise would not be donated 
benefits everybody on the waiting list in some way, and other potential negative effects 
may be minimised (see Recommendations 3 and 5).   
Some conditions do not affect the final allocation of donated organs: a condition 
specifying that only children should be given the organs would not alter allocation if the 
organs were only medically suitable for children. Accepting such donations is at odds 
with existing policy, but not the actions of the doctors involved in the 1998 case. In the 
1998 case, although the donation went ahead on the condition that the organs were 
only allocated to white people, the patients at the top of the waiting lists were all white 
anyway. In a situation like this, it is not true that the organs are being donated in a 
way that prevents them being allocated according to greatest need490. This means that 
fairness in terms of outcomes to those waiting for organs is no less than if the same 
donation was made unconditionally. Recommendation 1 proposed that altruism should 
not be considered the only ethical motivation for organ donation. Conditional donations 
can be altruistic, but alternatively may be motivated by solidarity, reciprocity or self-
interest. Even non-altruistically motivated conditional donations should be accepted if 
they do not affect allocation, because doing so provides life-saving or improving benefit 
without introducing additional unfairness.   
Some conditional donations do affect allocation, and do introduce unfairness. 
The claim that these donations should also be accepted is bolder, but may be justified 
with reference to the primary aim of the transplantation system, which is to save and 
improve lives. If accepting conditional donations results in additional donations that 
                                                          
490 Although, quite wrongly in this specific case, this was one of the DH Panel‘s objections to conditional 
donations. 
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would otherwise not occur, then the medical needs of all people who require transplants 
are better met. Deviation from impartial principles may therefore be justified on the 
same grounds as the impartial principles themselves. If allowing some partiality is the 
best way to meet the aims of an otherwise impartial system, then allowing partiality in 
some instances can be impartially justified. Many participants in the embedded 
stakeholder study supported this line of reasoning, but it is important to remain aware 
that organ donation/transplantation is just one of the NHS‘s activities, and 
compromises that benefit transplantation (such as accepting conditional donation), may 
have wider undesirable implications. Although there is a rational argument for 
occasionally deviating from a strictly impartial system, it is important that the public at 
large also understand and support this justification for what might otherwise appear to 
be an endorsement of unacceptable attitudes.  
Recommendation 3 
Some participants were concerned that by accepting the conditions placed on organ 
donations the NHS as an institution might be endorsing those conditions. This concern 
is, however, misplaced and should not be used as a reason for objecting to conditional 
and directed donation. The NHS should, however, be aware of public perceptions of its 
role in conditional donations, and should publish details (type of condition, and 
frequency) of all conditional donations periodically, in the interests of transparency. 
 
Contrary to a concern raised by some participants that by accepting objectionable 
conditions the NHS would be dirtying its own hands, it was argued in chapters 7 and 11 
that the NHS should not be considered to be endorsing, tacitly or otherwise, the 
conditions placed on donations.  Some (but not all) conditional donations will reflect 
regrettable or even immoral motivations such as racial hatred, and whilst the NHS as 
an institution should never appear to endorse these motivations, it is not obvious that 
accepting conditional donations is perceived in this way correctly. It is the person 
placing the objectionable conditions who acts wrongly, not the NHS. Unfortunately, 
whether or not the NHS accepts organs with these conditions, the donor‘s wishes are 
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granted, insofar as whoever s/he is trying to exclude will still not receive the organs. By 
accepting the donation and the conditions, the NHS can legitimately claim to be 
bringing about the best outcome from a non-ideal situation. Since conditional donation 
benefits everybody on transplant waiting lists, the NHS distributes some benefit to all 
potential recipients, even the ones who the donor may have wanted to disadvantage.  
Despite it being argued that the NHS would not be endorsing the conditions 
placed on donations, there is still a risk that the public may perceive the NHS to be 
doing so. Some may therefore argue that the NHS ought not involve itself in any way 
with morally objectionable conditional donations, and must therefore reject these 
donations. It has been argued that the benefits of saving additional lives may outweigh 
the possible damage to public perceptions, but further research would be useful to 
establish the extent and consequences of possible damage to public perceptions, the 
best ways to minimise any damage, and how the public would want to balance these 
concerns.  
In order to avoid a perception of underhandedness that could lead people to 
believe that the NHS is trying to cover up discriminatory practices, the NHS could 
accept conditional organ donations openly and transparently. If the NHS attempted to 
keep conditional donations and subsequent conditional allocation secret, one can 
imagine the potential media stories if it was ever discovered. The most transparent way 
to handle conditional donations would be for the NHS to publish suitably anonymised 
details of each conditional donation. This would only need to give a general impression 
of the conditions placed (e.g. type of condition and number of times it occurred). At the 
same time, the NHS ought to distance itself from objectionable conditions and explain 
that the reasons for accepting them are merely a result of the organ shortage. Although 
placing details of conditional donations in the public domain might be a constant 
reminder of discriminatory donations and may therefore dissuade some people from 
donating, there is also the possibility that anyone opposed to the discrimination behind 
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conditional donations might combat this simply by donating unconditionally. This, 
again, is an area where further evidence on the likely consequences would be useful. 
Recommendation 4 
Unconditional donation should remain the default type of donation. This allows organs 
to be allocated according to current policy, a policy which provides a balance between 
efficiency and fairness constraints. 
 
Conditional donations normally prevent allocation according to the criteria that are 
thought to reflect all relevant considerations. A condition could result in organs being 
allocated to patients who are not in immediate urgent need, at the cost to patients who 
are. Similarly a condition could result in an organ being allocated to someone with 
whom there is not an optimal tissue-match, which may increase the likelihood of post-
transplant complications to the extent that the transplant surgeon decides not to 
proceed. A condition could therefore result in organs being wasted if nobody on the 
waiting list met both the criteria of the conditions and the medical criteria for 
appropriate transplant risk. For these reasons it is preferable for organs to be donated 
unconditionally, and for the conditional donation not to be used to promote organ 
donation. It is desirable that if conditional donations are accepted, that they remain the 
exception rather than the rule. 
Conditional donations should not be accepted without question. Transplant staff 
and the donation team should explain to those making conditions that there are 
advantages to organs being donated unconditionally. Misunderstandings about 
allocation policy should be corrected if this is likely to result in unconditional 
donation491. 
 
                                                          
491 There could also be an argument for misunderstandings of allocation policy being corrected in all cases, 
regardless of the impact on conditionality.  
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Recommendation 5  
Offsetting the potential harms of conditional donation should be considered 
 
Accepting certain conditions may potentially cause unfairness, and the NHS could be 
perceived to be supporting the conditions. Although it has been argued that accepting a 
racist condition does not entail that the NHS is racist, any resulting unfairness may 
cause some people to consider the acceptance to symbolically support racism492. Forms 
of offsetting any unfairness may help to further distance the NHS from such conditions. 
Furthermore, offsetting may provide a disincentive for people wishing to place 
conditions on their donation. For instance, someone wanting to disadvantage a 
particular group may feel less inclined to place conditions if she was aware that the 
action would be taken to counter this disadvantage493.  
Offsetting could take various forms, and the appropriate form would depend 
upon what was needed to be offset. If it became apparent that people, for instance, 
thought that the NHS was supporting racism by accepting a racist donation, the NHS 
could simply make a statement condemning the racist motivation behind the donation. 
If more offsetting was required, the NHS could make a donation to an anti-racism 
charity494. An alternative form of offsetting might involve allocating the next available 
organ to somebody of a different race, if this was possible without significantly 
undermining existing allocation policy, to offset the previous allocation. The exact forms 
of offsetting required can only be established once the implications of allowing 
conditional donations are known (see Recommendation 8). As discussed under 
                                                          
492 Wilkinson TM, (2007) 'Racist Organ Donors and Saving Lives' op. cit. pp63-74 
493 Though it is equally possible that a person might feel that placing conditions is more acceptable given the 
measures in place to combat unfairness; we can only speculate at this stage and introduce careful monitoring 
to determine trends in either direction. 
494 Although some might argue that this is not a good use of public resources, one could counter this claim 
with evidence that transplantation is a cost-effective treatment and that the cost of ‗offsetting‘ might be 
outweighed by the savings created by having additional organs available. Kidney transplantation, for 
instance, is much cheaper than keeping a patient on dialysis: NHSBT 'Cost-Effectiveness of Transplantation', 
Available at: 
http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/newsroom/fact_sheets/Organ_Donation_Registry_Fact_Sheet_7_21337.pd
f, Last Accessed: 08/03/2013    
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Recommendation 3, there is the potential for harm to the perceived integrity of the 
NHS, and this harm may be difficult to offset or repair. It would therefore also be 
prudent to conduct wide scale research on the potential public reaction to conditional 
donations, and the possible effects this may have on perceived integrity of, and public 
trust in, the NHS.    
Recommendation 6  
Conditions that favour family and friends are acceptable. These conditions ought to be 
factored into allocation policy. 
 
There are good reasons for permitting directed donation to family members and close 
friends on the basis of philophilic partiality. This is largely compatible with current 
policy following the 2010 guidance. Current policy only permits requests for directed 
allocation, rather than a truly conditional donation. The policy is very clear that the 
next-of-kin must agree to donate even if the organ is not suitable for the requested 
recipient. There is, however, nothing inherently objectionable about conditionality per 
se, and where the condition reflects appropriate partiality it seems entirely reasonable 
to permit this donation. People regularly do things for their loved ones that they would 
not do for other people. Accepting a conditional donation of this nature can be justified 
by the acceptable nature of the condition content, rather than the appeal to avoiding 
waste needed to justify accepting other types of condition. 
 Directed allocation is only considered if it is specifically requested by the donor 
before death, or the next-of-kin. At present, SNODs are not permitted to raise the 
possibility of directed allocation with the next-of-kin – it can only be considered if the 
next-of-kin request it themselves. Directed allocation to close friends or family 
members ought to be factored into allocation policy. It should, therefore, become 
routine, at the time of donation, for next-of-kin to be asked if the deceased has a close 
friend or family member who they would have wanted their organs to be allocated to. 
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There should also be an additional question on the ODR to specify that one would like 
priority for family and close friends to be considered. 
 It should be noted that a situation where someone who dies has a relative or 
close friend on a transplant waiting list is rare. The HTA estimates that it may arise 
once every two and a half years, so this is not something that will have a significant 
impact on overall organ allocation.  
Recommendation 7 
Preferences expressed by donors may be followed but the implications for super urgent 
allocations should be assessed before deciding whether or not to do so. 
 
Not all conditional donations are ‗iff‘ conditional. Some donors could potentially express 
a preference that a certain type of recipient is given priority, but that if this is not 
possible, the organ should be allocated according to the standard criteria. When a 
donation has a preference like this attached to it, as opposed to a true condition, the 
primary reason for accepting and allocating according to the preference – that an organ 
is obtained that otherwise would not be – is lost. There is therefore, at first glance, less 
reason to allocate according to preferences than there is a true iff condition. What has 
to be considered, however, is that the next-of-kin are able to ‗convert‘ a preference into 
a true condition if they are informed that the preference will be ignored. 
It therefore seems reasonable to consider the consequences of accepting the 
preference before making a decision on whether to follow it. If the preference is likely 
to deprive someone who urgently needs a transplant, then this ought to be explained to 
the next-of-kin in the hope that they will choose to donate unconditionally. If, following 
this discussion, the next-of-kin agree to donate unconditionally then the donation can 
be allocated according to standard principles. If, in contrast, they choose to make the 
donation iff conditional, then Recommendation 2 should be followed.  
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If the preference was unlikely to deprive anyone of an urgent transplant, then, 
bearing in mind that the next-of-kin can potentially make the donation iff conditional 
anyway, the preference ought to be followed and the organs allocated accordingly. 
Even preferences like this should not be accepted without objection. The SNOD should 
discuss with the next-of-kin why it is generally preferable to have unconditional 
donations and to allocate according to the standard principles. 
Recommendation 8 
A trial period to assess the impact of conditional donation should be implemented. 
Data monitoring should continue after the formal trial period, and the effects of 
conditional donation should be continually evaluated. 
 
Many of the arguments about conditional and directed donation incorporate empirical 
claims. Allowing these donations may increase donation rates, decrease donation rates, 
or have no impact upon donation rates. Although some arguments make claims about 
likely outcomes495, outcomes are actually difficult to predict. There is evidence to 
suggest that perceived transparency and fairness can affect willingness to donate496, 
but no evidence to suggest how conditional donation would affect perceived 
transparency and fairness. In the absence of empirical evidence, valid arguments that 
incorporate a concern for likely consequences lack the factual premises required to 
make them sound.  
 It is therefore proposed that the recommendations above are implemented 
during a trial period. Careful data monitoring would ensure that the impact of allowing 
these donations could be measured, and this could then help to determine whether 
arguments in favour of permitting or prohibiting these donations are sound. 
                                                          
495 Radcliffe-Richards J, (2012) op. cit.  
496 Boulware LE et al., (2007) op. cit. pp1778-87 
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 The trial period could take two forms, which could be implemented in stages. 
First, donor co-ordinators and transplant staff could accept conditional organ donations 
if and when they occur. To do so would be consistent with ‗removing barriers‘ to organ 
donation. The present policy of refusing to accept conditional donations results in 
medically useable organs being wasted that could otherwise be used to save and 
improve lives, albeit not necessarily the same lives as if they were given 
unconditionally.  
 Second, conditional and directed donations could be actively employed as a 
means of promoting organ donation and the resulting conditions/directions recorded on 
the Organ Donor Register (ODR). At present, some next-of-kin may refuse consent for 
organ donation because they are aware that they are not allowed to specify the 
recipient. Similarly, some people may not join the ODR because they are concerned 
about the types of people who may receive their organs. Informing the public that they 
are now able to have some say on who receives their organs could encourage the 
reluctant to donate. One could imagine various marketing campaigns that could focus 
on helping people who are currently disadvantaged in organ allocation.   
 The barrier removing approach would be lower impact than the second 
approach, and would involve less risk. If it could be shown that the first approach had 
no negative impact upon overall donation rates, then the second approach could be 
considered for subsequent trialling497 if conditional donation was thought likely to 
increase donation rates without resulting in massively unfair patterns of allocation.  
 As was discussed in Chapter 3, the arguments in this thesis started with the 
assumption that it is good to save and improve lives, and that increasing the number of 
organs available for transplantation can increase the number of lives that can be saved 
or improved. If a change in policy demonstrably increases the number of organs 
                                                          
497 This would, however, require careful implementation. If people joined the ODR during the trial period and 
specified conditions when doing so, their registration would require reconsideration if it was subsequently 
decided that conditional donations would not be permitted after the trial period. 
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available for transplantation then, unless there is a good reason to prohibit it, it ought 
to be permitted. The results of the trial would provide key information for this 
argument.  
 A trial of conditional organ donation would have to collect data on several 
factors. The first stage of the trial would have to record the number of people choosing 
to place conditions, the types of conditions that were placed, and any impact that this 
had on the overall number of donations. It would also be necessary to have an 
awareness of media and public reactions to any incidents that occurred, to gauge 
possible wider consequences.  
 The second stage of the trial would have to gather more complex data, but 
again the key concerns would be whether allowing conditional donations would 
encourage people to donate organs who otherwise would not do so, and whether this 
had a positive or negative overall impact on organ donation rates. If this trial was likely 
to result in a significant increase in the amount of conditional donations, it would be 
important to monitor any emerging patterns of conditions. Emerging patterns of 
conditions could potentially provide arguments against conditional donation (if it 
transpired that certain types of people stood no chance of receiving an organ), but they 
could also provide an insight into the most effective ways to market conditional 
donation and organ donation more generally. 
 The precise details of the trial would require careful consideration of scope, 
timeframes and numbers. It would also need to be decided whether the trial would 
initially be implemented nationwide, or on a regional basis in order to allow for 
comparison with control regions. If conducted appropriately a trial period could provide 
reliable empirical data that many of the arguments surrounding conditional donation 
are currently lacking. 
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If the trial did suggest that conditional donations were acceptable to the public, 
and that they would lead to organs being donated that previously would not have been, 
then it may be tempting to simply regard conditional donation as a good thing and 
therefore permit it. However, the changing patterns of donation discussed in the 
previous recommendation may not become visible over the course of a trial period, or 
other factors in society may contribute to further changes in donation patterns after the 
trial period has finished. Because conditional donation has the potential to result in 
discrimination, unfairness and disadvantage, it is crucial to continually monitor its 
effects. If it transpired that conditional donations were resulting in widespread 
unfairness, decreased transplant efficiency and/or increased waste, then policy would 
need to be reconsidered.     
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Table 32 - Summary Recommendations 
Recommendation 1 
Altruism should no longer be regarded as the only acceptable motivating factor for 
deceased organ donation. Not all altruistically motivated donations are ethically 
acceptable, and not all non-altruistically motivated donations are unacceptable. 
Recommendation 2 
Accept conditional donations where the alternative is turning away medically useable 
organs (subject to the conditions set in Recommendations 7 and 8). 
Recommendation 3 
Some participants were concerned that by accepting the conditions placed on organ 
donations the NHS as an institution might be endorsing those conditions. This concern is, 
however, misplaced and should not be used as a reason for objecting to conditional and 
directed donation. The NHS should, however, be aware of public perceptions of its role in 
conditional donations, and should publish details (type of condition, and frequency) of all 
conditional donations periodically, in the interests of transparency. 
Recommendation 4 
Unconditional donation should remain the default type of donation. This allows organs to 
be allocated according to current policy, a policy which provides a balance between 
efficiency and fairness constraints. 
Recommendation 5  
Offsetting the potential harms of conditional donation should be considered 
Recommendation 6  
Conditions that favour family and friends are acceptable. These conditions ought to be 
factored into allocation policy. 
Recommendation 7 
Preferences expressed by donors may be followed but the implications for super urgent 
allocations should be assessed before deciding whether or not to do so. 
Recommendation 8 
A trial period to assess the impact of conditional donation should be implemented. 
Data monitoring should continue after the formal trial period, and the effects of 
conditional donation should be continually evaluated. 
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12.1 Thesis Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to conduct an empirically informed ethical analysis of 
conditional and directed deceased organ donation. This required using qualitative data 
from relevant stakeholders to create a philosophically-focussed discussion that took 
seriously the views of those likely to be affected by the issues raised. To this extent, 
the aims of the project have been achieved. 
The aims were met by first conducting an initial philosophical analysis of the key 
issues. This covered the lines of argument thought most important and relevant by 
Moorlock. The empirical study was then used to gather data to provide additional lines 
of argument that Moorlock had not considered or given due weight to, and to provide 
facts about the sorts of arguments and reasoning acceptable to key stakeholders. 
Finally, these data were used alongside the earlier philosophical analysis in order to aid 
and enhance further philosophical discussion. One of the difficulties for this project was 
deciding upon a suitable method to combine the philosophy and the qualitative data, 
but the final method, although philosophically-driven, gave the qualitative data 
opportunity to play a significant role. Ultimately, many of the lines of argument 
suggested by the data could not withstand philosophical scrutiny. 
The approach taken was specifically chosen to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of theoretical philosophy when it comes to addressing applied and 
practical ethical problems. The qualitative data met this aim, insofar as it has helped 
the philosophical discussion to produce a number of recommendations that could form 
part of a practical policy on conditional and directed donations.  
The final recommendations reached are not necessarily unique. Wilkinson has 
argued for similar conclusions498, and Radcliffe-Richards has also discussed the issue in 
detail. Wilkinson‘s conclusion is that there is a good reason (on the basis of avoiding 
                                                          
498Wilkinson TM, (2012) op. cit.  
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levelling down) to accept conditional donations if they result in organs being donated 
that otherwise would not be. Wilkinson fails, however, to provide guidance on how to 
handle preferences as opposed to iff conditions, and also does not discuss in detail 
directed allocation to family members and close friends. Radcliffe-Richards argues that 
the traditional reasons to not accept conditional and directed donations are not 
convincing. She, however, stops short of making clear recommendations for handling 
conditional donations when they do arise499. Both Radcliffe-Richards and Wilkinson used 
purely theoretical arguments, however, without the inclusion of any stakeholder views. 
The combination of stakeholder views with the theoretical philosophy in this project has 
resulted in findings and the consideration of arguments that neither Wilkinson nor 
Richards consider, such as the misunderstanding of the roles that medical data and 
moral judgements play in allocation policy. Taking wider considerations such as this 
into account has hopefully resulted in a richer discussion than would otherwise have 
been achieved. Using stakeholder views has also ensured that the recommendations 
are not merely the personal opinions of a sole researcher. 
One original contribution that this thesis has made is a detailed assessment of 
altruism in the context of organ donation policy, particularly in relation to conditional 
donation. The theoretical underpinnings of organ donation policy have been examined 
and criticised, and ultimately it has been argued that altruism should not be used in the 
way that it currently is. This is a bold recommendation, and calls into question one of 
the traditionally accepted principles of organ donation (at least in the UK). Altruism is, 
however, an ingrained and embedded principle and may be hard to dislodge from its 
central role – but a frank assessment of the principle has shown it to be incoherent and 
unnecessary. 
                                                          
499 She goes on to discuss a further debate, which she suggests may render any further discussion of 
conditional donation redundant. This does not, however, mean that the discussion of conditional donation in 
this thesis is redundant, as her argument is for a system involving reciprocity. Given that the current system 
is not based upon reciprocity, consideration of conditional donation remains important and worthwhile. 
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The project has resulted in eight key recommendations for policy relating to 
conditional donations. Many of the recommendations would require a change to current 
policy. The justifications and explanations provided demonstrate that the 
recommendations are well-reasoned and well-intentioned, and not merely an 
acceptance or endorsement of the public‘s various prejudices. The recommendations 
have taken seriously the views of stakeholders, and provide guidance that can be 
applied to transplantation in the UK.  
12.2 Reflexivity 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is important to consider the impact that the researcher 
has on the research, and vice versa. The entire research process will have been 
affected by my own values and perspective, and being open and transparent about 
these allows me to reflect on my impact on the research, and allows others to also gain 
an insight into my impact.  
I do not think I approached data analysis with a particular conclusion in mind, 
but my own views will have shaped the analysis to some extent. I am a white, middle-
class male with no prior personal experience of transplantation. I do, however, hold 
strong views on organ donation, and consider donating organs to be the right and 
obvious thing to do if one dies in a way that permits it. Furthermore, I believe that 
transplantation ought to use an opt out system based upon reciprocity, where people 
who choose to opt out of organ donation also opt out of receiving transplants. For the 
purposes of this study, I tried to set these views aside and assume nothing in particular 
about the right organ donation system. This was necessary because it would have led 
immediately to the conclusion that anyone trying to withhold their organs for donation 
for any reason was acting wrongly. Although this could have been the starting point for 
this thesis, it was more useful to focus the discussion within the confines of the 
donation system in existence today. 
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I did not speak with participants about my own views on organ donation before 
or during interviews, and tried to take the same approach of providing counter 
arguments and playing devil‘s advocate whether the participants‘ views were the same 
as mine or not.   
Before commencing data collection I undertook a placement at the participating 
Transplant Centre which allowed me to increase my understanding of the issues faced 
by people involved in transplantation. The placement also allowed me to acclimatise 
myself and learn how to engage with and talk to transplant staff. During this 
placement, and during various talks and facilitated discussions500 at the Transplant 
Centre, I was cautious to not express my own personal views on organ donation, as I 
viewed all staff members as potential participants. 
 Before this, my exposure to hospitals had been fairly limited; I have enjoyed 
good health, and I did not know anyone who had needed a transplant. This may have 
led to a tendency to look at the ethical issues in an abstract way, without really 
considering the fact that for some people these are very real and immediate life and 
death issues. Visiting the hospital wards and seeing the people affected by waiting for 
transplants, and people who have received the benefits of transplants, certainly made 
me question my previous attitudes towards the issues and gave new perspectives. I 
initially approached the problem of conditional donation from a principled perspective, 
valuing things like equality, fairness and due process as being the most important 
factors for organ allocation. After seeing patients on the transplant ward my views 
changed to favour maximising the number of available organs, but then changed again 
as I spent more time away from the wards.  
                                                          
500 This PhD was partly funded by the AHRC under the Collaborative Doctoral Awards scheme. This means 
that it was also partly funded by Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham Charities. The aim of this scheme is to 
―encourage and develop collaborations between Higher Education Institutions and non-academic 
organisations‖. Accordingly, the project was designed with Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham Charities to 
be useful for the organisation and was co-supervised by Simon Bramhall. As part of ‗placement‘ in the non-
HEI, an ethics forum was established at the transplant centre by me, with the encouragement and support of 
my supervisors, for the discussion of ethical issues arising in transplantation. Several meetings were held, 
including two to respond public consultations, but the topics were carefully picked to avoid discussion of 
issues related to this thesis to avoid biasing the interviews. 
294 
 
An outcome of taking the empirical bioethics approach is that I have ultimately 
argued for conclusions that I do not think I would have done if I had taken a purely 
theoretical approach. This may show that the approach has been partly successful, but 
it has also resulted in me proposing recommendations that I would previously have 
considered unacceptable. I have provided arguments in favour of accepting even those 
conditions that are badly motivated, such as racist conditions. This does not sit easy, 
but ultimately concedes principle to desperate need to increase the number of deceased 
organ donations.  When people are dying due to a shortage of a life-saving resource, 
ordinarily unacceptable ways of obtaining that resource seem more reasonable and, 
ultimately, justified. 
This thesis has looked at conditional donation as a particular issue that arises 
within the existing organ donation system, but it has not considered whether this 
existing, opt-in organ system should itself be changed. Accepting conditional donations 
may result in a small increase in the number of donated organs, but it would be 
unlikely to fully satisfy demand for transplants. Accepting conditional donations is only 
a partial solution to the organ shortage; bigger gains may be achieved by focussing on 
more fundamental changes to the organ donation system. Moving to an opt-out system 
(possibly incorporating elements of reciprocity) - whilst generating different complex 
ethical issues to be addressed - may provide the foundations for the greatly improved 
donation rates that are needed to prevent people dying while waiting for transplants501.          
 
 
  
                                                          
501
 It emerged during the viva that whilst this thesis does reflect my own views on conditional donations, as 
well as my research efforts, my overarching view is that a more fundamental change to the organ donation 
system is justifiable and likely to have a bigger impact than any changes relating to conditional donations. My 
preferred donation system would be an opt-out system based upon reciprocity where those who do opt-out 
have a reduced likelihood of receiving a transplant. The examiners suggested that this was recorded in the 
conclusion. 
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Appendix 2 – Letter from NHSBT re: removal from ODR 
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Appendix 3 – Interview Topic Guide 
Introduction: 
Thank interviewee for taking part 
Introduce self 
Remind interviewee that they are free to stop at any point without having to give a reason. 
Generic Scenario Number 1 (Responsibility and Desert) 
Two young men are killed in a car accident. The driver was driving recklessly and above the speed limit, 
which caused him to lose control of his car and crash, killing both himself and his passenger. The parents of 
the passenger are very distressed that their son was killed by someone acting so recklessly and are angry 
and upset that two lives have, in their eyes, been wasted. 
The parents of the passenger are very keen that their son‟s organs should be donated, but they have 
concerns about the sort of person that his organs might be transplanted to. They would like their son‟s 
organs to be transplanted to people who will look after them and live responsibly, and they consider young 
people to be risk-takers who are less likely to act responsibly than slightly older people with families. They 
therefore request that their son‟s organs are only transplanted to people who are over the age of 25 and have 
children. In the parents‟ opinion, these are likely to be responsible people who will look after themselves and 
deserve the improvements to quality of life that an organ transplant can bring.  
Staff at the hospital tell the parents that they are not allowed to say who their son‟s organs will go to, and 
that decisions like this are made by medical staff on the basis of medical considerations. If the organ 
donation is to go ahead, the organs must be donated without any restrictions being placed on who the organs 
can be transplanted to. 
The parents decide that because of the chance that their son‟s organs will go to people who they consider 
don‟t deserve them, they won‟t give permission for their son‟s organs to be donated. 
Questions for All 
1) This is an example of directed donation. What do you think about putting these kinds of directions on 
donation? [Prompt responder to give reasons for what they think]  
1a) Can you tell me what you think about the parents‘ request? Do you think that the parents‘ 
request is reasonable? Why? 
2) What do you think about transplant staff not being allowed to accept organs in examples like this? 
 2a) How do you think that transplant staff should react to conditional offers of organs such as this?  
 [prompt] If the organs are rejected, medically useable organs might go to waste? 
3) What do you think about people who want to donate their organs also being able to say that only certain 
types of people should receive them? 
 3a) Do you think there are any types or groups of people that are more deserving of transplants 
than others?  
 3b) If so, how important do you think this should be when deciding who should get organs? 
4) How important do you think it is that donated organs go to the people in greatest need? 
 [prompt] Can you explain a little about what you take ‗the greatest need‘ to mean? 
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Additional Questions for Potential Donors 
1) If you have ever thought about organ donation, have you thought about the type of person who might 
receive your organs? 
2) How do you think your views about organ donation would change if donors were allowed to say who gets 
their donated organs?   
 Additional Questions for Potential Recipients 
1) How would you feel if you benefitted from a conditional organ donation (e.g. if the person above you on 
the waiting list was excluded because of a condition placed on a donation, and you got the organ instead)?  
2) If you were given an organ with conditions attached to it, how important would it be for you to know about 
the conditions before or after the transplant? 
Additional Questions for Transplant Staff 
1) How would you feel about being involved in the transplantation process if directions such as those in this 
scenario were placed on the organs? 
 1a) How would you feel about being involved in the transplantation process if either you, or another 
member of staff, strongly objected to the conditions/directions placed on the organs? 
 
Generic Scenario Number 2 (Religion) 
A young woman dies following an accident. All of her organs are suitable for transplantation. This woman‟s 
faith and religious beliefs shaped how she chose to lead her life, and she placed great value in being what she 
considered a good member of her religion. Her parents know that her religious beliefs were very important to 
her, and are confident that, given a choice, she would have preferred for her organs to go to another member 
of her religion. Her parents therefore give consent for their daughter‟s organs to be donated, but request that 
priority is given to members of their daughter‟s religion. This request is not motivated by any dislike for a 
particular group of people; it is made simply because the parents believe that their daughter would prefer for 
her organs to go to people with similar beliefs and values to her own. 
The hospital staff explain that these sorts of requests cannot be complied with under existing policy, which 
states that organs will be given to the people who are in greatest need and who are the best match. 
Questions to All 
1) This is an example of directed donation. What do you think about putting these kinds of directions on 
donation? [Prompt responder to give reasons for what they think]  
2) The request in this scenario favours one group of people over others, but does not do so with bad or 
malicious intentions. How important do you think intentions and the reasons behind the request are? 
3) In this scenario, the request is for priority to be given to members of the same religion as the donor.  How 
would you feel about a request for priority to be given to a family member or friend? 
Additional Questions for Potential Recipients 
1) How would you feel about receiving an organ with conditions such as the ones in this scenario attached to 
it?  E.g. How would you feel if you received an organ just because you were of a certain [ethnic origin], 
[gender] or [religion]?  
 
Generic Scenario Number 3 (conditional donation) 
A man has died in an accident. All of his organs are suitable for donation, and his family are very keen that 
his organs should be donated. Prior to his death, the man had expressed concerns about the number of 
immigrants that had moved to his area. He believed that a lot of the immigrants were taking jobs, benefits 
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and resources that would otherwise be given to local people. He believed that people like himself who have 
lived in the area all of their lives should have everything that they need before things are given away to 
people who have arrived from other countries. 
The man had made clear, prior to his death, that if he died he wanted to donate his organs, but that he didn‟t 
want his organs to be transplanted to immigrants.  Knowing that their relative held these views, the next-of-
kin agree to donation only if the organs do not go to immigrants.  
Staff at the hospital tell the next-of-kin that they are not allowed to say who the organs should or should not 
go to, and that if the organs are going to be donated they have to be donated to the general pool. The family 
insist that they will not agree to donate the man‟s organs if there is a risk of them going to immigrants, as 
the deceased man would have been opposed to this. 
Questions for All 
1) This is an example of conditional donation. What do you think about putting these kinds of conditions on 
donation? [Prompt responder to give reasons for what they think]  
2) How do you think the transplant staff should respond to this offer to donate organs? 
[Prompt]  If they turn down the offer, they risk medically useable (and potentially life-saving) organs 
going to waste. 
3) Do you think it would make any difference if the people at the top of the waiting list happen to be British 
anyway? If this were the case, the organs would go to the same people whether the conditions were followed 
or not, but the doctors can pretend they are accepting the conditions. 
4) The conditions in this case discriminate against a group of people and the organs would not currently be 
accepted. In other areas of life people‘s personal beliefs and decisions about who or what to donate time or 
money to are respected though, even if some people might disagree with them.  How do you feel about this, 
and what do you think about the same ideas being applied to organ donation? 
5) Bearing in mind that there currently aren‘t enough organs to meet demand, do you think that allowing 
donations with directions such as these attached could ever be an acceptable way of increasing donation 
rates?  
6) How would you feel if usable organs were not transplanted because they‘ve got conditions attached to 
them? 
General Questions to All about Conditional and Directed Donation: 
1) The three scenarios have shown that there are different sorts of conditions or directions that a donor might 
wish to place on their organs. Are there any other sorts of conditions that you can think of that you, or 
somebody else, might want to place on organs? 
2)  Are there any conditions that you think are more acceptable than others? 
[Prompt] what makes these more acceptable? 
3) How important do you think the wishes or preferences of the donor are when it comes to deciding who 
gets organs?  
4) Do you think that the current policy of only accepting organs donated unconditionally should be changed if 
the change resulted in more organs being donated? 
5) One potential policy change could be to leave decisions about accepting conditional or directed donations 
up to local health authorities. How important do you think it is that any policy on conditional or directed 
donation is consistent throughout the UK? 
6) Do you think that the preferences of the public should play any role in who organs go to? Why/why not? 
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Appendix 4 – Consent Form 
An empirically informed ethical analysis of directed and conditional deceased organ donation 
 
REC reference number: 10/H1208/34 
University of Birmingham reference number: RG-10-094 
Name of Researcher: Greg Moorlock, PhD Student, University of Birmingham 
 
  Please 
initial 
box 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet (Version 1.3, 
12/04/2010) given to me, and I have had the opportunity to consider this information, 
ask questions, and these questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
  
   
I understand that taking part is completely up to me, and I am free to stop the interview 
at any time without giving a reason and that this will not affect my healthcare in any 
way. I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study up to three days after 
the interview has been taken place and that if I choose to do this my data will not be 
included in the research. 
  
   
I understand that my interview will be audio recorded, and that this recording will be 
stored securely.  
 
  
   
I understand that a written record of the interview I take part in will be made from the 
audio recording, and that my real name will not be used in this written version.  
  
   
I understand that the researchers might use my words in their research and 
publications, and I understand that my real name will not be used. 
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Participant name:…………………………………………………. 
 
Signature:………………………………………………..  Date:……………………… 
 
Name of person taking consent:…………………………………………………. 
 
Signature:……………………………….............  Date:…………………… 
 
  
a) I would like to be sent a summary of the results of this research 
 
  
6. b) I would like to receive this summary by: 
 
  
 
 
  
I agree to take part in the above study.   
Email Post 
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Appendix 5 – Participant Information Sheet – Potential Donor 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what you are being asked to do. Please take 
the time to read the information on this sheet, and please ask questions 
if there is anything that you are unsure about or would like to know 
more about. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
If a person who has died wanted to be an organ donor, their organs are 
given to the person who is the best tissue match and in most urgent 
need. This study is looking at whether or not people who would like to 
donate organs after their death should be allowed to say who they want 
to have their organs, even if this person or type of person is not at the 
top of the list. This isn‘t normally allowed in the UK. Directed donation is 
when a person, or a person‘s family, asks that the donated organs 
should be given to a particular person, or type of person. Conditional 
donation is when a donor or their family makes a request that donated 
organs should not be given to a particular type of person. Sometimes 
Conditional donation is the term used for organ donation when any 
special requests are made. 
We would like to know whether giving people this kind of choice will 
mean that they are more or less likely to think about being a donor in 
the future. Allowing people to have a choice about who gets their organs 
after their death might cause people who are not registered donors to 
think about becoming a donor. Or it might cause people to lose faith in 
the organ donation system and become less likely to donate. We would 
also like to know whether or not people think that it is right to have this 
kind of choice 
Why have I been chosen? 
We want to know what healthy members of the public think about 
directed and conditional organ donation.  You have been randomly 
selected by your GP because you have not been to see your GP in the 
last 12 months, so we think that you must be fairly fit and well. We are 
sorry if this is not the case. We will not be asking you to agree to 
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donate your organs after your death. We are only interested in 
hearing your views on organ donation. 
What would you like me to do if I decide to take part? 
We would like you to talk to us about your views about donation.  We 
will ask questions about what you think about organ donation in general, 
your views about whether people should be allowed to decide who gets 
their organs, and whether allowing conditional and directed donation in 
the UK might affect your decision about whether or not to be a donor in 
the future. To make the interview convenient for you, we would like to 
interview you in your own home but we can arrange to interview you at 
University Hospital Birmingham if you would prefer. We expect that the 
interview would take less than one hour, but it might take longer if you 
would prefer to be interviewed in a language other than English using an 
interpreter.  
Do I have to take part? 
No. Taking part is completely up to you. If you decide to take part and 
then change your mind that‘s OK. You do not need to give a reason, just 
tell us that you have changed your mind. If you decide not to take part, 
or decide to withdraw, this will not affect your healthcare in any way. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits to taking part, although you may value the 
opportunity to discuss these issues. If you choose to be interviewed at 
the hospital, your travel expenses will be reimbursed (you will need to 
provide receipts or mileage). We will also provide you with a hot or cold 
drink and a small snack if you are being interviewed there. 
What are the risks of taking part? 
There are no big risks to taking part. Some people might find it difficult 
or distressing to think and talk about what will happen to their bodies 
after their death. If this does happens to you, you are free to stop the 
interview. 
What will happen to the information that I give? 
Your interview will be audio recorded, and typed up word for word. This 
written interview will be analysed, and we will write or talk about results 
so that other people know what we found out.  When we do this we may 
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use some of your exact words from the interview, but we will not use 
your name.  Any information that might identify you will be 
removed before any of the results are talked or written about. 
If an interpreter is used during the interview, another interpreter will 
listen to the recorded interview to make sure it has been translated 
accurately. 
Your personal information will be stored securely at the University of 
Birmingham, and no one outside of the research team will be allowed to 
see it. Members of the research team need to know when, where and 
with whom interviews are taking place, so your name, address and 
contact details will be available to the people supervising this research.  
Your personal information will be destroyed when the study is finished, 
but your consent form and typed up-interview will be stored for 10 years 
before being destroyed. 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The research is being organised by Greg Moorlock, a PhD student at the 
University of Birmingham. The research is being supervised by Dr 
Heather Draper and Dr Jonathan Ives from the Centre for Biomedical 
Ethics at the University of Birmingham, and Mr Simon Bramhall from the 
Liver Unit at University Hospital Birmingham. Funding is provided by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council and University Hospital 
Birmingham Charities.  
A research ethics committee has approved this research project. 
  
Contacts for further information or to take part in the research 
If you have any questions about this research or anything mentioned in 
this document, or if you are interested in taking part, please complete 
and return the reply slip or contact Greg Moorlock:
      
If you have any complaints during any stage of your involvement with 
this research, please contact Dr Heather Draper: 
  
  
318 
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Appendix 6 – Participant Information Sheet – Potential Recipient 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what you are being asked to do. Please take 
time to read the information on this sheet, and please ask questions if 
there is anything that you are unsure about or would like to know more 
about. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
If a person who has died wanted to be an organ donor, their organs are 
given to the person who is the best tissue match and in most urgent 
need. This study is looking at whether or not people who would like to 
donate organs after their death should be allowed to say who they want 
to have their organs, even if this person or type of person is not at the 
top of the list. This isn‘t normally allowed in the UK. Directed donation is 
when a person, or a person‘s family, asks that the donated organs 
should be given to a particular person, or type of person. Conditional 
donation is when a donor or their family makes a request that donated 
organs should not be given to a particular type of person. Sometimes 
Conditional donation is the term used for organ donation when any 
special requests are made. 
We would like to know whether giving people this kind of choice will 
mean that they are more or less likely to think about being a donor in 
the future. Allowing people to have a choice about who gets their organs 
after their death might cause people who are not registered donors to 
think about becoming a donor. Or it might cause people to lose faith in 
the organ donation system and become less likely to donate. We would 
also like to know whether or not people think that it is right to have this 
kind of choice. 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being invited to take part because we are interested to know 
what people who might require organ transplants in the future think.   
We are interested in your views whether or not you are already on a 
transplant waiting list.  
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What do you want me to do if I decide to take part? 
We would like you to talk to us about your views about organ donation.  
We will ask questions about what you think about organ donation in 
general, your views about whether people should be allowed to decide 
who gets their organs, and how you might feel about being given an 
organ just because you are a particular type of person. To make the 
interview convenient for you, we would like to interview you whilst you 
are already attending University Hospital Birmingham, but we can 
interview you at another time or location if you prefer. We expect that 
the interview would take less than one hour, but it might take longer if 
you would prefer to be interviewed in a language other than English 
using an interpreter.  
Do I have to take part? 
No. Taking part is completely up to you. If you decide to take part and 
then change your mind that‘s OK. You do not need to give a reason, just 
tell us that you have changed your mind.  If you decide not to take part, 
or decide to withdraw, this will not affect your healthcare in any way 
nor whether or not you receive an organ in the future. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits to taking part, although you may value the 
opportunity to discuss these issues.  If taking part in the interview 
requires you to make any special travel arrangements, you will be 
reimbursed the cost of these (you will need to provide receipts or 
mileage). 
What are the risks of taking part? 
There are no big risks to taking part. Some people who may need an 
organ transplant might find it difficult or distressing to think or talk about 
the donor. If this happens to you, you can stop the interview. 
What will happen to the information that I give? 
Your interview will be audio recorded, and typed up word for word. This 
written interview will be analysed, and we will write or talk about the 
results so that other people know what we found out. When we do this 
we may use some of your exact words from the interview, but we will 
not sure your name. Any information that might identify you will be 
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removed before any of the results are reported and nothing you 
say will affect your healthcare in any way, nor affect whether you 
get an organ in the future. 
If an interpreter is used during the interview, another interpreter will 
listen to the recorded interview to make sure it has been translated 
accurately. 
Your personal information will be stored securely at the University of 
Birmingham, and no one outside of the research team will be allowed to 
see it.  Your personal information will be destroyed when the study is 
finished, but your consent form and typed-up interview will be stored for 
10 years before being destroyed. 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The research is being organised by Greg Moorlock, a PhD student at the 
University of Birmingham. The research is being supervised by Dr 
Heather Draper and Dr Jonathan Ives from the Centre for Biomedical 
Ethics at the University of Birmingham, and Mr Simon Bramhall from the 
Liver Unit at University Hospital Birmingham. Funding is provided by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council and University Hospital 
Birmingham Charities.  
A research ethics committee has approved this research project. 
Contacts for further information or to take part in the research 
If you have any questions about this research or anything mentioned in 
this document, or would like to take part in the research please contact 
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If you are affected by any of the issues discussed in this information 
sheet, or during the research in general, please contact the NHS Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) at the hospital: 
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Appendix 7 – Participant Information Sheet – Transplant Staff 
Introduction 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide 
whether to take part it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what you are being asked to do. Please take 
time to read the information on this sheet, and please ask questions if 
there is anything that you are unsure about or would like to know more 
about. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
If a person who has died wanted to be an organ donor, their organs are 
given to the person who is the best tissue match and in most urgent 
need. This study is looking at whether or not people who would like to 
donate organs after their death should be allowed to say who they want 
to have their organs, even if this person or type of person is not at the 
top of the list. This isn‘t normally allowed in the UK. Directed donation is 
when a person, or a person‘s family, asks that the donated organs 
should be given to a particular person, or type of person. Conditional 
donation is when a donor or their family makes a request the donated 
organs should not be given to a particular type of person. Sometimes 
Conditional donation is the term used for organ donation when any 
special requests are made. 
We would like to know whether giving people this kind of choice will 
mean that they are more or less likely to think about being a donor in 
the future. Allowing people to have a choice about who gets their organs 
after their death might cause people who are not registered donors to 
think about becoming a donor. Or it might cause people to lose faith in 
the organ donation system and become less likely to donate. We would 
also like to know whether or not people think that it is right to have this 
kind of choice. 
Why have I been chosen? 
You are being invited to take part because you are involved in the care 
of organ donors and/or recipients, and we want to know what you think 
about these issues. Your views on this topic are important because if 
conditional and directed donation were allowed, you and your colleagues 
would be the people implementing the policy. So we are interested in 
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whether or not you agree with conditional and directed donation, and 
why. 
What would you like me to do if I decide to take part? 
We would like you to talk to us about your views about organ donation.  
We will ask questions about what you think about organ donation in 
general, your views about whether people should be allowed to decide 
who gets their organs, and how you might feel about being involved in a 
system that allowed conditional and directed donation. To make the 
interview convenient for you, we would like to interview you at 
University Hospital Birmingham, but we could arrange an alternative 
location if you would prefer. We expect that the interview would take 
less than one hour. 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  Taking part is completely up to you. If you decide to take part and 
then change your mind that‘s OK. You do not need to give a reason, just 
tell us that you have changed your mind.  If you decide not to take part, 
or decide to withdraw, this will not affect your employment in any way as 
no one at the Trust will be told who has participated. 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
There are no direct benefits to taking part, although you may value the 
opportunity to discuss these issues.  We will provide you with a hot or 
cold drink and a small snack during the interview.  If taking part in the 
interview requires you to make any special travel arrangements, you will 
be reimbursed for the cost of this. 
What are the risks of taking part? 
There are no substantial risks to taking part. It is, however, possible that 
you might be asked difficult questions, or that topics may be raised that 
you find distressing. If this does happen, you are free to stop the 
interview. 
What will happen to the information that I give? 
Your interview will be audio recorded, and typed up word for word. This 
written interview will be analysed, and we will write or talk about the 
results so that other people know what we found out. When we do this 
we may use some of your exact words from the interview, but we will 
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not use your name. Any information that might identify you will be 
removed before any of the results are talked or written about.   
Your personal information will be stored securely at the University of 
Birmingham, and will be kept confidential (it will not be available to 
anyone outside of the research team or Simon Bramhall).  Your personal 
information will be destroyed when the study is finished, but your 
consent form and typed-up interview will be stored for 10 years before 
being destroyed. 
Who is organising and funding the study? 
The research is being organised by Greg Moorlock, a PhD student at the 
University of Birmingham. The research is being supervised by Dr 
Heather Draper and Dr Jonathan Ives from the Centre for Biomedical 
Ethics at the University of Birmingham, and Mr Simon Bramhall from the 
Liver Unit at University Hospital Birmingham. Funding is provided by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council and University Hospital 
Birmingham Charities 
A research ethics committee has approved this research project. 
Contacts for further information or to take part in the research 
If you have any questions about this research or anything mentioned in 
this document, or would like to take part in this research, please contact 
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Appendix 8 – Sample of coded transcript 
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